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This document is being presented to mark the twentieth anniversary 
of the establishment of the Economic Commission for Latin America» It 
is composed of a number of studies and parts of others dealing with the 
main questions with which the Commission has been concerned throughout 
the twenty years of its existence« It is a highly selective compilation 
as can be seen from the size of the annex, which lists the printed 
studies produced by ECLA but which does not include many others that 
were issued only in mimeographed form or for internal or restricted 
distribution,. 
The selected texts are reproduced in their original form^* except 
for certain accompanying statistical or illustrative material, and are 
preceded by an introduction in which an attempt is made to describe the 
basic theses in terms of the time period and the problems involved 
and to illustrate their continuity and the relationships between them* 
The twentieth anniversary is not the only r&ison d'etre of this 
document. The opportunity has been taken of embarking upon a long-
standing project, based on the widespread desire to have a compendium 
of ECLA studies and an outline of its thinking. It is hoped that this 
document, with all its limitations, will prove a useful contribution to 
this project. 





THE DEVELOPMENT OP ECU'S THINKING 
In the documents it has issued in the twenty years of its existence 
ECIA has been gradually building up a fund of interpretations, criteria 
and suggestions which cover many of the most important aspects of the 
theoretical and practical problems of Latin American developments The 
present document is intended to be a compendium of the ideas e^ressed on 
some of the questions which have been sources of concern to ECLA« Perhaps 
this will be useful to those who find it difficult to seek out and associate 
the observations scattered through the many studies that have been issued 
in the course of the last two decades« 
In. preparing this document it has been necessary^ first, to focus 
attention on some basic subjects, and to disregard many others which, 
however important, were not of such permanent, concern or which lie mainly 
within the competence of other international agencies (FAO, IMF, UNESCO, 
the IL0, etc„)a This applies to questions in the fields of agriculture5 
education, employment, etc. On the other hand, the guiding principle has 
been to give a faithful reproduction of the texts selected, with only minor 
cuts, excluding the statistical data they originally contained, as they 
would have made the compendium too bulky and they can be consulted in the 
studies cited» 
In the selection and classification of material, several central topics 
have been chosen, which are the subjects of the different chapters of this 
document» In broad outline,.these topics are as follows: 
(1) A criticism of traditional, theories on foreign trade and, more 
specifically, on the nature of the economic relationships between 
the "centres" and the "periphery"; 
(2) A justification of industrial development and an analysis of 
some of its main aspects in Latin America; 
(3) Planning as a sine qua non for development: its general content 
and technical direction, and regional planning experience; 
(4) The raison d'etre of external financing and investment; ways of 




(5) Regional integration as a primary means of getting away from the 
"closed" type of economy in post-depression industrial development 
(6) The nature of inflation in Latin America: an analysis of its 
underlying causes and of traditional stabilization policies; 
(7) The social dimension of economic development: social determinants 
and effects of thé development process, and changes in the 
structure of employment and of the social sectors; 
(8) The position of Latin America vis-à-vis world trade policy and 
trade between developed and developing countries; 
(9) An over-all and integrated view of development problems in 
Latin America and the structural changes needed to ensure more 
dynamic development and an equitable distribution of its 
benefits» 
Although these central topics are dealt with separately, they are 
clearly interrelated and interdependent«, Moreover, a certain sequence 
may be noted, fcr the knowledge gained in the first studies and its 
implications are naturally incorporated in the later ones, and give, them 
greater depth. This does not mean that ECLA started cut with or ever 
had the intention of formulating a cut and dried general theory or scheme 
that would systematically cover all the economic, social and institutional 
aspects of Latin America's development. The main factors that have 
gradually broadened the outlook or sharpened subsequent thinking.have 
been the actual facts, Latin America's experience of the problems and 
situations as they arose, and the development of the ideas themselves, 
10 The historical context 
To obtain a clear view from the historical standpoint it may be as 
well to establish the relationship between these central topics and 
certain aspects of Latin America's economic and political evolution. 
Going back to the time when ECLA was beginning to operate, that is, 
the second half of the ninéteen-forties, it is easy to discern a 
contradiction - or at least a lack of harmony - between the behaviour and 
aims of what are now the economically'more advanced countries of the 
/region and 
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region and the prevailing bo,dy of ideas, theories and doctrines» While 
these countries, under pressure of the circumstances created by the 
depression and the Second World War, had abandoned the outwarct-directed 
growth model and set energetically about transforming the structure of 
their economies* there had been no such process of adjustment on the 
intellectual plane, where the . concepts and theories associated with the 
old system continued to dominate the scene.^ In seme cases the prevailing 
thinking had been enriched with some of the new.Keynesian ideas, but here 
too the assimilation of these ideas had been indiscriminate and superficial, 
and at times they did little more than provide a veneer of respectable 
theory for inflationary measures. In shorty these economies were guided . 
in their new course only by an empirical and pragmatic approach, and 
this hampered their progress and exposed them to abrupt changes of 
direction through the action of those who continued to adhere to outr 
moded formulas. 
This is a particularly significant feature when considered in the 
light of the circumstances following the war. The reactivation of 
Latin America's external sector, with a few ups-and-downs and disparities 
between countries, was clearly observable for a fairly long-period which 
extended from the close of hostilities to the middle of the fifties, 
that is, almost a decade. This naturally revived the thinking based on 
the traditional model. Both inside and outside the region, a basis in 
fact was found for maintaining that the past fifteen years or so had 
been merely an unfortunate interregnum produced by exceptional factors, 
and that "normal" conditions - i.e., the advantageous division of labour 
model of the past - would resume its place. 
A convincing illustration of this is that, in nearly all the Latin 
American countries which had broken with the old system during this 
1/ "In the midst of the world depression we did not know the true 
nature of Latin America's development difficulties: the dominant 
idea was simply to restore normal conditions, to return to the 




phase the political backing for the diversification of the production 
system weakened, whereas advantage should have been taken of the external 
sector boom in order to intensify and introduce some method into the 
previous effort» With a few outstanding exceptions, the change in pace 
and emphasis was evident in most countries in the early post-war years. 
The deep significance of ECLA's early contribution may be assessed 
at its true value against this backdrop alone. This contribution consisted., 
in the first place, of presenting a conceptual interpretation of what 
most countries of the region - more through force of circumstances than 
in response to a deliberate policy - had been doing since the depression. 
It showed that they had proceeded, with greater or lesser success or 
energy, as circumstances dictated, A second and no less decisive 
contribution was to show that what were considered by some to be emergency 
measures - e.g., industrial development - were really policies that had 
come to stay and become more sophisticated, since there was no turning 
back despite the appearance of a relative external boom. 
From this standpoint, it is easy to discern the two-fold significance 
of ECLA's postulates in the early stages: on the one hand, it criticized 
the prevailing theory of the international division of labour - or of 
foreign trade - as viewed by the countries at the centre; on the other 
hand, it provided a.sound basis for a new approach to industrial 
development and, in general, to the diversification of the production 
system through the spread of technical progress. 
It is worth recalling the reason for the special emphasis placed on 
all issues relating to foreign trade. It should be borne in mind here 
that, apart from the essential role played by trade in the development 
process, perhaps the main general feature in the whole diverse complex 
called Latin America is precisely its structural position in the world 
market. In other words, one of the key characteristics of the Latin 
American economies is and has always been their distinctive role as a 
region specializing in and dependent on the exportation of primary products. 
Naturally, apart from being a burning economic issue this factor took 
on more importance as it became necessary to find a common denominator in 




2. Critique of the traditional theory 
Under the conventional system of the international division of 
labour, "the specific task that fell to Latin America^ as part of the 
periphery of the world economic system, was that of producing food and 
raw materials for the great industrial centres"^ 
In this trade model, two key assumptions could easily be discerned. 
According to the first, more of the benefits deriving from increases 
in productivity in the two areas would go to the periphery, because 
technical progress was more vigorous and widespread in the production of 
industrial products. ¡The second assumption was that in the centres 
demand for primary products would grow at least as fast as income, and 
perhaps faster if consideration was given to the possibility of a 
depletion in the supply of those goods and increases in their costs and 
prices. 
These two premises are the object of ECLA's main criticism in its 
first basic studies« No doubt the principal argument was that the 
agents of production - entrepreneurs and workers - in the industrialized 
countries tended to absorb the benefits of technical progress and 
translate them into a sustained rise in income, instead of transferring 
them to the periphery through a corresponding drop in prices. 
Briefly, the weakness of that argument lay in the fact that it was 
a generalization from particular circumstances. While it is true that 
the benefits of technical progress are gradually distributed among all 
social groups and classes in the great industrial countries, the immense 
gains deriving from increased productivity have not reached the periphery 
of the world economy in a comparable measure. "Hence the outstanding 
differences between the levels of living of the masses of the former and 
the latter, and the manifest discrepancies between their respective 
abilities to accumulate capital, since the margin of saving depends 
primarily on increased productivity.^ 
2/ See below, p. 4. 




What is the machinery facilitating the retention of these benefits 
by the centres, which is therefore responsible for the inequitable 
distribution of the gains deriving from technical progress? The answer 
to this question embraces one of the most vital and, in its time, most 
widely discussed of ECLA's ideas: the terms of trade® 
If the conventional premise had materialized, independently of 
any discussion regarding the actual periods and dimensions of the problem, 
the relationship between industrial and primary prices would have changed 
distinctly in favour of the latter, for the overriding reason that 
technical progress and, consequently, the biggest advances in productivity 
had spread mainly in the centres and in manufacturing and other subsidiary 
production. 
Nc one denies now that this did not happen and is still not happening, 
although, as indicated above, some related questions might be raised*, such 
as the processing of industrial products, or the dimensions, consequences 
and scope of the problem. The fact remains that far from following that 
trend, the terms of trade have swung against primary products«, 
Accordingly, not only has the primary expert sector been denied its fair 
share of the technological progress achieved by the centres, but part of 
its own increased productivity seems to have been transferred to the 
centres.^ 
(a) Concentration of technical progress and the terms of trade 
This critique must necessarily include an inquiry into the causes 
of the situation described above and into the processes which brought 
it about. There are several main hypotheses. The first relates to 
the second basic premise of the orthodox theory, i.e., the optimistic 
assumption regarding the trend of demand for primary products on the 
central markets. Flatly contradicting this assumption, ECLA's analysis 
made it clear that such demand, besides fluctuating periodically and 




thus causing serious distortions in the" peripheral economies, was 
increasing only slowly and evidently lagging behind the growth of 
income in the industrial centres. The Commission ascribed this mainly 
to the following factors: 
(a) The proportion accounted for by primary commodities in 
aggregate expencLiture or demand decreases as incomes rise; 
(b) Primary coromodities are being replaced increasingly by 
new products; 
(c) With technical progress, the share of primary inputs in 
the value of end products is diminishing; 
(d) Protectionist policies and inciimerits in the industrialized 
countries impede access to their markets for the primary 
products produced essentially by the periphery,. 
The weak position of priiB&ry products on the world markets owing' 
to these factors is aggravated by other circumstances which are dealt 
with also in the ECIA studies. The sluggish demand for raw materials 
and foods in the centres goes hand in hand with the periphery's marked 
propensity to import manufactures. Thus, while demand for the former 
is increasing at a manifestly' slower pace than income, demand for 
industrial imports in the periphery is rising more rapidly than 
5/ 
income.-^ This disparity, apart from other effects which will be 
examined later, cannot but impair the position of primary products on 
the world market and strengthen that of manufactures. Consequently, 
it affects both the terms of trade and the corresponding possibilities 
of retaining productivity gains in the centre and in the periphery. 
J5/ Approximate estimates show that for every 1 per cent increase 
in Latin America's income its demand for imports tends to 
grow by 1.8 per cent, whereas for every 1 per cent by which 
income increases in the United States the demand for imports 
• grows by only 0.66 per cent. See the statement by the 
Executive Secretary of ECLA to the fifth session of the Commission 
in the annual report for 1952-1953 (document E/2405-E/CN.12/324), 




Another factor heavily emphasized in ECLA's analysis is the 
effect of redundant manpower on the costs and prices paid and 
received by primary producers. The proportion of productivity gains 
which can be retained in a country of the periphery* through wage 
increases, depends partly on the existence and degree of such 
redundancy, to say nothing of other factors mentioned above, which 
also influence the distribution of these gains. In any event, what-
ever significance may be ascribed to the existing or potential 
manpower surplus in the primary-export economies, for a proper 
understanding of the over-all problem it must be remembered that the 
solution in the m?.jor industrial centres is very different, if not 
the exact opposite,, A relative or absolute shortage of manpower 
- generally evidenced by technological improvements designed to 
economize labour -- is accompanied by a solid and extensive trade union 
organization, which plays the role of watchdog and is in a position to 
claim constant wage adjustments in step with productivity increases. 
As some of the axiracts reproduced here recall, there was no 
room for this problem in the orthodox theory, since another of its 
premises was the mobility of the factors of production. The fact is, 
however, that neither the labour fores nor capital has been transferred, 
as assumed by that theory. To the almost complete immobility of 
reserves of active population in the periphery was added an equally 
marked immobility of the stock of capital and techniques in the 
industrial centres. 
To sum lip, the chief factors causing the benefits of technical 
progress to be retained in the centres under the influence of the 
terms of trade have been the sluggish demand for primary products in 
the centres, the disparity between the growth of expenditure on 
imports in the two areas, and the different positions of the two areas 
with respect to manpower and social organization, 
(b) Implications 
From its analyses ECLA deduced some of the main consequences of 
this particular system of economic relationships between the industrial 




One clearly significant result is the disparity involved in 
specialization, whether in the production of primary materials or 
in that of industrial goods. Since demand for the latter increases 
more rapidly, it is inevitable - as has been proved - that the 
economies specializing in the production of industrial goods will 
develop faster than those which continue to be dependent upon primary 
products. Therefore, in absolute terms, the gap between the central and 
the peripheral countries will widen in time unless the original structure 
is modified. This question will be examined at greater length in the 
section on industrial development0 
The second conclusion relates to what may be termed the "built-in 
disequilibrium implicit in a system of relationships based on the 
traditional international division of labour. The foreign exchange 
earnings of a peripheral economy depend above all on exports of primary 
products, which, as is well known, tends to increase slowly. On. the 
other hand, its demand for imported goods - or, in other words, need of 
foreign exchange - tends to rise faster than domestic income, and export 
earnings. As a result, depending on the relations between these variables, 
the balance of payments is subjected to constant pressure which will be 
heavier as the gap widens between the amount of foreign exchange available 
and the increment in domestic income, on the one hand, and the resulting 
demand for imports, on the othe'r. This is still true today and it is a 
guideline for the United Nations in taking practical action in the spheres 
of trade, industrialization and developmentM 
It is understood that this built-in disequilibrium is due to structural 
causes? specialization by the central and the peripheral countries each in 
certain types of commodities for the world markets, and the disparity in 
the income-elasticity of demand for the two types of commodities. 
The problem is also found in another and perhaps more acute form as 
diversification of the production system gains impetus in a primary-export 
economy. This point will be mentioned again in connexion with the outline 
of ideas on industrial development. 





3. "Inward-directed" development 
In addition to analysing the characteristics and implications of 
the "centre-periphery" system, the ECLA studies also stress another 
fundamental dichotomy; "outward-directed" and "inward-directed" growth. 
As was noted above, criticism of outward-directed growth is the point 
of departure for elucidating the nature, problems and requirements of 
a new type of economic expansion in the development of much of Latin America, 
What are the fundamental implications of moving from one model to 
another? An approximate first definition might be that it involves 
substituting one focal centre of dynamic development for another. External 
demand for basic commodities nc longer has pxide of place and is replaced 
by internal demand. From a practical standpoint, i.e., from the standpoint 
of the allocation of resources, this change supposes that a substantially 
larger proportion of resources is directed towards the production of goods 
and services for home consumption. 
Although unequivocally directed towards reducing the ecommy' s 
dependence on the extern:-.! sector - which is the outstanding characteristic 
of "outward-directed" growth - and therefore towards making the process 
of expanding and changing the structure of production more autonomous, 
the new model does not imply, as was sometimes maintained by observers 
with an over-simplified approach, a move in the direction of autarchy and 
an under-estimation of the importance of foreign trade. It will be seen 
later, the external sector continues to play a primary role in the new 
development model, although it is less important than before. Though 
foreign trade tends no longer to be ths only, or, in other case3, the main 
motive force underlying demand, it continues to play a key role, either as 
a supplier of supplementary goods and services, or as an actual or potential 
market for new production generated by structural diversification as well 
as for traditional products. 
(a) Nature and, motivation of industrial development 
It seems clear that industrial development is the nerve centre of 
"inward-directed" growth, with the result that the two terms tend to be 




nature of the process implied by the new approach should not be lost sight 
of» Although it is true that the expansion of manufacturing is the linchpin 
of this process, equally important is the fact that corresponding changes 
take placé and are required on all fronts and at all levels, both in 
economic and in related fields. This consideration is kept in view in 
the ECLA studies, as is shown by the subject-matter of the final chapters 
of the present document and, undoubtedly, in other studies not quoted 
here. This point, although elementary, needs to be made, since the 
attachment of importance to manufacturing growth alone has led both to 
unfounded criticisms and to a defective understanding of the nature and 
implications of such growth« 
There are several main reasons why so much importance has been 
attached to industrial diversification. One, which is of a general nature, 
is that industrialisation is viewed as a transformation of economic 
structures which is inherent in the process of development. Another more 
specific reason is that industrial development is viewed as the .indispensable 
answer to upheavals in tho external sector* From this point of view, a 
distinction can be drawn between two types of situation, both of which 
are loosely linked with specific historical periods. In the first, which 
covers the post-depression and war years, there were fairly considerable 
difficulties in securing the usual goods and services abroad, either 
because of the drop in foreign exchange earnings.or because of restrictions 
imposed in the supplier countries. In the second, which covers the post-
war period in general, the problem had its origin in a bottleneck in the 
external sector, in the sense that the foreigp. exchange available was not. 
sufficient to satisfy the demand for imports generated by the growth of 
domestic income. 
In either case, it is domestic production which must help to supply 
the industrial goods that cannot be imported with the foreign exchange 
available. 
The necessity of industrial development - as has already been stated -
has another basis which is one of the central points in ECLA1s reasoning: 
the spread of technological innovations in primary production and the need 




labour force resulting from population growth. Industrial development will, 
of course, take place, even if primary production is expanded, to the 
extent that technical progress reduces the absolute or relative levels of 
manpower absorption; and its growth will be even more rapid if, in addition 
to the spread of capital-intensive techniques, there is a slackening of 
the growth of demand for primary commodities. 
This line of reasoning pointed to the fact that industrialization 
was the cornerstone of development, even if there were no restrictions or 
shortfalls in foreign trade, and this has been more than borne out by the 
experience of the countries at the centre. 
(b) Some aspects of industrial development __iLatin America 
In the experience of Latin America, restrictions and fluctuations 
in the external sector have a much greater effect on industrial development 
than they had in the developed countries. This is the reason for the 
fundamental fact that in Latin America the diversification of iaf..nufacturing 
takes the form of "import substitution", i.e., it is a means of replacing 
or ensuring the supply of goods that cannot be bought with the foreign 
exchange available. This circumstance is a determining factor of some of 
the characteristics and limitations of industrial development in Latin America. 
For the moment we shall consider only those which are most closely linked 
with the questions raised in the preceding paragraphs, leaving others to 
be discussed later. 
Of course, since the process of industrial development was not primarily 
stimulated by the introduction and spread of new techniques in the primary 
sectors, except in the case of those producing for export, the urgent nature 
of the expansion of industry accentuated the so-called "dualism" of the 
productive system and heightened its complexity. As it was inevitable that 
modern techniques and organization should be used in starting up or expanding 
manufacturing activities, this widened the gap between these activities and 
the backward areas of the traditional economy, particularly the agricultural 
and rural sectors. The social repercussions of this imbalance, which is 
geographical as well as sectoral in view of the concentration of these new 
activities in certain areas, are increasingly a matter of concern. Moreover, 
this imbalance in itself has weakened the base of support for industrialization, 
whether because it limits the domestic market or because of the shortages it 
entails in the supply of foodstuffs and various inputs. /This situation 
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This situation has on occasion served to reopen the old debate on the 
relationship between industrial development and agriculture, and there are 
those who have attributed the backwardness of agriculture to the support 
given to industrial development. The question has been discussed in several 
7/ 
ECLA studies,-' Without denying, and even on the contrary emphasizing, the 
fact that insufficient attention has been paid to the development of. 
agriculture in Latin American economic policy, these studies have pointed 
to a number of circumstances which have an important bearing on the problem. 
One such circumstance is the complementary nature of expansion in these 
basic sectors. From the standpoint of agriculture, any expansion that was 
not based on an increase in urban demand would be inconceivable, and such 
an increase is largely dependent on the growth of manufacturing and related 
8/ 
activities,-' Another is that greater attention to agriculture would 
inevitably speed up the introduction of new techniques into agricultural 
production, and this in turn - although in agri.cul.ture there is a wider 
range of possible techniques that are labour-intensive - would have an 
important effect on freeing labour or re'.vicing the absorption of new 
contingents. If in these circumstances there are no opportunities outside 
the sector, the position of agriculture would be worsened by the existence 
of redundant labour, and by the effect on relative prices. Agricultural 
prices, for example, would decline, in a kind of domestic parallel to the 
trend in international terms of trade between the centres and the periphery, 
(c) Industrial development and import substitution 
It is worth calling attention to some characteristics of industrial. 
development in Latin America which are related to the import control policy 9/ often applied because of balance-of-payments difficulties.-'
U See below, pp. 9 and 46. 
8/ There is, of course, the foreign market, but this is conditioned by 
factors already discussed» 
2/ For a more extensive treatment of this and other aspects of industrial 
development in Latin America, see The process of industrial development 




To go straight to the heart of the matter, in broad outline one of 
the most notable effects of "outward-directed" growth in the major Latin 
American countries was the lack of association between the structure of 
demand and the structure of production. While the former was considerably 
diversified as a result of the growth and concentration of income, the 
latter was overwhelmingly dominated by primary production. This balance 
between the two was restored by means of imports financed by the primary 
exports. 
When this pattern of relationships led to a depression or showed 
itself to be inadequate^ internal material and human resources were reallocated 
to meet domestic demand which was unsatisfied because of import restrictions 
and had been reactivated by the various measures designed to defend the level 
of national income. There is, moreover, no reason to suppose that there 
was any modification of income distribution. 
Ih these circumstances - defence of the level of incoma, no change in 
income distribution, and the eduction or elimination of certcin imports -
it is obvious that the productive factors tended to be directed towards 
domestic production of those goods for which there was already an effective 
demand and which presented fewer problems from the point of view of 
technology, Scales of production and financing requirements, In other 
words, the structure of production strove to adjust itself to the previous 
pattern of demand, particularly as regards manufactures. 
Measures for controlling and virtually or directly rationing imports 
favoured this type of evolution and played a fundamental part in it. The 
reasons for applying such measures seemed eminently justified and even 
inescapable. If it was desired to "save on foreign exchange" and, on the 
other hand, to ensure the supply of essential goods, the only feasible 
solution seemed to be to restrict or eliminate ail imports deemed to be 
of secondary importance or superfluous. However, to the extent that such 
measures were applied, the elements referred to above came into full and 
unrestricted operation and directed import substitution and industrial 
development efforts towards the very activities or ends which trade policy 




As is well known, this was not the only striking contradiction 
revealed by experience« The internal inconsistency of the policy had a 
direct and even drastic effect on the external equilibrium it was designed t o 
attenuate. Domestic production of inessential goods formerly imported doubled 
the pressure on foreign exchange holdings by stimulating demand for inputs 
and equipment to expand that production» In short, far frcm being a saving 
on. foreign exchange, the effect could well be greater demand for foreign 
exchange, backed by the employment and income being generated in the 
country» 
, Despite.these inherent contradictions in the process of-industrial 
development in Latin America, it is not ea^y to devise other economic 
policy options that would have been feasible in the original conditions 
under which the problem was posed* They would undoubtedly have required 
considerable changes in the pattern of income distribution and* in general, 
in the whole social and institutional framework« 
It must also be remembered that, vrith all its limitations, this sui 
generis approach - with regard to the industrialization of both the capitalist 
and the socialist countries of the centre - succeeded in re seizing their 
economies from the aftermath of the depression, raising their rates of 
growth and placing them in a position to resume world trade® 
Moreover, during the Second World War in some countries and after it 
in others, economic policy began to be aware of and to deal fairly 
effectively with the problems raised by those first attempts at the 
development of import substitution industries. This is clearly demonstrated 
by the steps taken to widen the bases of support, which took the form of 
investment in infrastructure and in such key industries as steelmaking. 
It was at that time, when interest in planning was beginning to dawn or 
become more widespread, that some of the main aspects of industrial 
development strategy began to be formulated. The documents produced by 
ECLA played no small part in this process of elucidation, and it is 
worth-while referring to some of the ideas expressed, which are to be 




(d) Industrial development options 
Unquestionably, the driving force behind this effort was the need 
to steer a largely fortuitous process, determined in the main by external 
factors, into well-defined channels which would lead to the best possible 
results. From this standpoint, the primary objective was to lay down 
certain guiding principles that would make for fuller and more efficient 
utilization of human and material resources. 
The first problem that arose, in manifest connexion with the 
discussion of "inward-directed" development, consisted in "determining 
to what extent the available factors in a growing economy should be employed 
in increasing exports, with a view to expanding imports, and to what 
extent agricultural and industrial production for the domestic market 
should be expanded" 
In principle, and closely in line with the orthodox argument, any 
immediate comparison of relative productivity would have shown a 
balance in favour of using naw resources for the export sector» This 
inference was based on the major assumption - not always explicit or 
well founded - that there would be sufficient demand for the additional 
exports and that their impact on prices would not cancel out the apparent 
advantages of such an allocation of resources. In so far as such, 
forecasts proved unrealistic, the idea of producing for the home market 
gained adherents. It must be noted that in analysing this question all 
or most of the primary producers should be taken into consideration. 
While it is true that for a single exporter country - especially if its. 
share in the market is small - the assumptions referred to may be valid, 
the picture is altogether different if all producers are taken into 
account. In this case, moreover, the temporary gain of one exporter, . 
which would probably be nullified as the others pursued their own path, 
would end by entailing a loss for all concerned. 
This gives rise to a second question. Even if the advantages are , 
really on the side of the allocation of resources to the domestic market, 
a difficulty comes to the fore: productivity and costs may not compare 
favourably with those of similar imported goods. This is another of the 
arguments traditionally adduced in support of the orthodox position. 




"Without under-estimating the importance of the disparities in internal 
and external production costs, ECLA's analysis focused attention on other 
factors that seem to carry more decisive weight. First, the imports-
domestic production dichotomy was largely fallacious, in view of the 
limitations of the capacity to import. In many cases, therefore, the real 
choice was between producing the goods at home, or doing without them. 
Secondly, even if the productivity of an industrial enterprise was lower 
, than that of its foreign counterpart, the resources assigned to it 
would represent a more or less significant contribution to the domestic 
product^ which they could not make if they stood idle or were u?:d in 
"traditional" activities where their productivity might leave even more 
to be desiredp 
(e) . Internal options 
This line of reasoning shifted the centre of interest to the study 
of criteria for selecting, among the various ends served by the domestic 
market, the one that would imply the most productive use of resources. 
Here the pointers given are categorical, and are based on the principle 
of. marginal social productivity, according to which investment or "the 
increment of capital should be utilized so as to obtain the maximum 
product, which is only possible when the marginal productivity of the 
different investments is equalized"»-"^ 
This is, of course, a very general guide, especially as the starting-
point necessarily has to be a given relative price situation which may 
be affected by a number of factors, such as the influence of economic 
policies and income distribution. It does, however, establish a clear 
point of divergence from any consideration based on the profitability 
of private investment or of a single enterprise, although this does not 
imply that such indicators are meaningless. 
The foregoing rule was not laid down as a rigid dogma, since it was 
expressly recognized that decisions as to the allocation of resources 
. may be swayed by other considerations - sometimes of overriding importance -
such as the expediency of reducing the vulnerability of an economy, 
increasing its independence and capacity for self-development, and lessening 
sectoral or regional disparities. 
11/ See below, p. 36, 
/(f) Discussion 
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(f) Discussion of protectionism 
These remarks on industrial development may be concluded with a 
brief review of the ideas expounded with respect to protectionism» This 
subject was a fount of never-ending controversy in the past, and has not 
yet altogether lost its topical interest. Moreover, it is closely linked 
to other questions that have been analysed in the preceding sections. 
Even at the risk of harping on points already discussed, stress 
should be laid on the relation between the various kinds of protectionist 
devices and the balance-of-payments situation in Latin America. From 
this standpoint it can be seen that as a rale such expedients were adopted 
not so much to promote rational industrialization aims as in order to 
bring expenditure on imports into line wi'oh the amount of foreign exchange 
available j in other words, they merely represented, a side-effect of 
the region5s chronic external deficit. Naturally, in so far as such 
measures wero applied and substitution activities grew up under their 
shelter, the interests vested in these industries came to depend upon 
the existence of a protectionist policy and, with varying degrees of 
justification, sought to perpetuate it in order to profit by the restriction 
or total elimination of competition from abroad. 
This point is worth making in order, inter alia, to underline a 
first aspect of the contrast with the operation of protectionist machinery 
in the coimtries at the centre of the world economy. There, such measures are 
seldom applied because of structural weaknesses in the balance--of-payments, 
but rather out of regard to the situation of domestic producers who are 
unable to withstand external competition. Thus, their original motivation 
is entirely different from the considerations usually underlying 
protectionist policy in Latin America. 
Here the line of reasoning pursued be ECLA goes beyond the 
"incipient industry" proposition, important though this is. As is pointed 
out in one of the documents reproduced, instead of considering separate 
undertakings, "the new approach includes industry as a whole and establishes 
the need for protection so long as productivity continues to be lower 
than that of more advanced countries".^' In other words, it is the 




general fact of their backwardness in terms of the intensity and extensiveness 
of technical progress that forces the developing countries to resort to 
appropriate protectionist measures, with the primary object of facilitating the 
diversification of the economy and the improvement of levels of productivity. 
The ill-effects of over-protectionism are undeniable; but they do 
not seem to have prevented Latin American industry from making 
significant technical progress, A glance at its over-all growth will 
show, for example, that its rate of expansion has easily outstripped 
its rate of absorption of manpower. This is a suggestive indication of 
the headway it has made in respect of productivity, with the corresponding 
reduction of its capacity to provide additional employment opportunities. 
In this context, needless to say, the far-reaching problem represented 
by technological dependence is not overlooked. It is considered in detail 
in the excerpts to be found in chapter II below. 
Another vital question which calls for discussion, and which also 
has implications for the world trade problems that will be noted later, 
is the analysis of the differences between the effects of protectionist 
measures when they are applied in the industrial Centres and in the 
peripheral countries. In brief, without reverting to what has already 
been said, whereas in the first case over-all trade levels will probably 
be affected, in the second, such a thing is hardly likely to happen. 
The explanation is simple. "The restriction of certain types of imports 
in under-developed countries is offset - within the bounds set by the 
capacity for external payments - by increased imports of other 
commodities ... In contrast, restrictions on the import of a'given'' 
primary commodity into a large industrial centre are not necessarily 
neutralized by greater imports of other primary products, since all 
imports required to satisfy demand in existing conditions were being 
brought in before."^/ 
12/ See below, p. 57. 
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4. Development programming: achievements and difficulties 
As has already been pointed out, the transition to a fom of 
development based on industrialization geared to the domestic market will 
inevitably be subject to the conflicts and stresses that are, to a greater 
or lesser extent, in its origin and in the economic and social structure 
of the countries concerned. It is in the light of these facts that 
concern has been felt about how best to organize and channel the efforts 
that are being made and thus safeguard the continuity of the process. 
Hence, the need for general development programming, a concept which was 
foreshadowed by the formulation and implementation of sectoral plans, 
particularly for energy, transport and certain basic industries. 
It would not be fitting to lay stress here on the leading role played 
by ECLA's studies and activities in the advance towards what has been 
termed a "higher stage" of economic policy." Nevertheless, some of the 
main stages of this process, which is still going on, may safely be 
recapitulated. 
Theoretical analysis of the broad problems of external economic 
relations and "inward-directed" diversification was superseded by a more 
searching diagnosis of the. over-all situation in individual countries, 
and an examination of their"prospects and needs in terms of the scale 
and composition of the investment (and external financing) required to 
fulfil the projections.^5^ Moreover, as early as 1955* a general 
compendium of the basic concepts and principles of planning had already 
been compiled. This document has been included in chapter nij it still 
preserves much of its original importance and topicality. 
The development and study of the technical features of planning 
need not be mentioned here, since a very full and specialized ."'"'• 
bibliography is available on the subject. Other questions that are more 
relevant to the purpose of this introduction will therefore be considered 
instead. ' ' 
14/ See the country monographs in the series entitled Analyses and 




The. first aspect that should be stressed is the relatively rapid 
and sweeping change that has taken, place in the attitude, to planning* 
It may not be out of place to recall that only a short while ago - not 
moire than a decade. - the idea that the devel9pment of the region, should, 
be deliberately regulated rather than left to the mercy of "market forces" 
was regarded in many circles as smacking of heresy* Although it was clear 
from the experience of many European countries, such as France, the 
Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries, that planning was not the 
property .of economies which had undergone a social and political revolution,, 
there was a tendency to identify planned development with the regimentation 
of the econony 
These prejudices were completely overcome in a very brief space of 
time and the formulation of over-all development plans came to be regarded 
as a prime requisite for obtaining co-operation from abroad. Once the 
initial reservations had been dispelled and the new situation accepted, 
Latin America made great headway in planning, as is shown in another 
document included in chapter J l l M ^ The collaboration of ECLA, either 
in developing theory or in providing assistance, has been an alttost constant 
factor in the region's progress. However, it is clear from the last-
mentioned document that the region still lacks experience in planning 
and the advances it has made do not mean that the magnitude of the obstacles 
which still remain or of the - efforts which must be made to surmount them 
can be discounted. 
Sane important conclusions can be drawn from the gist of the critical 
review in chapter III. The first is that, planning has been accepted to a 
considerable and very significant degree among the authorities aind in 
influential circles-, progress has been made chiefly with its technical, 
institutional and administrative aspects, but planning has not yet completely 
permeated economic policy and the daily routine of decision-waking. In 
other words, although nearly all the countries have made headway with the 
15/ See below p. 61. 




technique of development plan formulation and the establishment of 
institutional and administrative machinery for drawing up and evaluating 
plans, they still have much to learn about how to put plans into effect and 
how to obtain the indispensable co-operation of key public areas and the 
private sector. Co-operation should, in fact, be secured not only from 
entrepreneurs, but also from all the "social agents"» parties, trade unions 
and so on that have a part to play in the planning process* 
Another salient conclusion to be drawn from the analysis is that 
although there have been undoubted organizational and operational advances 
in external co-operation, they have not been sufficient to achieve the 
requisite standards for effective programming« This point will be raised 
again later. 
However that may be, it would not be going too far to say that ECLA's 
theoretical and practical co-operation in the work of promoting planned 
development have established a new landmark in the history of planning 
in Latin America. 
• 5. External co-operation in Latin America's development 
Although the importance of external financing and investment for the 
development of the region has been emphasized by ECLA ever since its earliest 
studies, it. was not until the mid-nineteen-fifties that the subject began 
to claim special attention. The excerpt reproduced in chapter IV, which 
i e taken from an extensive report on international co-operation in Latin 
American development policy, dates from that time (1954)* ' 
It may be helpful to explain why the subject came to the fore then, 
and why it continues to be one of the most important. 
If Latin America's economic development is viewed in retrospect, it 
is plain that external investment and loans played a leading role during 
the phase of "outward-directed" growth. Not only did a large proportion 
of investment in the export sector come from outside the region, much of 
the process of public capital formation was financed by foreign credits 




exports expanded sufficiently for the countries to meet their debt 
servicing and repayment commitments without much difficulty. The picture 
was quite different during the depression and even up to the early years 
of the post-war-period. With a few outstanding exceptions, such as the 
Bximbank credits, the process of capital formation came to depend first 
and foremost on domestic savings. Owing to'the restrictions on foreign 
trade and the consequent changes in the structure of imports, the countries 
were able to earmark a large part of their foreign exchange supply for 
purchases of equipment and basic inputs. Moreover, many of them had 
accumulated foreign exchange during the war or added to their holdings 
in the post-war period» Again, apart from the impetus automatically 
given to private investment by the development of import-substitution 
industries, Governments began to take a much more active part in saving 
and capital formation, and often resorted to inflationary devices for 
this purpose» 
By the-end of the nineteen-forties> the situation was already in 
a:state of flux and it took an entirely different turn as a result of the 
changes that accompanied thè end of the Korean War» 
What were thé basic reasons for the change, and why did thqy increase 
the importance of foreign capital? 
The main reasons for the changé were undoubtedly the sharp fluctuations 
during that period as a result of the hostilities in Korea and the first 
post-war economic recession in the United States. Aòting in combination, 
these put an end to the recovery of the export sector which had begun in 
the early days of the Second World War* Another major factor was the 
steady deterioration in the terms of trade,'which was particularly severe 
from the mid-fifties onwards» 
Furthermore, the change in the over-all balance-Of-payiaents situation 
is linked to certain features of previous developmént which have already 
been analysed in these pages. In conjunction with the external incentives 
that had been provided during the war years and immediately afterwards, 
the development of substitution industries had raised income considerably 




reasons aforesaid, led to a disproportionate expansion of demand for 
imports. This process could be kept up as long as countries were in a 
position to draw on their accvimulated reserves or to modify the composition 
of their external purchases. The situation altered radically once 
reserves were exhausted or substantially depleted, and the reducible 
margin of imports grew so narrow as to limit the second of the two fields 
for manoeuvre. 
The combination of this metamorphosis with the change described 
above, i.e., the weakening of the export sector and therefore of the 
position with respect to foreign exchange supplies, gives the answer to 
the first part of the question. 
The second part is probably related, in some countries, to the 
growing difficulty of forming domestic savings by means of inflationary 
expedients. Such procedures had proved more or less effective as long 
as thqy were backed by the recovery of the external sector and the 
vigorous impetus behind the initial development of substitution industries, 
and favoured by the heedless unconcern of those affected by the inflationary 
process, but as circumstances changed they lost their efficacy. Moreover, 
even where recourse to compulsory saving methods continued to enjoy a 
measure Of success, the other stumbling-block remained: to turn these 
savings into investment, a considerable proportion of the funds built up 
had to be converted into foreign currency, because of the high import 
component in capital formation, 
(a) Possible functions of foreign co-operation 
As part of the response to these new or growing problems, the question 
of credits arid foreign investment comes to the fore. 
In the first place, generally speaking, such contributions are 
viewed as a means of obtaining the additional foreign exchange resources 
required to maintain a high rate of development and at the same time close 
the gap between the demand for imports thus generated and the region's 
own regular export earnings. In other words, the role of the inflow of 
foreign funds is to relieve the "built-in disequilibrium" described at 




Still in close connexion with the questions previously raised, 
external co-operation is visualized as fulfilling a second function, 
inter-related with the firstj that of supplementing the most vitally 
important part: of domestic savings - the resources earmarked for imports, 
of capital goods - and reducing or eliminating the need to.resort to 
inflationary expedients or to restrict consumption unduly. ... 
To these two basic functions others might be added. One,is linked 
to the operation of anti-inflationary policies, and is based on the 
assumption, that a timely and adequate inflow of funds from abroad would 
cushion the .depressive impact of an energetic effort to control external 
and internal disequilibrium»^/ Another outstanding role is that 
attributed especially to private investment, which can serve as a direct 
agent for the transfer of.new techniques and new organizational patterns» 
(b) The temporary nature of the expedient 
From the relevant ECLA studies it is clear that the functions 
assigned to external financing are related to the needs of a specific 
stage in Latin America's development. It may even be said that they 
are regarded as a device which will help to surmount the difficulties 
inherent in that stage and tp facilitate the transition to another phase» 
in which their strategic importance would diminish, and development 
would come to, depend mainly upon, the mobilization and allocation of 
domestic, resources» This vision of the future, is based on the assumption 
that external co-operation - on an, appropriate scale and on. satisfactory 
terms - would simultaneously promote both internal diversification .and 
export opportunities, thus widening the margin of domestic savings and 
increasing foreign exchange earnings. It would also, open up additional 
possibilities of continuing to remodel.the structure of imports in 
favour of capital goods and such inputs as can be replaced least easily 
or least economically by domestic production. 
12/ See below, p. 163 
/(c) Co-operation 
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(c) ••• Co-operation requirements 
Consideration may now be given to ECLA's ideas on the conditions 
that would have to be fulfilled if external financing was to discharge 
these possible functions» The subject is discussed in detail in 
the document reproduced in chapter IV of the present compendium 
and there seems to be no need to enlarge upon it further» Reference 
may usefully be made, however, to one or two major questions» 
It should be borne in mind, of course, that the emphasis 
placed on the requirements which should be met by external co-operation 
stemmed from a keen awareness of the anomalies and risks involved 
in any form of borrovang. It was not overlooked that such co-operation 
might bypass the purposes and functions for which it was intended 
and become yet another factor making for disequilibrium and yet 
another obstacle to self-sustained development, in so far as the 
requirements stipulated were not complied with in full» 
What were the conditions laid down in the ECLA documents as 
essential for the effectiveness of external aid? 
The initial stress was laid on the most elementary requisites. 
The funds contributed should be sufficient in quantity to have 
appreciable effects on the development process. This carried the 
additional implication that loan costs and maturities and returns 
oh investment should be kept down to proportions which would maintain 
the net contribution at the same level throughout the period to be 
covered. Importance was also attached to the continuity of the 
inflow of capital, which would enable internal programmes or 
investment to be designed and carried out with the indispensable 
measure of security and stability. 
/Alongside these 
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Alongside these basic requisites, attention was drawn to the necessity 
of setting up new financing institutions, revising the policy of those 
already in existence^ and. organizing institutional machinery, for assembling, 
assessing and allocating foreign capital resources. Nor wag it forgotten 
that evaluation.agencies wbuld be needed, which would be qualified to issue 
an authoritative technical verdict on the merits and implementation of 
piogrammes for which financial assistance might be obtainable. 
The fact that some of these proposals have materialized.largely 
accounts for the progress made in organizing the. institutional framework . 
for the mobilization of external resources on Latin America's behalf. A 
number of others,still represent distant goals, and. it is to this 
circumstance that many of the existing problems - for. instance, the 
"indebtedness spiral", as it is called,^/ and the inadequacy and 
unreliability of external financing - must be imputed. 
6. The time for regional integration 
It would be impossible to evaluate the significance of ECLA's conceptual 
contribution and veritable campaign in favour of regional economic integration 
without considering two prime aspects of development in the last few decades, 
which had not been deliberately brought into focus before, although they 
had been receiving attention since the issue of the earliest ECIA documents. 
In a way, the first aspect may be considered, without exaggeration, 
to be a complete contradiction of the inward-directed growth model, in 
that the structural changes entailed by the development of import substitution 
industry did not aim at or extend to a key segment of the over-all structure: 
the export sector. While the economies were being "modernized", in the 
sense that they were undergoing the changes to be expected with the spread 
of technical progress and the diversification of the production system, 
virtually no change took place in the primary-export system, specializing 
as it did in the production of a small number of primary products almost 
exclusively for export. 
18/ See, for example, Economic Survey of Latin America. 1965 (United 




Needless to say, this particular dissociation has not occurred in 
the evolution of the countries at the centre, nor apparently in that of 
the socialist countries. In both cases, diversification of the structure 
of production embraces not only the activities producing for the domestic 
market but export industries as well. The change is widespread« as the 
structure of production for the domestic market alters, so also does that 
of the external sector activities, i.e., the composition of exports changes. 
Moreover, although goods may be produced with a definite market in view, 
in practice there is no out-and-out specialization, and goods are not 
produced exclusively for export or for the domestic market. 
This characteristic is associated with another related feature which, 
in some degree, represents the other side of the coin: the fact that, at 
the national level, the changes in the process of inward-directed growth 
and industrial development take place almost entirely in the "watertight 
compartments" referred to in ECLA's early studies. 
Needless to say, in this respect also Latin America's experience 
contrasts sharply with that of the centres, which adopted and still maintain 
a relatively "open" industrial development model. 
This is not the place to analyse the causes of such striking contrasts. 
It may be noted in passing, however, that dissociation or dispersion in 
Latin America is due not only to geographical factors but also to the fact 
that the different countries had forged their own separate links with the 
centres during the phase of outward-directed growth. On the other hand, 
the absence of an outward-looking approach to industrial development in 
the Latin American countries may be ascribed both to their lack of 
experience and to their late arrival on the manufacturing scene, when 
other countries had already reached considerably higher levels of productivity. 
Latin America's industry is developing in unfavourable circumstances for 
its foreign trade, and it is based on small markets precisely at a time 
when economies of scale are beginning to be a prerequisite for the 




Implications of the characteristics and options ... 
From an appraisal of the characteristics described above, it is not 
difficult, to see that .they were bound to give rise to further contradictions. 
In.the first place, the more vigorous growth deriving from the 
development of import substitution industries, in giving rise to an 
increasing demand for imports, was hampered by the slow growth of the 
traditional export sector. Secondly, inward-directed growthitself, 
besides:being curbed by the limitations, of the capacity to import, was 
to become more difficult as the "easy" stages of import substitution were 
passed and-other problems of greater magnitude and complexity had to be 
faced, such as the:size of the market required by this process, the volume 
of resources needed to finance it, and the technological requirements. 
As noted in the previous section, a diagnosis based on these and 
other related facts led to more emphasis being placed on the external 
contribution. It was not enough,, however, - or feasible, or satisfactory 
in the long run - to leave the matter, to decisions taken beyond.the radius 
of national policy. Hence the need to seek sounder and more lasting formulas. 
If more consideration is given to the contradictions indicated above, 
it can be seen that the main lines of a solution were fairly obvious. On 
the one hand, it was necessary to extend the, structural changes to the 
export sector-and diversify its essential base. In that way it would be 
possible to increase, foreign exchange earnings and to make the Latin American 
economy less vulnerable than it is with the. present high degree of 
concentration. On the other hand, the national.markets would have to be 
broadened in order to satisfy the basic requirements for, progressing to,, 
more advanced stages of industrial development. . 
Some ideas on how to do these two things began to take shape. One 
possibility was to give more impetus to foreign trade by expanding the 
traditional exports and placing new products, mainly manufactures, on the 
competitive and difficult world market. Another was to make a.determined 
effort to incorporate in the market those-populations-'or areas which had . 
been left behind or bypassed by earlier. ;developnent,.:-.§n. .important, matter 




These activities were and continue to be necessary, a fact which 
19/ 
is borne out by the attention they are given in various ECLA studies,—' 
but apparently they were not enough. To achieve both objectives, regional, 
integration emerged as the indispensable and virtually irreplaceable 
instrument, or the only measure capable of bringing about a qualitative 
change in the real situation and in the problems under consideration. 
Apart from the thorough examination contained in chapter V of this 
compendium, ECLA defined the essence of the problem as follows in one of 
its other documents: "...An expansion of inter-Latin American trade based 
on an accelerated substitution process in respect of imports from other 
parts of the world, but carried out at regional level and by means of 
more intensive trade in traditional commodities... would have the advantage 
of enabling the substitution process to be carried farther, without 
detriment to specialization possibilities, than would be possible within 
the sphere of each country's individual market." 
By following this course, the basic framework of inward-directed 
growth for the countries of the region is expanded and modified. This 
concept is no longer confined to an individual country but extends to 
the whole common area. Substitution, therefore, would imply carrying 
out the process in and for each economy and also for the whole region. 
As countries proceed with import substitution for the region, they will 
be developing exports which will make it possible, and indeed necessary, 
for the other Latin American countries to finance and increase their 
imports from the region itself. Thus they would not have to extend the 
import substitution process along the whole front, which would have been 
essential - supposing it were possible - if each country was compelled 
to act on its own. 
19/ On the question of foreign trade, for example, see chapter VIII, 
20/ The Latin American. Common Market, (United Nations publication, 




It is unnecessary to go deeply into many aspects of regional 
integration, since they are examined in greater detail in chapter V. , 
The main purpose here is merely to bring into focus the close relationship 
that «xists between this question and the previous over-all analyses of 
Latin American development procedures and problems, which actually led to 
integration« 
It is conson knowledge, moreover, that the analysis and justification 
of this objective were accompanied by energetic, and continuing, action to 
create appropriate institutional machinery. In this respect, the 
establishment of both the Latin Ameri'-^n Free Trade Association (ALALC) 
and the Permanent Secretariat of the General Treaty on Central American 
Economic Integration (SIECA) was primarily the result of ECLA's efforts. , 
7. International trade policy 
ECLA has recently been devoting special attention to questions 
directly connected with those just discussed in the preceding section. 
They concern the need to take advantage of new opportunities to reactivate 
the external sector by strengthening the position of primary products, 
promoting industrial exports to the world centre's and devising more 
satisfactory formulas to ensure the effectiveness of external co-operation 
in the development of the peripheral countries. 
The address delivered by the Executive Secretary of ECLA at the 
second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
is reproduced in chapter VIII of the present document, and it represents 
both the product and the gist of a whole series of studies which have 
acted as catalysts of Latin American thinking.^/ Particular mention 
should be made of the documents presented at the two sessions of UNCTAD, 
and of other special studies concerned with transport and external financing 
problems. 
The major postulates of these studies could hardly be more clear-cutj 
they are summarized below. 




The first may be defined as follows: if the outdated pattern of the 
international division of labour is still, in essence, preserved intact, 
it is right and proper that at the very least the industrial centres 
should do their utmost to facilitate the access of primary products to 
their markets, especially as the result will be a more than proportional 
increase in demand for the manufactured goods they themselves produce. 
Clearly, any step in this direction, rather than representing a graceful 
concession, will mean that the industrialized countries are putting the 
interests of their economies as a whole before the individual interests 
and the existence of secondary economic areas or activities« In this 
connexion, one of the documents reproduced draws attention to the vitally 
important and paradoxical fact that "while the industrialized countries 
have agreed upon decisions of enormous importance for the liberalization 
of their trade which will certainly promote a new surge cf rapid 
technical progress and economic growth in the developed areas of the world, 
no such agreement has been reached as regards adopting the measures or 
establishing the institutions which would make for equal progress in 
the developing countries".^/ 
The second postulate relates to another patent fact, obviously 
linked to the preceding one: the countries at the centre of the 
world economy should throw their markets open to industrial exports 
from the periphery, without demanding reciprocal concessions, not only 
because the impact of such a move on their over-aH economies would be 
Very slight, but also because its indirect effects would include an 
expansion of demand for the more complex goods in which their production 
systems specialize. 
The third premise is no less relevant: in so far as the terms of 
external financing are not modified on the lines mapped out in an earlier 
section, inflows of foreign capital - which are inadequate, costly, 
unrealiable and not always consonat with development priorities «• may 
become yet another factor making for disequilibrium and possibly for 
strained relations with the suppliers of the capital in question. 
22/ See below, p, 254. 
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8« A panoramic view of development problems 
Alongside the effort to pursue the central line of analysis of 
Latin American development farther and in greater depth, ECLA has shown 
a tendency to broaden the scope of its studies so as to take in other 
relevant factors and questions, not only of an economic but also of a 
social and political nature. This progressive broadening of its approach 
is largely attributable to a reconsideration of the scale of the obstacles 
to growth and of the conditions under which they can be surmounted. 
To elucidate this point, a contrast may usefully be drawn between 
the attitudes to the region's development prospects current in two 
significant periods. Up to 1950, a relatively optimistic view was taken 
of the future of industrialization and of the new development pattern* 
While the difficulties and'limitations were recognized, the predominant 
feeling was one of confidence that the dynamism of the process itself, 
and the changes already brought about in the structure of production, 
would make it possible to forge ahead and to remove or reduce the most 
formidable barriers to progress. By I960, a different mood seemed to 
prevail. Prospects were evaluated with a good deal more caution, and 
the magnitude and the varied nature of the obstacles to development, 
and of the requisites for the continuance of the process, aroused far 
more concern. * 
What was the reason for this change of front? To bcrrow the approach 
adopted in one of the studies included in the present compendium, it 
may be ascribed to a critical revaluation of the "effects"" and the 
"conditions" of development.^ 
From the standpoint of the effects of the process, it can be seen 
that many significant and disquieting phenomena gradually took shape. 
There was, of course, the general circumstances that with certain 
exceptions - few in number and related, moreover, to very special 
situations - the economies of the region found great difficulty in 
attaining, and still more in maintaining,"satisfactory growth rates. The 
prospects of establishing the process on a sound footing thus receded 




into a more distant future. Furthermore, in a number of countries 
- mainly those that had done most to diversify their structures of 
production - development trends became less firm as the gravity of the 
threats represented by inflation and external disequilibrium increased. 
Whenever the economic policy-makers sought to control such distortions, 
they found themselves forced to choose between two alternatives which 
in practice, although not in theory, were incompatible - stability and 
development; and in many cases the solution adopted furthered neither 
of these possible ends, but was detrimental to both, in the sense that 
the unfavourable effects on development strengthened one of the basic 
factors of instability,^ 
It was felt, moreover, that the difficulty of keeping up a steady 
and satisfactory rate of development without undermining stability was 
linked to the persistence and indeed the aggravation of certain external 
problems. In particular, the terms of trade, which had been deteriorating 
since the mid-nineteen-fifties, had once again become a major handicap. 
Internal obstacles also seemed to loom larger. In several countries, 
with the completion of what has been called the "easy", stage of import 
substitution, the margin for further diversification of the structures 
of production was growing narrower, while at the same time the whole 
development process was affected by the internal stumbling-blocks 
deriving from lack of flexibility in the agricultural sector, a small 
market and inadequate capacity for saving and capital formation. 
While these were - and to a large extent still are - the general 
features of the process, others were also discernible which related to 
its economic and social content. One of these, for example, partially 
invalidated the theory that the expansion of a "modern sector", mainly 
built up around industry, would exert a vigorous promotional influence 
on the whole body of economic activities, and would thus tend to unify 
the system at a higher level of productivity. In practice, the tendency 
in many countries seems rather to have been towards what has been 
described as the concentration of technical progress and its benefits. 




This again is in striking contrast with one of the characteristics of 
development in the central economies» The disparities that used to . 
and still do exist in these countries are not on the same scale or of 
the same kind as those observable in Lc-.tin America, In short, sectoral 
and regional disequilibria, instead of righting themselves, have become 
worse, a development which accounts for the .increasing attention devoted 
by economic policy in the various countries to means of remedying this 
trend. 
Furthermore, in close relation to the foregoing difficulties, a 
twofold problem arose: the inhabitants of rural and backward areas 
were strongly attracted by the more populous urban centres, while in these 
latter the "modern sector", and in particular the more capital-intensive 
and dynamic branches of. manufacturing, showed a very limited capacity 
to increase employment opportunities,^^ The most visible and serious 
form assumed by the combined effect of these factors was the proliferation 
of the marginal settlements .("shanty towns") which are a more or less 
salient feature of large town3 in Latin America, 
There is another .important question which may be regarded both 
as the outcome of some of the foregoing situations and as a factor that 
has helped to create and aggravate them: namely, the marked 
concentration of income distribution which has been prone to occur 
at all the relevant levels (personal, functional, sectoral and regional 
This is another basic respect in which the hopes of those who expected 
the histoiy of the industrial centres to repeat itself were doomed t» 
disappointment, While economic development in Latin America has 
undeniably raised income levels in a segment of the middle income groups 
25/ With reference to the linkage between this situation and the 
problems relating to the assimilation of imported technology, 
see below, pp, 37 et seq. 
26/ See below, pp. 262 et seq.. and "Estudios sobre la distribueidn 




and in the upper stratum of manual workers - especially those employed in 
the "modern sector" it is equally true that the proportion of total 
income falling to the privileged minority is much larger than in the 
industrialized countries, and, above all, that about 50 per cent of the 
population still receives only a tiny share, which in absolute per 
capita terms is estimated at an average of not more than 140 dollars 
a year. 
The social significance of this situation needs no comment; nor 
do its implications with respect to political tensions and the difficulties 
of achieving a minimum degree of collective unanimity, solidarity and 
participation in the arduous task of national development and self-
realization. Its economic repercussions are no less obvious and important. 
Suffice it to recall the population sectors that virtually play no part 
in the development process, and all that they represent for the domestic 
market, at once as ballast and as a potential reserve.; or to consider 
how they affect public expenditure and welfare services - which do not 
always strike at the roots of the problem - by diverting resources from 
more advantageous investment possibilities. 
In the present cursory review, allusion must be made to a problem 
which is relatively new in the stage of industrial development based on 
import substitution, but is plainly significant at several levels. This 
is the question of foreign enclaves in the most dynamic key sectors of 
the new manufacturing structure and the complementary financial and 
business activities. The existence of such enclaves produces innumerable 
repercussions relating to the balance of payments, technological dependence, 
dependence on decisions and criteria that are not necessarily in the 
best interests of the national economy concerned, etc. Furthermore, 
it has another consequence to which due weight is not always attached» 
It hampers the development of national entrepreneurial skills,^' 
27/ For a discussion of various aspects of this problem, see 
Radl Prebisch, Towards a dynamic development policy for Latin 
America. (United Nations publication, Sales NO,: 64.II.G.4), 




In this context, a factor must be noted which has lessened internal " 
independence in a different way, and which has its origin in the short-
comings of the external co-operation system. This is the '^indebtedness 
spiral", as. it is called, which has already been mentioned in these 
pages, and is particularly serious in some countries 
If the new circumstances are considered from the standpoint of the 
general and particular "conditions" required for a development process, 
it is easy to see that almost all the key variables o r factors mentioned 
in the foregoing analysis, which was pre-eminently economic - such as 
rates of saving and capital formation, the channelling of investment, 
the responsiveness and flexibility of the sectors of production, the 
efficacy of programmes and machinery for the allocation of resources -
were conditioned, if not determined, by a complex of social, political 
and even psychological factors whose implications could not be ignored 
or shirked if development policy was to bear fruit.-
The new approach to the problem of Latin American development, which 
began to take shape in the early nineteen-sixties, was crystallized by 
Mr. Rafil Prebisch, then Executive Secretary of ECLA, in the document, he 
presented to the Commission at its tenth session (Mar del Plata, Argentina, 
March 1963), the introductory chapter of. which summarizes this approach 
and is reproduced as chapter IX of the present document. 
As can be seen, Mr. Prebisch*s study is a coherent presentation of 
the central line of thinking and analysis already described, with the 
addition of new circumstances, problems and tasks which subsequently 
appeared. Its point of departure is that the lack of dynamism .in Latin 
American development and its various distortions "are not determined by 
circumstantial or transient factors. They are an expression of the 
critical state of affairs in our time and of the incapacity of the economic 
system - ovdng to structural defects that, it has been beyond our ability 




or our power to remedy - to achieve and maintain a rate of development 
consonant with the growth of the population and with its demands for a 
speedy improvement in its levels of living".^/ 
What are the main aspects or factors determining this "critical 
state of affairs1'? Gn the one hand, it is a product of the numerous 
anomalies and deficiencies in trade, financing and foreign investment, 
and of the obstacles to accelerating and extending Latin American 
integration.. On the other, it stems from certain features of the social 
structure, which still predominate in Latin America.but which vary in 
intensity according to the conditions in each particular country. The 
question of social structure includes a number of topics which received 
too little attention in the past, and it is, therefore, worth-awhile to 
comment on it. 
Che of the features referred to is the excessive rigidity of the 
social structure, which prevents the emergence of new dynamic elements 
and deprives the bulk of the population of the social mobility which 
would ensure the expansion of the ruling groups and infuse them with new 
life, and would also establish another level of effective participation 
in development decisions and tasks. In fact, those who can participate 
and carry seme weight in public affairs represent a relatively small 
proportion of the various social groups and interests. This means that 
the great majority of wage-earners, agricultural workers, technicians, 
professionals, and even entrepreneurs, are still not directly linked with 
the growth process and do not participate in that process as active and 
united agents. This situation may have been compatible with development 
in times gone by. but does not seem to be so today, given the size of 
the undertaking and the absolute necessity of the bulk of the people being 
consciously associated with development objectives and efforts. 
The most striking and significant socio-economic expression of this 
"closed" society is what the author calls "a situation of privilege in 
the distribution of wealth". These distributional privileges are both 
a consequence of the structure described and a cause of the greater or 
lesser isolation of the masses from development goals and tasks.. 
22/ See below, p. 262 /The analysis 
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The analysis touches upon the diagnosis and implications of the 
prevailing pattern of income distribution in Latin America, but it 
also goes on to diècuss the design and content of a new kind of 
distribution policy to meet the demands of development and social justice. 
With regard to the diagnosis, the study stresses two outstanding 
elements of the present distribution structure: the striking concentration 
of income in the upper income groups, which represent only 5 per cent of 
the population, and the meagre participation and absolute level of 
income of the "base of the pyramid",, or lower income groups, which represent 
50 per cent of. the population. 
The study also stresses the somewhat paradoxical fact that the 
marked; inequality of distribution, far from strengthening savings and 
capital formation, led to the creation of consumption levels and patterns 
similar to those of the upper inccmè groups in thé industrialized 
countries, and often even more exaggerated. Thus, the social sacrifices 
and the restrictions on the expansion of the domestic market which are 
a consequence of this great inequality of distribution are not even 
hypothetically offset by a high rate of capital formation. 
To reduce or eliminate these distributional privileges seems, 
therefore, to be an essential task of economic policy. The strategy does 
not, however, consist in "taking income away from the upper minority and 
simply distributing it among the broad masses' of the population, for with 
per capita personal income in Latin America as a whole barely amounting 
to 370 dollars a year, the benefits of such a redistribution would not 
stretch very far. But if, on the other hand, restrictions on the 
consumption of the privileged groups were reflected in a steady increase 
in net capital formation, the standard of living of the bulk of the 
population would rise progressively faster" J ^ 
To avoid any misunderstanding, it should be.made clear that this 
transfer, of surplus consumption to capital formation does not imply any 
lack of consideration for the social aspects. - On the contrary, it opens 




the way, in the first place, to solving the crucial problem of employment* 
In other words, despite the uses of investment and its "technology-
intensive" nature, only a substantial increase in capital formation and 
in productive capacity can help to raise the uncertain rate of absorption 
of the labour force in productive and steady employment. Secondly, it 
does not ignore the significance and place of social investment. It is 
explicitly stated that "the first concrete expression of an income 
redistribution policy should be in this field, through social investment 
in the development and training of human resources and in the provision 
of effective means of access to education at all levels. This would 
bring about a new order of things in which the dynamic elements that 
reach the upper strata would be proportionate to the numerical size of 
the social strata from which they come" 
The new "state of affairs in our time" which is in sight will 
finally emerge only as a result of far-reaching changes in the region1© 
economic and social structure. This is the message of the document 
that concludes this compendium. 
Hie changes that are advocated include the transformation of the 
system of land tenure, which has been the keystone of all attempts to 
put an end to under-development. It is imperative for three main 
reasons: to malce use of the saving potential and encourage social mobility, 
to satisfy demand in a rapidly growing population, and to raise the 
levels of living of the rural masses, which still constitute almost half 
the population of the region and so far have been more or less excluded 
from any share in the development process. 
This is not the only reform that brooks no delay. If the potential 
sources of capital formation represented by the concentration of inccme 
are to be tapped, tax, financial and other machinery must be established 
to divert these funds from non-essential consumer expenditure to 
investment that is economically and socially productive. This shift 
31/ See Towards a dynamic development policy for Latin America. 




will, in its turn, involve not only technical and organizational problems 
but also what is perhaps the main issue, namely, the social and political 
changes that are required to make the new pattern of spending a practical 
possibility» 
ECIA's concerns and sphere of work in the Immediate future will 
thus be distinguished by a broad approach and constant stress on the 
major structural changes and obstacles in the development process. 
Without relaxing in its efforts to widen its knowledge and to study 
problems in such fundamental areas as international trade policy, industrial 
development, basic resources or the transport system, usually in the 
context of Latin American integration, ECLA has been paying increasing 
attention to research on social problems and policies, the experience of 
planning alternative development strategies, income distribution in 
different countries and the improvement of administrative institutions, 
and machinery. Both in this work and in its approach to the whole body 
of problems, ECLA still abides by its traditional principle of providing 
"a true interpretation of Latin American reality". 
Latin America must find its own path to development and social 
change. What it most needs in order to do so is to possess a full 
understanding of its situation and to develop original lines of thought 
for interpreting it and providing effective guidelines for its activities 
In the last analysis, these are the principles that have always inspired 
ECLA's critical studies and underlain its work; they continue to be its 





FOREIGN TRADE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA : 
. A. THE PERIPHERY- AND THE SPREAD OF TECHNICAL PROGRESS 
1/ A new stage in the spread of technical progress -J 
The spread of technical progress from the countries where it had 
its source to the rest of the xirorld has, from the point of view of 
each generation, been relatively slow and irregular. During the long 
period which elapsed between the Industrial Revolution ar.d the First 
¡World War, the new methods cf production in which technique has.constantly 
found its expression have reached only a"small proportion of the 
world's population. 
The movement began in the United Kingdom, continued in varying 
degrees of intensity in Eurcpe^. received an extraordinary inpu3.se in the 
United States and finally reached Japan, which strove rapidly to assimilate 
Wester:i methods of production. Thus the groat industrial centres- of 
the world grew up, while the vast and heterogeneous peripheral areas 
of the new system shared only to a slight extent in the improvement of 
productivity. 
In these peripheral areas, technical progress only affected small 
sectors of the vast population as it usvelly only penetrated \diere it 
was needed to produce foodstuffs and raw materials at low cost for 
delivery to the great industrial centres. 
If this economic pattern which the world had developed before the 
First World War could have been considered the ideal system of the 
division of labour, any departure frca its principles would, of course, 
have had-to be considered as a deviation from the economy's normal way 
of functioning. However, there could be no sound, scientific reason for 
believing that this v/as a final pattern. All that happened in that period 
was that the world economy passed through a singularly important stage 
1/ Economic Survey of Latin America, 1949 (United Nations publication, 




in its growth, but in spite of the significance of its effects, it could 
hardly be called a final stage since, to a certain extent, it had left 
untouched the vast peripheral area with its enormous potential capacity 
for assimilating technical progress so as to raise the very inadequate 
level of living of the great masses of its population. 
Carefully considered, the economic development of the peripheral 
countries is one more stage in the world-wide spread of tha new form of 
productive technique, or, if preferred, in the organic development of 
world economy,, A few early signs of this new stage had already appeared 
in the primary producer countries before the First World War« But it 
was the war, -with the consequent difficulties of maintaining imports, 
which revealed the industrial possibilities of those countries, while 
the great economic depression of the 1930!s strengthened the conviction 
that those possibilities had to be used in order to offset, by means of 
internal development, the manifest failure of the external incentive 
which until then had stimulated Latin American economy; this conviction 
was confirmed during the Second. World War., when Latin American industry, 
with all its improvisations ana difficulties, nevertheless became a 
source of employment and of consumption for a large and increasing part 
of the population. 
Latin America has, therefore, entered a new stage in the world-
wide spread of technique, though technical methods are still far from 
having been assimilated completely in primary production, for, as 
explained above, new production methods tend to be adopted in 
activities connected in one way or another with the exportation of 
foodstuffs and raw materials rather than in other activities. In the 
performance of this function as a primary producer which is actually 
the function of Latin America, there was from the beginning a strict 
selection of aptitudes. Vast regions were coupled to the world 
economic system, while others, no less large and generally more densely 
populated ones, have up to the present time remained outside the system. 
Hence, development was very uneven. New and fertile lands, which became 
accessible during the second half of the last century through the 




with which to undertake agricultural and mineral production to satisfy . 
the ever-growing European donand, whereas the impressive process of the 
extension of capitalist technique and economy by-passed other lands 
which had been cultivated and had supported their populations for 
centuries but which suffered from a low level of productivity cr 
difficulties of access. Thus in Latin America there remain extensive 
regions, with relatively large populations, in which the methods of 
working the land, and consequently the standard of living of the people, 
are essentially pre-capitalist. Accordingly, economic development in 
these countries req»iires first and foremost technical progress in 
agriculture and other related activities, including means of communication. 
Experience has repeatedly shown, however, that as ?c.odsrn technique 
increases productivity, a surplus of labour, no longer needed by agriculture, 
is created. It then becomes the task of industry and other activities 
to absorb this labour productively. Hence, agricultural improvement 
and industrial development are two aspects of the problem cf economic 
development. Che need only consider tho; large number of pc-cp.le engaged 
in agriculture in Latin America, with the exception of a few countries, 
to realize the magnitude of this problem and the vast effort which will 
be necessary to solve it. 
through the force of circumstances, with the spread of technical 
progress an increasing proportion of the economically active population 
of Latin America, as part cf the peripheral area, will be diverted 
from agriculture towards industry and other urban occupations. Yet, 
that would not constitute a full solution unless certain pre-capitalist 
03? S ei.l • C 3 . tjclJLlS"b methods of production (still used by a large part of 
the population) were to evolve towards methods characterized by a high 
level of capitalization per person and high productivity. Though this 
is indeed very important, the problem of the economic development of 
Latin America cannot be limited to these terms, for to do so would bo 
to ignore other fundamental aspects. This is not surprising, for though 
there are certain common denominators in the appearance of the problem 
in the different countries, there are also specific differences which 




Past trends and new developnents —' 
In Latin America, reality is undermining the out-dated pattern of 
the international division of labour, which achieved great importance in 
the nineteenth century and, as a theoretical concept, continued to exert 
considerable influence until very recently, 
IJhder that schema, the specific task that fell to Latin America, 
as part of the periphery of the world economic system, was that of 
producing food and raw materials for the great industrial centres,, 
There was no place within it for the industrialization of the new 
countries,. It is nevertheless being forced upon thsm by events0 Two 
world wars in a single generation and a great economic crisis between 
thoa have shown the Latin American countries their opportunities, clearly 
pointing the way to industrial activity. 
The academic discussion., however, is far from ended. 2h economics, 
ideologies usually tend either to lag behind events or to outlive them« 
It is true that the reasoning on the economic advantages of the 
international division of labour is theoretically sound, but it is 
usually forgotten that it is based upon an assumption which has been 
conclusively proved false by facts. According to this assumption, the 
benefits of technical progress tend to be distributed alike over the 
whole community, either by the lowering of prices or by the corresponding 
raising of incomes. The countries producing raw materials obtain their 
share of these benefits through international exchange, and therefore 
have no need to industrialise, If they were to do so, their lesser 
efficiency would result in their losing the conventional advantages of 
such exchange. 
The flaw in this assumption is that of generalizing from the 
particular. If by "the community" only the great industrial countries 
are meant, it is indeed true that the benefits of technical progress are 
2/ Raúl Prebisch, "The economic development of Latin America and its 
principal problems" (United Nations publication, Sales N°.: 
1950.II.G.2), Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. VII, N° 1, 




gradually distributed among all social groups and classes. If, however, 
the concept of the community is extended to include the periphery of the 
world economy, a serious error is implicit in the generalization. The 
enormous benefits that derive frcm increased productivity have not 
reached the periphery in a meadure comparable to that obtained by the 
peoples of the great industrial countries. Hence the outstanding differences 
between the 'levels of living of the masses of the former e\:& the latter 
and the manifest discrepancies between their respective abilities to 
accumulate capital, since the margin of saving depends primarily on 
increased productivity0 
Thus there exists an obvious disequilibrium, a fact which, whatever 
its explanation or justification,» destroys the basic premise underlying 
the schema of the international division of labour. 
Hence the fundamental significance of the industrialisation of the 
new countries. Industrialisation is net an end in itself, but.the 
principal means at the disposal of those countries of obtaining a share of 
the benefits of technical, progress and of progressively, raiding the 
level of living of the masses. 
B. ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL OF ESTIMATES BASED ON 
TRADITIONAL ECONOMIC THEORY 2/ 
1« The premise of the mobility of the factors of production 
A good many of the peripheral countries, including those of Latin 
America, appear to have decided to make their own economies the basis of 
the development of industry but it is not without interest to discuss 
briefly the conditions which would have to be fulfilled in order to carry 
out the opposite policy: namely, that the existing industrial centres 
should continue increasing their industries, while the periphery continued 
to devote itself to primary production,, 
It has already been seen that when technical progress is extended 
to primary production, it produces a surplus of gainfully employed 




population in that sector, which can be absorbed by industry and other 
activities. If these other activities were not developed in the 
periphery, they would automatically have to develop in the centres, 
which would consequently have to absorb the surplus manpower.) in addition 
to that part of the natural increase in population vhich could not be 
absorbed in their own primary production» 
This presupposes complete mobility of population; in other words it 
would mean not only that the unemployable surplus of the population must 
be willing to emigrate from the periphery, overcoming a rooted unwillingness, 
but also that the countries of the centre must be prepared to admit large 
masses of immigrants who, accustomed to relatively low wages, would 
compete to advantage with the workers of the centre. 
This demostrates that the idea that the peripheral countries 
should continue to act as prinary producers as they did during a 
particular stage in the process of tho extension of technique.; according 
to the precepts of the interi*ational division of labour, is based upon 
Certain assumptions which do not appear compatible with the economic and 
social reality of the world as this has emerged since the process 
started. 
The logical consequences of the premise of the mobility of the factors 
of the production, which is the postulate on which the theoretical concept 
of the international division of labour is built up, are very far-reaching and 
must be borne in mind in any attempt to interpret the significance of 
this reality by theory» 
If this premise of mobility had been an actual fact, the economic 
and social effects of technical progress, and the way it spread, would 
certainly have been very different from what actually took place. 
2» The spread of technical progress and the terms of trade 
We have already stated that it is not possible to understand the 
problems connected with latin America's economic development without first 
investigating this process and its consequences. One of these consequences 
without a doubt, is the constant tendency of the terms of trade to deteriorate. 
The phenomenon is purely dynamic and wo hope to prove that ultimately 




development to absorb the real or potential surplus of population 
gainfully employed in primary occupations. Technical progress, as we 
have seen, tends to decrease the amount of labour engaged in primary 
production. However, this decrease has been extremely slight over the 
years. In the meantime, new productive techniques are evolved which 
make further readjustments necessary in the distribution of employed 
population. 
Thus there is a relative abundance of potential labour in primary 
occupations, tending constantly to exert pressure upon wages and the 
prices of primary products and preventing the periphery from sharing with 
the industrial centres the advantages of the technical progress attained 
by the latter. Furthermore, the periphery is unable to retain a part of 
the benefits of its own technical progress, 
3» Significance r>Z the price relationship between 
primax'7 and industrial fi .-ods 
v • 
From the outset one must be careful not to attribute to -this 
statement implications which can only be understood laterc Therefore, 
a short explanation will be useful before going more deeply into the 
subject. If prices reflected only decreasing costs resulting from 
technical progress, then prices of manufactured goods should fall more 
than those of primary goods, since, as i;i generally recognized,, the 
increment of productivity is greater in the former than in the latter. 
The price relation would thus seem to swing in favour of primary 
production, and its index or that of its equivalent, that is,the index 
of the terms of trade, would consequently rise,, A rise of, say, 100 to 
150 would indicate that the same amount of primary products as before could 
purchase 50 per cent more manufactured goods. Primary producers would 
then be able to share equally with the manufacturers the profits derived 
from technical progress, as they would be able to purchase larger amounts 
of higher quality goods. If, despite the greater decline in the cost of 
manufactured goods, the index of the price relationship were to remain 
at 100, it would mean that producers of manufactured goods would have 




quality of manufactured goods. Should the index fall below 100, then 
not only would primary producers not have received any share from 
increased industrial productivity but they would have been unable to 
retain for themselves the full profits of their own technical progress, 
since they would have surrendered a part of it to the manufacturers. 
This does not mean that primary producers are worse off than they were 
before. Everything depends on the degree of increased productivity 
reached and the extent to which it is transferred to industrial 
manufacturerso If the index falls to 80, for Instance, primary producers 
will be able to obtain 20 per cent less manufactured goods than they 
did before, for the ss>i<e amount of primary goods 0 However, if to obtain 
that same amount they need work only half as long as before, one hour's 
labour would now allow them to purchase 60 per cent more manufactured 
goods, instead of 100 per cent more, as would have been the case had they 
received the full benefits of their own technical progressj or an even 
greater quantity had they been able to share in the benefits of technical 
progress achieved in the industrial, sector, should such progress be 
greater than that achieved in the field of primary production.^ 
The indices available seem to indicate that in the past seventy-five 
years something of this sort has occurred; that is to say, if, as is 
likely, technical progress in primary production at the periphery had 
been less than that of industry at the centre, then the periphery will 
have transferred to the centre part of the benefits of its own technical 
progress. Unfortunately, o>ring to the lack of data concerning the 
increment of productivity in primary production it is not possible to 
ascerta.in the extent of such benefits and what part of them has 
remained in the primary producer countries. Ws will return to this 
aspect of the question later. Meanwhile, we shall try to explain the 
causes of this phenomenon, which is so vital in the economic development 
of Latin America. 
y For a fuller analysis of this phenomenon, see Rail Prebisch, 
"The economic development of Latin America and its principal 




4» The real or potential surplus of gainfully employed population 
and the terms of trade 
We have already stated that a surplus of labour generally exists in 
primary production and that this excess exerts an unfavourable, pressure 
on primary wages and costs. This tendency derives on the one haad from 
the relatively large increase c.r? population in the regions of primary-
production and on the other from technical progress, which reduces the 
number of persons required to obtain the same quantity of products. The 
absorption of such a surplus in fact becomes the task of industry and the 
occupations directly or indirectly depending on the development of 
industry. 
The surplus may be either real or potential, that is to say, it may 
already have become a reality through the application of new techniques in 
primary production or occur when new methods are introduced either 
spontaneously or as a consequence of industry's labour requirera-nts which, 
by drawing labour from primary production, cause wages to rise and force 
an improvement in methods of production. This latter case seems to have 
occurred frequently in the United States, where industrial areas attract 
population from the peripheral zones of primary production in the country, 
A real surplus of gainfully employed population could also occur if 
technical progress in primary production vras not accompanied by either 
prior or simultaneous development of industry and its related occupations, 
in which case neither would then be capable of absorbing the excess 
labour as it arises« 
In either case, if the gainfully employed 'population were perfectly 
mobile and did not show reluctance or deliberate opposition to migration, 
and if the rapid development of industry and its related occupations 
could immediately absorb the aforesaid real or potential excess of 
gainfully employed, then there would be a marked tendency towards a 
levelling of primary and industrial wages, even making allowance for 
differences in skill, Both would benefit from the general increment to 
productivity if instead of wages rising with the increase of productivity, 




However, an examination of the situation in the world as a whole 
shows that both industry and its related occupations have developed 
relatively slowly, so that absorption of the real or potential surplus 
of gainfully «ployed population in primary production has been 
considerable in the great industrial countriesj but the process is only 
just beginning in latin America and the rest of the periphery« 
The large countries, given the present structure of "ihe world's 
economy, limit the process to their own population. Within their 
frontiers, industry and its associated activities do not develop in 
such a manner as to absorb the population of the periphery., so that the 
peripheral countries have no m^ans of absorbing the surplus of their 
garlnfully employed population except by developing their own industrial 
activity. It is not possible for them to employ this surplus in 
expanding primary production since the distribution of the active 
population is not arbitrary but depends on productive technique, as has 
been pointed out above«. 
Consequently, the relatively slow spread cf technical progress has 
carried more weight than the factors which tend to distribute its benefits 
over the world, and the periphery not only has been generally unable to 
share with the industrial centres in the advantages derived from the 
technical progress in th<sse centres but has even been compelled to cede 
to them a part of the benefits deriving from its own progress, owing to 
the insistent pressure of the real or potential surplus of gainfully 
employed population. 
5« Degree ito which benefits of -technical progress are transferred 
The magnitude of this cession by the periphery to the centre of 
a part cf the benefits derived from technical progress in primary 
production is not uniform. On the contrary, the intensity of the 
movement varies in proportion to the strength of two opposing forces. 
On the one hand, we have the growth of primary production and, on the 
other, the demand for primary goods in the industrial centres. Should 
the latter increase more than the former, the amount ceded decreasesj 




benefits of their technical progress, a phenomenon which would become 
manifest in the improvement, for the periphery, of the terms of 
reciprocal trade. However, if demand in the industrial centres increases 
relatively less than primary production, or is slow to recuperato its 
powers after an acute depression, the price relationship will deteriorate 
for the periphery, and the degree of the transfer to the centre will 
increase in inverse ratio to the proportional or absolute weakening of 
the dynamic industrial factor. 
There is, in fact, a dynamic element in industry which is not 
found to a comparable extent in primary .production,, The latter, as 
it3 nai5e would imply, covers the initial phases of the productive 
process, while industry accounts for subsequent stages. Because of 
this relative position of the two activities, the increase in industrial 
activity stimulates primary production, but the latter has not the power 
to generate industrial production. When industrial entrepreneurs, 
stimulated by the normal econcaic forces, or by extraordinary factors 
in times of war, undertake, to increase production, demand for primary 
products increases; as profits are consequently, greater, entrepreneurs 
in the periphery seek to increase primary production. The spontaneous 
increase of the latter, on the other hand, does not cause a similar 
rise in industrial demand which would be capable of absorbing that 
increase, as can easily be seen from the following example. Let us 
assume, exaggerating the proportions to simplify matters, that in a 
total selling price of 1,000 units for a finished product, 500 correspond 
to the periphery.and the rest represents values added during the various 
stages of the productive process corresponding to industrial sectors. 
Let it further be assumed that the periphery on its own initiative 
intends to increase its production by 10 per cent, giving its productive 
factors an added income of 50. To simplify even further, let it be 
assumed that this increase of income is entirely absorbed by the consumption 
of finished goods from the centre. It is clear that the demand for such 
goods will only increase by 5 per cent at most, whereas primary production 
' will have increased by 10 per cent. There would, therefore, be no 




production and the latter's terms of trade would deteriorate. In 
actual fact, the share of primary production in the value of finished 
goods is less than that given in our example and the increase in 
income is not absorbed entirely and immediately by the consumption of 
finished goods. In reality, the periphery's influence on the centre 
would be weaker and the consequent disequilibrium would be correspondingly 
greater. 
The foregoing affords us a better understanding of the effects of 
increased production in the periphery deriving from either increased 
population or from improved technical progress, and shows that if such 
an increase of production is not accompanied by an equivalent increase 
in the demand for primary goods in the industrial centres, the position 
of the periphery is weakened and it cannot resist the pressure of 
factors which tend to take from it the benefits of its own productivity. 
6, Dynamic importance of industrial growth 
From our remarks concerning the dynamic significance cf industrial 
development, it may be seon that this development makes itself felt in 
two ways: first, by what we have called demand from the centre - this 
covers both raw materials for industry and foodstuffs required by the 
centre - and secondly, by the absorption of surplus manpower from 
primary production. Let us now look at this second point0 
It has been shown that the centres absorb their own surpluses 
but not that of the periphery. However, they may have an indirect 
influence on the number of the gainfully employed in the periphery, 
through the demand for primary products, If industry and other activities 
at the centre develop to such- an extent that they not only absorb the 
surplus manpower of their own primary production but also the population 
which that production requires in order to meet the increased industrial 
demand, then the centres would have to import from the periphery a greater 
proportion of primary goods to meet the increase of their own requirements. 
In this way the periphery would obtain relief from the pressure of its 
surplus population and at the same time the deterioration of the terms 
of trade would be halted. 
Phenomena of this nature must have occurred in the development of 




there are other, better known and perhaps more important ways in which 
industrial development has functioned as a dynamic factor, absorbing 
surplus population from primary production. It is a well-known fact 
that when the Industrial Revolution was in full swing in the nineteenth 
century, the European population increased considerably. An increasingly 
large part of this population increase was absorbed by industry and 
other related occupations developing at the time, and the rust was 
engaged in primary production not only at the centre but also in the 
new overseas countries which technical progress in transport had thrown 
open to international economy, especially in the latter half of the 
century. Large numbers began to emigrate from the older 'regions of 
primary production in Europe (which were gradually becoming more and 
more industrialised) to the newer areas which had become either complements 
or substitutes in the production of primary goods » If we look at the 
phenomenon as a whole, however, we perceive that the proportion of persons 
gainfully employed in primary production tended to decrease whereas* 
that in industry and related economic activities tended to increase. 
Nevertheless, the decrease was not sufficient to avoid a relative drop 
in primary prices , 
Productivity in the new lands was higher per capita than in the 
older regions, and progress in transport enabled goods from the former 
to' reach the European markets easily and cheaply. It is possible that 
this increase in production, probably greater than that of demand at the 
centre, greatly influenced the deterioration of the terms of trade 
which occurred after the eighteen-seventies and continued until the 
First World War, 
Then, as now, the growth of industry probably did not have sufficient 
impetus to prevent the terms of trade from changing to the disadvantage 
of the peripheryo If industry and related occupations at the centres 
had absorbed more of the population employed in primary production, 
emigration towards new countries would have been less and consequently 
they would have had fewer people available to increase primary production; 
thus primary production would have been in a more favourable position 




A good deal of this «ill remain conjectural until further research 
has been undertaken» Nor should we forget that, in the case of some 
primary goods at least, the increase of productivity indirectly attained 
when the new countries were opened to world trade by technical progress 
in transport, may possibly have oeon ££*Go.v3r than that attained by 
certain industrial sectors. This would not., of course, invalidate this 
analysis since, if a part of the -benefits of technical progress in 
primary production in the periphery is transferred to the industrial 
centres, both when the increase of productivity in primary occupations 
is greater than in industry and when the increase is less,, the reason is 
probably that the real or potential surplus of gainfully employed 
population engaged in primary production exerts a persistent pressure 
on wages and prices. 
Not all. the countries then opened up to the international economy 
were predominantly exploited by immigrant labour from the oldor regions 
of Europe. In the latin American countries with old settled populations 
that had come to live there before or afirer the Spanish Conquest., there 
is more than ample potential labour to work the land, whether in 
agriculture or mining. For this and other reasons, these countries do 
not attract immigrants from Europe, or at least not to the same extent 
as other countries. This fact cannot be overlooked in a study of the 
changes in the terns cf trade of the various primary products, according, 
to the type of product, the pattern of production, and the degree of 
technical progress attained. Yet we must disregard it in this summary 
explanation, which for the moment has no other purpose than to clarify 
certain fundamental ideas for a better understanding of the problem of 
the terms of trade. 
The period during which the new lands were opened up on a large 
scale in Latin America may be taken as ending somewhere between the 
First World War and the Great Depression« There are remarkable contrasts 
between this period and the subsequent period. During the latter the 
deterioration of the terms of trade was much more pronounced than 
before, since the marked deterioration during the First World War was 




to the centre of the benefits accruing from technical progress in 
transport and other activities which made possible the better utilization 
of the increased productivity of the new lands, but also a transfer 
of part of the increase in productivity directly obtained from improved 
technical methods of exploitation, or perhaps the whole of the increase 
and even mere, as may have occurred in some cases» 
Exports, which in the previous period had generally increased 
more than the population, continued increasing but at a slower rate 
than the population; the serious consequences of this fact in conjunction 
with the adverse trend in the terms of trade have already been pointed 
out«. In addition, income from land, expressed in terms ox' constant 
prices, decreased instead of increasing. All these circumstances combine 
to place an entirely different complexion on the economic development 
of Latin America compared with the earlier development of other countries 
7» Wages and income fron land in the development of the periphery 
In this first analysis of the terms of trade, it can he stated' 
that in Latin America the export industries to which these terms relate 
have, as a general rule, kept wages at a fairly low level compared with 
wages at the centres, evc-n in cases where there has been an appreciable 
increase of productivity. We should not forget, however, that there 
have always been marked differences from country to country and that, 
in recent times, increases have been achieved where the organization of 
labour and other favourable factors made than possible. A number of 
factors account for such differences between the wage levels, among 
these the extent to which the industrial development of each country has 
progressively absorbed the surplus population and tended to raise wages 
relatively when competitive conditions in the international sphere 
allowed. 
The fact that wages have remained at comparatively low levels during 
the primary development of the Latin American periphery does not mean 
that technical progress has not been.able to increase other sources of 
income considerably, In those areas which are opened- up to agricultural , 




land whereby the value of the land itself, previously worth little or 
practically nothing, was greatly enhanced. The income from the 
economically new lands is, in the last analysis, the expression of their 
greater productivity as compared with the older lands. Technical 
progress in transport is largely responsible for this increase of land 
income. A part of the benefits derived from this progress remains in 
the hands of the landowners, while another part flows into the industrial 
centres, by means of a relative lowering of prices. 
The economic and social repercussions of this fact are indeed 
vast, as increasing returns frcrn the soil give a very special character 
to the penetration.of the capitalist technique in the export industries 
of the peripheral countries. 
The relatively low level of wages in primary production was 
therefore compatible with the high increase in income from land, to the 
advantage of certain social classes. 
Thus we find considerable sources of income springing up during 
the primary development of certain countries in which more advanced forms 
of economic development may later thrive, whereas in other countries, even 
though income from land also greatly increases, an appreciable part of 
the increase flows into the industrial centres, especially in the 
development of certain mining enterprises,. 
Terms of trade in this new stage of extension 
of techuical progress 
It has been shown that technical progress had been predominant in 
Latin America's primary export activities, though with varying intensity. 
There is still much room for technical improvement in these occupations; 
but if present world economic conditions continue, it is possible that 
these improvements will not guarantee the permanent raising of wage 
levels. On the contrary, wages may even be lowered and a large part of 
the profits derived from technical progress lost, if the surplus 
population created by these very improvements cannot simultaneously be 
absorbed into industry and its associated occupations. 
Still, the periphery is immense and the population which will have 




technique elands is also-large. If a country proposed to raise its 
wage levels by increasing the productivity of its export occupations 
and absorbing into industry the surplus of gainfully employed 
population accruing therefrom, it might be seriously hindered by 
other countries, also engaged in improving their techniques, but making 
no effort to raise the very low level of their wages. 
This might be the case for areas which are at present engaged in 
a process of primary development similar, to that which began about the 
middle of last century in the latin American periphery. In these; 
areas there is no industrial development to absorb the surplus population 
and this lack may contribute to the maintenance of.low wage levels. 
This is one of Latin America's most serious problems, especially owing 
to its influence on the phenomenon described above in connexion with 
the terms of trade of certain important products« 
The same tjiing does not occur in the case of primary production 
for domestic consumption in r-hpse same countries where, in general, 
little technical progress has been introduced, as compared v.lth <-:xport 
industries. It is obvious that if the surplus of gainfully employed 
cannot be absorbed there, prices will drop as productivity rises, to 
the advantage of other social groups; but in this case the phenomenon 
can be counteracted by the development of industry and its related 
occupations, ensuring that primary producers obtain all the benefits 
deriving from technical progress without interference from competitor 
countries. 
Nevertheless, even in the case where the benefits of technical 
progress in export industries flow abroad, a net increase of income 
would bo possible by employing in industry and its associated occupations 
the surplus: of labour created by technical progress in primary production. 
In other words, despite the possible deterioration of the terms of trade, 
the peripheral countries can obtain for themselves the full benefits 
accruing from technical progress in primary production for the domestic 
market, as well as from technical progress in industry, as applied to 
the surplus .gainfully employed population; but it is obvious that the 
net increase in income will be proportionately greater in accordance 
with the country's ability to counteract the tendency of the terms of 
trade to worsen. / 9. Mother 
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9. Another form of transfer of benefits of technical progress 
At the outset, we cautioned against any tendency to attribute to 
the terms of trade, without further study, any implication other than a 
mere statement of facto The preceding analysis now permits us to study 
the possible implications, beginning with those which seem unacceptable. 
First let us take the ethical implications* The f,i;;t that the 
centres tend to retain the benefits derived from their own technical 
progress does not mean that they are taking something that does not 
rightfully belong to them» From the ethical standpoint, there might 
be raore than one justification for this procedure« However, this point 
is irrelevant to the present report. Oar purpose is rather to point 
ov-t that this method of appropriating those benefits was not assumed 
in theories which have had great influence on certain currents of 
economic thought«, According to these theories, the benefits accruing 
from technical progress should flow equally to the whole coraanity in 
the form of lower prices or in-rraased incomes» This is what has, in 
point of fact, generally taken plar.e, but only in the industrial centres 
which have retained the benefits of their, technical progress0 The same 
theories furthermore assumed the absolute mobility of factors and 
products, and the abstract world based on this assumption is substantially 
different from the one in -which we lire« It would, therefore, be 
necessary to revise the theory ab initio before applying it to the 
study of problems of economic development in the periphery. If the 
world division of labour had been effected according to this theory, 
thé distribution of economic activities; throughout the world would 
perhaps have been very different from what it is today, and the problems 
presented by the differences in the rate of increase of productivity 
and income which so profoundly affect the world economy would not have 
assumed their present proportions. The difficulties would have been of 
another kind, perhaps far more serious than those with which we are 
now faced. 
This same difference between the abstract world of absolute 




reality of the present economic organization, on the other, makes it 
difficult to compare the results which, in given circumstances, would 
correspond to that theory, with those which are, in fact, observed,. 
It might be argued that, if the centres did not retain the benefits 
of their own technical progress, every peripheral country xiould be 
able to attain far better terms of trade than at present and its 
income level would approach that of the centres; but it might similarly 
be contended that the peripheral countries derive a lower income than 
that of the centres from their export industries because their productivity 
is lower. According to the above-mentioned theory, no country, region 
or industry could maintain its position in. a state of absolute mobility 
of the factors of production if its technique was inferior to that of 
other countries, regions or industries, since it would no longer be 
able to export and its factors of production woiild be transferred to 
other countries, or else to other regions or industries .in that same country 
Furthermore, according to the same theory, if the benefits derived 
from technical progress flow from one party to another, similarly, benefits 
derived from a greater productivity of the latter must flow towards the 
former. There is reciprocity in this movement and in no case could the 
transfer be a premium on inefficiency in production. 
Since the theory must not be applied only in part, we will do no 
more than keep it in mind as an'aid to understanding the differences 
between the facts and the assumption in order to acquire a more accurate 
knowledge of actual conditions. 
Conclusions dram from the preceding analysis 
The foregoing leads to a first conclusion. The theory as outlined 
above assumes reciprocity of transfer whereas, in fact,, such reciprocity 
does not appear to exist. Given the dynamic changes which: are constantly 
taking place in the world economy, the slight mobility of the factors 
of production and the slow development of such occupations as can 
absorb the surplus of gainfully employed persons, the periphery tends 
to transfer a part of the benefits accruing from its technical progress 




The more the periphery seeks to increase its productivity, thus 
increasing the surplus of its gainfully employed persons, the more 
intensive will be the transfer, other things being equal. Therefore, 
in order to raise the income level in primary production in Latin 
America it is not sufficient merely to increase productivity;' it is 
also necessary to absorb the surplus of gainfully employed persons in 
expanding industry and allied occupations, 
There is also a second conclusion to be drawn in relation to the 
economicity of developing industry. The argument demonstrates, with 
unimpeachable logic, the economic advantages to be derived from a 
natural division of international labour, given perfect mobility of 
the factors of production. It is evident that, if a country obtains all 
the advantages of technical progress achieved by other countries and in 
reb irn affords them the advantages of its own productivity, it will not 
obtain any additional advantage if, by means of protective measures, it 
engages in the production of goods already produced by others0 On the 
contrary, it can be proved conclusively that economic lose*-;:; will 
follow. However, if there is not absolute mobility of the factors of 
production from country to country, the development of industry may 
help to bring incomes in the primary producer countries up to the level 
of industrial countries. In. so far as this occurs there will be a net 
profit for the primary producer. Nevertheless, for this levelling to 
take place, it would be necessary for other competitor countries in 
primary production not to force competition in their own favour by 
lowering wages. That is precisely the difficulty facing the periphery, 
as has been indicated earlier. But there is another source of net 
profit which is less problematical, since industry and its allied 
occupations add a net increase to incomes previously earned when employing 
the surplus population formerly gainfully employed in primary production 
and dislodged therefrom by technical progress. This increase will be 
proportionately greater as the productivity of the new industries reaches 
that of those industries in the countries which are more advanced 
technically, and it represents a net profit even though productivity 




of the factors of production, we have to apply a criterion of 
economicity to the development of the periphery, instead of the criteria 
suggestecLby.the above theory. 
;The third conclusion relates to the way of extending technical 
progress. In the theoretical, argument we have been examining, the fact 
that-a group of occupations increases its productivity presupposes that 
the resulting lowering of prices will immediately benefit all other 
activities, creating an additional margin of income available to,increase 
demand or savings; but in fact, if prices, do not fall in the large, 
centres a§. productivity increases and income.rises, then greater demand 
and Savings capacity.will be developed only in the centres. This would 
mean that the peripheral countries have,.on the one hand, remained 
unaffected by such advantages while, on the other, they are faced vrilth 
the problem of assimilating an advanced industrial technique which 
requires extensive development of both demand and savings. 
To sum: up» the discrepancy between the theoretical argument 
based upon absolute mobility of the factors of production and the . 
realities: of economic experience is so.significant for the theory, of 
economic-development in latin America in particular, and in the periphery 
in. general, that we shall have to give our theories a thorough overhaul. 
A revisionai this nature,: being based upon premises closer to reality, 
will help us.' to state, on sound premises, the essential lines of a 
policy of economic development. 
11. The economic cycle and fluctuations in the terms of trade 
In reviewing the theory from the standpoint of the development of 
the periphery, the study of the economic cycle must be given speciâl 
consideration. Even though the low mobility Of the factors of production 
as technical progress spreads suffices to explain the great differénce's 
between incomes at the centre and those of the periphery* these differences 
are actually created during the cyclical movement. In other words, the 
cycle has, in fact, been the mode of growth of the capitalist economy. 
These phenomena are of great interest to the Latiti American countries, 




It is a well-known fact that, during the cycle, price relationships 
move in favour of primary products on the upswing but, on the downswing, 
generally tend to fall more than they had previously risen, Thus, as 
the relative price level falls during each depression more than it had 
risen during the preceding period of prosperity, we find that over a 
number of cycles there is a continuous tendency for the terms of trade 
to worsen, as has been shown above. 
This periodic deterioration in the price relationships is the 
result of the way in which, in cyclical downswings, the benefits of 
technical progress are transferred from entrepreneurs to other social 
groups. During the upswing, despite increased productivity, prices 
rise and the profits of the entrepreneurs rise concurrently. If 
increased productivity brought immediate improvements to wages and 
salaries, these would have to rise more than prices. This does not 
usually occur during the upswing* when prices frequently rise more than 
wages so that the benefits accruing from technical progress remain in 
the hands of the entrepreneurs. It is during the cyclical downswing 
that these benefits are transferred to wages, which1decrease less than 
prices, and a more favourable wage relationship is thus established; 
more and more advantage is taken of this as a new phase of prosperity 
absorbs the unemployment which marks the cyclical downswing. 
In other words, during the depression, wages lose only a part of 
the benefits obtained during the period of prosperity and thus can reap 
the benefits of technical progress. Naturally, not all the benefits go 
into wages. The State has been taking an increasing proportion of the 
benefits derived from technical progress and so has been able to widen 
the scope of its activities. Other social groups also take their share, 
to a greater or lesser extent, and, furthermore, as competition between 
entrepreneurs is limited, these are left with a greater share than they 
would otherwise have had, BoweVer, we are not concerned with the 
distribution of benefits in the centres but rather with the sum of the 
respective increments of.productivity which remains there, as compared with 




Let us assume that after a period of depression, the net increase 
in income at the centres is equivalent to the increase in production 
obtained by greater productivity. It is evident that, if the full 
benefits remain in the centres, the periphery will obtain no share at 
all,. Now let us assume that the net increase in income at the centre 
is greater than the increase of production there; this would mean that. 
the periphery must have transferred part of its increased productivity 
to the centre and even part of the real income which it formerly enjoyed. 
The question now arises: what are the forces which allow the 
industrial centres to exert such pressure on the periphery, retaining 
the profits of their own technical progress or even appropriating part 
of the benefits accruing to the periphery? 
To answer this question, let us recall some observations made in 
a previous document regarding certain manifestations of cyclical 
5/ 
phenomena at the centres and in the p e r i p h e r y D u r i n g the cyclical 
upswing, demand for finished goods in the centres is greater than supply. 
There exists, therefore, an excess demand which increases the profits 
of the entrepreneurs and gives rise to, other phenomena; these phenomena, 
in which the periphery plays an important part, eventually transform 
this excess demand into insufficient demand, and so lead to the cyclical 
downswing, wherein demand becomes less than the aggregate supply of 
finished goods at the price offered. As the value of the aggregate 
supply, swollen by the higher profits of earlier stages in the production 
process, cannot be easily reduced.by lowering prices, stocks of finished 
goods, temporarily unsaleable at those various stages are accumulated. 
There follows a series of reactions which tend to lower the 
aggregate supply price until demand once again begins to absorb current 
production and the surplus stocks are gradually reduced. 
This way of decreasing the aggregate supply price of finished 
goods is of great importance to the periphery. In actual fact, this 
¿/ See, "The economic development of Latin America and its principal 
problems", op, cit., pp. 18-22, 
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price, as mentioned before, was augmented at the centres by the addition 
of profits; but some of these were converted into increases in wages 
and other forms of income. For the sake of brevity, and to avoid 
entering upon any unnecessary complexities, we will refer merely to the 
increase of wages, this being the more significant phenomenon. If the 
aforesaid decrease in the supply price was in proportion to the increases 
of profits and wages which had previously raised that price, the 
situation would once more be what it had been at the point of departure, 
and both the centres and the periphery would share equally in the 
benefits of technical progress, whatever their amount in either place. 
However, this is not the case, owing to the mechanism of the 
cyclical downswing and the nature of the forces affecting it. The 
accumulation of surplus stocks causes the sellers of finished goods to 
scale down their demand for goods from their immediate suppliers; these 
in turn scale down their requirements of goods from their own suppliers, 
and so on, to the stage of the entrepreneurs engaged in primary production 
in the periphery. In each of these stages through which the cyclical 
downswing is transmitted, there is a fall in employment and profits. 
It is a recognized fact, however, that at the centres there is 
great resistance to any lowering of wages, despite unemployment, and, 
in some sectors, to the reduction of profits. This constitutes an 
obstacle to the lowering of that part of the aggregate supply price which 
is accounted for by the centres, and when it cannot be brought down 
far enough to bring the supply price more closely into line with aggregate 
demand, surplus stocks will continue to accumulate. It follows that 
the greater1the volume of these surplus stocks, the more production, and 
therefore the demand for primary products, will be curtailed, and the 
greater will be the fall in the prices of these primary products. 
In the periphery, lower prices for primary goods naturally mean1 
lower profits and adverse pressure on wages in communities in which 
labour organizations, where they exist, are far less powerful than in 
the cyclical centres. 
The greater piart of production costs corresponding to the stages 
completed in the industrial centres is accounted for by the wages paid 
/at those 
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at those stages. Therefore, the fact that wages suffer a relatively-
small decrease means inevitably that.it is for the periphery to reduce 
the aggregate, supply price, so that the greater the wage increase 
during the cyclical upswing and the more rigid wage levels become 
during the downswing, the greater will be the pressure exerted by the 
.centres on the periphery, through the reduction of their demand for 
primary goods and the consequent decline in the price of these goods. 
All this occurs while the other factors which influence the 
intensity and duration of the cyclical downswing remain equal. For 
instance, if during the upswing only a relatively small part of the 
profits has flowed into wages, the fact that during the downswing 
profits may become inelastic would have even more serious consequences 
than the rigidity of wage levels since during the depression, profits 
are generally not spent, so that there is a falling off in-demand. 
Having made this qualification, let us continue the analysis. If, 
on the one hand, at the centres we have this relationship between the 
net increase in wages and their resistance to any decline, and, on the 
other hand, we have the-intense pressure exerted by the centres on the 
periphery, it is not difficult to understand that if the net increase 
in wages is greater than the. increase in productivity, in accordance 
with a previous assumption, the pressure on the periphery will be so 
great that the lowering of prices will take frcm the periphery an 
ever-increasing.share of the benefits of its own technical progress, 
or even more, as has been shown.above. 
How far does experience show that the periphery can resist this 
pressure? There have been cases in which large stocks of primary 
products have been accumulated in the periphery in preference to selling 
at prices considered too low. But when the periphery resists the 
constriction of its own supply price, the total supply price of finished 
goods at the centre does not fall sufficiently to eliminate the difference 
between it and demand. Hence stocks of finished goods and also of 
goods in course of manufacture continue to accumulate and there is a 
steeper decline in the demand for primary products. 
/Though this 
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Though this explanation is rather general and each individual 
case would have to be examined separately, the Great Depression of the 
1930's showed clearly that the pressure on the primary producer countries 
can be so great as to compel than to devalue their currency in order to 
be able to adapt themselves to the fall in prices imposed by the 
decrease in demand at the cyclical centres, In this way, the whole 
population is affected by the consequences of a readjustment which 
would otherwise be catastrophic for those who derive their income from 
primary production. 
It would not be admissible to generalize this inference and argue 
that the chronic tendency towards monetary depreciation, recorded in 
the annals of some of the Latin American countries, can be attributed 
to the particular manner in which this reduction in selling prices 
occurs during the cyclical depressions. But neither would it be 
reasonable to suggest that financial distortions and resulting inflation 
are exclusively to blame for that phenomenon, without admitting the 
influence of the pressure which is automatically brought to bear on 
the periphery during the cyclical downswing. The whole problem offers 
a most interesting field for study. 
It is evident that if there had been notable increases of 
productivity in the periphery, this area would have been better 
prepared to withstand the effects of such pressure by surrendering to 
the centres the benefits recently acquired through increased productivity. 
But if there are no such advantages, the periphery will be compelled to 
surrender a part of the benefits acquired in the previous phase of 
development. This is one of the reasons why the world economic crisis 
affected Latin America and other peripheral countries so seriously. 
Depressions prior to the First World War had been shorter and far less 
intense. One niust go back to the eighteen-seventies to find a depression, 
that was as long though less intense. However, the downswing of the 
seventies coincided with a period during which Latin America was rapidly 
increasing its indirect productivity, by incorporating new areas into 
international productive activity. There was, therefore, a wider margin 
of benefits derived from technical progress in the periphery to be 
shared with the centres, 
/Here we 
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Here we have another case where the course of events subsequent 
to the world economic crisis, when contrasted with those leading up 
to it, offers us a better vantage point frcm which to analyse the 
problem of economic development in Latin America, Xet this is not the 
only important comparison, as has been shown above, 
C. . TECHNICAL PROGRESS, INDUSTRIALIZATION 
AND DISEQUILIBRIUM 6/ 
It has been said that technical progress is compelling the Latin 
American countries to resort to industrialization as a means of 
development, and that in this form of economic development there are 
certain inherent and persistent tendencies to external disequilibrium. 
The origin of these tendencies to disequilibrium lies in the 
changes brought about by technical progress itself: on the one hand, in 
the methods of production and in demand and, on the other, in the 
distribution of the gainfully employed population to meet this demand 
within each country and the sphere of the world economy. 
External disequilibrium must be eliminated; a regular and orderly 
form of economic development is to be achieved. Thus far, the Latin 
American countries have sought to correct the disequilibrium only 
after it has occured and at considerable cost, as may be deduced from 
the experience of the past twenty-five years. However, this experience 
provides valuable lessons in how to avoid this phenomenon, or at least 
how to attenuate it. 
Before considering these practical aims, it is necessary to 
analyse the nature of this disequilibrium, which may be found in certain 
aspects of the technique of production that are of great importance to 
primary producing countries. In a broad sense, technical progress has 
been reducing the share which the value of primary products represents 
in the value of finished goods. In other words, the share of primary 
6/ See ECLA, "Theoretical and practical problems of economic 
growth" (B/CN,12/221), 18 May 1951, PP. 28-32. 
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products in the real income of the population has been declining, 
especially in the great industrial centres* There are various reasons 
for this tendency, among which the following should be cited: 
(a) The technical changes involved in the constant creation of 
new products result in a progressively more complex or sophisticated 
elaboration of the raw materials required in the productive process, 
whose contribution to the value of the finished article is therefore 
diminished. In relation to the total value, the proportion of raw 
materials used in the manufacture of an aeroplane is therefore lower 
than in that of a locomotive* and lower in the case of a locomotive 
than in that of a horse-drawn vehicle. 
(b) Technical progress makes for a better utilization of raw 
materials, sub-products and by-products, so that the same amount of 
raw materials is now equivalent to a proportionately greater value of 
finished goods than heretofore. Though there is no reason to assume 
that cotton piece goods contain a smaller quantity of cotton than one 
hundred years ago, in our times the same amount of raw material provides 
industrial by-products or sub-products which make the total value of the 
finished products considerably greater than previously; and 
(c) Synthetic materials such as synthetic nitrates, artificial 
fibres and plastics, are replacing a number of natural products in 
increasingly important spheres of industrial activity. 
Thus new foras of'production and certain changes which technical 
progress has brought about in the structure of consumption, are 
responsible for reducing the scale on which primary products are being 
utilized. Technical innovations are undoubtedly the dynamic factor 
which has caused the greatest changes in demand. Moreover, the increase 
in productivity and per capita income which these innovations bring in 
their train has made it possible to satisfy demand in new ways. Thus, it 
is a well-known fact that, when the level of income rises (a) demand 
becomes more diversified, and while beyond a certain point there may be 
only a relatively small increase in demand for ordinary foodstuffs, 




technical innovations rises sharply. Furthermore, these innovations 
imply an increasing industrial processing of foodstuffs for the sake 
of hygiene, preservation or convenience, thus widening the gap between 
the rates of growth of the primary product and of real incomej and 
(b) the growth of demand for personal services also tends to become 
more diversified, and therefore the proportion of primary products in 
the supply of the population's aggregate demand diminishes. 
The.combination of all these factors, arising from advances in 
the technique of production, has consequences of vital importance to the 
periphery, since imports of primary products in the industrial centres 
tend to expand at a lower rate than real income. In other words, the 
income-inelasticity of demand for primary imports in the centres tends 
to be lower than unity,. . 
Other facts must also be mentioned which are partly the result of 
technical progress. Productivity increases are also observable in the 
primary production on the industrial centres themselves, and this often 
enables them to compete successfully with the periphery on foreign 
markets, despite the low salaries prevailing in the peripheral areas. 
In other cases, where this does not occur, the industrial centres resort 
to the application of customs tariffs in order to maintain or stimulate 
their primary production,., thus protecting the domestic market against 
competition from the periphery. This.is another of the consequences of 
the unequal distribution of the increase of productivity in the. various 
domestic activities and in the'various countries, and of the slight 
international mobility of human resources. , 
As a result of the protection of primary production in the great 
industrial centres, the proportion of. the population gainfully employed 
in these activities has not decreased to the.extent, it might otherwise 
have done, and consequently the increase of the population gainfully 
employed in industry, services and other activities has not been so 
great as might have been expected. Had no such measures been adopted, 
there would not now be such a pressing need in the periphery for labour 
to obtain employment in secondary and tertiary occupations when no 




be borne in mind, however, that the protective tendencies of the 
industrial centres merely accentuate the compulsory migration of the 
peripheral population from primary to secondary production and services, 
since ultimately this movement is occasioned by the spread of technical 
progress. 
As has been said, imports of primary goods in the centres tend 
to increase more slowly than real income. Thus, if the Latin American 
countries expanded only as a result of primary exports, as usually 
occurred before the world economic crisis, their rate of economic 
development would be considerably lower than that of the industrial 
centres» 
However, these countries, as a whole, seem to be in a position 
to expand at the same rate, if not more rapidly, than the centres, 
owing to the stage of development which most of them have reached. 
The rate of growth of the population is much higher, and as its 
productivity is relatively low, there is more room for growth. 
In practice, experience during the twenty years following the 
world economic crisis shows unquestionably that the export activities 
of the Latin American countries, even allowing for their exceptional 
development in Venezuela, have been insufficient to provide employment 
for the natural increase in the gainfully employed population and for 
the surplus manpower resulting from the spread of technical progress 
in primary production. 
Hence the vital need for industrialization, in order that 
economic development may take place at a faster rate than the expansion 
of primary exports. Industrialization absorbs a part of the available 
population, enabling another part to be absorbed by associated activities 
such as transport and trade, which expand together with it. The increase 
in average productivity resulting from industrialization, together with 
the increase of productivity caused by technical improvements in primary 
production, raise per capita income and lead to a growing demand for 
services, thus creating new sources of employment. Thus industrialization 
is linked with various phenomena inherent in economic development, and 
if reference is made only to this aspect, it is for reasons of brevity 
and not because the importance of other phenomena has been overlooked. 
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- , •Chapter II 
INDUSTRIALIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT -
A* SOME MAJOR QUESTIONS ^ 
1, Industrial development options 
Besides absorbing population growth and surplus labour from other 
activities, industrialization also provides a developing country with 
the manufactures articles that it cannot obtain abroad, owing to its 
limited capacity to import. 
The ultimate objective is the attainment of the maximum real income, 
that, is, the goods and services which the population requires, according 
to its pattern of demand. 
Two problems arise in the obtaining of this maximum. They both 
involve the best method of utilizing productive factors. The first consists 
in determining to what extent the available factors in a growing economy 
should be employed in increasing exports, with a view to expanding imports, 
and to what extent agricultural and industrial production for the domestic 
market should be expanded. Once this first problem has been solved, the 
second problem lies in ascertaining which goods can most advantageously 
be imported and which should be produces .internally, (given optimum, 
quantities of imports and domestic production), in order to maximize 
real income, , 
With regard to the first problem, .primary producing countries as a 
group are faced with the very limited option of either employing the 
increment of their productive factors in increasing exports so as to acquire 
supplementary imports, or alternatively, of increasing production for 
domestic consumption, , 
1/ From "Theoretical and practical problems of economic growth" 
(E/CN.12/221, 18 May 1951), PP.35-67. 
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A brief explanation would kept to elucidate the problem. Let it 
be assumed that countries producing a specific article obtain 100 dollars 
annually per worker employed in production for export, and that they use 
this amount to obtain an equivalent volume of imports. Assume that 
one million workers are employed, in other words, that the total product 
is 100 million dollars, and that there are, in addition, 100,000 workers 
and available capital that can be employed either in increasing exports 
and obtaining additional imports, or in the production of these goodd 
domestically. 
Let it be further assumed that the productivity of these 
2/ 
100,000 labourers in domestic production is merely 70 dollars per capita,-' 
which is lower than the value accruing from export activities. It is 
evident that if exports could be increased 10 per cent by making use of 
these 100,000 workers, without allowing per capita yield to be lowered 
by a fall in prices, then it would be more profitable to employ the 
labour force in export activities than in domestic production. On the 
whole, however, this is hardly likely to occur, if the increase in 
production exceeds the increase in consumption in the importer countries, 
in terms of the expansion of income and other factors which determine 
the volume of demand, It would be sufficient for prices to fall 9.1 per 
cent, thus reducing the yield per man to 90,9 dollars, for the total value 
in dollars to be decreased to the 100 million prevailing earlier, despite 
the increase in the volume of goods. 
It is evident that instead of increasing production for export it 
would be more convenient for primary producing countries to employ these 
100,000 labourers in production for domestic consumption, despite the 
fact that the yield per worker (90,0 dollars in export activities) is 
greater than that accruing from domestic production (70 dollars). 
This simple conclusion is of interest, since the opposite might 
be argued from the current theory, that the optimum solution lies in a 
distribution of productive effort whereby the marginal yield per worker 
2/ Computed on the basis of the value of imports of identical goods 




in export activities is equal to the marginal yield per worker in 
activities supplying the domestic market, taking into account the . 
differences in skill required by these activities. . 
. If the industrial centres and the periphery are viewed as a whole, 
this latter theory would be correct since it would thus be possible to 
obtain the maximum volume of goods or of real income. However, because 
of the price-inelasticity of demand in the industrial centres, the latter 
would have been favoured in the distribution 'of these goods, to the 
detriment of priinary producing countries. 
Undoubtedly, in the case of absolute mobility of the factors of 
production, income or the remuneration of these factors would tend to 
uniform in a given country and as between several countries. Thus, 
provided that skill is uniform throughout, the same wage level would 
obtain. Consequently, if in the foregoing.example the yield, of export 
activities declines, together with the wage level, there would be a 
displacement of the factors of production from these to other activities. 
Since these factors could not be employed in additional production for 
domestic consumption, where, because of the lower yield, wages would 
similarly be lower, excess labour would migrate to other countries, until 
wages were equalized. 
It is therefore evident that an example such as the above could not 
occur, if the assumption of absolute mobility of the factors of production 
obtains. But this assumption is unrealistic, whereas, the example reflects 
conditions which are vey similar to those found in developing countries. 
•Let us consider the example again for a moment. For the increase 
in exports to be advantageous to the periphery, export prices should not 
fall below a per. capita yield of 97.3 dollars. Thus the increase in the 
value, of exports andi, therefore, of imports, would amount to 7 million 
dollars, which is the same increase in value to be derived from production 
of these goods for domestic consumption,. Beyond this neutral point, it 
would be advantageous to utilize the productive effort in domestic activities. 
/If at 
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If at the neutral point a worker engaged in export activities could obtain 
97.3 dollars' worth of imported products through trade, in domestic 
activities he would obtain only 70 dollars' worth of the same products, 
that is to say, the cost of the latter would be 28. per cent higher. 
Consequently, domestic production could not be fostered unless it was 
protected against foreign competition,^ 
2« Economjcity of industries where the level of 
productivity is lower than in the centres 
It has been shown that, in view of tha factors which determine the 
demand for primary products in the industrial centres and the very small 
margin of international mobility of the factors of production, it might 
be expedient for a peripheral country to employ its extra manpower in 
domestic production, even where the cost of such production is higher 
than that of the imported articles, A cursory examination often leads 
to a condemnation of industries in which production costs are higher than 
the prices of similar imported goods as uneconomic. Despite its seeming 
validity, this conclusion does not take account of the fact that the 
productive factors employed in these industries could not be put to better 
use. It is, therefore, to the advantage of the economy to produce at 
relatively high costs rather than to leave productive factors lying idle 
or use them in ways that would adversely affect the terms of trade and, 
consequently, the capacity to import. 
2/ It is necessary to realize that the free interplay of economic 
forces might give rise to another solution which would render 
protection unnecessary. It would be sufficient for the excess 
population to exert pressure freely on the wage level, until it was 
lowered to such an extent, that thé cost of domestic production 
would equal that of foreign production. However, this would involve 
a serious deterioration of the terms of trade and it would be 
greatly detrimental to total production, further to involving other 
considerations which are alien to the main thesis of this work. 
There is considerable theoretical interest in this particular example 
of the free interplay of factors in the peripheral countries, 
associated with their low mobility as between these countries and 




If complete mobility existed, this proposition would be inadmissible. 
Given the tendency for wages to equalize the economic impossibility of 
increasing exports beyond a certain limit would cause the gainfully 
employed"population to seek higher incomes in other countries. It 
logically follows that the total volume of production and of real income 
for the whole world would be optimum* if certain other conditions 
obtained which need not be mentioned here. However, actual conditions 
differ from this theoretical model, and they are influenced by other 
factors, often more important than the purely economic. If industrial 
costs are higher than import prices, this does not mean that it is 
necessarily-uneconomic for a country, as is sometimes assumed. On the 
basis of that criterion, industrialization would be practically impossible 
in Latin America at the present stage of economic development. The economic 
development of the periphery is therefore not compatible, with this theory. 
The problem, as has been shown, must be considered from another standpoint. 
It is not so much a question of comparing industrial costs with import 
prices as of comparing the additional income obtained from the expansion 
of industry with the export earnings that would have resulted from 
applying the same productive resources to export activities. 
Costs in a great number of Latin American industries and in large 
sectors of agricultural production are, in fact, higher than those of 
imports .under the present terms of trade. The prevailing low incomes cannot 
offset the,relatively low productivity in these activities. This does not 
imply that such activities are necessarily uneconomic. It .simply means 
that goods which cannot be obtained from abroad because of the limited 
capacity to import must be produced by domestic industry .at a higher cost 
than if exports could be easily increased in order to provide, the means 
of obtaining the necessary imports. 
The concept of economicity should be based on the total supply of 
available goods. It has been shown that a greater volume of goods is 
obtained despite higher costs. But it is evident that this volume could 
be increased proportionately with the raising of Latin American productivity 
to a level closer to that obtaining in the great industrial centres, 
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This general proposition is not incompatible with individual solutions. 
In a given country and in given circumstances, it might be possible to 
achieve a steady marked expansion of exports, out of proportion with the 
rate of increase of income in the industrial centres, 
3» Optimum distribution of the factors in different 
sectors of domestic production 
Attention should now be given to the second problem presented. In 
view of the optimum volume of imports on which a country may rely under 
given circumstances, and the increased capital it could muster, it is 
necessary to ascertain in what sectors of production investments should 
be made so as to maximize real income. 
The principle of marginal social productivity would appear to meet 
this requirement fully. The increment of capital should be utilized 
so as to obtain the maximum product, which is only possible when the 
marginal productivity of the different investments is equalized. 
This criterion offers a basis on which to determine the best means 
of utilizing the limited capacity to import, that is, which products 
that were formerly imported should be replaced by domestic production, 
and which it is more advisable to continue importing. The advantage of 
developing an iron and steel industry instead of a heavy chemical industry, 
or of developing domestic production of. all the footwear required by the 
population, or of the cultivation of all the wheat at present imported 
will depend on the comparative increase in the social product which would 
be obtained from, the different activities, according to the various 
alternatives open to the investment of the available capital and other 
conditions influencing productive efficiency. If the amount of capital 
required by the iron and steel industry would give rise to higher 
productivity in that industry than in other import substitution activities, 
its development would be economic, despite the fact that the cost of 
the domestically ¡produced article might be higher than that of the 
imported product. It may be higher, but not so high as in other cases, 
given the average level of productivity in the country, 
/These considerations 
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These considerations are also applicable to agricultural production, 
which, in some Latin American countries, may be relatively easy to 
increase. In other Countries, however, the increase in agricultural 
output involves extensive irrigation works or other improvements;. . If it 
is expedient to replace certain imports by agricultural production, or 
• by the development of industrial production, how the two may best, be 
combined can only be determined by comparing the levels of productivity. 
However, the maximization of productivity in the form described 
previously does not always imply that the most satisfactory solution has 
been found. Certain productive activities, in which the level of 
productivity is lower than in others, may nevertheless be eminently 
advantageous, owing to the fact that they diminish a country's 
vulnerability to foreign fluctuations and contingencies. The experience 
of the Latin American countries is very instructive on this; point, and 
it is easily understandable that this kind of consideration may prevail, 
in certain specific cases. 
4. 'Optimum capital intensity per gainfully employed 
person in Latin" America 
ihe validity of the principle of the social yield or marginal 
social productivity of capital has already been acknowledged in connexion 
with the planning' of an investment policy for the Latin American countries. 
This principle demonstrates that if savings are distributed in such a 
way that the social productivity of the marginal increment of capital per 
gainfully employed person is the same in all branches of economic activity 
the maximum product will be obtained. The optimum degree of capital 
intensity per gainfully employed person in each branch will thus have 
been attained, that is, the exact amount required in order to obtain 
the highest possible product for the economy as a whole. 
However, the mere statement of this principle does not suffice for 
an analysis of the concrete investment problems encountered in the 
economic development of the Latin American countries. Outstanding 
amongst such problems is the determination of" the most suitable intensity 
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As a result of technical progress, the optimum intensity of capital 
has tended to rise continuously in the great industrial centres. Thus, 
a constant increase in productivity has been achieved which, by raising 
per capital income and expanding the margin of savings, has facilitated 
the introduction of new techniques, thus increasing further the intensity 
of capital, the process being repeated again and again. 
This process takes a different form in the underdeveloped countries. 
In those countries technical improvements do not appear gradually, as 
they did in the development of the great centres, and thus the under-
developed countries do not have to go through the successive stages of 
evolution which the centres went through in developing their capital 
goods. In carrying out their investment programmes, these countries 
find that they must import the same equipment as that which was developed 
by the industrialized countries over a long period. Thus, equipment which 
is highly capital-intensive and which is compatible with the high level 
of per capita income in the industrial centres, is equally available to 
the under-developed countries, in which per capita income, and therefore 
the capacity to save, are evidently lower. 
In other words, it is theoretically possible for the Latin American 
countries, in view of their relative scarcity of capital and abundance of 
manpower to have a lower capital intensity than the more advanced countries. 
However, given the nature of technical progress, and its irreversible 
character, there is little likelihood of Under-developed countries actually 
attaining their optimum capital intensity. It is true that in some 
cases they are in a position to use less compleix equipment, and other 
outdated techniques involving low capital investment. However, if they 
seek to modernize the equipment, because of the very low productive 
efficiency of the methods in use, they are often faced with the necessity 
of acquiring highly capital-intensive machinery, since given the nature 
of the productive techniques utilized, each unit of equipment is generally 
indivisible,, and therefore its intensity cannot be reduced to the level 
compatible with a relatively small volume of available capital. 
/Were sufficient 
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Were sufficient capital available for investment in capital-intensive 
machinery in all the branches of economy, no such problem would arise. 
It would only be necessary to assimilate the technical methods of the 
more advanced countries .in order to obtain" approximate, if not equivalent, 
levels of productivity. This, however, is not the case. The problem of 
capital intensity arises precisely because there is shortage of Capital, 
but this problem varies considerably fromone Latin American country to 
another. In some of these countries, 60 per cent of the gainfully 
employed population is working in activities where productivity is low 
and capital is scarce, whereas in others, capital formation and productivity 
are approaching the levels of the more advanced countries. This means that 
the following generalizations must be qualified in the light of the actual 
situation in the different countries. 
The diffusion of modern production techniques thus gives rise to 
a paradoxical situation. Countries rich or potentially rich in labour 
and short of capital are faced with production techniques which, 
especially in the United States, are primarily concerned with saving as 
much labour as possible, by means of increasing the capital outlay per 
worker. Undoubtedly technical progress also seeks to increase the volume 
of production per unit of capital, whilst reducing the amount of labour 
required. However, though these two aims call for increasing capital 
investment per gainfully employed person, and though in the abstract 
they may be considered separately, technical development has linked them 
in such a way that, as a rule, it would be impossible to break down . 
investment into the part which, is aimeci at increasing production, per 
unit of capital and that, which is directed toward;saving labour. Undoubtedly 
sufficient capital has been available in the great industrial centres 
to realize both of these aims progressively. In other words, these 
objectives have been combined in a manner.and to a degree compatible with 
capital formation. Thus, with the exception of brief intervals, investment 
to reduce labour consumption tended to be made in accordance with the. 
availability of the capital necessary for this purpose and, at the same 




In view of the fact that these aims have been pursued simultaneously 
and in view of the indivisibility of technically advanced equipment, 
the combinations adopted in the economy of a highly industrialized country, 
with a high per capita capital intensity, cannot be undone arbitrarily 
and transformed into other combinations which are better suited to 
prevailing conditions in a less developed country, where per capita capital 
intensity is much lower. It is logical that if the combinations prevalent 
in the former were to be transplanted to the latter, there would not be 
sufficient capital to absorb the amount of labour saved. In order to 
avoid this self-defeating consequence, it would be necessary to 
invest in equipment that would increase production rather than reduce 
labour consumption per unit of capital. 
This, then, is the problem which faces countries in which there 
is a relative scarcity of capital, since, as a rule, the characteristic 
indivisibility of equipment prevents the adoption of any combinations 
other than those produced by the evolution of the great industrial centres, 
5. Technical unemployment and the role of 
capital industry 
Turning again to the saving of labour, which is generally entailed 
by capital-intensive equipment, it should be noted that this problem is 
typical of the under-developed countries. This does not imply that, in 
the large centres, the introduction of such equipment has not occasionally 
given rise to a surplus of labour. However, the problem is not the same. 
The form of technical unemployment which generally occurs in these centres, 
especially during the cyclical downswing is not superimposed on a 
structural problem of a large force with little capital and low 
productivity, as occurs in the under-developed countries. It is a 
transient phenomenon, which will persist until new investment creates job 
opportunities for the unemployed. If surplus labour is not reabsorbed 
rapidly, it is not owing to a deficient capacity to save, but to flaws 
in the operation of the system. On the other hand, in the under-developed 
countries, where capital is inadequate for the intensive absorption of 
low-productivity labour, and excessive reduction of labour, through new 





In the development of the industrial centres, it was possible to 
incorporate capital-intensive equipment into productive activity 
because savings were sufficient to introduce it in to all the branches 
of the economy in which entrepreneurs found it advantageous. This 
equipment, therefore, corresponds to a high income and a high capacity to 
save0 On the other hund_, such, equipment is out of line with the relatively 
low income and low capacity to save characteristic of underdeveloped 
countries. The fact that certain entrepreneurs may be in a position to 
acquire such equipment does not by any means imply that there is sufficient 
capital available to general:!^ its use® It is necessary to distinguish 
between the interests of the entrepreneur and the general interests of the 
economy. The entrepreneur is only concerned with minimizing his production 
costs and increasing his profits. As a rule, the question of how to 
combine an increase in production with a reduction in labour consumption 
per unit of capital in order -oo achieve his objective is, for him, 
usually a secondary or unimportant consideration. If his action causes 
technological unemployment and the unemployed cannot be absorbed because 
of the scarcity of capital, the entrepreneur will nevertheless have 
increased his profits even when the capital invested in saving labour 
instead of increasing production involves a misuse of capital from the 
standpoint of the country's economy, apart from the social repercussions 
of the phenomenon0 
This phenomenon is not so evident when the reduction of labour 
consumption entailed by the introduction of this equipment, instead of 
causing technological unemployment, prevents the absorption of labour 
displaced from occupations with a lower productivity. This absorption 
might have taken place if the capital invested in reducing labour 
consumption had been used to increase production,, 
However, in the cases in which there are no better alternatives 
from an economic viewpoint in the under-developed countries, the latter, 
as was pointed out, are compelled to employ this equipment or fall back 
on techniques which waste capital by reason of their very low yield. 
/In other 
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In other words, even though capital-intensive equipment does not offer 
the best solution to the problems of development in countries where 
is labour plentiful., it may constitute the least harmful of the feasible 
means of increasing productivity open to the entrepreneurs. 
There are still ether differences between the under-developed 
and the more advanced countries0 In the latter, technological unemployment 
tends to disappear as a result of new investment /} D-Cis development of 
capital goods industries must provide the strongest element of absorption, 
since employment in these industries has expanded more intensely than 
in consumer goods industries0 Moreover, the increased profits aperuing 
to entrepreneurs with the reduction in costs, resulting from the 
introduction of new techniques are to a large extent reinvested thus 
stimulating demand in the capital goods industriesv The under-developed 
countries, lacking capital goods industries, except perhaps for the 
initial stages of such industries, find themselves in a very unfavourable 
position from the point of view of their internal development, because 
the profits accruing from the cost reductions mentioned above, when 
employed in acquiring capital equipment, are transferred to the great 
industrial centres producing the equipment, thus stimulating employment 
there and not at home. Consequently, in countries where no capital 
industries exist,, the re-investment of profits does not tend to reduce 
unemployment as it does in the great centres, except to the extent that 
it is directed towards building, and making the small amount of equipment 
manufactured domestically. 
It might be argued that these countries have vast possibilities 
/ for absorbing technological unemployment in existing consumer goods 
industries or in those which might be established with a view.to replacing / 
imports. This is true; but it brings us back to the starting point, 
lack of capital. If the investment of profits in imported capital 
equipment offered a means of absorbing the technological unemployment 
resulting from the utilization of the same profits, the problem would 
be relatively simple; but this is not the case. There is a considerable 




worker and the capital required in order to re-employ that worker. 
Profits accumulated during the course of several years would be 
required for that purpose. In this as in other aspects of economics, 
the tims factor is of the greatest importance. Substantial capital 
investment is necessary if time is not to be wasted. Undoubtedly the 
existence of profits for the amortization of investments c w a period 
of time is a favourable factor in stimulating investment. However, in 
order to absorb unemployed workers, an immediate increment of capital 
several times greater than the wages saved, would be necessary. 
The foregoing considerations show that the problem of fjivestment 
in the present stage of Latin American development has several distinctive 
features which make it impossible to draw general conclusions from the 
experience of the great industrial centres. We do not propose to examine 
all these features, but merely to draw attention to the most important: 
first, capital intensity, which was analysed above, and secondly, the 
obsolescence of equipment, which will be considered below, 
60 Obsolete equipment and the shortage of capital 
The persistent utilization of certain types of obsolete equipment 
as well as other highly efficient equipment is often encountered in 
Latin America. This i3 generally put down to the habits of entrepreneurs, 
and tliis explanation might be acceptable, were it not for the fact that 
the saes entrepreneur often uses obsolete and modern equipment in the 
same factory, or more significantly that he seeks to invest in other 
fields of productive activity and acquire the most advanced equipment 
obtainable instead of investing his profits in replacing his old 
machineryc There is undoubtedly an explanation in each specific case, 
At the root of the whole problem, however, the common denominator is 
the shortage of capital - not a shortage of capital in the case of individual 
entrepreneurs, but a general shortage in the country. 
From the economic standpoint of an under-developed country,.if 
capital equipment, despite its obsolescence, is in a sufficiently good 
condition to continue operating, the solution of the problem lies in 
/an analysis 
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an analysis of the alternatives. Evidently, the replacement'of obsolete 
equipment would considerably increase the total product, disregarding 
for the moment its labour saving effects. However, it could well be 
the case that the same amount of capital invested in other sectors of 
economic activity in which capital resources are limited and productivity 
is low would lead to an even greater increase in the product0 It is 
ultimately a question of ascertaining how the greatest increase in the 
product of the economy as a whole may be procured by investing a given 
amount of available capital; whether by replacing equipment which, 
though old, is still productive, or by investing this capital', to absorb 
part of the real or potential surplus labour force, l'n many cases, it 
might be preferable to keep the outdated equipment in operation, since 
its elimination would involve the destruction of existing capital, when 
capital for new.investment is scarce. This possibility is nevertheless 
limited*, since the productivity of obsolete equipment might be reduced to 
such an extent, in the course of time, that by substituting new equipment 
for it the net increase in output would be greater, and would exceed 
that which might be obtained in other branches of the economy.-, 
In other tirords, in countries where the scarcity of capital gives 
rise to the employment of a .viable part of the labour* force in primary 
production; where capital is scarce and productivity is low, and to 
disguised unemployment in other occupations, there is no reason to 
destroy existing capital equipment, despite its obsolescence if the 
labour employed is more productive there than in other activities, and 
if the increase in productivity which new investment would bring about 
in the latter activities is greater than that which would result from 
the replacement of obsolete equipment. If, in addition to the increase 
in the- product, the labour saving effect is also taken into account, 
the problem becomes more complex. Even though there may be more'suitable 
fields for investment from the general economic standpoint, the entrepreneur 
may find it advantageous to discard the obsolete equipment and replace 
it by modern equipment, simply because he will thus be able to obtain 
a substantia], saving in labour costs. 
/Problems of 
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Problems of this nature will continue to arise in the under-developed 
countries while thsre are still substantial internal differences in the 
degree of capital intensity and in the productivity of different sectors 
of the economy, Therefore, a clear distinction should be made in 
investment policy betteri the interests of the entrepreneurs and the 
general interests of the economy. 
In the more advanced countries, where technology and productivity 
have developed gradually and have been extended to all branches of 
economic activity, the proble.-a does not arise in the same way» There are 
no vast sectors in which the scarcity of capital offers a wide field for 
investment, the rate of growth of the population is lowsr than in the 
under-developed countries, and the high level of income determines an 
appreciable margin for savings« Consequently, there is sufficient capital 
to replace equipment normally, and even to shorten its normal span in 
order to introduce technical innovations that increase productivity, and 
at the same time to absorb the labour thus saved. This does not imply 
that the problem under discussion never occurs in the more advanced 
countries, since, in the great centres, there are well-known cases in 
which obsolete equipment has been retained in certain sectors which, 
for specific reasons, such as the decline of experts, have lagged 
behind in technical improvements» 
7* The special case of export activities 
Since it is not our purpose to make a complete analysis of the 
problem of productivity and the consequences of a shortage of capital, 
but rather to stimulate discussion of these topics, there are important 
aspects and specific situations which cannot be included in this brief 
outline. However, the special case of export activities warranty separate 
consideration since the introduction-of labour saving equipment in these 
activities may be essential in order to enable them to compete favourably 
on the international market and in order to expand exports themselves, 
whose fundamental importance in economic development is generally accepted. 
The reduction of labour consumption in primary export activities most 




which should be absorbed by industry and other activities, therefore 
increasing the amount of capital required for economic developmentc 
On the other hand, exports may procure a wider margin of savings and 
facilitate the use of such savings for importing capital goods« The 
measure in which this may be done depends on the extent to which both 
the effects of the reduction in labour consumption and of tiv- increase in . 
production per unit of capital can be retained within the coiaitry, 
in the form of increased income, rather than be transferred abroad, to 
the detriment of the terms of tradee 
8«, The problr-;, of investment in agriculture 
The duality of the aims of technical progress, montiorrjd earlier 
is clearly perceptible in the case of agricultural investment but, 
in practice, it is possible to distinguish the purpose for which such 
investment is made0 Some investments are designed to increase the volume 
of production per unit of land, whilst others are aimed at reducing labour 
consumption per unit of land and per unit of production, by different 
degrees at mechanization, ranging from the use of better implements to 
'that of the most advanced technical equipment,. Despite this division, 
there are ways in which the two objectives are related which, for reasons 
of brevity, will not be taken into account in the following general 
observations0 
Increase in yield is a general necessity in the Latin American 
countries, where with a few notable exceptions, foodstuffs production 
is relatively low0 There is also a general need for mechanization, since, 
in the course of economic developmentt it offers a means of obtaining 
a labour surplus to be productively absorbed by industry and other 
activities» 
From the general economic standpoint both aims have a very 
different significance, though for the agricultural entrepreneur both 
the reduction of labour consumption and increased yield per hectare achieve 
the same results, namely, a reduction in costs and an increase in the 
profits accruing to him» 
/The absorption 
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The absorption of agricultural workers by industry and other ^ 
activities will crcate a powerful incentive to mechanize agriculture 
and improve primitive farming methods. However, the experience of some 
countries has shown that this incentive is not enough in itself: without 
technical action in the rural sector on the part of the State, the 
incentive might nasfire and.even hold up the development of agriculture 
since the introduction of new techniques requires careful preparation 
and perseverancea 
From the general economic standpoint> and independently of the 
individual advantage of the entrepreneur, the degree of agricultural 
mechanization which it is desirable to attain depends as was stated 
before, not only on the capital available to purchase equipment and 
thus to free labour*, but also on the capital available to enable industry 
and other activities to absorb the surplus labour. If mechanization is 
extended beyond the capacity to absorb this surplus labour, a problem of 
technological unemployment is created similar to that described in the 
section dealing vrith equipments Moreover, in agriculture it is easier 
to avoid this problem, since the investments are divisible and it is not 
necessary to resort to self-defeating reductions in labour consumption 
in order to increase productions 
This is a very important aspect of the extension of technical 
progress in Latin America and one which has not yet been.given the 
consideration it warrants, It is likely that, in view of the scarcity 
of capital with which to absorb the labour freed by the mechanization of 
agriculture^ the reduction in labour consumption may in some cases have 
given rise to disguised unemployment in rural areas or in densely populated 
urban areas. 
There are, nevertheless, cases in which the absorption of surplus 
labour by industry has been very intense while mechanization has lagged 
behind. In other cases, the opening up of new farmland in sparsely 
populated regions has led to intensive mechanization, since that has 
proved to be more economic than the transfer and settlement of large 




There are also cases in which mechanization was essential, not in order 
to reduce labour consumption but because of the need to cultivate 
foodstuffs on what wars formerly pasture land, or to shorten the period of 
cultivation and thus reduce weather hazards0 
However, given the abundance of human labour on the land and the 
scarcity of capital, mechanization should be prrm careful consideration 
in economic development programmes, especially since the scanty capital 
available might perhaps be far more advantageously employed in increasing 
production, particularly when the limit beyond which surplus labour 
cannot b? absorbed has been reached. 
Investment to increase production must also be considered from the 
general economic viewpoint. The land immediately available for this 
purpose is fairly scarce throughout most of Latin America, with several 
notable exceptions; and this factor, together with the scarcity of 
capital, constitutes one of the most serioas obstacles to economic 
developmenta f 
It is therefore necessary to use the scarce capital available so as 
to obtain the maximum increase in yield. Investment for this purpose 
may be divided into two main groups: investment designed to increase the . 
yield per hectare, by technical improvement of the methods of cultivation, 
including seed selection and the use of pesticides, and investment 
designed to enlarge the arable area by irrigation, drainage, deforestation 
and rehabilitation of areas affected fey erosion, or to prevent erosion 
from reducing the arable area and diminishing the actual volume of production® 
Together with the need to increase the amount of capital per 
worker in order tc increase his productivity, it is also indispensable 
to avoid what might be called the natural depletion of the land, i.e., 
the loss of its productive capacity. Erosion is the most important 
agent of this depletion. Erosion takes different forms, and the very 
abundance of land resources may have helped to increase erosion. For 
instance, from the point of view of the individual, over the short 
term the most advantageous procedure, may be to take land, exhaust it 




be admitted that the labour and capital invested in the new land would 
produce more than the same amount invested in preventing the land 
already farmed from deteriorating. However, in the long run and from 
the point of view of society as a whole, such procedures are not 
reccmmenaable because they destroy enormous quantities of natural wealth. 
This is another fundamental problem, which jf net solved in time might 
prove a very serious obstacle to efforts to increase productivity and raise 
the level of living of the population. 
The relative-, slovf growth of agricultural production in thece 
countries, together with the general low levels of nutrition, emphasize 
the need to stimulate investment in technical improvements of farming 
methods, especially in cases where this represents the more economic of 
the two methods, given immediate possibilities of increasing the yield. 
In all cases where a persistent effort had been made, substantial results 
have been obtained,,compared with the relatively small amount of capital 
per hectare needed by such investment» Undoubtedly little has been done 
in comparison with the magnitude of the ta:> which the experts maintain 
must be carried out, as may be seen from the small amounts spent by 
most of the Latin American countries on agricultural research and experiments 
and on agricultural extension in relation to their total public expenditure. 
Nevertheless, the improvement of methods of cultivation may also 
involve the opening up of new land, in order to achieve satisfactory* 
results. In many countries, rainfall is sparse and the land exhausted 
by age-old methods of cultivation, or impoverished by the type of crops 
grown or by erosion. Where it is possible to achieve these improvements, 
large amounts to introduce mechanization, for the above-mentioned reasons. 
It will be seen then here, as elsewhere, generalizations can be 
dangerous. Each country, and even the different regions within a country, 
have individual characteristics which must be taken into account in 
order to understand the concrete problems of economic development,, 
Not infrequently, there are cases in which increase in agricultural 
output depends largely on improved utilization of the available resources 
rather than on new capital investment. There are regions where the 
land is used uneconomically, not in relation to the improved methods of 
^ /cultivation which 
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cultivation which might be adopted, but in terms of current practices 
in that region or country, Thus, among others, there are cases in which, 
before undertaking costly irrigation works, which might be justified 
at a later date, it is necessary to make better use of the water in 
lands which are inadequately irrigated; in other instances, land is wasted 
in areas cf a.bundant rainfall, and in still other cases land appropriate 
for artificial pasture of higher yield is still U-Jed for natural pasture» 
Thus, increased investment is not a panacea; the rational utilization 
of existing resources must also be considered. Hoxirever, this solution 
encounters iri many Latin American countries a seriouo obstacle in the 
system of land tenure. In some parts,, there are vast ntret-hes of 
well-cultivated land, whereas in others a poor or average utilization of 
a fraction of his land allows the large landowner to derive a substantial 
income from it» This point is so familiar that it needs no further 
development. There would be no reason for the industrial entrepreneur to 
allow part of hi3 capital to remain unproductive, except in periods of 
reduced demand. But, as a ruis, the productive value of land does not 
decline if the land is not worked; in some cases, on the contrary, it 
may even improve, and its value is enhanced, in the course of time, 
commensurately with that of cultivated land, especially where inflation 
helps to accelerate the normal increase in the income derived therefrom. 
In many Latin American countries, this feature, together with other 
social factors, causes a considerable portion of arable land to remain 
in the hands of a relatively small number of persons. This system of land 
tenure and the high value of the land in relation to its present yield 
(because of the present capix-alization cf future increases in its value) 
make land almost inaccesible to the landless farmer. He is thus compelled 
to invest his limited resources in holdings which are too small to 
enable him to attain a higher level of living than that of the agricultural 
wage-earner, which is very low in most of these countries. Hence the 
extraordinary phenomenon of the subdivision of a small part of the total 
area into numerous small uneconomic holdings, whilst a' relative small 




There is little doubt that this problem may be solved as industrial 
development continues to absorb agricultural labour, but the process is 
slow and can only be speeded up by a sharp acceleration in the rate of 
development of industry and other activities. Ultimately, it is a problem 
of investment, vhich by increasing the demand for labour in activities of 
considerably higher productivity will compel the large landholders to 
mechanize and to increase the yield of the land« The high proportion of 
the labour force employed in agriculture is only a part of the general 
problem of economic development« Little progress can be made in raising 
the level of living of the agricultural population, ffpecially in areas, 
where the soil is poor and where ag'>»oid methods of agriculture prevail, 
unless the surplus population can be displaced by technical progress, 
and unless that portion not required for work in the new areas opened up 
for cultivation can be reabsorbed into activities where productivity 
is higho 
This does not imply that the problem of land tenure in the Latin 
American countries can oe postponed, On the contrary, it should form an 
integral part of economic development programmes, once an objective and 
impartial consideration has been made of the different aspects of the 
vital problem ox increasing agricultural production. In regions where 
the land tenure system itself is not at fault in retarding progress, but 
rather the lack of investment and'of technical action on the part of 
the Government, a. different solution will be required from that applicable 
where the land tenure system constitute the major obstaclec It is 
surprising that so little has been done to explore practical possibilities 
in this field, although much has been written and planned with regard to 
the problem of land tenure. In other words, when there is possibility of 
assimilating modern productive techniques, extensive holdings may offer 
the most economical means of raising the level of productivity. 
/9» Immigration 
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9« Immigration and the surplus of human labour 
In this brief outline of some of the aspects of the problem of 
productivity in Latin America, reference has been made to the real or 
potential abundance of human labour, in relation to the shortage of 
capital ar.d of arable land. It would now be of interest to ascertain 
if, in these circumstances, there is any point in discussing the 
possibilities of immigration, especially in countries where the disequilibrium 
of these factors is greatest. It is evident that if the productive 
capacity cf these immigrants is comparable to that of the population which 
economic progress tends to displace from primary to secondary production 
within the country, then there would be no call for such immigration, 
since it would affect the process of migration within the country, and 
unnecessarily intensify the problem of the relative shortage of capital. 
However, if their productive skills are greater, then the case is 
different. In countries which need to assimilate better agricultural 
or industrial techniques, immigrants with such skills would be very 
useful, as has been shown by past experience. Experience has also shown 
that within the mass of immigrants not only are there efficient labourers 
who tend to raise the average level of productivity, but many of these 
labourers have since become entrepreneurs, exercising considerable 
influence on the general direction and pace of economic development. 
However, immigration is also essentially a problem of greater capital, 
as are all problems of economic development. The addition of each worker 
to the labour- force generally calls for an increment of capital, and 
if there is not enough capital to achieve a satisfactory rate of absorption 
of surplus labour from primary production, this same capital could 
hardly absorb immigrants. Therefore, without the necessary capital, 
immigration would be unproductive. It should be remembered, at the same 
time, that the capital required for immigration is lower than that 
generally needed for internal migration, since in the latter case 
capital is required not only to free labour from primary occupations, 
but also to re-employ it in secondary activities. The cost of freeing 
labour does not arise in the case of foreign immigrants. Moreover, if the 
productivity of the immigrant is higher than that of the domestic worker and 
helps to raise the general level of productivity, the resulting increase in 
real income will help to promote increased capital formation in the future, 
to the evident advantage of economic development. 
/B. TRADE 
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B. TRACE POLICY AND INDUSTRIALIZATION ^ 
It, Industrialization and protectionism 
There are two principles, the frank recognition of which would exert 
a substantial influence on the policy of the Latin American countries as 
regards their trade relations both with industrialized countries and with 
each other0 First, in differing degrees according to individual countries, 
industrialization is an inevitable feature of economic development0 
Secondly, a reascn&ble raeasare of protection if generally indispensable 
for industrialization. 
One3 these fund «.mental principles are recognized, the problem arises 
of determining how and to what degree industrialization should be 
accomplished^ This in -;.he key to an industrial policy, although only 
the aspect of tariff protection is considered here„ 
The major justification for protection lies in the differences of 
productivity between less developed countries and those which have developed 
to a greater degree, These differences e.re explained basically by the 
great disparity in the capital per person engaged and in the technical 
skills which they possess. 
In the abstract, it is possible to conceive a case in which a 
decrease in the wage levels of less developed countries could offset 
these differences in productivity. On this supposition a given country 
could entirely abolish its protective tariff, always provided that the 
decline in wages would compensate industrial establishments for the losses 
which would ensue. But, in addition to being impracticable for social and 
political reasons, such a policy would have serious economic consequences. 
If a decline in domestic wages was followed by a fall in prices, real 
wages might recover their former levels, assuming that adequate adjustments 
4/ From International Co-operation in a Latin American Development 
Policy (United Nations publication, Sales No„: 1954.11.0.2), 
pp.60-62 and 6?-?0, 
/could be 
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could be made. However, this wage decline could in turn affect export 
activities, causing a drop in export prices through the workings of the 
wage-price mechanism. Since this would not be accompanied by a 
corresponding fall in import prices, a deterioration of the terms of 
trade would result, with adverse effects on investment and the rate of 
development of the country. 
Therefore, if the spontaneous development of industry is impracticable 
and uneconomic, protection alone, either through customs tariffs or 
subsidies, would remain to offset the differences in productivity, since 
direct import restrictions are usually less advisable as a moasure of 
industrial policy, unless they are only temporary, 
Such is the type of protection required by Latin America's industrial 
development. Within the classical school of economic though'-;, protective 
measures are condoned during the initial phase of industrialization until 
such time as industry can bo strengthened and has the ability to meet 
foreign competition. It is certainly possible that, in a developing country 
a given industry may achieve the same capital density and the same 
productivity as in the large industrial countries, In such a case, in 
view of lower wages, it would cease to be an infant industry requiring 
protection even before reaching the same degree of productivity. But 
this could hardly be the case for all the industries which a developing 
country requires to expand as a means of absorbing the actively employed 
population not required by other sectors. For this purpose it would be 
necessary to obtain a volume of capital per person engaged similar to 
that of highly developed countries and also the necessary technical skills. 
It is not difficult to show that such a situation is theoretically possible, 
but it is hardly likely to occur in the foreseeable future, since, while 
productivity grows in under-developed countries, it also increases in the 
industrially advanced countries - and sometimes with greater rapidity. 
As a result, the argument employed to demonstrate the inevitability 
of protection enlarges the scope of the classical argument. Instead of 
considering one isolated industry, the new approach includes industry as 
a whole and establishes the need for protection so long as productivity 
continues to be lower than that of more advanced countries and to the 
extent that the difference in productivity is not offset by differences 




A sound development policy must recognize the need for protective 
measures, which are in no way detrimental to world trade, so long as 
they are kept within the limits required by development. Within such 
limits, which will be discussed later, they do not reduce the imports of 
a developing country but only change their composition in accordance with 
the structural modifications of thè domestic economy., "Customs tariffs 
decrease or eliminate some imports for which domestic substitutes are 
found, thus causing an increase in other imports with a very elastic 
demand in relation to the growth of per capita income. 
Thus, if protection dees not exceed these limits, it does not affect 
the total voluns of .imports.. This volume is mainly determined by the 
exports of primary products from developing countries (as well as capital 
investment and other positive elements in the balance of payments which 
are omitted here to simplify the reasonlag), 
2» Consequences of protectionism in the 
industrial centres 
Protectionism in the industrial centres and its consequences for 
world trade, especially the trade of the developing countries, should now 
be considered. It has already been stated that a general characteristic 
of the centres is for imports to increase at a slower rate than income. 
This tendency may be either neutralized or accentuated by trade policy, 
In Great Britain during the nineteenth century, the elimination of customs 
duties upon imports of primary products encouraged these imports to such 
an extent that for a number of decades they increased more rapidly than 
income and their coefficient rose steadily0 The influence thus exerted 
by Great Britain, not only directly on the periphery but also indirectly 
on other industrialized countries, was one of the outstanding features of 
economic history in that period. This was the period when the Latin 
American countries received a strong impetus to outward-directed growth 
in response to a rapidly expanding world demand. Countries such as the 
United States, whose growth began to be more inward-directed, were 
favoured by this strong stimulus to world trade, which has slackened 
to a great degree today when it is Latin America's turn to follow a 
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similar process. Despite such favourable conditions in the international 
sphere, industrialization in the United States systematically resorted 
to protectionist measures, the theoretical rejection of which at that 
time is clearly evident in the many criticisms of the classical school. 
If Great Britain at that period Is an example of how trade policy 
may alter the tendency cf primary imports to increase at a sl'r-rer rate 
than income, the United States, now the principal economic centre as 
a result of its prodigious growth, is an example of the opposite trend. 
The protection of primary production has accentuated this import trend 
in the United States, where the import coefficient is at pre:ont almost 
3 per cent, in contrast with the 3? per cent recorded in I80O in the 
principal economic centre during the nineteenth century. 
The results of this phenomenon cannot be interpreted in the light 
of the previous explanation of protectionism in the peripheral countries. 
Another distinction oS decisive importance must b;; introduced. The 
effects of protectionism on world trade are not the same in an industrial 
centre as in countries in the course of development. While primary 
imports to the centre tend to increase less than its income, its exports 
of manufactured goods have a tendency to rise more rapidly than the income 
of peripheral countries, as has already been pointed out at some length. 
This disparity in trends creates contrasting problems« Imports to 
developing countries tend to expand more than their exports, while the 
opposite tends to occur in the ind"u3trial centres, although to a very 
different extent (with exceptions which will be indicated later), and 
to the degree in which the changes in the composition of imports from 
the periphery affect their industrial exports. 
Thus, in industrial centres whose exports are particularly in 
demand in developing countries, the tendency for exports to grow faster 
than imports of primary products is greater than in other centres. 
Under these conditions, there might be other motives for supporting 
measures to protect domestic primary production, although very different 
from the underlying motives for protectionism in developing countries. 




in the balance of payments, but rather the exact opposite. Further the 
active population which technical progress is gradually eliminating 
from primary production spontaneously moves towards other domestic 
occupations and to the industrial export activities favoured by foreign 
demand. 
Consequently, while protective measures in under-developed countries 
- within the limits previously established - result in maintaining the 
close relationship between imports and exports, without retarding the 
rate of growth in world trade, for an industrial centre with these 
characteristics, they reduce imports below the capacity for external 
payment and have an unfavourable effect on world trade» 
In other words, given the substantial income elasticity of demand 
for industrial goods in general, the restriction of certain '¿¿pes of 
imports in under-developed countries is offset - within the bounds set 
by the capacity for external payments - by increased imports of other 
commodities which could not previously be acquired in the same volume. 
In contrast, restrictions on the import of a given primary commodity 
into a large industrial centre are not necessarily neutralized by greater 
imports of other primary products, since all imports required to satisfy 
demand in existing conditions were being brought in before; the 
restrictive measure will not be offset unless it is combined with others 
designed to encourage imports of manufactures or semi-manufactures. 
The consequences of such a protectionist policy on the part of a 
large industrial centre are obvious. Developing countries are compelled 
to strengthen their own protectionist policies because of a new and 
weakening factor for their export, trade. They must clearly exert 
stronger pressure on imports, both in order to reconcile them with a 
potentially lower capacity for external payments and to encourage 
the additional use in industry of productive factors which would have 




. 3. The United States and trade reciprocity 
It is of interest to examine the breadth of the functional 
differentiation already noted. A large industrial centre, the United States 
has a decisive influence on world trade. Confining the argument to 
Latin America, it is a well-teaown fact that its industrial imports 
depend closely upon exports cf primary products. But, as already stated, 
the opposite does not hold true. If Latin America independently increases 
its purchases from the industrial centre, this does not imply that the 
centre will acquire more primary exports from Latin America;, The volume 
of these exports is governed by ether factors which arc so important that 
fluctuations ir Latin American demand are insigriXicmt in comparison. 
Therefore, the only effect of an independent riss in Latin American 
imports, not caused by a previous increase in experts, will be a 
disequilibrium in the balance of payments .. 
The position of the United States as the principal dynsmc centre 
of the world economy lends particular emphasis to the concept of trade 
reciprocity* Upon examination, reciprocity is found to be implicit in 
the functional nature of that centre, since if exports are increased 
at the same time as imports, compensation is spontaneous and there is 
no need for the tariff's of other countries to be adjusted in order to 
avoid market disruptions, It was a function of the British centre also to 
provoke th? immediate reaction of the periphery when industrial exports 
from Great Britain were subject to very intense demand. 
Thus the tariff concessions granted by the United States to 
developing countries act as a counterpoise, and world purchasing power -
generated by greater United States imports will tend to transform itself 
directly or indirectly into greater international demand for United States 
exports. In fact the position of the United States vis-a-vis the economic 
development of Latin America could not be more advantageous. While 
Latin American countries maintain their policy of protection within the 
given limits, rather than their tariffs it will be their volume of exports 
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to the United States which will determine their quantum of imports. It 
is true that if Europe strengthened the competitive position of its 
industry, some of the dollars generated by the United States would 
be diverted to Europe, but those dollars would soon be transformed into 
European demand for United State3 exports, as indicated by the foregoing 
reasoning and also cy experience. This is a well recognized Xict. 
Clearly, sinco Latin American tariffs are the instrument for 
modifying the composition of imports, United States export activities 
must undergo the process of rsadaptation already mentioned;, In this respect 
also the United States holds a favourable position as compared with other 
industrial countries, not only because of the slight incidence of its 
exports in the national income (approximately ? par cont), but also 
because, as has been said, its exports are attractive to Latin American 
countries, even to an exaggerated extent. This does not imply that in 
certain cases the United States may not have a particular interest in 
promoting certain experts in preference to others, and the exports it 
wishes to promote may be precisely those vir^ se dxiestic output a Latin 
American country may desire to stimulate» This i3 a matter for trade 
negotiations, which would be far easier if agreement were rcached on the 
fundamental principles of an economic development policy« 
If the principle is recognized that the volume of Latin American 
imports ir, not dotermirod by tariffs but by exports, it would not be 
difficult to find an agreement of interests. Suppose that, as a result 
of United States tariff concessions, a Latin American country increases 
its exports and is therefore in a position to import more; but suppose 
also that this country wishes to reduce rather than raise imports of 
certain goods which can be replaced by domestic production through a 
reasonable measure of protection. It is probable that with this object 
in view, the protective duties on such goods will be increased. What 
will happen to the other imports? There will be a tendency towards an 
over-all increase, without any need for a reduction of customs duties. 
Nevertheless, it is evident that if the duties on certain goods were to 




the expense of others. An increase could therefore take place in imports 
of luxury goods mainly consumed by the higher income brackets or of goods 
which are not indispensable for popular consumption. The resources could 
have otherwise been advantageously employed in acquiring capital goods. 
Once again the value is apparent of considering all these aspects within 
a development policy which takes account not only of pre sen' requirements, 
but also of the evident need to introduce future changes in ihe composition 
of imports. 
To return to protection, the maintenance of high duties on goods 
to avoid over-en^curagement of imports might cause their domestic 
substitution and thus prevent productive factors from being used to the 
country's greater advantage,. A good development policy can use domestic 
fiscal instruments to deal with such cases and thus eliminate one of the 
difficulties which often arise in trade negotiations« 
This ability of tha United States to obtain spontaneous reciprocity 
for its tariff concessions is a result of the fundamental changes that 
have taken place in the short span of one generation, interested as 
the United States is in a vast peripheral development policy, it is 
logical that it3 trade policy should also be modified in accordance 
with its new international situation. But to assume that this merely 
consists in accomodating a policy to new principles would be an artificial 
over-simplification of a real and very complex problem. There is no 
reason why exporters in general - and especially those encountering tariff 
obstacles elsewhere - should react in a manner which does not coincide 
with their immediate interests. This attitude is even more explicable 
in a country whose foreign trade policy only a few decades ago had 
necessarily to be focused upon the encouragement of exports. 
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Chapter III 
PLANNING CONCEPTS AND EXPERIENCES 
A. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING 
1, Development programmes and the regimentation 
of the economy 
There is a certain amount of confusion between the concept of a 
development programme and that of rigid state control of the economy* 
Such ambiguity must be dispelled* A programme of economic, development 
is the expression of a single idea, namely, the desirability of increasing 
and judiciously regulating capital investment, so that a stronger impetus 
and greater order may be given to the growth of a country. Undoubtedly* 
the State may thus encompass a very wide sphere of action and to a great 
extent supplant the role of private enterprise; but this is by no means 
inherent in a development programme. In fact, state intervention may even 
take place without economic development as a definite objective, and there 
may be no clear direction of investment. Conversely, a programme may be 
put into effect with the minimum of state intervention. That the sphere 
of action of private initiative and free enterprise in a programme may 
actually be very wide does not imply that the State ought- necessarily to 
limit itself to the traditional attitude of laissez-faire. On the 
contrary, a programme calls for the firm application of a development 
policy; but this is possible without shackling private enterprise which 
may, in fact, be stimulated into undertaking certain activities, and be 
offered access to essential resources. The State possesses.effective 
instruments for this purpose, namely, its fiscal and tariff, monetary 
and credit policies, and domestic and foreign loans, apart from its 
direct participation in those basic investments which, for one reason or 
1/ From the series Analyses and projections of economic development, 
I. An introduction to the technique of programming (United 
publication, Sales N° 55.11.G.2j, pp. 3-9. : ~ 
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another, cannot be effected by private enterprise. Well handled, these 
can become the chief instruments of a programme conceived in terms of 
a development policy. 
Here, too, it would be as well to avoid confusion. There are two 
kinds of state intervention: that which involves the use of such instruments 
and which creates a favourable environment for the evolution of private 
enterprise^ enhancing its ability to fulfil certain goals or objectives; 
and that of a regulatory character which tends to prescribe what private 
initiative may or may not do. The system of exchange permits and price 
controls is characteristic of this kind of intervention. A good programme, 
far from strengthening or insisting upon the necessity of this type of 
control over the actions of individual entrepreneurs, could, on the contrary, 
create favourable conditions for its elimination, by means of a more 
systematic and intensive growth of the economy. 
The field of programming techniques is so vast that this chapter will 
be limited to the preliminary techniques of programming and to a general 
commentary on the problers involved. 
2. Development targets and investment 
The first problem involved in the technique of formulating a programme 
consists in determining the possible targets of development in a given 
economy. Such a problem cannot be resolved without a prior review of past 
events and present possibilities, and its solution must be the result of 
painstaking analysis. First, to undertake what might be termed a diagnosis 
of the national economy, an examination must be made of the way in which 
a country has evolved in latter years, and of the dynamic factors which 
have played a part in its growth. Of special importance is the determination 
of the most recent rate of growth, as well as of the efforts made by the 
economy to attain it. Secondly, a study must be undertaken of probable 
future trends, and of the possibilities of change or of persistence in the 
internal and external factors that have played a role in recent years. 
An over-all survey of these elements will enable the economy's growth 
potentialities to be assessed, and the degree of effort required to attain 
various rates of growth to be defined. 
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The possible conclusions to be derived from the results of such an 
analysis are many and varied. It may well be that, on account of favourable 
circumstances - internal or external in origin - the country has attained 
what might be considered a satisfactory rate of growth, but that a 
continuation of these promising trends is unlikely. In that event, the 
aim of a programme might be to maintain development at the previous rate, 
which would necessarily imply a greater effort on the part, of the economy 
as a whole. Another possibility is to accelerate the rate of growth, 
inasmuch as the present rate is considered unsatisfactory, or because 
it is thought that the economy could' either make a greater effort or 
achieve a better organization and distribution of its resources» These two 
instances are perhaps the most typical in Latin America. 
At all events, it is likely that the study of recent and future trends 
in a country's development will suggest various alternative patterns of 
growth, depending upon the degree of effort employed. One of the decisive 
factors in the evaluation of theso alternatives is the level of investment 
required to ensure that e given rats may in practice be achieved. 
Careful calculation of the total investment required would.be a 
laborious taskj but simplified procedures exist which, established upon 
past experience of a country:s economy, make an approximate computation 
possible. These methods are based on the relationship between the stock 
of capital and income over a representative period. This relationship 
will give an approximation of the volume of new investment required to 
attain a given increase in income. Thus, taking Latin America as a whole, 
it can be estimated - according to experience later than that of 1935 -
that to obtain an increase in income of 1 per cent, about 2.3 per cent 
of income must be devoted to capital investment, apart from the amount 
which must be invested to offset the loss or depreciation in the stock 
of capital. 
With the coefficient thus derived it is possible to make a preliminary 
estimate of the volume of income that would be obtained from year to year 
according to each rate of growth, as well as of the aggregate annual investment 
required to attain it. In this way projections of income and investment are 
drawn up, on the basis of past experience, which by their very nature are general 
. /and aggregative. 
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and aggregative. The next step is to establish projections for individual 
sectors of the economy, with more detailed estimates of the capital 
required by each, so that the general projections of investment can be 
subsequently amended; but'this comes at a more advanced stage of programming, 
and meanwhile work must proceed with aggregate projections. 
To return to the previous question - it is in this matter of the 
investment required by each growth alternative that economists responsible 
for programming encounter the first limitation to their range of alternatives. 
To attain a higher rate of growth, the coefficient of investment must be 
raised. This implies a corresponding increase in saving, which cannot be 
achieved without a restriction of present consumption. Or, paper, it is 
easy to see how the lowering of average per capita consumption by a given 
amount could raise the coefficient of investment, so that, within a few 
years, income would increase and consumption return to its former level, 
subsequently expanding at' a higher rate than before. The numerical 
demonstration of the acceleration of growth is a very simple concept; but 
in expressing numerical hypotheses in terms of practical reality considerable 
stumbling-blocks are encountered. In the first place, preference for the 
current pattern of consumption is very strong and the population will not 
readily accept any modification of its habits of consumption and saving 
unless there is an appreciable change in the volume of income or in its 
distribution among the different social groups. This attitude is all the 
more understandable in countries such as those of Latin America, where 
the level of consumption - although it has risen in no small measure -
still remains very low, notwithstanding the fact that the pattern of 
income distribution would suggest that the higher income groups are capable of 
much greater saving than at present. In the second place, very strong 
pressure exerted on consumption may lower it to a level below the installed 
capacity of consumer goods industries, so that the stimulus provided by this 
important sector of production would be lost. 
These practical difficulties are one of two fundamental reasons for 
believing that savings must be supplemented with foreign capital to attain 
a higher rate of growth. The other reason will be examined at a later 
stage. The additional contribution of foreign capital to a development 
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programme is usually considered as a transitory expedient which allows of 
a higher rate of growth without the curtailment of existing consumption. 
Its impermanence rests upon a simple principle. The growth of income 
must be accelerated with the aid of foreign capital until it reaches a point 
beyond which all the investment required for further growth at a higher 
rate of development can be covered by domestic saving, without resort to 
additional foreign capital. From this point of view the aim of the foreign 
capital inflow is to create conditions favourable to an increase in the 
savings coefficient. In a programme, the time required to raise initial 
domestic saving to the level necessary to achieve the target rate of growth 
2/ 
will be called the period of transition,-' 
In other words, foreign capital must facilitate an increase in the 
coefficient of domestic savings, without its being necessary to reduce 
current consumption. Nevertheless, it will be essential to restrict the 
expansion of consumption as income rises, A larger share than previously 
, of the increment in income obtained from greater investment should be 
devoted to savings. If this is not accomplished and the savings coefficient 
remains at the same level, the inflow of foreign capital must continue 
indefinitely in order to maintain the desired rate of growth. This would 
be hardly practicable for a series of reasons. Among them figures the 
increasing burden of remittances abroad« which could be borne only on the 
assumption that the foreign capital inflow would continue to increase 
without interruption, not only to meet the deficit in saving, but also 
to contribute to the payment of these remittances. 
Between the assumption of a continued and indefinite rise in the 
inflow of foreign capital and the hypothesis that consumption would be 
restricted in order to accelerate development without resort to foreign 
investment, there are other intermediate courses. Everything depends upon 
the share of the increase in income to be set aside for saving during the 
2/ This treatment of foreign capital as a transitory phenomenon should 
be understood as a methodological approach and not as a principle 
of economic policy, It is quite conceivable that, after the period 
of transition, the inflow of foreign capital should be continued to 
make possible a higher rate of growth and the introduction of new 
techniques, 
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period of transition* The higher this proportion and the more rapidly a 
country's domestic saving reaches the savings target for a higher 
coefficient of investment, the smaller vail be the foreign capital 
required to attain this objective* Here also the question of feasibility 
must be borne in mind, which, as in the preceding example, is inevitably 
affected by political and social, as well as economic, considerations. 
The programming expert must present the different possibilities as 
objectively as possible, to facilitate the decisions of the responsible 
authorities» Consideration must be given not only to this aspect, but 
also that of import substitution or an increase in exports« Domestic 
savings alone are not enough; the possibility of transforming them into 
capital goods imports is indispensable, 
3» The vital need to raise the domestic savings coefficient 
It was stated above that domestic saving would have to increase until 
it could cover the investment needed for an accelerated rate of growth. 
This is one of the most delicate points in a development policy,, in view 
of the tendency to adhere to a set pattern of saving and consumption. It 
would not therefore be possible to count too much on a spontaneous rise 
in saving resulting from the gradual and moderate increase in income 
achieved by a programme. The lower-income groups will be inclined to 
use their earnings to improve their level of living, and very little in 
the way of saving can be expected from them. The higher income-brackets 
have a greater capacity for saving, but they too will tend to increase 
consumption in the adoption of new and luxurious ways of life. These 
obstacles to an improvement in domestic saving have sometimes led to the 
replacement of voluntary saving by inflationary methods of financing which 
result in lower real incomes for the poorer and more populous sectors. 
To judge by the experience of some Latin .American countries, the consequences 
of such a policy were either that saving rose at an extremely high social 
cost or that dangerous conditions of foreign and domestic instability were 
created. Both situations retarded development over the long term. 
It is thus: part of the technique of programming to discuss the means 
available to a government for modifying saving in terms of the existing 
data on income distribution. Some examples will serve as a better illustration 
/of these 
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of these possibilities. It should be recalled that much private financing 
takes the form of reinvested.profits, which firms or enterprises retain 
in preference to distributing them as dividends. An incentive to this 
type of saving could be most effective, and doubtless the tax system could 
play a decisive role by reducing or eliminating taxes on income that is 
reinvested. This is one of the most important objectives of fiscal policy 
in a development programme. The fiscal instrument might thus be employed 
to encourage saving by the entrepreneur before income flows towards 
consumption. But taxes can also be used directly to discourage consumption, 
above all in the high income groups, in so far as they have rejected 
investment. If the coefficient of saving in the high income sector is 
relatively low, and these means for discouraging consumption canr.ot Increase 
it, fiscal policy might be of considerable help in achieving this end, if 
a substantial proportion of the tax on such income were use! for purposes 
of investment. In this way, th-3 State would divert to investment those 
resources which would otherwise have been used for consumption. Moreover, 
the investment could also be ir-ids through private channels If the resources 
thus obtained were placed at the disposal of those entrepreneurs who would 
know how to invest them, instead of resorting to familiar inflationary 
expedients in the banking system. 
Nevertheless, the fiscal instrument may also exert an unfavourable 
influence on development,, The excessive growth of current government 
expenditure in relation to a country{s income can adversely affect the 
savings of the population and will thus retard the rate of development. 
It is extremely difficult to demarcate clearly what is and what is not 
excessive in thi3 fields There is obviously much need for governmental 
services in Latin America, but equally vital is the necessity to increase 
the consumption of goods and of certain private services. Consequently, 
changes in the proportion of government services to total income should 
be a matter for careful consideration A programme must be based on 
certain assumptions of the relationship between the rate of development 
of governmental services and the expansion of income; should.these 
assumptions cease to be valid, the programme must be revised. 
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The nature of this relationship is usually determined by motives 
other than economic development; but the projection of its influence on 
the rate of development, together with the analysis of growth, may contribute 
persuasively to the argument that the policy of fiscal expenditure should 
not be considered independently from the problems of a country's growth, 
4* limitations to development arising from the 
capacity to import 
Another problem involved in the technique of programming must now 
be examined. It was explained earlier that one reason for resorting to 
foreign capital was the practical difficulty of reducing consumption in 
order to increase saving; but if this difficulty was overcome, others would 
crop up in its place, since the additional saving obtained in this way 
would have to be used for the purchase of capital goods abroad at the expense 
of other imports. This point is of such practical importance that it 
must be dwelt on at more length here. If ths coefficient of imports to 
aggregate investment was equal to the coefficient of imports to aggregate 
consumption, there would be no difficulty in using the increase in saving 
for buying foreign capital goods, since the additional saving would be 
divided between the imparted and the locally-produced capital goods in the 
same proportion as the sacrifice made by the consumer would be divided 
between national and imported goods; but this does not happen. Even in the 
Latin American countries where capital goods industries havo been vigorously 
developed, the coefficient of imports in investment is much higher than the 
coefficient of imports in consumption, A reduction of consumption in favour 
of saving does not therefore lower imports as much as the growth of investment 
increases them. This has two fundamental consequences. First, greater 
saving, and its transfer abroad, weakens the demand for domestic consumer 
goods, without being offset by a corresponding increase in the demand for 
domestic capital goods. Secondly, imports will rise. These are two aspects 
of the same phenomenon, in which the deficiency in domestic demand is 
equivalent to excess demand for import3. 
This excess is the important point. The shift of income from consumption 
to investment ¿implies additional imports. It is conceivable.that non-essential 
imports might be restricted in order to offset this increase. Nevertheless, 
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apart from the fact that such a process does not occur spontaneously but 
requires selective state intervention, the margin for control is very 
narrow in countries where severe restrictions upon the expansion of imports 
are already in force because the capacity to import is fully absorbed. 
Such is the case in some Latin American countries. However, this is only 
one aspect of a more general problem, namely, that of the limitations 
imposed on economic development by the capacity to import. Even when 
greater imports of capital goods are offset either by a reduction of 
imports of other goods or by the use of foreign capital, only a temporary 
difficulty has been removed. There still remains an obstacle of major 
importance to economic development: as per capita income expandsc imports 
generally tend to rise more than the capacity to import. This disparity 
makes the replacement of imports by domestic production inevitable', so 
that income may continue to grow at a rate which is adequate in relation 
to the capacity to import. 
A development programme calls for an assessment of how much substitution 
should be effected in order to attain a given rate of income growth. For 
this purpose two series of hypothetical calculations must be made. First, 
the probable expansion of the requirements for imported goods must be 
determined by means of a series of projections, to which further reference 
will be made. Secondly, the probable growth of the capacity to import 
must be estimated in terms of exports and their relative prices, as well as 
of the volume of foreign capital necessary to carry out the programme. In 
view of the probable increase of these requirements and of the capacity 
to import, the difference between these two estimates will give the volume 
of imports to be replaced by domestic production. Different alternatives 
will be available in selecting the most suitable items for replacement and, 
in some cases, in deciding whether it is preferable to increase import 
substitution or encourage exports. Apart from the other considerations* 
the essential criterion should be the increase in income obtained from 
the different alternatives. The greater the increment obtained by a given • 
addition of capital, the greater will be the volume of goods and services 
available for the community, Since further reference will be made to this 
subject at a later stage, it is now sufficient to note that the calculation 
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of import substitution, as of other fundamental estimates in a programme, 
rests upon a series of hypotheses. These must be carefully prepared on 
the basis of past events and future prospects, but it is not worthwhile 
to discuss whether or not they are true in practice. It is therefore 
necessary to introduce an element of flexibility into a programme, which, 
while affecting its primary aims as little as possible, will allow it to 
be adapted to any changes that may occur» 
5. The projection of demand in terms of the rate of growth 
The problem mentioned above forms part of a much greater whole, from 
which it has been isolated inasmuch as it has certain different characteristics 
that give it special significance. This problem appertains to the 
assessment of the growth of demand for available goods and services, in 
order to calculate investment requirements in the different sectors of 
economic activity and in the different branches uf each sector. 
The aggregate projections give a first approximation of the volume 
of capital required to obtain a given rate of growth and its corresponding 
coefficient of investments A second approximation must then be made by 
calculating capital requirements by sectors. Once this is done, either 
the first calculation or the rate of growth must be adjusted. In this 
way, the aggregate projections of income and over-all capital requirements 
are transformed into pro jections by sectors. Only then m y more elaborate 
calculations be made with the assistance of specialists in the different 
activities. To enable such specialists to work satisfactorily, it is 
essential to provide them with clear and precise information on what 
each activity must attain in terms of the probable rise in demand and 
the capital available to meet this growth. 
At this stage the part to be played by the projections may be seen 
more clearly. It is not possible to project the probable expansion of 
demand in each sector of economic activity without first having determined 
the general rate of growth whioh it is desired to achieve. The target 
for per capita income growth determines the form and intensity with which 
the sectoral expansion of demand can be forecast. It is thus necessary 
to pass from the general? to the particular, in order to return once more 




If future demand were to expand proportionately to current . 
consumption, its calculation would be very simple, since the rate of 
growth in the aggregate projection could be applied to individual sectors. 
Obviously this is not the case. With a given increment of income, the 
expansion of demand for the different goods and services varies; in some 
cases demand increases more than income, while in others it rises either 
proportionately to or less than income. The income-elasticity of demand 
according to the principal groups of goods and services must therefore 
be calculated; but this is no easy task, given the unreliability of Latin 
American statistics. The same is true of the estimates of capital needs 
in the different sectors. 
This method of summarizing the principal problems of the technique 
of programming was adopted in the interests of clarity, and does not imply 
that in practice these problems should be considered in the same order. 
In reality, once the rate of growth haïs been determined, they must be 
analysed according to the relationship imposed by their interdependence* 
Thus, the assessment of Capital needs, to which reference has just been 
made, cannot be separated from an analysis of the availability and 
productivity of labour. This is another of the problems to be raised 
in the present chapter, and a discussion of it now follows. 
6, Productivity and transfer of labour 
Two main stages distinguish between economic development in 
under-developed countries and the growth of more highly developed countries. 
By the very way in which technical progress penetrates the less developed 
countries, Latin America* s primary activities, except those producing for 
export, are generally characterized by a relative abundance of labour, a 
relative shortage of capital, and low productivity. As a result, a high 
proportion of the labour force is engaged in these primary activities. As 
technical progress advances, the proportion gradually falls and the labour 
force shifts to industry, trade, transport and services. In the latter 
sectors the intensity of capital per gainfully employed person is usually 
higher than in primary activities, with a consequent difference in labour 
productivity. Therefore, as the working population shifts from activities 
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with a low productivity to others where it is higher, average productivity 
throughout the whole economy also rises, although it may not have improved 
in any individual sector. For this effect to be achieved, it is 
sufficient for the increment in the population that cannot find employment 
in agriculture to be absorbed by the other more productive.activities. But 
in reality this process is accompanied by an improvement in the productivity 
of the different sectors; the shift of the active population from primary 
production becoses greater as the same productivity can be attained with a 
smaller labour force«, The same is true of the other sectors^ although to 
a varying dsgree and, as theea effects are added to those of the normal 
displacement of tbo l&bo.ir foroe, both elements unite to rri.se productivity. 
Given the degree of progress in productive technology, there is a 
limit to the reduction of the active population engaged in primary 
activities, which cannot continue to decrease without adversely affecting 
the relationship existing between production in the different sectors. The 
complete assimilation of tecto.iqr.es5 in primary activities «113. enable such 
activities to surrender virtually their entire surplus labour, and thus 
the initial phase of economic -levslopmert .will be accomplished, 
During the second stage, there are no great shifts in the labour 
force. There is a certain technological, homogeneity in all activities, 
compatible with the degree of technic?! progress in the different branches« 
Naturally, a certain amount of displacement will occur, owing to the 
different intensity with which this technical progress is introduced and 
the different rates of expansion of demand. Nevertheless, the large and • 
unilateral shifts from primary activities to others will have disappeared« 
There will be no further outstanding increases in productivity as a result 
of the mere transfer of manpower^ but only through the improvement of skills 
and of the capital intensity in the individual sectors and branches. 
The Latin American countries are now in the first stage, although 
some are reaching the end of it and are ready for gradual entry into the 
second stage. In other -.rordc.5 they have the problem of a shift in the 
labour force from agriculture to industry, trade, transport and services. 
In general terms, therefore, the labour force is not usually a factor 




limiting factor lies in the capital required to free labour from activities 
with low productivity and at the same time to raise productivity in the 
other sectors by increasing the capital intensity. 
Herein lies one of the principal motives for drawing up an over-all 
programme which can co-ordinate partial plans and' make them compatible» 
How, for example, could per capita productivity in agriculture be raised, 
if a simultaneous attempt were not made to reabsorb in other activities 
the labour force which agriculture, with its own rate of expansion, could 
no longer retain? From another standpoint, how could industrial development 
be accelerated if it was not known how much of the labour force could be 
withdrawn from agriculture or from broad categories of personal services 
with a low economic yield? 
The essence of the problem is as follows: given the probable increase 
of demand in the various activities, and the higher productivity to be 
expected from each of them should their capita;, intensity be ir.areased, 
how should manpower be distributed' among them, what shifts will be 
necessary, and how and where can the displaced labour forco be absorbed? 
7© Productivity and investment alternatives in a programme . 
To solve this problem, the concept of productivity and the influence 
of capital formation upon it needs prior- explanation,. This is a basic 
concept in programming development. Once the rate of growth to be reached 
within a given period has bean determined, and a preliminary estimate..made 
of the capital requirements, a criterion for directing the distribution of 
the capital among the different sectors and branches of each sector must 
be established. An estimate will naturally be available of- the expansion 
of the requirements for goods and servias in the different sectors and 
branches* To meet these requirements5 various alternative courses of action 
are open, and one of the most important considerations in choosing among 
them, but not the only one, is productivity. 
There are two types of alternative, .The first is the satisfaction . 
of requirements by domestic production and imports, although it is known 
that the present volume of imports cannot be maintained, since the 
capacity to import expands more slowly than the demand for imported 
/commodities. Import 
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commodities* Import substitution must therefore take place, and various 
possibilities offer themselves. Should the domestic production of a 
particular foodstuff instead of a particular raw material or manufactured 
product be undertaken or increased? What should be the selective criterion 
if, given the estimated increment in the available capital and labour 
force, the aim is to achieve a maximum rise in income? These are the 
first types of alternative which mast be examined by the economist in 
charge- of a programme. 
The second type of alternative is closely linked with the first, 
although it does not encompass the whole economy but is concerned with 
each of the individual, branches,, The problem lies in the existence of 
different solutions for the production of a given commodity or service, 
each of which involves a different capital intensity per workere What 
criterion should be adopted so that the series of investments will be 
accompanied by a maximum increment in production? 
A discussion of this aspect must include the two principal forms 
of productivity, namely, product per worker and product per -unit of capital. 
To increase productivity in either of these forms it is generally necessary 
to raise the capital intensity per workerj but an increase of this kind 
does not always have the same effect on the product per worker and the 
product per unit of capital«, For the economy as a whole.,, the final 
objective of technical advance is a progressive increase in the product 
per worker, that is, a reduction in the amount of labour per unit of 
production. However, to obtain a given increment in the-product per 
worker may require disproportionate increases in capital. The ideal 
situation would be for a given increment in the product per worker to be 
achieved with the minimum increase in capital,. which evidently implies a 
maximum increment in the product-capital ratio,. But either because of 
reasons inherent in the process of introducing improved techniques, or 
because the latter is aimed mainly at achieving the greatest possible 
increase in labour productivity, capital increments which do not bring 
about an increase in the productivity of capital and which even result 
in a decline in the product-capital ratio are not only conceivable, but 
are also of great importance in more economically developed countries. 
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limiting factor lies in the capital required to free labour from activities 
with low productivity and at the same time to raise productivity in the 
other sectors by increasing the capital intensity. 
Herein lies one of the principal motives for drawing up an over-all 
programme which can co-ordinate partial plans, and make them compatible. 
How, for example, could per capita productivity in agriculture be raised, 
if a simultaneous attempt were not made to reabsorb in other activities 
the labour force which sericulture, with .its own rate of expansion, could 
no longer retain? From another standpoint, how could industrial development 
be accelerated if it was not known how much of the labour force could be 
withdrawn from agriculture or from broad categories of personal services 
with a low economic yield? -
The essence of the problem is. as follows: given the probable increase 
of demand in the various activities, and, the higher productivity to be 
expected from each of thorn should tfeei? capita", intensity be increased, 
how should manpower be distributed among , them, what shifts .wil'l be 
necessary, and how and where can .the displaced labour force, be absorbed? 
7o Productivity and investment alternatives in a programme . 
To solve this problem, the concept of productivity and the influence 
of capital formation upon it needs prior explanation. This is a basic 
concept in programming development. Once the rate of grov/th to be reached 
within a given period has bean determined, and a preliminary estimate made 
of the capital requirements, a criterion for directing the distribution of 
the capital among the different sectors and branches of each sector must 
be established. An estimate will naturally be available of the expansion 
of the requirements for goods and servies in the different sectors and 
branches. To meet these requirements, various alternative courses of action 
are open, and one of the most important considerations in choosing among 
them, but not the only one, is productivity. 
There are two types of alternative, The first is the satisfaction . 
of requirements by domestic production and imports, although it is known 
that the present volume of imports cannot be maintained, since the 
capacity to import expands more slowly than the demand for imported 
/commodities. Import 
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commodities. Import substitution must therefore take place, and various 
possibilities offer themselves. Should the domestic production of a. 
particular foodstuff instead of a particular raw material or manufactured 
product be undertaken or increased? What should be the selective criterion 
if, given the estimated increment in the available capital and labour 
force, the aim is to achieve a maximum rise in income? These are the 
first types of alternative which must be examined by the economist in 
charge of a programmes 
The second type of alternative is closely linked with the first, 
although it does not encompass the whole economy but is concerned with 
each of the individual branches,, The problem lies in the exist once of 
different solutions fcr the production of a given commodity or service, 
each of which involves a different capital intensity per worke.r0 What 
criterion should be adopted so that the series of investment3 will be 
accompanied by a masaaam increment in production? 
A discussion of this aspect must include the two principal forms 
of productivity, namely, product por worker and product per unit of capital. 
To increase productivity in either of these forms it is generally necessary 
to raise the capital intensity per worker; but an increase of this kind 
does not always have the same effect on the product per worker and the 
product per unit of capital. For the economy as a whole., the final 
objective of technical advance is a progressive increase in the product 
per worker, that is, a reduction in the amount of labour per unit of 
production. However, to obtain a given increment in the.product per 
worker may require disproportionate increases in capital. The ideal 
situation would be for a given increment in the product per worker to be 
achieved with the minimum increase in capital,. which evidently implies a 
maximum increment in the product-capital ratio« But either because of 
reasons inherent in the process of introducing improved techniques, or 
because the latter is aimed mainly at achieving the greatest possible 
increase in labour productivity, capital increments which do not bring 
about an increase in the productivity of capital and which even result 
in a decline in the product-capital ratio are not only conceivable, but 
are also of great importance in more economically developed countries, 
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intensity may be very high, accompanied by a high level of productivity 
per worker, although the product-capital ratio is lower than in other 
investments or in the rest of economic activity. It is evident that if 
there was sufficient capital'to attain the highest possible intensity 
in all activities, the problem would be solved. This is not the case 
however, to obtain maximum -income- in the- oèanà±y as a mole, in certain 
sectors it would bs necessary to adopt solutions giving a higher 
product-capital ratio, even at the expense of foregoing increases in 
the product per worker. • 
However^ it is not always possible to find solutions of this nature, 
since technological rocoarch in those countries where capital is 
relatively abundant is directed more towards laboui^savlng processes 
than towards capital saving. ' 
At this point, it .may be useful to digress a little so that the ' . 
point just made can be placed in-the context c-f technical development» 
A British transport authority recently showed thet if underdeveloped 
countries assimilated the road-building techniques of other countries 
such as the United States, many of them would be unable to meet the 
resultant cost. Progress in the field of motor transport, together 
with the abundance of capital in the United States^ has given rise to 
heavier and faster vehicles- and this has created new problems in the 
technique of road-building, with a consequent increase in investment 
per unit of surface. This is a further manifestation of the glaring 
discrepancy between the modest per capita income of under-developed 
countries and the high investment level required by modern productive 
techniques 
Thus it may be necessary to adopt solutions involving a product-capital 
ratio which would be much lower- than that of other new investments, owing 
to the lack of alternative courses of action in the same branch of the 
economy. On the other hand, the techniques involving a high capital 
intensity, combined with a Idgh product per, worker, are as attractive to 
the Latin American entrepreneur as th:y were to his counterpart during 
the evolution of capitalism. But in the latter case, technical progress 
took place gradually and in easy stages, whereas thè ünder-developéd 
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countries have sought to absorb advanced technology as quickly as possible, 
in view of the prospect of greater profits. It happens with relative 
frequency that entrepreneurs, whose own individual resources are adequate, 
choose the alternatives involving high capital intensity, while the 
econony as a whole has sufficient capital only to effect investments 
corresponding to a much lower intensity. Owing to this shortage of 
capital, the dynamic effect which the entrepreneur obtained in the highly 
developed countries by raising the wage level in the rest of the economy 
cannot be achieved - or only to a very small extent; moreover, available 
capital is not distributed in a manner conducive to obtaining fee 
maximum increment in the product^ 
Undoubtedly, this will not result in the most economical distribution 
of the small stock of capital. In a development programme, all possible 
attention should therefore be devoted to this problem, particularly in 
those instances where the Government effects direct investments or guides 
investment policy by means of its tariff, fiscal or credit measures. 
The other types of alternative are of equal importanr.fi, although 
they are not applicable in a single branch of activity, but among 
different branches, especially in connexion with import substitution. 
Here too, of course, the product-capital ratio must be considered, but 
in the following special way. 
If, in order for a country to attain a given rate of growth, a 
certain amount of substitution must be effected, it would be essential, 
above all, to select those items involving the highest product-capital 
ratio. Nevertheless, as these substitutions are carried out, the ratio 
might decline until it was lower than that obtained by the new investments 
in the rest of domestic activity. The only alternative would then be 
to export, always provided that a product-capital ratio could be obtained 
which would be superior to that in the replacement activities. Should 
this be impossible, the reduction of the product-capital ratio would be 
vital to the continuation of growth. As long as this phenomenon is 
accompanied by an increasing labour productivity, there is no cause for 
alarm; but it is a different matter if the decline in the product-capital 
ratio coincides with a fall in the product per worker. This is not an 
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arbitrary assumption, but something that might well take place if 
substitution is expanded in those countries whose markets are hot 
sufficiently wide to absorb the production deriving from investments 
of high capital intensity. The smallhess of markets is therefore one 
of the gravest obstacles to the development of the economy beyond certain 
limits, which in seme cases are hot very wide. 
All the foregoing considerations demonstrate that analysis of 
productivity is of fundamental importance in a development programme. 
However, there is very little material available in the latin American 
countries upon which such an undertaking could be based3 and a i>x>re 
resolute effort must be made to study and analyse the subject if a 
better understanding of economic development problems i* to be achievede 
8. The neutrality of the progrs.Tiimj.nq technique 
In the foregoing pages,, frequent reference has been made to. 
alternative solutions which the economist charged with the preparation 
of a programme should submit with all possible objectivity, to the ..' 
authorities responsible for making the final decisions. In some cases, 
the terms of these alternatives are of a strictly economic^character; 
in others, social and political factors are involved, These, decisions 
are of no concern to the erports a3 such, although the technique of 
programming must provide a sound basis for judgement so that a, full 
knowledge may be had of the extent of the factors at play and of the 
consequences to be expected from any decision. 
The first impartial step of the programming technique is to discuss 
the possible rates of growth and to decide whether recourse must be had 
to foreign capital and, if so, to what extent, to attain these rates of 
growth. As has already been seen, from the economic point of view 
various solutions exist, and their selection will inevitably depend 
upon social and political considerations. The role of the expert is to 
submit the different alternatives with all objectivity, explaining the 
requirements and probable effects of each one. It must be ascertained, 
for example, whether current consumption would have to be restricted in 
order to attain a given rate of growth, if no recourse is to be had to 
foreign capital; or what amount of foreign capital -would be required 
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according to the way in which consumption is to be permitted to expand 
in relation to savings, as a result of the additional increase in income« 
Similarly, with respect to this problem of increasing saving, the 
programming technique must permit an unprejudiced examination of the 
various possibilities offered by taxation or other expedients, pointing 
out in each case the probable effects on the distribution of income and 
consumption in the different social groups» 
This attitude of impartiality in the technique of programming is 
not only necessary in defining functions; it is also ccmmandablo inasmuch 
as it strengthens the moral authority and increases the powers cf 
persuasion of those drawing up the programme. Programming is an extremely 
complicated procedure, requiring the collaboration of strong social 
forces. In obtaining this co-operation, it is indispensable to give 
an unbiased presentation of the possible targets and the different 
alternatives for attaining them. The final objective of any programme 
is to obtain a substantial increase in future consumption, and this 
inevitably requires the raising cf the level of investment by restricting 
the growth of consumption. The support of vast sectors of public opinion 
for a development programme necessitates a clear understanding of the need 
to improve the investment coefficient. Without this support, no development 
programme could be effectively implemented, no matter hew rational and 





B, PLANNING IN LATIN AMERICA ^ 
I. PAST HISTORY 
The need for a development planning policy has only recently been 
recognized in Latin America, as the result of a combination of internal 
and external factors* 
During the forties, the need to enlarge the economic infrastructure, 
particularly the transport network and power supply, and to adapt it to 
new development conditions, as well as to encourage relatively"large-scale 
projects in key industries led to the preparation and implementation of 
some partial programmes dependent mainly on public investment. 
It later became increasingly apparent, particularly towards the end 
of the fifties, that the Latin American economies lacked the necessary 
dynamism to maintain moderately satisfactory rates of growth, to remedy 
critical imbalances in their foreign trade and external financing, to 
contain inflationary pressures, to provide sufficient productive employment 
for a rapidly increasing labour force, and to improve living conditions 
and at the same time fulfil rising expectations created by a knowledge 
of the tremendous possibilities opened up by technological advances. 
Economic policy thus came to hinge on development in its most comprehensive 
sense as an economic and social concept* and to take into account both 
internal and external limitations, ECLA, whose objectives are to obtain 
a fuller knowledge of Latin America's development problems determine 
technical criteria for a development strategy and suggest methods of 
projecting future needs, helped to instil that more comprehensive outlook. 
Although its work was. focused on analysis rather than planning, the 
increasing use of projections as a method of anticipating certain problems 
and analysing policy alternatives helped to prepare the ground and provide 
a methodological tool for the formulation of plans, 
Bolivia, Chile and Colombia were the first Latin American countries 
in the fifties to formulate national development plans and to establish 
the necessary planning machinery, largely with the help of international 
y "Planning in Latin America" (E/CN,12/772), Economic Bulletin for 
Latin America. Vol. XII, No. 2 (1967). 
/technical assistance. 
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technical assistance. However, it was not until the Punta del Este 
Conference in 1961, that the Latin American Governments acknowledged 
that planning should be the fundamental instrument for mobilizing 
national resources, making structural changes, enhancing efficiency and 
productivity and securing more international financial co-operation. 
Since then, virtually all the Latin American countries have prepared 
plans of different kinds and scope. These plans have also been analysed 
and evaluated by regional organs, which have helped to sustain planning 
efforts by bringing them into line with the volume and orientation of 
foreign financial assistance, 
A valuable fund of experience has thus been built up, but its true 
significance may be hard to appreciate because planning is a relatively 
recent phenomenon and began in very special circumstances. Until fairly 
recently, no experience had been obtained in this field, apart from scane 
preliminary experiments and certain sectoral programmes, and the very 
idea of planning was resisted. There were no background data on which 
to draw for planning purposes, and no methodology that had already, proved 
its worth in the particular circumstances of Latin America. Nor was there 
a flexible administrative structure which could be adapted to functions 
and methods other than those enshrined by custom and tradition. None 
the less, this period was marked by the preparation of the technical bases 
for planning and the training of cadres on an ever-increasing scale. All 
the countries now have thè necessary machinery for the preparation and 
orientation of plans (offices and general plans); the criteria used in 
the allocation of resources are becoming more rational, especially in 
the public sector, and, last but not least, planning has become a 
widely accepted idea. 
/II. OBSTACLES 
j 
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II. OBSTACIES TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS 
Although planning in Latin America has made a number of important 
advances in certain aspects, it still has serious weaknesses and the 
improvement of planning and implementation o f plans are still being 
hampered. Of late, the planning process has been experiencing a 
period of stagnation, and in some cases can be seen to have lost ground. 
The impetus to prepare the over-all plans has spent itself, and the 
same fervour has not been applied to the tasks of translating over-all 
planning policy into specific economic policy programmes and short-term 
operational plans, and establishing efficient instruments for the periodic 
review and up-dating of plans and the evaluation of their implementation. 
It is in such tasks that the different limitations and obstacles are 
most apparent. Seme of them stem from internal factors, ranging from 
those of a general nature that include the degree of political security 
and support that planning efforts actually enjoy, to those with a more 
direct bearing on the operation of planning machinery. In assessing the 
latter, it is important to remember that little time has elapsed since 
planning first began, whereas, in other countries, efficient planning is 
the fruit of many years' sustained effort. Moreover, the attainment of 
planning targets in Latin America is hampered by other and usually 
formidable obstacles that derive from external factors primarily 
connected with thé instability, limited growth and.unsatisfactory 
conditions of foreign trade and external financing. 
It is more useful, therefore, to identify the present obstacles to 
planning in Latin America and to suggest ways of overcoming them than to 
draw up a balance-sheet of planning accomplishments and limitations in 
the region. 
1. Internal problems 
(a) The functions of planning 
Although the need for planning as the mainspring of a co-ordinated 
development policy has been generally accepted by governments, there has 
been no effective unity of aims as regards planning objectives and basic. 
priorities. From the beginning, a number of different attitudes emerged, 
/in some 
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In some instances there was a tendency to regard planning primarily as an 
instrument for mobilizing external financial resources and as an 
additional requirement for international financial co-operation, thus 
emphasizing the urgent need for plans of some kind, and tending to 
highlight those aspects of the plan most directly related to foreign 
aid. In others, planning was seen from a professional and theoretical 
point of view as a tool for shaping the structural changes essential to 
Latin America's development and as the expression of a national programme 
of action encompassing the different economic sectors and aimed at 
achieving the economic and social goals which planning itself would help 
to define. Again, i t was sometimes regarded as a means of attaining the 
limited goal of more rational administration. In one way or another, all 
these points of view were incorporated in the plans drawn up, but substantive 
aims of economic and social policy were often not reflected in specific 
decisions. 
The problem is all the more important in that the structural changes 
essential to the development of Latin America confront planners with a 
different and more difficult task than planning in developed economies, 
where the changes required are usually less drastic and where there is a 
wider consensus on more issues. 
Moreover, those different outlooks have given rise to a destructive 
and sterile controversy, based on much confused thinking, concerning 
the planning most suitable for Latin America. It has been argued that 
"over-all" or "macro-economic" planning should be abandoned and that 
efforts should be concentrated on building up a sufficient number of 
well-planned specific projects. On the other hand, where stress has been 
laid on planning as an instrument for formulating basic long-term policy, 
immediate problems have sometimes been neglected or deferred for future 
study. Instead of attempting to co-ordinate the efforts to define long-term 
policy, which are indispensable for effecting the far-reaching changes 
essential to Latin American development, with the machinery designed to 
implement that policy by immediate action, there has been a tendency to reject 
or under-estimate one aspect and concentrate exclusively on the other J ^ 
¿/ These and other problems touched upon in this paper were the subject of 
detailed study at a seminar organized by the Latin American Institute for 
Economic and Social Planning and held in June 1965» In this connexion, 
see Discusiones sobre Planificación. Textos del Instituto, Editorial 
Siglo XXI (Mexico, 1966), 
/(b) Political 
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(b) Political support for planning 
The need for planning the economic and social changes essential to 
the development process raises the problem of the political viability 
of Latin American plans and the amount of effective support required 
by the planning effort. The plans generally encounter resistance from 
sectors which feel threatened by specific measures or are exerting pressure 
for a larger share of national income. At the same time, they often 
encounter resistance from the traditional government administration, 
which is reluctant to institute changes and jealously guards its policy-
making power against any possible transfer of power which may imply 
reorganization of the administrative structure to facilitate the 
establishment of the polity-making machinery which planning requires. 
Thus, plans inevitably suffer from serious obstacles during the 
implementation stage which cannot be overcome unless the governments 
provide ample and sustained support, a support which is not always 
forthcoming in Latin American experience. 
Moreover, apart from substantive reasons, the difficulties of 
successful planning arise to some extent from the manner in which the 
plan takes shape. In some cases, there was little or no communication 
between the technical planning officials and the government departments 
during the preparatory stages, 
(c) Participation of the private sector 
The problem of political support is even greater where the private 
sector is concerned. Resistance from some parts of the private sector 
is inevitable whenever plans incorporate decisions to institute changes 
affecting specific situations or interests, but there seems to be a wide 
margin of potential support which has not been mobilized because of 
deficiencies in the planning process itself. 
In general, there is a lack of communication between planning organs 
and the private sector. Rarely is any attempt made, during preparation 
of the plan, to consult representative national opinion groups (Parliament, 
political parties, trade unions, employers' associations, universities, etc, 
or the sectors directly concerned (entrepreneurs, importers, exporters, 




This phenomenon, like others, arises partly because planning is not 
expressed in terms of specific economic policy measures which might 
induce the private sector to follow particular guidelines. The private 
sector regards the plan as an over-all review of the economic situation 
providing valuable information on the intentions of the public sector, 
but the plan does not guide its activity by furnishing incentives or 
disincentives in the form of credit, trade or tax policy measures, 
for example, 
(d) Operation of planning machinery 
The varying degrees of political support for planning, the poor 
definition of its functions and its relationship with the decision-making 
centres, and the limited participation of the private sectors are not 
calculated to promote the more efficient operation of the planning 
machinery. Moreover, its operational flaws and weaknesses make yet 
more remote the possibilities of forging closer links between the 
planning offices and the permanent decisions of the government authorities 
and other interested sectors. 
The opposition which is bound to arise from the traditional policy-
making organs, both among the political authorities and in the national 
administration as a whole, would seem to necessitate some sort of "strategy" 
for introducing planning machinery, which would obviate such friction as 
far as possible so that planning could be progressively built into the 
administrative structure and procedures« 
In this respect, planning in Latin America has manifested serious 
shortcomings. Isolated as they usually are from the traditional channels 
of administration and decisions-making the planning offices have often 
been saddled with the responsibility of preparing a development plan with 
a minimum of guidance from the political authorities or none at all. As 
a rule, contracts have continued to be sporadic and inadequate throughout 
the formulation stage, and the planning agencies have not been punctual 
in presenting the technical alternatives together with a justification 
and evaluation of implications, which would have required decisions at 
the political level. In the circumstances, the plan which has been 
/drawn up 
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drawn up has not been discussed in sufficient detail by the various 
government policy-making and executory organs, and therefore creates 
resistance in the Ministries and decentralized agencies. 
There have also been instances of an over-concentration of resources 
and activities in the central planning agency. While such a concentration 
was essential at•the time, the result was that a high proportion of the 
planning experts - who are in any case few and far between - were grouped 
in this central office, and since the Ministries and autonomous agencies 
have done very little in the way of planning, that office has tended to 
assume direct responsibility for the preparation of sectoral plans 
and projects. 
While there would seem to be every justification for making the 
central planning office a division of the Office of the President of the 
Republic since the support of the Chief of State and his Cabinet is a 
sine qua non for the satisfactory operation of the central agency, this 
has not automatically guaranteed the institution the stability and 
backing it needs, or the maintenance of easy channels of communication. 
In some instances, a change of Government has halted planning processes 
that were making good headway, and in others it has pumped new life into 
efforts that seemed to be petering out. An attempt has been made to 
maintain communication through development councils or boards consisting 
of Ministers, high-level officials and technical experts. However these 
organs have not always served their purpose. In other instances they have 
done useful work in co-ordinating development policy with the work of other 
departments of the national administration, but this co-ordination is apt 
to peter out at the operational level for lack of proper direction and 
supervision. The absence of efficient sectoral and inter-sectoral 
co-ordination machinery means that the co-ordination achieved at the 
core of the system weakens or disappears altogether at the lower levels 
as a result of organizational and procedural deficiencies. 
The direct link between the head of the central planning office and 
the President of the Republic which exists in seme countries seems to 
impart greater flexibility to the central planning agency by forestalling 




in Latin America have, as a rule, proved to be slow-moving and lacking in 
dynamism. It is observable, however, that when the technical director 
of the planning office does not have ministerial rank or a voice in the 
Cabinet, he finds himself at a definite disadvantage, and the central 
planning agency cannot discharge its functions efficiently, especially 
that of co-ordinating the public sector for purposes of implementing 
the plan. At the same time, the technical director in charge of the 
central agency is exposed to political pressures, and is often replaced 
when the government changes, since he is held responsible, whereas that 
responsibility would otherwise be assumed by the planning council or board. 
The sectoral planning agencies are generally weak and faced with 
organizational and procedural problems. However, this is far from being 
the rule in the various Ministries and decentralized agencies. They are 
often regarded merely as operational instruments for compiling statistical 
data; they are assigned routine duties which relegate progranming 
activities to a secondary place, or they are used as agencies for the 
study of the most widely varying questions. They do not get the political 
support they need to carry out their functions, and are usually cut off 
from the central planning agencies, the operational agencies of the 
Ministry concerned, and the decentralized and autonomous agencies in 
their sector. 
Similarly, regional planning has had to cope with innumerable 
obstacles, not the least of which is the fact that political divisions 
and economic areas are not the same. Since the regions suitable as a 
basis for planning often comprise different political divisions, each with 
its own interests and provincial, state or local pressure groups, it is 
very difficult to reconcile opinions and advance towards common objectives. 
Furthermore, some provincial or state governments are riddled with 
administrative weaknesses or are not sufficiently active in promoting 
economic and social development. 
In the last analysis, those problems are simply so many corollaries 
of the general rule that planning organs have been superimposed on an 
administrative structure which has not been adapted to the demands of 




In recent years, several countries have established central 
organization and methods offices, which have assumed'responsibility for 
administrative reform. In many cases, these central offices have had 
no connexion with the agencies of the planning system, or with those in 
charge of staff and budget administration. Action taken to promote the 
reform has nothing whatever to do with national development activities. 
Thus, although general planning efforts have indirectly served to focus 
attention on administrative streamlining, this task has usually been 
undertaken independently of economic development policies, 
(e) "Qperabilitv" of the plans 
In addition to the problems arising from administrative organization 
and the position of planning machinery within the administration, other 
factors help to widen the gulf between the planning organs and the 
policy-makers. 
The crux of the problem is that the plans formulated thus far 
cover only a part of the planning process; in other words, the planning 
effort has not yet been carried through to a conclusion, as regards either 
the plans drawn up or the establishment and operation of effective machinery 
for the periodic revision of plans and for the supervision and evaluation 
of their practical application. 
Many of the over-all plans embody forecasts based on an improvement 
- sometimes substantial - in previous trends and on the anticipation of 
potential limiting factors.. As a result, the over-all plans leave a wide 
gap between macro-economic considerations and general principles, on the 
one hand, and their implementation by means of specific policies (monetary, 
exchange, fiscal) and operational plans, on the other. At the other 
extreme, sane plans for immediate action which have begun to be applied 
merely enumerate partial proposals and certain specific projects often 
without evaluating them in broader perspective. 
The lack of an effective "bridge" between the two damensaiflsas; of 
the planning effort has been detrimental to both types of plan, in the 
first instance because it greatly detracts from, their viability, and in 
the second, because the plans fail to come to grips with the fundamental 




between the long-term general plan and the corresponding specific plans 
in terms of the use of the various economic policy instruments and the 
mobilization and allocation of resources, is still one of the principal 
shortcomings of planning efforts in Latin America, 
It is as much the result of poorly-conceived development policy 
as of failure to design and implement effective short-term planning 
schemes, 
(i) Definition of development policy. The lack of a clear definition 
of that policy is reflected in the fact that the growth targets of long-tern 
plans are not usually expressed in terms of the employment, productivity 
and training of human resources. Despite the significance and magnitude 
of the- under-employment problem in Latin America, most plans do not deal 
with it specifically, and little attention is devoted to the occupational 
structure and educational pattern of the employed population. Similarly, 
too little attention is paid to the supply and demand for labour, and the 
need to bring the economic development targets established in the plan 
into line with the supply of manpower available, and particularly of skilled 
labour. The problem of sectoral differences in productivity and the 
assimilation of technology is hardly mentioned in the majority of the o 
plans, and the relevant proposals are confined to the broadest generalizations 
no attempt being made at analysis in depth. 
Much the same may be said in connexion with the continuing high 
degree of' income concentration in Latin America, which is another factor 
exerting a marked influence on the region's development. The plans often 
allude to this problem in the diagnosis, and even go so far as to list 
certain general palliatives (absorption of unemployment, increases in 
productivity, and/or price and wage, tax, public expenditure and education 
policies), but these statements of principle are not translated into 
specific terns, nor is due allowance made for the effects on income 
distribution of the targets established in the plan and of the proposals 
for attaining them. 
From another standpoint, although a broad and integrated view of 
development, in which economic and social factors are closely inter-related, 




specific practical problem of how to decide whether funds should be 
allocated to particular "social services" (education, housing, and 
public health) or used to enlarge the economic infrastructure and the 
immediately productive field of the econony, In the absence of objective 
guidelines, decisions are influenced in the end by circumstantial 
factors, such as the power of the authorities responsible in each field, 
or political considerations of the moment. Through force of circumstance 
rather than as a result of deliberate policy, social expenditure has been 
increasing proportionately in most Latin American countries, and this 
process has been encouraged by the tenor of foreign aid over the last 
few years. It is a matter of conjecture how far this concentration of 
effort can be maintained, unless a similar effort is made to broaden 
the economic base which must sustain it. Moreover, serious doubts are 
beginning to emerge as to the effectiveness of certain kinds of social 
action in favour of particular social groups, when they are intended to 
relieve shortages which really reflect more deeply-rooted problems of 
economic and social marginality. All this places a very heavy burden 
on those responsible for planning, who have neither sufficient experience 
nor the necessary technical machinery for discharging their responsibilities, 
and are hampered by the failure of governments to adopt the political 
decisions to support them. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that, with the exception of 
Central America, most Latin American development plans have not explicitly 
incorporated the regional economic integration prospects in their plans as 
a variable with a bearing on their development policies. Integration 
appears to be taking its own course, along channels relatively far 
removed from planning efforts. Although there are several fundamental 
reasons for this, it may reasonably be supposed that this separate 
development is also affected by the fact that economic integration would 
raise new problems and that technical planners do not have the necessary 
methodological instruments to cope with them, 
(ii) Short-term planning schemes. The second problem arises from 
the fact that countries have not yet succeeded in developing and activating 
the essential technical machinery required to complete the various stages 
of planning so that general economic policy can be translated into 




Despite considerable progress in improving procedures for allocating 
public sector resources by means of medium-term public investment plans 
and the use of programme and performance budgeting techniques for the 
annual government budget, there are still acute problems. No comparable 
progress has been made, for example, in working out annual operational 
plans and economic policy or in standardizing annual economic budgets, etc. 
For example, in the application of public investment plans, there 
is a marked disparity between targets and financial estimates, either 
because the tax reforms on which they are based are not carried out to 
the extent or in the time anticipated owing to delays in international 
financing or special problems of financing local cost, or because any 
unexpected shortage of financial resources in the public sector affects 
investment much more than current expenditure. The operational capacity 
of the public administration to undertake new or increased activities 
is often over-estimated because there are no proper criteria or machinery 
for evaluating it objectively, although there has been some significant 
progress in that respect. On the other hand, there is a general tendency 
to under-estimate the volume of projects under way and, consequently, to 
under-estimate the lack of flexibility in the allocation of resources because 
priority, save in exceptional circumstances, must be given to partially 
executed projects. 
The programme and performance budget has been adopted as the model 
for annual public sector budgets in most countries of the region, and 
Uruguay's new political Constitution expressly stipulates that the 
Executive must present a breakdown of the national budget by programmes. 
On the other hand, similar progress has not been made in the preparation 
of annual plans of operation, an exercise regularly carried out only by 
Venezuela. The formulation of experimental numerical models for the 
analysis of economic policy is being tried out chiefly in Venezuela and 
Chile. As regards national economic budgets, the only practical 
experiments thus far have been conducted in Argentina, where such a 
budget was drawn up and comprised a series of quantitative estimates of 
the probable behaviour of the chief macro-economic variables - including 
private investment - and of the compatibility of public expenditure with 




The wide disparity between the plans and the conduct of economic 
policy is usually most pronounced in countries suffering from acute 
and persistent inflationary pressures. Those countries are confronted 
not only with the practical problems associated with the level and system 
of prices, but with the fundamental difficulty of reconciling the plan*s 
objectives with the requirements of stabilization policies. Growing 
concern with this problem has led to the preparation of plans specifically 
designed for that purpose. What happens, most often, howeVer, is that two 
unrelated and frequently contradictory policies are superimposed on one 
another: the policy implicitly or explicitly related to development plans 
or based on them, and the policy intended primarily to stabilize prices. 
(iii) Procedures for controlling the implementation of plans. The 
lack of progress in the formulation and implementation of operational 
plans is clearly demonstrated by the non-existence of machinery for 
controlling the implementation of plans, evaluating the problems which 
arise and insisting on the rectifications which aré patently necessary. 
Not only must administrative organs be established to assume those 
functions, but evaluation techniques must be developed which will be 
applicable to Latin American conditions. 
( f) Specific investment projects 
Without discussing the spurious•distinction made between plans and 
projects, which unfortunately continues to be the subject of some controversy, 
there is no doubt that the lack of sufficient specific investment projects 
has proved a serious obstacle to the effective implementation of Latin 
American development plans. 
This subject was examined in detail at a recent seminar at which 
a number of suggestions were put forward, which might appropriately be 
summarized here.— 
One suggestion referred , to the need - particularly under present-day 
conditions in the Latin American economies - for a very broad interpretation 
of the "project" concept, covering every unit of activity capable of 
implementing a development plan. 
6/ The seminar in question was organized by the Latin American Institute 
for Economic and Social Planning and was held in Santiago, Chile, 




The persistent shortage of projects despite the progress achieved 
in certain immediate factors which are usually regarded as decisive, 
posits the existence of other root causes. It appears that the shortage 
of projects is merely another manifestation of the weakness of the 
decision-making and implementation machinery. The shortage of projects 
is no more acute than it was before in absolute terns; quite the reverse. 
What seems to be happening is that, in one way or another, traditional 
policies of unplanned development provided incentives for public and 
private enterprise which led to the formulation of specific projects, some 
of them of considerable importance* There is still a continuous flow of 
investment decisions, some of which materialize in project form, but 
planning has imposed additional and much greater demands. 
Firstly, projects are now required to meet specific investment 
objectives and targets established in the plans and to fit into certain 
over-all strategies. In so far as they are not clearly defined, the 
objectives and policy do not provide sufficient incentives for suitable 
projects, nor do they in themselves represent strategic projects. The 
economic integration of latin America illustrates this points until the 
political decisions have been taken and political agreements concluded 
at the appropriate levels, no public or private ventures in the form 
of specific projects can be launched. 
Secondly, planning not only requires the initiation of a certain 
number of projects but also arranges them in the proper order of 
priority and determines the relationship between projects and groups of 
projects with due regard for their direct and indirect effects on the 
economy as a whole. 
Viewed in this context, the problem of promoting, identifying, 
preparing, evaluating and executing projects is closely linked with the 
establishment of an effective planning system and with the necessary 
administrative reforms. Naturally, the difficulties of rapidly translating 
a development strategy into operational plans cannot be disregarded, any 
more than the difficulties connected with the shortage of trained personnel, 
experience and technological resources. When thè first plans are drawn 
up, a high proportion of investment capacity - particularly in the public 




be replaced by other projects better adapted to the new plans. In other 
words, the maturation period of projects of a certain magnitude tends to 
be longer, as suggested by the experience of the Bank, which found that 
a large power or transport project may take from three to five years or 
more from the time it is decided to undertake the economic and engineering 
studies to the time- they are completed-and the financing of the project can 
be approved and implementation started, 
(g) Availability of information 
Improvement of the planning process in Latin America is being 
hampered by problems of the availability and quality of the basic 
information on which it is based. The information consists mainly, 
but not exclusively, of statistical data. 
There are serious deficiencies in the quantity, quality and timeliness 
of data that are basic to planning. Moreover, full justice has not been 
done to the statistical function within the planning effort. In general, 
national statistical offices occupy a very subordinate role in public 
administration as a whole; their employees are frequently ill-paid and 
their staff unqualified. Very few have adequate financial resources or 
mechanical equipment for the efficient collection and elaboration of data. 
Moreover, there are gaps in the legislation that make it compulsory to 
supply certain data and, above all, in the machinery for giving effect 
to that legislation. The various sectoral, regional and local statistical 
services are not sufficiently co-ordinated, and national statistical 
programmes have not been drawn up. 
Problems have also cropped up in relations with the users, one being 
the under-estimation of the information requirements of the public 
administration and private sector." Moreover, proper facilities have not 
been set up to enabie the offices providing the data to use them as a 
guide in decision-making. Relations with the planning offices, in 
particular, are usually characterized by sporadic demands for data made 
when plans are already in course of preparation. These relations have 
never been systematized, let alone developed into a mechanism providing 
a permanent flow of up-to-date information that would facilitate the 




The quality of the data iis uneven, vaitying in accordance with the 
sector to which they refer, foreign trade statistics, followed by 
population data, are the most accurate, while data on domestic trade, 
services, construction, road transport and unemployment are particularly 
poor. When censuses are used as a basis, there is a lack of continuity 
in the statistics, one of the results of this being the preparation of a 
new industrial directory every time an industrial census is taken instead 
of the up-dating of an earlier edition. Delays are a common feature of 
the data processing, but in some cases attempts have recently been made 
to overcome this problem by using sampling techniques. Another shortcoming 
is the lack of a systematic and continuous series of indicators for tracing 
short-term changes in the economy. Lastly, there is usually a long delay 
before the data are published, 
2. External problems 
The limitations and obstacles cited have undoubtedly detracted from 
the effectiveness of planning, and can only be overcome by decisions taken 
in the countries themselves and by the progressive improvement of planning 
machinery. It should be noted, however, that the implementation of 
Latin America's development plans has been and is still hampered by serious 
obstacles deriving from the evolution of trade and financial transactions 
with, countries outside the. region. 
These obstacles are known as "exogenous" factors, not only because 
they are largely beyond the country's control or because they arise from 
new circumstances which could not have been predicted when the plans were 
being formulated, but, in particular, because they alter the economic context 
in which the plans must be implemented« 
A review of recent trends makes this situation quite clear. In the 
short space of time that has elapsed since planning activities first began 
to gain ground, several important factors have assumed considerable 
significance: the insufficient and unstable growth of exports, external 
debt commitments, the need to replenish gold and foreign exchange reserves, 
and - as a result of those factors - the irregular trend of imports and 




(a) Export trends . 
Exports expanded irregularly, as shown by the fact that the annual 
growth rates in terms of volume fluctuated between a high of 9.2 per cent 
ih 1962 and a low of 2.2 per cent in 1964, while the figure for 1966 was 
4 per cent* These averages for the region as a whole reflect occasional 
violent fluctuations in certain countries, resulting in sharp reductions 
in absolute terns. ' 
Export trends in terms of current prices have been somewhat steadier. 
Nevertheless, thus far in the sixties, Latin America has lost a substantial 
proportion of its share in world trade. The sharpest drop was in its 
contribution to total United States imports - from about 21 per cent in 
the three-year period 1960-62 to less than 16 per cent in 1966 - but 
there was also a marked reduction in its share of imports by the European 
Economic Community (from 6 to 5*5 per cent) and the European Free Trade 
Association (from 5,4 to 4.2 per cent). These decreases have not been 
offset by the sizable increase in intra-Latin American"trade. 
The recent trends were influenced by structural and institutional 
factors created by the preponderance of primary commodities in Latin American 
exports and their scant diversification, and by the limitations, obstacles 
. and adverse conditions which continue to affect world trade. Although 
the problem may arise in part from the shortcomings' of national export 
promotion policies, serious imbalances are expected to devèlop, judging 
from projections of the future value of exports on the basis of trends 
over the past fifteen years compared with the potential demand for imports. 
In the circumstances, by 1975 the trade deficit may'well range from 
4,600 to 5,500 million dollars at I960 prices. This huge deficit will be 
further inflated by the sums required to finance outflows in the form of 
amortization, interest and profits, with the result that it'will become 
impossible to obtain new inflows of foreign capital. 
(b) External debt 
The gross inflow of foreign capital has reached high levels and 
increased rapidly in the present decade, as shown by the fact that Latin 
America's aggregate external public debt rose from 6,100 million dollars 




This is not reflected in an equally large net contribution to Latin 
American development financing. On the contrary, net external financing 
- defined here as the balance on current account - has fallen off 
considerably as a result of debt commitments: from 1,100 million dollars 
in 1961 it rose to its peak (1,230 million) in 1962, declined steeply to 
500 million dollars in 1965 and recovered only partially in 1966 (950 million 
dollars). Variables which are strategic in the implementation of plans 
have not only shown a negative trend but have fluctuated very widely. 
The critical situation in some countries has prompted Governments to 
renegotiate the cumulative debt, consolidating and reconverting loans to 
mitigate the iraaediate effects on the balance of payments. However, 
considerable progress has been made in extending the scope of external 
financing to other fields of economic activity and in obtaining more 
favourable terms, although the interest rates on some foreign loans have 
increased in the last two years. • 
In addition, loans generally have very short maturation periods. A 
balance sheet of the position at 31 December 1964 shows that in accordance 
with the original repayment periods the debt was made up as follows: 
18 per cent repayable in less than five years, 28 per cent in five to 
ten years and, 54 per cent over more than ten years. But the repayment 
periods applicable at that time reflected a critical position: 47 per 
cent of the total debt had to be paid off in the next five years, 24 per 
cent in five to ten years, and 29 per cent over more than ten years, 
(c) Other factors 
Other factors have further weakened the already tenuous effect of 
the growth of exports on real import capacity, one of them being the 
need to build up international reserves to a reasonable level in the last 
few years. Latin America's gross gold and foreign exchange holdings in 
I960 amounted to 3,000 million dollars, but dropped sharply to 2,200 million 
dollars in 1962J a subsequent recovery brought them up to 3,200 million 
dollars in 1965. In other words, 1,000 million dollars were used to build 
up reserves during these three years. Moreover, monetary liabilities, 
including balance-of-payments loans, were cut by 500 million dollars over 
the same period. In short, this meant a total reduction of 1,500 million. 




The evolution of the terms of trade has had a similar effect. 
Although the trend has not been particularly unfavourable during the 
sixties, the losses due ,to the deterioration^in the terms of trade 
since I960 amount to roughly 1,000 million dollars for the region as 
a whole. Some countries have suffered more than others, Venezuela's 
losses amounting to 1,800 million dollars and Brazil'is to 500 million 
during the. same period, 
(d) Import trends 
The factors that have been described above are responsible for the 
irregular trend of imports, and in seme cases have made it necessary to 
introduce a policy of import restrictions. This has weakened the 
possibility of increasing the supplies urgently needed for the 
implementation of development policy and plans. 
The value of imports of goods and services in I960 was practically 
the same as the value of exports: about 8,600 million dollars. Not 
until 1964 did Latin America regain its 1957 level of imports (some 
9,300 million dollars). It is even more significant that in recent 
years imports have expanded more slowly than exports, the trade surplus 
being as high as 1,200 million dollars in 1966. In fact, exports amounted 
to about 12,000 million dollars, compared with 10,760 million dollars for 
imports of goods and services, 
- - • • • 
, ..III, CONCLUSIONS 
Planning,, like.every<other1process, must be developed and improved. 
Thus far Latin America has gone through the first stage; it has established 
.planning agencies^ prepared a variety of plans, worked out consistent 
development policies with some success, allocated public resources more 
systematically, trained a large group of professionals in new techniques 
locally and accumulated- a' fund of valuable experience. At the same time, 
it has encountered limitations and obstacles including a general lack of 
political support for planning, inadequate over-all development strategies, 
no. effective co-ordination between policy and operational machinery and 




Measures to overcome those limitations and obstacles would represent 
the second stage of planning in Latin America, in which development plans 
would be better formulated and above all more efficiently carried out. 
Some conclusions fiom the analysis made here might usefully be analysed 
by national agencies and the competent organs of foreign financial and 
technical co-operation, -
1. National planning machinery 
(a) The planning systems that have been developed should be 
completed by renewed efforts in many areas and, in particular, by: 
(i). Establishing a closer relationship between over-all 
guidelines and short-term operational machinery, preferably by drawing 
up annual plans of operation incorporating decisions to mobilize and 
allocate resources and implementing detailed economic policy; 
(ii) Supplementing the process of formulating and implementing 
plans by the periodic evaluation of results, and establishing appropriate 
organs for the purpose. 
(b) Planning systems should be brought more closely into line with 
long- and short-term development priorities: 
(i) Through the co-ordination of national planning with the 
aims of regional economic integration; 
(ii) Through measures to relate planning to such questions as 
the assimilation of new. techniques, employment and training, income 
distribution and the improvement of levels of living; 
(iii.) Through action to relate planning to anti-inflationary 
measures, 
(c) Stronger co-ordination should be established between planning 
agencies and the political authorities, the national administration and 
the private sector by: 
(i) Carefully reviewing the relations between planning offices 
and top-level national authorities; 
(ii) Ensuring that administrative reform programmes allow for 
proper co-ordination between planning bodies and the general, sectoral 




(i i i) Establishing or improving existing channels of communication 
•with the various representative bodies of the private sector (political 
parties, trade unions, entrepreneurs1 associations, etc.), 
(d) Further research should be carried out to discover the most 
effective technical means of implementing the various planning activities. 
The following questions should be urgently considered: 
(i) Methods and techniques for preparing annual plans (including 
such instruments as the national economic budget)} 
(ii) Methods and techniques for evaluating and supervising the 
implementation of plans; 
(iii) Methods and techniques for formulating development policy 
with due regard for maximum utilization of human resources, the economic 
integration of latin America, the redistribution of income and a reasonable 
allocation of resources between social and economic objectives. 
(e) It is imperative to improve data-gathering and data-processing 
so that reliable statistics and other data will be readily available for 
the preparation of plans and the supervision of their execution. To 
that end: 
(i) The offices which collect, tabulate and publish information 
should be given greater autonomy and provided with additional staff and 
technical resources; 
(ii) Basic programmes of urgently needed information should 
be prepared for priority action in order to ensure a steady flow of 
up-to-date data; 
(iii) Machinery'should be devised and put into operation for 
providing inforaation on progress achieved in implementing plans, 
2. External technical and financial co-operation^ 
(a) Technical co-operation from international and other external 
sources in national planning activities should be encouraged. The need for 
such co-operation is greater than ever at the present stage, especially in 
the following areas: 
2/ The following conclusions contain no reference to foreign trade despite 
its importance in the execution of Latin America's development plans, 




(i) The study and dissemination of the methods and techniques 
referred to abovej 
(ii) The training of technical personnel in performing their 
present functions as well as those likely to become more important in 
the near future (annual plans, evaluation and supervision, etc.); 
(iii) The exchange of experience between planning agencies in 
the various countries of the region, 
(b) The provision of technical information and specific projections 
concerning the following questions should be systematically co-ordinated: 
(i) The economic growth of the various Latin American countries 
(ii) World market prospects, by groups of products and by 
specific products; 
(iii) Estimates of the developing countries1 external financing 
resources and needs, 
(c) External financing has exerted a profound influence on national 
planning activities. It is therefore essential to continue the progress 
already achieved in the following ways: 
(i) Biy financing programmes of concerted action in many 
different fields, and, in particular, by replacing the old system of 
project financing by a new system which will ensure the over-all financing 
of development plans and supplementary and compensatory financing needs 
on suitable terms, 
(ii) By extending amortization periods and lowering interest 
rates on foreign loans; 
(iii) By allocating resources more flexibly, so that they are 
not made contingent upon the import content of investments and can cover 
local costs; 
(iv) By more flexible use of external financing with a view 
to eliminating the conditions attached; 
(v) By financial support for national and international 
planning agencies. 
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Chapter Tf 
REMARKS ON FINANCING AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT ^ 
A. DESIRABILITY OF ESTABLISHING A TARGET FOR FGPEIGN INVESTMENT 
1» Limited volume and Inappropriate composition 
of foreign investment 
It is a matter of concern that so l itt le foreign capital is being 
invested in Latin America« The object of this chapter i s , f irst , to 
examine the factors influencing this situation and, secondly, to consider 
the possibilities for a greater absorption of such capital« 
The limited amount of international public loans raises problems of 
considerable importance« Owing to the nature of such loans, they are 
used principally fox* social capital investment in transport, power and 
other services that account for a major proportion of public investment« 
During the nineteenth century and from the beginning of the present 
century until the First World War, the financing of economic development 
was entirely dependant on private capital, and consequently the foreign 
contribution to Latin American public investment was very high in relation 
to the tiny percentage vfoich it currently represents« 
This is the principal explanation for the lack of social capital 
that at present characterizes most of the Latin American countries« It 
has not been possible, as in the past, to resort to the private bond market 
in order to finance these requirements, and, as will be explained below, 
direct private investment would have been too costly» Social capital 
investment is essential in creating a favourable environment for private 
investment, and its inadequacy constitutes one of the major obstacles 
hindering the economic development of Latin America« 
V From International co-operation in a Latin American development 




Moreover, during the earlier period referred to, most of the resources 
used for social capital investment came from bond issues on the financial 
markets, principally in London* In fact, over two-thirds of aggregate 
investment in social capital and for other purposes was the product of 
bond issues. As is well-known, the international bond market is no 
longer accessible to Latin American countries, and its has fallen to the 
international credit institutions to f i l l the gap by lending public funds« 
The contrast between the relatively small share of public resources 
in foreign investment and the considerable proportion which was previously 
derived from bond issues is another point that needs to be stressed. The 
interest paid on bonds is far below the rate of return on direct investment 
of foreign private capital* Since direct investment constituted less than 
one-third of total investment prior to the First World War, the cost of 
capital formation at that time was lower for debtor countries than in 
recent years, when the proportion represented by direct investment of 
private foreign capital has been very high» 
What is now required is to encourage foreign capital investment in 
order to accelerate the rate of Latin America's economic development» It 
is dear that to maintain so high a proportion of private capital would 
involve a substantial increase in the incidence of financial services on the 
balance of payments» This does not mean that the absolute amount of private 
investment will have to be reduced. On the contrary, its expansion is 
desirable for Latin America» But an even more intensive increase must 
take place in loans of public resources at a relatively low rate of interest» 
This follows from the two requirements already mentioned: f irst , the need 
to reduce the cost of foreign investment for Latin America; and, secondly, 
the need to increase the participation of international public resources 
in financing the social capital investment necessary to provide an ample 
opportunity for domestic and foreign private investment» 
Increased loans of public funds also mean that the role of international 
credit institutions will have to be strongly emphasized, at least until the 
private bond market is reopened» Should this occur, the Latin American 
countries would be the first to welcome such a development» Not only would 




advantageously take the place of the credit institutions, but also private 
investors in the United States and other countries would feel renewed 
interest in participating in the economic development of the Latin 
American countries« . * 
From another point of view, larger-scale international loans for 
social capital investment would have favourable internal consequences 
in the Latin American countries« It is a well-known fact that the need 
to finance such investment without adequate domestic savings has frequently 
caused governments to resort to the expansion of bank credit. On the 
other hand, in those cases where it has been possible to use the genuine 
savings of the population for basic investment, this has generally been 
done at the expense of private investment, which in turn has been forced 
to utilize bank credit, as a substitute. A larger contribution of foreign 
• resources, covering at least 20 to 25 per cent of this basic capital 
investment, could therefore prove very useful in the application of an 
anti-inflationary policy« 
With regard to investment of private foreign capital one further 
observation may be made« In the first place, the'greater part of such 
investment does not constitute new capital inflows but rather represents 
reinvestment of profits accruing from capital already invested. It i s , 
of course, desirable for profits to be reinvested rather than remitted 
abroad« If this reinvestment is deducted, however, the annual average 
inflow of new capital in the shape of private foreign investment is 
appreciably reduced« 
Another indication of the limited amount of foreign capital invested 
in Latin America in recent years is the relationship between the amount 
invested and the financial remittances required to service and amortize 
the stock of capital« It is obvious that, in developing countries, the 
capital inflow should exceed the outflow of remittances. Nevertheless, a 
time comes when this is no longer necessary« As income increases« a 
higher domestic savings coefficient enables a country-to carry the burden 
of remittances even if its balance-of-payments asset» do not include new 




Although the Latin American countries in general are, of course, still far 
from reaching this stage, the figures for remittances nevertheless exceed 
those for investment» 
In this context, it should be remembered that approximately 30 per 
cent of private capital investment has been earmarked for developing 
export activities, principally mining and petroleum production« As a 
result, a part of the remittances has been covered by increased exports« 
Even so, this very fact i s a striking comment on the insufficiency of 
foreign investment* 
It does not stand alone, however. Still more eloquent testimony is 
provided by the small share of foreign investment in the total capital 
investment effected by toe Latin American countries« 
2« The foreign investment target 
Until the research that has been initiated is intensified and extended, 
it would be rash to specify, for practical purposes, the totals which 
foreign investment should reach if a given rate of growth is to be 
attained. It seems advisable, however, to establish a target for investment 
policy. Once this policy was mapped out, the activities of international 
credit institutions would be judged not only by the care with which they 
examined projects submitted for approval - a factor of vital importance -
but also by the volume of their operations« I f , within a reasonable time, 
a minimum figure had not been attained, it would have to be concluded 
that investment policy was not being satisfactorily implemented, and the 
determining factors of the situation would have to be reconsidered« 
Moreover, the establishment of an investment target might have very 
positive effects upon the Latin American countries themselves, creating an 
atmosphere favourable to economic development programming both in government 
circles and among the leaders of political and economic l i fe , as well as in 
the entrepreneurial and labour sectors» The doubts and uncertainties as 
to the possibility of obtaining an adequate and reasonable degree of 
foreign financial co-operation have not exactly played an encouraging role 
in the formulation of development programmes» This task entails considerable 
effort and heavy expenditure, and it is very understandable that governments 
should be reluctant to assume such commitments if they cannot rely on 




It would be over-simplifying to assert that this explains why 
several countries s t i l l show no interest in programming and why others 
have not yet put into the task either the energy or the sense of continuity 
it demands., Obviously, however* the existence of a policy aimed at raising 
investment can greatly reinforce the authority of those who are endeavouring 
to follow the path of development programming in the various countries« 
The process signifies not only the formulation of a programme but also the 
adoption of a series of measures to attract investment and to ensure that 
it bears fruit. Gare must be taken not to lose sight of the real facts 
of the case. The establishment of an investment target might have the 
twofold virtue of focusing the efforts of credit institutions on its 
attainment and also of influencing the Latin American Governments themselves • 
Interest in development policy is as yet in its initial stages - in some 
cases very confused initial stages - and it may be indispensable to add 
this external stimulus to domestic incentives, if certain'aspirations 
towards economic development are to crystallize in a definite policy. 
3« The necessity of continuity in credit policy 
In addition to establishing certain investment goals for Latin 
America, it is desirable to analyse the possibilities of introducing those 
specific procedures which expérience recommends. Hitherto, the general 
practice has been to grant loans gradually, as the corresponding projects 
are approved. A country drawing Up an investment programme» partially 
based on foreign resources, does not know beforehand whether it will or will 
hot be able to count on those resources during the years in which the 
programme is being implemented. Furthermore, in countries subject to great 
economic instability of external origin, the volume of.domestic savings 
envisaged in the programme might perceptibly diminish, thus seriously 
affecting the programme unless credit institutions were to assume , 
responsibility for a reasonable share of the investment which it was planned 
V 
to make with these savings. If development policy is controlled, as is 
to be hoped, by wise and responsible bodies, they may harbour some doubts 
as to the desirability of involving their country in an investment 




may induce than to restrict the scope of the programme, or singly to 
eliminate it, and to follow the more prudent course of approving the 
projects one by one, as and when the required resources become available» 
It is clear that international credit institutions could not 
unconditionally approve their own participation in an investment 
programme» There is no question .of such a .thing; they could simply approve 
in principle the investment to be financed in each year of the programme, 
making final approval conditional upon the submission of a satisfactory 
project and upon fulfilment of the requisites held to be: indispensable 
for its efficacious execution» At the same time, they might undertake 
to finance additional investment in the event that the country concerned, 
for external reasons beyond its control, found itself unable to mobilize 
the amount of domestic resources envisaged in the programme* 
4» Towards an inter "American investment programme 
The starting-point and keynote of this discussion has been that 
Latin America requires a development policy with ample international 
co-operation. Some of the elements of this policy already exist, and if it 
can be duly concerted, it will constitute the first step in a new 
experiment, on whose present and future importance no further stress 
need be laid. This new experiment demands a search for new methods and 
instrument of action, which may properly be discussed here. Just as a 
national development policy finds expression in a programme, so a programme 
will also b© needed for an inter-American development polity, and in 
that programme investment will naturally have to play a predominant role 
for a period of years long enough to allow the Latin American countries 
to increase their own savings capacity» This inter-American programme, 
however, can only be based on national programmes, at any rate for the 
larger countries, and in this sphere a considerable effort, which has only 
just begun, will have to be made» Meanwhile, the establishment of a 
provisional investment target might in itself be of great importance 





The Governments of the inter-American system could have At their 
disposal, the results of ECLA's work on analyses and projections of 
economic development, together with any other background material they 
might require in order to consider - at such periodic meetings as thqy 
might deem expedient - the establishment of new targets and eventually 
the formulation of an inter-American investment programme» 
This would not be a Marshall Plan for Latin America» The Marshall 
Plan, conceived to meet a very serious situation, had necessarily to be 
based on subsidies. The economic development of the Latin American 
countries can proceed at a rapid rate without recource to subsidies, 
except in the case of a few countries where per capita income is extremely 
low. Latin America's need is for productive loans with long amortization 
periods and at rates of interest as low as those prevailing on the money 
markets. In this connexion an essential distinction must be drawn. The 
Marshall Plan has disseminated a concept of aid which usually embraces 
ordinary loans. But in fact two entirely different operations are involved» 
A loan presupposes regular amortization and interest payments, while aid 
implies an act of donation pure and simple» 
It is desirable to forestall the psychological and political effects 
of this confusion, not only in the United States, but also in the Latin 
American countries, if the idea should spread that their economic 
development depends upon such donations and that the primary aim.of inter-
American conferences is to obtain resources on that basis. Despite the 
extremely high per capita income levels in the United States, there are 
comnunity needs which have not yet been satisfactorily metj for example, 
lower-cost housing facilities in the larger towns leave much to be 
desired. Furthermore, the heavy taxes are not only a burden upon the 
higher income brackets - so much so that in sane respects the level of 
living of this sector of the population is lower than that of corresponding 
groups in Latin America - but also have a considerable incidence on the 
earnings of the middle and lower income groups. It is therefore a moot 
question whether the prestige and continuity of an inter-American economic 
development policy would be best served by basing it upon resources obtained 
throu^i taxation, drawing upon private or by savings, in competition with 
domestic productive investment. 
/5» Collaboration 
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5« Collaboration of independent experts In a 
development -policy 
There is yet another aspect of the problem of public investment of 
international resources in Latin America which requires extremely careful 
handling» A programme is the concrete «impression of a development policy, 
which consists not only in investment but alco in the adoption of a 
series of measures designed to raise the savings coefficient and to 
encourage domestic investment and also to create conditions in which 
such investment can produce the desired results» The degree and form 
of external co-operation will depend upon the wisdom and common-sense 
of the policy pursued, and it is readily understandable that credit 
institutions, while prepared to co-operate in certain aspects of that 
policy, may at the same time wish to link their loan commitments to the 
fulfilment of specific conditions. It is indeed inconceivable that one 
of the parties should guarantee to contribute resources over a certain 
period of years without the other party1 s likewise accepting an obligation 
to observe certain basic conditions, previously agreed upon by both 
parties. Without this measure of reciprocity, it would be impossible to 
put into practice an effective international co-operation policy» 
A H international negotiations of this kind involve very delicate 
questions, and the possibility of finding more satisfactory formulas should 
be explored. The fomulation of a programme - especially if important 
economic and financial measures are necessary for its implementation -
usually calls for the advice of experts who can speak impartially and with 
authority by virtue of their detachment from the environment and from the 
interests at stake. It is questionable whether credit institutions, 
precisely because they have a direct interest in the solution of the 
problem, are always best qualified to give such advice, still less to 
campaign for or against the adoption of given measures. Their aeal might 
often be interpreted as an intention to intervene in a country's domestic 





Here experience can provide a guide to future action» If both 
a government and the credit institution authorities were jointly to 
express their confidence in certain independent everts, and were to 
request their views and recommendations, it vould be less difficult to 
negotiate the contribution of foreign resources to a national development 
programme, and there woiild be less risk of irritating understandable 
national susceptibilities» liihat is more, the experts in question, because 
of their impartial and neutral position, could advantageously mediate in 
the negotiations, seeking formulas which are somestimes difficult to 
find when the two parties are dealing with each other directly» 
B. OBSTACLES HINDER M J THE INVESTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL 
PUBLIC RESOURCES 
Attention has already been drawn to the desirability of establishing 
a minimum foreign investment target to be attained over a transition 
period. During this interim, it will have been possible to adopt a number 
of measures to mitigate — or eliminate, as the case may be - the 
principal hindrances to the Latin American operations of the two leading 
international credit institutions.^ 
The existing obstacles are varied in nature, and have been divided 
here into two large groups; those pertaining to the Latin American 
countries themselves and those deriving from the policies of the above-
mentioned institutions« 
1. Obstacles pertaining to the Latin American countries 
(a) Lack of investment programmes and properly-presented projects 
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has 
enphasised the desirability of drawing up development programmes that 
encompass all public-sector projects and estimate the investment requirements 
of private economic activities. The task of programming was begun saite 
time-ago in several countries and is now being undertaken in some others» 
2/ At that time, the International Bank for Reconstruction and 




Unquestionably the presentation of well-prepared over-all programmes will 
have very favourable effects on the policy of credit institutions» 
Nevertheless, as previously remarked, the preparation of such programmes 
is a difficult and costly process; consequently, willingness on the part 
of these institutions to agree in principle to finance a programme for 
its entire duration would constitute a powerful incentive to programming« 
The preparation of specific investment projects also requires 
considerable technical and financial resources which governments are not 
always willing or able to stake, quite apart from the time it takes to 
formulate such projects» The :t:-.3k that a project may fail in the end to 
obtain approval, after these resources have been used, sometimes acts as a 
deterrent» Nevertheless, experience has been gradually indicating 
satisfactory procedures» In several cases, IBRD has sanctioned certain 
undertakings in principle and has encouraged the submission of projects 
which were afterwards approved» Furthermore, on occasion, it has even 
suggested the expansion of such projects with a view to increasing their 
economic efficiency» In this respect, larger-scale technical, co-operation 
with governments on the part of the United Nations and its specialized 
agencies could help to remove the obstacles. Such co-operation in the 
preparation of projects has been given in specific cases, but there is 
also a need to train technical personnel in the various countries who would 
be capable of formulating projects or of evaluating those drawn up by 
other technical experts» 
(b) Defective management of enterprises 
There are certain badly managed public utilities vàlidi the credit 
institutions have suggested should be reorganized before loans are 
granted» It has happened that loans have been made for the purpose of 
importing equipment viiich rapidly deteriorated because it was not properly 
used. The elimination of such difficulties of course depends upon the 
governments themselves, although a commitment to grant the loan on condition 





(c) Obstacles created by inflation 
The inflation prevailing in several Latin American countries is a 
considerable obstacle to the investment of international resources, although 
in some of these cases sizable loans have been granted. Nevertheless, 
such resources can hardly be obtained for the purposes of a far-reaching 
investment programme unless measures are taken to control inflation at 
least in part» Conversely, it cannot be ignored that the sucess of 
an anti-inflationary programme generally depends upon the availability 
of such resources on carefully-concerted tenia. 
There are many recent e^ieples which afford very useful lessons. I f 
inflation is caused by the use of bank credit to finance private investment, 
the immediate consequence of suspending such investment in order to curb 
credit expansion is unemployment, first in the industries directly affected, 
and secondly in those which supplied consumer goods to persons employ«! 
in the first cgroup, with all the attendant repercussions. A contraction 
of the economy ensues, with results that generally lead to a renewed 
inflationary expansion of credit. The only way to prevent this is to 
cover the inflationary excess of investment with foreign capital - whether 
the same investment as before is involved, or other new investment - and 
to continue in this manner until such time as it can be covered entirely 
fraii a higher domestic savings coefficient. 
In such cases, an inflow of foreign capital makes it possible to 
obviate the distortions that accompany straightforward deflation. Although 
such an inflow alone cannot correct the disequilibrium underlying the 
inflationary process, it is equally true that .stabilization becomes an 
easier task if the real supply of goods increases, or can be expanded by 
means of additional imports financed with foreign resources. 
Hence it appears that the best way of combating this type of inflation 
is to adopt an investment programme while simultaneously applying energetic 
anti-inflationary measures. 
If inflation is due to public-sector investment, higher taxation is 
generally the most convenient formula, in so far as the reduction of such 




very often it is necessary to find solutions for technical, administrative 
and political problems. Foreign capital can facilitate the transitional 
process, enabling it to be carried out in a shorter time or reducing its 
negative effects on the level of income* Thuo a temporary contribution 
of international resources becoc.es essential? just as when the aim is to 
obviate the effects of a contraction in investment expenditure. 
The problem becomes much more difficult in the case of wage or cost 
inflation. Here too a substantial investment programme is imperative, 
which, together with other measures, will enable productivity and income 
to increase rapidly, and wither". which inflationary pressure cannot be 
withstood. 
It is no exaggeration to say that inflation, owing to its economic, 
social, moral and political effects, is the most acute problem facing 
Latin America« It must, of course, be combated by domestic measures, 
applied with firmness and conviction. Nevertheless, if such action is to 
be taken, the contribution of international resources is indispensable. 
Otherwise, anti-inflationary measures would be incompatible not only with 
development but even with the stability of the domestic economy at the 
level of employment reached in inflationary conditions. One such a pooling 
of effort were achieved, the capacity for absorption of international 
resources would substantially increase® 
(d) Obstacles created by the difficulty of meeting external payments 
Apart from inflation, the difficulty which a country may experience 
in the financial servicing of foreign loans is among the factors that 
have most seriously limited the capacity for absorption of foreign capital« 
As a general rule, the Latin American countries have to face periodic 
foreign exchange difficulties which could be appreciably reduced - and 
perhaps obviated altogether - if far-sighted measures were adopted to 
encourage exports and to promote import substitution, thus altering the 
imposition of imports. It has already been stated that one of the most 
significant aspects of a development programme consists precisely in 
effecting the investment required to introduce such structural changes in 
the economy. Consequently, a country*s capacity to pay for financial 
/services - and 
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services - and therefore the ceiling for the foreign loans which could be 
raised - should not be judged in the light of such foreign exchange crises, 
bub should be assessed with due regard to the possibilities of structural 
readjustment. Thus, it might often happen that foreign, exchange difficulties, 
instead of discouraging the investment of international resources, could 
beccme an incentive thereto, thus helping to expand the capacity for 
capital absorption. 
• 2« Obstacles deriving from the policy of credit institutions 
(a) Limiting investment to r-noorts of foreign equipment 
The international credit institutions1 practice of limiting the 
financing they grant to the amount needed to pay for imports of capital 
goods has a reasonable basis if each loan is considered separately on its 
ofcn merits. It appears logical that the recipient of a loan should draw 
upon domestic savings to cover the proportion of his investment represented 
by local expenditure» A reservation should be made, however. There are 
cases where a rise in production also entails an increase in the working 
capital represented by semi-finished goods imported from abroad. There 
would be no valid grounds for restricting investment to goods constituting 
fixed capital alone. 
If the economic process is considered as a whole, however, some 
doubts arise which call for comment. The following example may be'taken. 
Supposing that at a given moment a country has net savings equivalent to 
10 per cent of its national income which are entirely used for investment, 
and that additional investment is planned which would raise the total 
investment coefficient to 12 per cent of income. Half of this additional 
investment corresponds to capital goods which will have to be imported and 
for which appropriate international resources will be available, in 
.,¡accordance with the current practice under discussion. The other half, 
however, equivalent to 1 per cent of income, will represent domestic 
expenditure. If spontaneous savings stand at only 10 per cent, there will 
be no means of.covering this additional sum, unless the State - if it is 
involved - were to resort to higher taxes far this purpose, which might be 




expedient open to the private entrepreneur is recourse to the banking 
system, with the ensuing inflationary effects both in the internal econcny 
and on the balance of payments® 
A ¿Loser analysis of this example is warranted by the lessons it 
offers» The persons for whom employment is provided by that half of the 
additional investment which must be covered locally will mainly come 
from the increase in the active population plus the population displaced 
from primary production and from low-productivity activities« Of the 
net income earned by these new employees out of funds supplied by the 
banking system, part will be spent locally and part on imports* Consequently, 
if a balance-of-payments deficit is to be avoided, it will be necessary 
to cover at least the latter part with resources from abroad» As regards 
the share of domestic demand, an inflationary pressure on supply nail occur, 
as at best supply will take seme time to increase, whereas the income 
increment is usually quickly spent. Hence, from this direction also 
imports will receive a stimulus, owing to the additional presure generated 
by the inflationary expansion of trade» 
If it is not additional employment that is involved, but simply the 
transfer of persons already employed in production of consumer goods to 
production of capital goods, the inflationary impact will be greater, 
since the volume of income will remain the same while production for 
consumption will diminish« 
In the example under consideration, the only way in which the share 
of local expenditure in the increase in investment could be covered without 
inflationary consequences would be to leave unused an equivalent proportion 
of the savings representing 10 per cent of income» 
Obviously, therefore, if the economic process is viewed as a whole, 
the practice followed in this respect limits the possibilities of productive 
absorption of international resources or leads to inflationary consequences» 
The problem lies, however, not only in the lack of savings but also in 
the difficulties of transferring them abroad in order to purchase capital 
goods» It may happen that all the savings required are available and yet 




Such a situation is of course inconceivable in countries which manufacture 
their own capital goods and have no need to import thou« 
In this as in other aspects of international investment, the 
practices followed by the London financial market before the First World 
ifiar displayed very interesting features in respect of adaptability to 
real requirements. The bonds that were floated when a British railway was 
being built abroad covered not only the materials and equipment that had 
to be exported but also the amount of sterling required for transfer to 
the country receiving the investment, to cover wages and other local 
expenses. It would be inadvisable to adopt the same procedure today, 
but its lesson can be profitably applied in searching for a more satisfactory 
solution to this aspect of the problem. 
It must be acknowledged that such a solution would be difficult to 
find in the case of individual projects. Under a development programme, 
on the other hand, if it is calculated that a country's spontaneous 
domestic saving cannot exceed a given proportion of its income, and if an 
investment plan involving a larger amount is drawn up, the excess must be 
covered with international resources, whatever the projects for which it 
is to be used. In this connexion it is interesting to note that for the 
economic development programme for southern Italy, IBRD loaned funds to 
cover the additional imports brought about by the increase in income, 
(b) Priority for private investment 
As previously noted, current opinion in the Latin American countries 
is in favour of encouraging private enterprise and there could therefore 
be no fundamental objection to the principle of giving priority to private 
investment. Accordingly, the investment of public international resources 
is generally regarded as justifiable only if no private foreign capital 
is available for the purpose. But there are two points which must be 
considered in working towards a satisfactory and practical application 
of such a policy. The Latin American countries are traditionally in 
favour of the State's assuming responsibility for certain types of public 
investment which in seme other countries have been undertaken by private 




private investment in other public services shows that such an attitude 
was not dictated by ideological considerations but simple grew up because 
in this way economic development was more satisfactorily served« 
Nevertheless, it is evident that there is now a tendency to place 
some undertakings formerly left to private enterprise in the hands of 
the State« This again must not be ascribed to the influence of ideological 
considerations. One significant example is sufficient to make the 
position clear« For the State to exercise control over public utility 
tariffs is an established practice« In the United Stat es, rates which 
provide a yield of 15» to 6 per csnt, of the capital invested are considered 
reasonable. Although a somewhat higher ceiling may be justifiable in 
the Latin American countries, private capital could hardly be attracted 
into new public utility enterprises with yields at that level« To achieve 
this goal, it would be necessary to raise the rate of return substantially, 
and that would not in fact be warrantable in view of the nature of such 
enterprises. It is no longer, as in the past, a matter of introducing 
new techniques, but of utilizing those already familiar. Consequently, 
there is no reason whatever to pay foreign investors a considerable 
premium for technical know-how which has now became camion property« 
It is therefore understandable that in these circumstances governments 
should prefer to effect such basic investment on their own, and that 
they should have to resort to public international loans at a relatively 
low rate of interest until the private bond market has been re-established 
in the large financial centres« Again because of the low rate of return, 
the alternative of interesting Latin American private investors in such 
undertakings is rarely feasible« 
Existing public utilities in the hands of foreign private investors 
are not in the same position« Any additional capital required can be 
obtained at suitable rates of interest, either in the financial market 
or from EX3MBANK and IBRD. The usual problem in this case is of a 
different nature« Tariffs have frequently not been adjusted to the rise 
in operational costs caused by inflation, and in seme cases enterprises 
have reached the point where they can no longer make reasonable profits, 




This is also a frequent occurence in the oase of State-owned public 
utilities, where the situation derives more from the demaging results 
of inflation than from a specific policy of opposition to foreign investment» 
When, as often happens, there is a time-lag in the adjustment of wages 
and salaries to the rise in prices, the profits of entrepreneurs generally 
increase, while in order to prevent a further upswing in the cost of 
living, public utility rates are not raised» There is thus a transfer 
of real income to the entrepreneurial sector, not only from the broad 
masses of the population, but also from public utility enterprises, 
whether they are private or State-owned» On the other hand, if it is . 
difficult to increase tariffs when public utilities are State property, 
it is much more so when they belong to private interests and particularly 
when, in addition, they are foreign-owned» 
In other cases, there has been reluctance to accept foreign capital 
when, for one reason or another, it is used to establish a. monopoly or 
with the open intention of limiting competititon» This fact need only be 
touched upon here, as it will be discussed at a later stage» Lastly, 
the actual size of a foreign enterprise, and the disproportionate weight 
it may come to carry in a country's internal economic life, has at times 
given rise to feelings of mistrust» This situation, although hampering 
the access of private capital to ownership of enterprises, leaves open 
other opportunities for co-operation both on the part of private investors 
and on that of the international credit institutions, as will also be 
shown in due course« 
In cases where well-founded misgivings exist, it would be desirable 
for the government to demarcate and define the field of action which it 
has reserved for itself, and to give adequate guarantees to private 
entrepreneurs in all other activities not affected by the policy in 
question, in order to prevent any withdrawal on the part of private 
enterprise. The viability of such a policy has been demonstrated in 
recent years in Mexico, where agrarian reform and the expropriation of 
petroleum and the railways have not prevented private entrepreneurs, both 





From another point of view, in cases where it is justifiable to give 
priority to private capital rather than facilitating public investment, 
it is essential that the Latin American entrepreneur should be afforded 
ready access to international sources of capital and technical know-how 
in order that he may compete with foreign entrepreneurs on a reasonably 
equal footing* Herein lies one of the weakest points in the international 
loan systems, and this important aspect of the problem will be discussed 
later* 
(c) Differences of opinion as to the expediency of a project 
It sometimes happens that although there are no technical objections 
to a project doubts may arise as to whether it is in the best interests 
of a country's economic development • It would not be difficult to settle 
the question if the two.parties concerned had the same criteria for 
judging a project from this point of view. A case in point is the report 
of the Currie Mission on the economic development of Colombia. Although 
this Mission was sent by the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the report expresses opiniones for which its authors alone 
are responsible. They were not in favour of the establishment of steelworks 
at Paz del Rio, because, inter alia, domestic production costs were higher 
than the prices of imported iron and steel. It must be reiterated that 
if this criterion had carried the day throughout Latin America, industrial 
development would never have gained momentum. Even if costs are higher 
than foreign prices, an industry can be a sound economic proposition if 
the net increase in the product derived from the factors employed therein 
is greater than that obtainable in other activities, as was explained in 
the context of foreign trade problems. No judgement could therefore be 
passed on this specific point without reviewing the other investment 
alternatives and discussing the possibilities for import substitution 
activities that a country will have to undertake by virtue of its own 
growth. It is in such instances that the need for a development programme 




(d) Reluctance to invest in certain types of public services 
Up to the time of the world depression of the nineteen-thirties the 
Latin American Governments had obtained loans in London and other European 
cities, and later in New York, for public-sector activities such as the 
provision of health services, schools and public buildings¡> whose own 
productivity is not always high, but which do make a notable contribution 
to the over-all increase in productivity© As a rule they were long-tern 
loans which were serviced out of general public funds and in some cases 
by means of special levies. The private capital market abroad continues 
to be practically inaccessible to Latin American countries and no other 
way of satisfying this need has yet appeared» There can be no doubt that 
a decision to grant loans for this purpose out of international public 
resources would considerably stimulate the absorption of such resources 
in Latin America. 
(e) Need for a government guarantee for loans 
This prerequisite also tends to impose serious limitations on the 
capacity for absorption of international resources in the field of private 
enterprise» On the one hand, there are governments which prefer, as is 
only natural, to satisfy their own needs before those of private entrepreneurs® 
On the other hand, private entrepreneurs are often deterred by the 
possibility that a State guarantee of a loan for which they are applying 
may entail direct intervention in their enterprise, although there might 
be no other reason for this. All this explains why international public 
resources have only rarely been available for private undertakings, and 
these have generally been on a very large scale. Credit has been inaccessible 





C. ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC RESOURCES 
• ' FOR LATIN AMERICAN ENTREPRENEURS 
The chief obstacles to the investment of international public 
resources having been set forth in the foregoing pages, and the possibilities 
of removing them, having been reviewed in general terms, the time has now 
come to enlarge upon one such possibility in particular, whose vital 
importance must not be overlooked: that of using such resources to 
encourage enterprise and private investment on the part of entrepreneurs 
established in Latin America» 
Economically and technically, the situation of these entrepreneurs 
is unquestionably inferior to that of their foreign counterparts, and any 
effort to bridge the gap will have marked effects on economic development 
and on the operation of the free enterprise system» 
It is a well-known fact that in Latin America the need for medium-
and. long-term credits for industry can be adquately satisfied only in very 
few case3, and that this is one of the factors which retards development. 
The banking system is well prepared to provide tho usual short-term loans 
to supplement a lack of working capital, and such loans are often made 
with inflationary consequences. The basic organization for loans to 
industry is therefore available, but not the necessary resources for 
sufficiently long terms. Banking legislation itself' often prohibits the 
freezing of an unduly large proportion of current deposits in operations 
of this kind. 
In some countries, besides.commercial banks, there are special 
institutions for furthering industrial development, but they are almost 
always hampered by a shortage of resources. The problem therefore consists 
in using the best establishments existing in each country - without 
prejudice to the creation of others if It should seem advisable - so that 




1a Possible solutions of the problem 
An examination of the difficulties leading to the failure of certain (7 
operations reveals no intrinsic obstacles to their elimination« If the 
most reliable and respected banks or other institutions are chosen in each 
country, there would be no reason not to provide them with aggregate sums 
proportionate to their capital and reserves, to be earmarked for direct 
loans to industry on certain prearranged terms» The prior approval 
requirement could be waived, except when the sums involved exceeded a 
certain limit which would not be difficult to establish» 
Considerations may now be given to the concrete possibilities for 
carrying out such operations on the broad scale which they could attain 
in the whole of Latin America under an adequately organized system« There 
are three such possibilitiesto organize an industrial credit system under 
the direction of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 
to do so within the framework of the Export-Import Bank; and to establish 
a special fund« 
Let us take a glance at the first two solutions and than give separate 
consideration of the special fund question« As regards IBM), it would be 
desirable, for the reasons already given, that these operations should 
not require a government guarantee, although the central bank in each 
country would have to approve the aggregate sums to be lent in order to 
cover the exchange risk» While it is true that the statutes of IBRD demand 
such a guarantee, these operations could be conducted by means of an 
affiliated organization, such as the International Finance Corporation, 
for which the Bank itself drew up a project in 1951 at the request of the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council* This Corporation is authorized 
to carry out operations of the type advocated here, although the end 
pursued is different» .The aim of the Corporation is primarily to attract 
foreign private investment to the less-developed countries, and also to 
promote domestic investment, either through loan operations or by under-
writing shares which, it later sells on the domestic or foreign market o 
The Corporation's fundamental objectives and the idea of industrial loans 




The fact that the Export-Import Bank has begun successfully to carry 
out industrial credit transactions of this type indicates that it is fully 
qualified to do so« Moreover, its available resources are much bigger 
than the Corporation's. Since it is not obliged to obtain funds by 
issuing bonds on financial markets, it can act vdth a freedom that it 
perhaps might not enjoy if it were compelled to take account of certain 
doubts or reservations with which operations unfamiliar to foreign 
financial centres might be received« 
2• Establishment of a special fund within 
the inter-American system 
An objection to this idea might be raised at the outset: namely, 
that a new body is being planned when two institutions already exist that 
could fill the same role. Recommendations as to the most appropriate 
j 
solution are beyond the scope of the present analysis-» It should be pointed 
out, however, that if such an industrial, credit system is to be broad 
enough, a special instrument will need to be established, either in 
combination with the agency projected by IBRD or as a new department of 
Er.MBMK. The operations involved are of a different type from those 
normally carried out by these two banks, and they necessitate appropriate 
experience. In this connexion, it would perhaps be necessary to establish 
agencies or branches in the principal countries in order to maintain closer 
contact with the banking system and gain direct knowledge of industrial 
needs« It is obvious that such an objective would entail the training of 
specialized personnel, most of whom might be drawn from the latin American 
banks themselves if due importance is to be attached to first-hand knowledge 
of the operational environment« 
On all these grounds, a third alternative is presented here-j the 
choice of which might be influenced by other considerations also« 
If the proposal should materialize, all the countries would have to 
contribute capital; but of course only a comparatively small proportion 
of the credit resources could come from Latin America, since the whole 




It would therefore be essential to endow this institution with an adequate • 
amount of special resources, While the capital, although it could be used 
for credit operations, would be mainly earmarked for underwriting possible 
losses in the application of the resources in question» 
In present circumstances, it would be very difficult to find any 
solution other than the endowment by the United States of a special fund 
for credit operations» Given this sources, the form taken by the 
contribution does not seem to matter* However, there is one source of 
financing that, on account of its special character, might be considered 
the most suitable» It is calculated that the United States Government 
receives about 100 million dollars annually from the tax imposed om the 
yield of capital invested in Latin America by United States firms and 
companies» This revenue thus accrues from Latin American sources, and 
- although discussion of the legal aspects of the question would be out of 
place here - there is an argument for its remaining in Latin America and 
contributing to the acceleration of the region's rate of growth» Indeed, 
the United States Treasury itself has demonstrated its willingness to 
consider a reduction in the receipts from this tax, as a means of encouraging 
the investment of private United States capital in the Latin American 
countries» The possibility of abolishing the tax altogether has frequently 
been discussed; but objections to this idea have been raised, not so 
much on account of the reduction in public revenue (which would be 
negligible), as because of the discriminatory treatment which would thereby 
be introduced into the United States tax system«» This stumbling-block 
prevents private United States investment in Latin America from receiving 
maximum tax incentives, but, on the other hand, the possibilities of using 
these funds to encourage private enterprise in the Latin American countries 
themselves might well be examined® 
Unfortunately, in present circumstances the Latin American countries 
could not utilize the United States money market to obtain resources for 
a development fund of this nature; but if the United States couDd undertake 
to endow the fund with the revenue accruing from the above-mentioned tax 




for the issue of a loan on the United. States money market, on terms 
similar to those usual in Treasury operations» This would be a means 
of providing the fund, as its operations were gradually expanded, with 
much more substantial resources than could be obtained through the direct 
contribution of tax proceeds. Such a formula would offer the advantage 
of helping to renew the interest of private investors in Latin American 
development, while a financial market which has remained practically 
close to Latin America since the world depression would be reopened, 
even if only in this special form. 
The exact amount of resources which Latin America could absorb each 
year in these industrial credit operations cannot be estimated. It will 
mainly depend on the skill with which the system is organised and managed. 
But, given the considerable potential needs of the Latin American countries, 
it may safely be assumed that from 50 to 100 million dollars at least 
could, be absorbed annually once the system had been organised» 
D. 3WESTMENT OF PRIVATE FOREIGN CAPITAL 
1» Brief review of the present situation 
Investment in Latin America of private capital both from the 
United States and from other sources has been primarily channelled into 
export activities. This traditional characteristic continues to prevail. 
Except in special cases, investment in internal activities has not aroused 
the same degree of interest. It is determined by other criteria, requires 
knowledge of a local market which is usually limited in size, and is 
subject to transfer difficulties in respect of service payments which do 
not usually affect investment aimed at promoting exports. It is custcanary 
to cite as an instructive example the great attraction of Canada's domestic 
development for the entrepreneur in the United States. But Canada 
constitutes a special case on which generalizations cannot legitimately 
be based» 
Apart from this, the returns on capital in the United States have 
been high; and it is only natural that the private foreign investor should 




There are, of course, types of investment in Latin America on which the 
yield is much larger® But if, in such circumstances, investment of this 
kind were to spread and expand substantially, the burden of financial 
services might become a very serious factor in the balance-of-payments 
positions of the Latin American countries» 
All this leads to the conclusion that even under highly favourable 
conditions such investment in Latin America cannot reasonably be expected 
to increase enough to make a substantial contribution to the acceleration 
of the region's rate of development» And even if that should at any time 
Occur, the burden of service payments would restrict the capacity for 
capital absorption. Suffice it to bear in mind that even if the rate of 
return on private capital were only 10 per cent, two and a half times more 
capital in the shape of international public resources could be absorbed 
with the same service payments, given the relation between interest rates» 
2. Obstacles and possibilities of removing them 
This is far from implying that the present state of affairs may be 
considered satisfactory. There is a general desire to receive more private 
foreign capital, particularly in those frequent cases in which it is 
accompanied by new. production, organization and market development techniques» 
But it cannot be denied that there are real difficulties which sometimes 
hamper the inflow of this capital to several Latin American countries. The 
chief problems are reviewed below» 
(a) Transfer difficulties 
Emphasis has been laid elsewhere upon the need for a far-sighted 
policy of encouraging exports and promoting import substitution in order to 
reduce or eliminate the foreign exchange crises which recur at such 
frequent intervals in Latin America. A policy of this kind would, of course, 
alleviate the transfer difficulties that occur in many countries. 
Inflation is also one of the major causes of these difficulties. 
Unless it is merely a cost inflation that is involved, the profits and 
interest to be transferred abroad increase, and if the currency has not 




such transfers on the balance of payments may give rise to serious 
distortions. This is what happened in those unquestionably significant 
cases in which dollar quotations long remaied steady while domestic prices 
were rising sharply» 
Such effects are often aggravated by a practice current among foreign 
firms which operate in Latin America with comparatively liberal credit 
granted by the banking system of the country concerned» They are in the 
habit of taking account of their responsibilities abroad rather than of 
the real capital allocated to their local operations» Thus the foreign 
concern is working on the basis of a substantial amount of domestic capital, 
yet transfers its profits abroad as if they were the proceeds of the 
foreign capital invested» 
Provisions which ensure the remittance cf service payments on the 
capital invested up to a specified maximum, and of a given proportion of 
amortization payments, are an improvement upon previous conditions, in 
which remittances of service payments were subject to severe restrictions;» 
Only a free exchange market, however, allows absolutely unlimited transfers, 
although the relief this implies is often partly offset by the instability 
that is generally produced in such cases or by the fact that the devaluation 
of the currency is greater in the market in question than in the internal 
economy« Be this as it may, herein lies one of the characteristic evils 
of inflation« On the one hand it causes an excessive increase in company 
profits, and on the other it leads to restrictive measures or to 
unfavourable situations which, although they may be justified by circumstances, 
are considered to militate against the interests of private • capital» In 
fact, satisfactory solutions are quite impossible to find when an inflationary 
movement of this type is under wayj and this provides still further 
evidence of the adverse effects on economic development which, sooner or 
later, inflation is bound to produce« 
(b) Restrictions on certain types of investment 
Sometimes a selective criterion is established for the types of 
investment which a country wishes to admit or to which it is prepared to 
grant special exchange treatment on the lines referred to. Such a policy 




other undertakings for which, in opinion of the authorities, domestic 
firms could be responsible* The latter include all those activities whose 
techniques are easily accesible and in which the investment of foreign 
capital and the consequent remittance of profits abroad would be unjustifiable 
so long as such funds could be used elsewhere to the positive advantage 
of the country concerned* 
The motives underlying this attitude are understandable, and so are 
the misgivings it arouses in capital-exporting countries*. The idea of 
discrimination always gives rise to uneasiness, and it may well be asked 
whether the adverse effects on foreign investment caused by this form of 
discouragement are or are not, in practice, offset by tangible benefits* 
The organization of a system of international credit for the Latin 
American entrepreneur might modify the atmosphere that has bred restrictions 
of this kind, since he would no longer feel at a disadvantage vis-a-vis 
his foreign counterpart on account of capital shortages» If in addition 
he were to be given easier access to up-to-date techniques as a means of 
iii crea sing productivity, most of the economic arguments in favour of a 
system of selective approval of private foreign investment would be 
invalidated© 
(c) Opposition to certain types of investment 
There is one controversial and therefore delicate question which 
cannot be shirked if the aim of making an objective survey of the obstacles 
to private foreign investment is to be fulfilled. Even in those cases 
where there has been a tendency ..towards selective control of investment, 
Latin America has not really afforded any striking instances of animosity 
towards foreign capital invested In freely competitive conditions. When 
a hostile feeling towards foreign capital has arisen3 it has generally 
béen because the very nature of the concession - as in the case of public 
utilities - or the organization or size of the company itself has in 
practice led to the establishment of a monopoly or to open restriction of 
competition. In contrast to such cases, which have been much in the public 
eye, countless others could be cited of foreign commercial and industrial 
enterprises which, besides having earned general recognition" of their 




of hostility of any kind, although in the course of their operations 
they may have encountered transfer problems or administrative difficulties 
with the authoritieso 
There is no reason to suppose that the attitude of the Latin American 
public in this respect is any different from that of the public in the 
United States. The fact that a company is an egression of free enterprise 
is not enough to incline the general public in its favour. Free 
enterprise must go hand-inland with free and fair competition, and on 
this point public opinion holds a theoretical position which is unassailable 
In the United States the pressure of public opinion has won two fundamental 
victories« The first is reflected in legislation protecting the general 
interests of the community, coupled with machinery for applying the law 
and supervising its implementation; and the second is represented by the 
development of a sense of collective responsibility, together with the 
practice of giving publicity to their operations that has been adopted 
by those large corporations which, on account of their size or the nature 
of the market-j are faced only with limited competition. 
An assurance that United States companies operating in Latin America 
are not in practice exempt from the legislation referred to might help 
to clear the air in this connexion. Such an interpretation may be placed 
upon the decision of the United States Department of Justice to inquire 
into the working methods of a large United States corporation operating 
in Central America« 
In some cases, the application.of anti-monopolistic measures might 
break up an operational complex to the detriment of the efficiency of an 
organization. This does not imply that the problem cannot be satisfactorily 
solved. There are effective possibilities for international co-operation 
in this respect« Inter-governmental agreements could be envisaged, aimed 
at ensuring that the business methods of enterprises should be subject 
to appropriate regulations which, without affecting the companies' freedom 
of action in their own field, would safeguard the interests of the community 
and would also enable Latin American countries to ascertain the real 





The complexity of economic life makes it impossible to establish 
a single formula to solve the serious and varied problems which this type 
Of enterprise brings in its train® But once a policy of co-operation 
with common aims has been concerted, it will first permit the gradual 
elimination of disruption factors, and later progressively facilitate 
the creation of favourable conditions for effective investment in Latin 
America's economic development» 
It is understandable that in cases such as those just mentioned, 
the State may consider the alternative of making the investment itself, 
in order to obviate the complications which a limited degree or total lack 
of competition involves« It could not be said that by acting thus a 
Latin American country would be tampering with the principle of free 
enterprise» This principle has already been violated once free competition 
ceases to exist or is severely restricted» From this point of view, 
there can be no reason why a government should not resort to public 
international loanso 
Even if this obstacle to a governments access to international loans 
were to be overcome, however, others might arise in connexion with the 
loan operation itself« Credit institutions are naturally obliged to 
see that their resources are advantageously applied in projects with 
sound economic bases; and they must also make sure that the management of 
the companies concerned is reasonably efficient«! No question of principle 
is thus involved, but one of practical judgement® 
In this connexion possibilities are opened up which perhaps have not 
yet been fully exploited« There are cases where, even though private 
enterprise cannot operate satisfactorily for the above-mentioned reasons, 
it can do so very effectively in the realm of management or service 
contracts, whichever term is preferred» For example, the State may sign 
an agreement with a private firm for the building of a given plant and 
entrust the management of the concern to the same firm or another for a 
long enough period to amortize the whole or a considerable part of the 
loan» Such firms may also wish to contribute a share of the capital, on 




both in these respects and in cases where special elements of risk exist» 
At all events, a general characteristic of such contracts might be a 
commitment on the part of the foreign private firm to train local technical 
and administrative personnel so that in the course of time they could 
asume responsibility for the entire operation of the enterprise,, 
3« Final considerations 
Nothing has hitherto been said about the nationalization of foreign 
enterprises. In capital-exporting countries, however, this possibility 
is usually mentioned as one of the deterrents to the foreign investorn 
Although there have been very few instances of nationalization in Latin 
America. and those with .a backwash of troublesome inderanisiaiicn .problems 
have been even rarer, it is undeniable that their psychological repercussions 
have often been far-reaching. While a discussion of this problem and of 
the merits of any legal formulas are outside the scope of the present 
report, there can be no doubt that in this and other aspects of the 
foreign investment problem a satisfactory and lasting solution can be 
reached only on the basis of a policy of international co-operation in the 
economic development of Latin Americas A well-planned policy, whioh is 
complemented by essential internal measures, and which, besides speeding 
up the rate of economic growth, may help to remedy certain ills such as 
those indicated above, will give a better understanding of the objectives 
pursued through investment of foreign capital; and that will be the surest 
guarantee that such capital will receive favourable treatment» 
Latin America's political instability is also frequently mentioned 
as a source of discouragement to investment of private foreign capital». 
Undoutedly, certain political changes which take place through irregular 
channels may also have significant psychological repercussions abroad» 
But such events must be viewed in their proper perspective. Latin America 
is subject not only to the vicissitudes of its internal politics but also 
to the impact of political and economic changes which occur within the 
large industrial centres and which in one way and another are usually 
far-reaching in their effects. All this affects Latin America's balance 




ability to service foreign capital® On the other hand, it cannot be said 
that the Governments which have come to power in Latin America as a 
result of irregular political changes have, as a general rule, been any 
less well disposed towards foreign capital than those that have assumed 
•office through the regular constitutional processes. In any case, the 
favourable attitude of both types of government will not depend upon 
the merits of any given formula, but upon the creation of the propitious 
climate to which reference has been made, through an appropriate combination 
of national and international measures« 
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Chapter V 
ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN RELATION TO THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF LATIN AMERICA 1/ 
1, The tardiness of Latin America's development 
In the twenty years that will shortly have elapsed since the end 
of the Second World War, Latin America's rate of development has been 
slow and fluctuating, and in vast areas of the region has so greatly 
slackened that average per capita income has increased only by 50 per cent 
in that length of time, rising from a minimal figure of 250 dollars to 
its present modest level of 430 dollars. Unless the trends that have 
thus evolved in the first half of the sixties are modified, the average 
per capita income of the 600 million inhabitants that Latin America will 
have at the end of the present century will be only about 650 dollars, 
and even if the growth rate registered in the last fifteen years was 
2/ 
outstripped in the future, would not exceed 850 dollars,-' 
This slow rate of development, which entails such unsatisfactory 
material and cultural living conditions for the broad masses of the 
Latin American population, is thrown into sharp relief when it is borne 
in mind that such an average income - which, in default of radical reforms, 
could be expected to materialize only by the end of the century - represents 
no more than one-fifth of that currently enjoyed in the United States and 
little more than half the corresponding levels in Western Europe and in 
the USSR, while it is also lower than the figure registered in many other 
private-enterprise countries and centrally planned economies. These gaps 
are bound to widen considerably, for while the Latin American countries 
1/ "A contribution to economic integration policy in Latin America" 
(E/CN,12/728, 20 April 1967), pp. 3-31. 
2j Data expressed in terms of i 960 prices. During the first four year3 
of the present decade, average per capita income in the region as a 
whole increased at a cumulative annual rate of 1 per cent. In the 
interval between 1950 and 1964 the corresponding growth rate was 




in the aggregate have attained an annual growth rate of barely 1 per cent, 
the other regions mentioned are developing two or three times as dynamically, 
quite apart from such examples of exceptionally rapid expansion as are 
afforded by Japan and some of the centrally planned economies. Thus, 
while Latin America took twenty years to raise its average per capita 
income by 50 per cent, the members of the European Economic Community 
achieved the same relative increase in under ten years, while the other 
areas referred to did so in even less time, after having already completed 
an arduous phase of post-war reconstruction. 
Moreover, in its cultural and material living conditions Latin America 
will go on lagging still farther behind on account of the wide disparities 
currently existing between its income levels and those of other areas. A 
4 per cent increase in income in the United States enables its 192 million 
inhabitants to expand their consumption, on an average, by 55 dollars 
per capita; in Latin America, when income rises by 5 per cent, the 
per capita increment in the consumption of the region's 230 million 
inhabitants averages only 5 dollars. 
These various data testify to the slowness and inadequacy of 
Latin America's development, and to the region's failure to participate 
in the economic expansion that is taking place in vast geographical areas 
of the world. 
While it is true that particular characteristics, such as the high 
rate of population growth, help to retard per capita development, and that 
special circumstances which have arisen in the past and still persist in 
some countries at times permit more rapid spurts, it is equally undeniable 
that the experience of the past twenty years affords plenty of evidence 
of the difficulties attending Latin America's development, and that the 
foregoing comparisons of national income indexes reflect the truth of 
.this picture of the region's backwardness in relation to the world at 
large, which becomes yet more marked when future development prospects 
are considered. 
The contemplation of these problems, and the comparison of Latin 
America's experience with that of other countries, make it very clear 
that the region has not succeeded in establishing the economic and social 




sources of dynamic energy are permanent and powerful enough for the desired 
objectives to be attained,, A great deal is being done of late at both the 
national and the international levelj but, at the same time, the limitations 
imposed upon Latin America's development by the policy of the industrial 
countries with which the region has trade and-financial links have been 
and still are stringent, - Nevertheless, the question may well be asked 
whether it does not lie with the Lcitin American countries themselves to 
adopt the strategic decisions that may help, again at both the national 
and the international level, to prevent a delay of thirty or thirty-five 
years before the region can attain that modest per capita income of 
650 dollars, which will still be accompanied by its train of unemployment, 
under-productive jobs, and minimal levels of living for 50 per cent of 
the Latin American population«, 
In secretariat documents and at the sessions of the Commission, ECLA 
has repeatedly discussed the problems of Latin America's economic development 
and the essential features of the policies that should be pursued. But it 
will not be superfluous to analyse a few points in the present, document,. 
which once again signposts regional economic integration as the only 
possible path for Latin America to take at this stage of its development, 
2o The present stage of development and the need for 
regional economic integration 
The problem of Latin America's development could be summed up by 
compressing the reciprocal economic and social relationships involved in 
its mechanics into the following terms. The low average income in 
Latin America is determined by the failure of the national economies to 
develop as dynamically as is needed, not only for full utilization of their 
available manpower and material resources, but also for the assimilation 
of technical progress, which is an indispensable requisite for the 
improvement of productivity. Many obstacles which the region has not had 
the skill or the power to circumvent have hitherto prevented the 
establishment of the conditions required for such a process. 
The world depression of the thirties and the policy applied by the 
industrialized countries disrupted the pattern of development that the 




affected, while others were able to cushion the depressive impact by-
measures which later came to shape a new economic policy. Provisions 
which, to begin with, were primarily directed towards correcting the 
balance-of-payments deficits, and mitigating the effects of the fall in 
world market prices and the contraction in exports of primary commodities, 
spurred on an import substitution process which acquired major importance 
as time went by, and in many countries became one of the objectives of a 
deliberate industrialization policy. In practice, this process constituted 
the dynamic factor in a new growth pattern, and its repercussions made 
themselves felt in the economic and social changes that characterized one 
phase of Latin America's development. 
The economic variables representative of this growth pattern are 
well known: a long-term downward trend in the ratios between foreign trade 
and the domestic product, an expansion of the industrial sector's share 
in the formation of that product, and a striking change in the composition 
of imports. If the existing situation is compared with that prevailing 
in 1928-29, the statistics for the region as a whole show that the import 
coefficient has plummeted from 30 to 9 per cent and the export coefficient 
from 31 to 14 per cent, while industry's contribution to the domestic 
product has risen from 13 to 23 per cent. Furthermore, the proportion 
of imports represented by consumer goods has dwindled from 46 to 18 per cent, 
while the share of intermediate products, fuels and capital goods has 
climbed from 54 to 82 per cent. 
The industrialization process has not taken place in all the Latin 
American countries simultaneously, or at the same pace. The geographically 
or economically smaller countries - i.e., the majority - were slower to 
adopt this policy, and in many of them exports have continued to play 
the leading dynamic role in the growth process and in determining the 
economic situation. At the present stage of the region's development, 
the various countries display such marked disparitj.es that they can be 
classified in accordance with those economic ratios that indicate 
differences of structure, income levels and degrees of industrialization. 
At one end of the scale, a relatively advanced stage of industrial 




Mexico, especially in the first two. Close to them, although with special 
characteristics of their own, come Chile and Colombia. At the other end 
are the less developed countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay and 
most of the Central American countries, where as a rule export and import 
coefficients are still high. Venezuela exemplifies a different type of 
economy, which developed quickly on the basis of petroleum exports and 
has been undergoing a .rapid metamorphosis in recent years. 
Despite these differences, all the countries have pursued a very 
similar policy as regards the conduct of the import substitution process, 
and all have continued to export primary products. In effect, the 
Latin American countries that are smaller in size or relatively less 
developed are embarking upon industrialization or proceeding from one 
stage to another through the same channels that were used by the more 
developed countries some time ago. Only recently have certain changes 
begun to creep in, with the initial integration efforts of the ALALC 
countries and the more vigorous, decisions that are being adopted in the 
integration movement of the five Central American countriesa 
The purpose of the present chapter is to discuss some essential 
aspects of over-all development policy, especially those relating to the 
evolution of the external sector, in order to see how far it is contributing 
to the establishment of the basic requisites for an acceleration of the 
Latin American countries1 economic growth rates which will enable them 
to make up their leeway. It is a matter of evaluating the possible 
alternatives that may present themselves, given existing conditions in 
respect of the national economies and of international policy, with the 
aim of defining the role that integration will have to play as an 
instrument of Latin America's development. 
While it is no easy matter to make such an evaluation for the region 
as a whole, because of the marked differences among the Latin American 
countries, the experience of recent years unquestionably provides adequate 
grounds for certain basic inferences in the.light of which Latin America's 
current development problem can be stated in-reasonably accurate terms. 
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The countries that made most progress in import substitution, 
reducing their import and export coefficients, witnessed a slackening 
of their growth rate as time went by, and have found themselves faced 
with serious difficulties as they approach later stages of development. 
This state of affairs has arisen in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia, 
although in different circumstances and periods. Mexico is the only 
one of this more advanced group of countries in which industrialization 
has continued intensively in recent years, thanks to peculiarly favourable 
conditions, but here too potential limitations exist, of the same type 
as those hindering the continuance of the process in the other countries. 
The decline in the growth rate also affected the group of countries 
at less advanced stages of industrial development, whose economic 
development patterns were still comparatively open to the outside world. 
In their case, the fluctuations of external demand or purchasing power 
were reflected in the marked instability of the rate of development, which 
decreased from the mid-fifties onwards. The improvement registered in the 
economic situation of many Latin American countries in the last two years 
is attributable to the rise in export prices for primary products - which 
in turn must be largely ascribed to factors that may alter over the very 
short term or are already undergoing modification - rather than to changes 
in the basic conditions upon which development traditionally depends. 
Within the complex of factors and events that have been particularly 
influential in weakening and slowing down the rate of economic growth, 
attention must be drawn in the present over-all analysis and in the context 
of the topic under discussion to those relating to the conduct of the 
import substitution process and those which have maintained and aggravated 
the external bottleneck in the Latin American economies. 
Although the import substitution process was a fundamental dynamic 
factor in the development of what are now the most advanced countries, and 
is playing a similar role, in conjunction with external demand, in those 
that are relatively less developed, it has had virtually no influence on the 
diversification of Latin American exports. The countries of the region 
have continued to rely on their exports of primary products, while the 
industrialization process, under the aegis of a strongly protectionist 




In these circumstances, the Latin American countries have been unable 
to solve the problem of their balance-of-payments deficits. On the one 
hand, there has been a substantial drop in experts through the deterioration 
of the terms of trade, and external parchasing power has remained 
stationary or increased very slowly. On the other, the substitution process 
has altered the composition of imports but has' not reduced the aggregate 
volume of external supply requirements, which, on the contrary, has tended 
to expand with the growth of income and of demand for the items not replaced 
by domestic production. External financing has covered balance-of-payments 
disequilibria, for given periods, and played an active part in the import 
substitution process, but the terms have tightened increasingly, so that 
the rate of economic growth and the further continuance; of the substitution 
process itself have become unduly vulnerable to the vicissitudes of the 
bailee of payments. 
Two other features of this policy are of great significance for the 
region's development problem. They concern the economic productivity of 
the substitution process and the implications of dependence upon exports 
of primary products. 
The economic yields of import substitution activities have fallen short 
of the levels they might have reached had a rational industrialization policy 
been applied. The process has been carried on at relatively high costs, to 
some extent imputable to excessive and indiscriminate tariff protection, and 
through an industrial organization which has failed to attain normal 
standards of efficiency, partly because the markets are too small for 
advantage to be taken of economies of scale and specialization in important 
branches of industry. At the same time, as exports have continued to 
depend upon primary commodities, foreign trade has not transmitted to the 
Latin American countries all the dynamic impetus that might have been 
expected of the intensive economic expansion registered in the industrialized 
countries. In short, the assimilation of technical progress has been held 
up and the improvement of over-all productivity impeded; 
i 
Obviously, if the region is to regain this lost ground, some means.of 
rapidly expanding domestic production and increasing the efficiency of 




institutional reforms must be introduced, and the technical progress and high 
productivity indexes of contemporary industry must be assimilated. This is 
impracticable, as is being demonstrated by events, if the policy of 
industrialization within the narrow confines of individuál country markets 
is persistently adhered to, and if foreign trade is restricted to primary 
products- It is indispensable, therefore, to expand trade flows and 
gradually to establish a diversified structure of production, demand for 
which will transcend the bounds of the national markets and, in addition, 
t 
will mean that imports can be increased. 
A solution of this kind is hardly conceivable if each individual 
Latin American country - including the most advanced within the region - has 
no defence against the powerful industrialized countries and the still 
more powerful regional and political groupings they have formed. The 
developing countries have neither the resources nor the technical ability 
to compete with others even in the developing areas themselves, and much 
less in the industrialized regions. And in so far as they might be able 
to do so, experience is showing that they would encounter very strong 
opposition. 
The only solution, therefore, is to establish a gradual integration 
process conducive to the economic union of the Latin American countries. 
By this means, the national economies could take advantage of the 
region's resources and potential, and organize their activities, at much 
higher levels of productivity than at present, on the basis of a market 
of 230 million inhabitants, increasing at one of the highest population 
growth rates in the world. They would thus have found the means of 
remedying the present bottleneck in their foreign trade, which is due to the 
fact that their development possibilities are tied to the fluctuations and 
poor sales prospects encountered by their primary products on the markets 
of the industrialized countries. 
Given the existing position in respect of production techniques and 
international economic policy, regional integration appears to be the only 
efficacious formula for the creation of new dynamic stimuli and a new 
national growth structure, more flexible and more productive than that 
afforded by the substitution process. This thesis must not be interpreted 




itself, since the integration process cannot be put into effect unless at 
the same time national development programmes are carried out, trade 
with other regions reaches specific levels, and adequate technical and 
financial co-operation is forthcoming from abroad. 
It will be useful, therefore, to analyse the arguments in favour of 
integration more thoroughly, and demarcate more precisely its place within 
the framework of integrated national development policies. 
3* Development problems and the role of foreign trade 
It has been shown that the bottleneck in the external sector has been 
a very important cause of the low productivity and the lack of dynamic 
force displayed by the Latin American economies. It must not be inferred, 
however, that the only aim of economic policy is to surmount this obstacle. 
Latin America's development problem is much more complex, since other 
economic and social factors and conditions, which have not yet been 
tackled, or in any event not thoroughly enough, have combined with external 
difficulties to perpetuate the backwardness of the Latin American countries. 
Although these factors are all too well known, it is worthwhile to restate 
then here in order to show the reciprocal relationships that link than with 
foreign trade and with the approaches to regional integration that are 
formulated in the present document. 
In the first place, attention may be drawn to the general limiting 
factors relating to the efficiency of economic and social organization, 
which still subsist because of the slowness with which the structural and 
institutional reforms required by an up-to-date and progressive society 
are being introduced. This state of affairs is reflected in the lack of 
social mobility and the extreme inequity of property and income 
distribution; these factors in turn determine the rigidity of the social 
structure in many countries, low levels of living, deficient training and 
organization of human resources, and the constant frustration of economic 
growth incentives. 
Secondly, there are other limiting factors more closely linked to 
economic policy and market size. Thus, the want of internal and external 




restrictive practices, which in turn have had repercussions in the shape of 
the concentration of ownership, ill-advised allocation of resources, 
under-utilization of production capacity, and higher costs. At the same 
time, the small size of the individual country markets, which may not have 
been a serious obstacle in the early phases of industrialization, has 
made it impossible to reap the benefits of economies of scale and of 
particular degrees of specialization, and affords no incentives to the 
continuance of a dynamic investment process, especially in the relatively 
less developed countries of the region. Furthermore, the slow progress 
that has been made in organizing planning procedures precludes a 
sufficiently rapid implementation of efficacious policies, execution of 
plans, and formation of investment absorption capacity. 
Thirdly, something must be said of the more specifically economic 
factors. These are very numerous, but the following may be singled out 
as severely retarding the development of the Latin American countries: 
the under-development and stagnation of the rural economy, especially in 
the sectors producing for domestic consumptionj and the public sector's 
lack of funds - resulting from inefficient tax systems and, in most countries, 
from the absence of proper financial machinery and institutions - which 
hinders the execution of the infrastructure investment projects needed to 
encourage private investment in productive activities. In this context, 
reference must also be made to the financial and monetary disequilibria 
manifested in the dizzy inflationary spirals whose harmful effects on the 
allocation of resources and the formation of savings finally culminate in 
the disruption of the conditions required for economic growth. 
Fourthly and lastly, mention must be made of the limiting factors 
connected with the external sector. They derive from the inadequacy of 
external purchasing power, the deterioration of the terms of trade, the 
heavy burden represented by service payments on external loans and 
investment, the low levels of gold and foreign exchange reserves, the 
absence of a genuine policy of international financial co-operation, and 
the Latin American countries' insufficient bargaining power for the 





The various socio-economic conditions cited here as obstacles to 
development, and the limiting factors of a more specifically economic 
character, combine with the external bottleneck to slow down the rate 
of economic growth. 
In several important respects, it would be difficult to draw a line 
between the facts that represent primary causes and the phenomena that 
might be regarded as their manifestations or effects. The operation 
of all these obstacles and limiting factors is inter-related. Thus, a 
policy which succeeded in removing internal obstacles would make for 
the improvement of external conditions, bit a more flexible and easier 
balance-of-payments position would be needed to facilitate the implementation 
of reforms and the execution of over-all development progrananes. 
In these reciprocal relationships, the influence of the external 
sector is far-reaching and its operation, up to a point, autonomous, since 
its movements depend upon international market forces and on the policy 
of the industrialized countries, fields in which the Latin American 
Governments can exercise little control and take little action. 
lioreover, the situation is unfortunate in that, as long as the 
external obstacles subsist, it is very difficult to make a clean sweep 
of the limiting factors of an internal nature. The reason is that the 
development of Latin America is largely dependent on imports of essential 
goods, on the application of the technical improvements that originate in 
the industrialized countries, and on financial co-operation from abroad. 
It is worthwhile to cite a few aspects of development which will 
illustrate the strategic importance of the external sector. For example, 
even if the countries carried out the necessary reforms to promote an 
increase in domestic savings with the aim of augmenting real investment, 
these reforms could not be put into effect unless at the same time enough 
external purchasing power was acquired to cover the imports entailed by 
such investment. Progress in planning will unquestionably increase 
investment absorption capacity, but again, investment projects could not 
be executed without the corresponding imports of capital goods that sane 
countries are not and may never be in a position to produce, because of 




short, the implementation of a policy designed to improve the living 
conditions of the lower income sectors will encounter serious obstacles, 
if it proves impossible to expand imports, even in the case of actual 
consumer goods whose domestic production cannot immediately be developed. 
To sum up, when the restrictive effects of the various factors 
are more thoroughly analysed, it will not seem surprising if in many 
countries the obstacles deriving from the external sector should prove to 
be as serious as others, or even more formidable, in the sense that 
unless they are removed it will be impossible to surmount the rest. 
Finally, this study leaves no room for doubt on one point. Development 
policy must attack on several internal and external fronts at the same time. 
Everything need not be done at once, for that will often be physically 
impossible. What is wanted is a strategy that will immediately tackle 
the more vulnerable points, among which the external bottleneck, alongside 
the.need for internal basic reforms, has been plainly shown to constitute 
one of the most significant, 
4» Long-term limitations of a policy of import substitution 
and external borrowing 
(a) Chronic balance-of-payments deficits 
The countries of the region have tried to get rid of the external 
bottleneck and stimulate economic growth by resorting more or less 
intensively to three basic measures: import controls and import substitution, 
external financing, and the promotion of traditional exports or of new 
export lines. 
For a number of reasons, both external and internal - among which 
a lack of planned policies or an excess of caution have been common - little 
has been achieved in respect of the diversification of exports, and the 
Latin American countries have continued to depend in this respect on their 
primary products. Policy has concentrated mainly on the restriction of 
imports and their replacement by domestic production, and on the utilization 
of external financing. It is here that the larger countries have found 
the dynamic growth factors for which they had previously relied on exports. 
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In the smaller countries, these factors have been combined, to a greater 
or lesser extent, with export movements, and as a result more stable 
development conditions have been promoted. 
As time goes by, however, such a policy tends to lose its efficacy. 
Once the import substitution process and external borrowing reach a 
certain saturation point, extremely inflexible conditions are created 
that ultimately bring about a decline in the rate of growth. In the 
following pages the mechanics of this phenomenon will be analysed. The 
first step will be to study import substitution policy, with particular 
reference to the experience of the countries that have advanced farthest 
in their industrialization process, in order to draw generally applicable 
conclusions, 
(b) Import substitution, economic growth and balance-of-payments 
equilibrium 
The evolution of the import substitution process may conveniently 
be mapped out in several stages, although seme rather arbitrary divisions 
are involved. An analysis of this kind is useful to clarify the effect 
of the process on the rate of growth and on balance-of-payments trends. 
In an initial phase, import substitution develops in the sector 
producing non-durable consumer goods, where the production techniques 
employed are relatively simple and capital-intensity is low. It is 
comparatively easy to make the necessaiy investment and launch these 
activities. By their means, the growth of the domestic product and of 
internal income is directly and indirectly promoted, and employment levels 
are raised. External resources may help to finance investment. And 
the foreign exchange released or transferred by the restriction of imports 
of non-essential goods, and often of capital goods for other sectors, 
makes it possible for this phase of the substitution process to develop. 
The import coefficient decreases, and the dynamic effects on the domestic 
product and internal income are accentuated in so far as substitution 
activities are based on the use of domestic raw materials. It was 
precisely because a high proportion of their direct raw material inputs 
was available that this stage was facilitated in many Latin American 
countries. 
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The process continues in what may be demarcated as a second phase, 
when it extends to import substitution in respect of other consumer goods, 
including even certain types of consumer durables, branches of intermediate 
products and specific capital goods. The most highly industrialized 
countries of the region have completed this second phase, and several of 
the others are embarking upon it. 
These new industrial activities use more complex techniques and 
require higher levels of technical know-how and more efficient organizing 
capacity. The ratio of fixed capital to output and the amount of 
investment per plant are higher, and economies of scale, or cost reductions 
in accordance with production levels, also acquire considerable importance. 
The dynamic impetus of these activities is so considerable that they 
come to dominate the economic and financial process - as has been shown 
by the experience of Argentina and Brazil in recent years - especially 
when the stage of installing the motor-vehicle industry is reached. 
Alongside these quantitative effects, there are others, no less significant, 
which influence development. This phase of industrialization involves 
the absorption of technical know-how and production techniques which raise 
the general level of training, organization and modernization in national 
economic structures. 
But serious difficulties set limits to the eoonomic soundness and 
hamper the operation of this process in the conditions attending it in 
Latin America, In the first place, its effects on the balance of payments 
must be considered. 
This phase is characterized by a marked subsitution effort in 
respect of intermediate products, although there is an initial increase 
in requirements of imports of parts or spares which are not manufactured 
in the country, but these are later gradually replaced by domestic production 
In any event, as the volume of production in import substitution 
activities is usually greater than that of the former external purchases 
concerned, demand for imported parts and spares may very soon exceed 
the value of the goods that used to be imported. If the high import 
content of industrial plant is also taken into consideration, together 
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with the additional demand for imported goods that is generated by the 
increase in the product and in income, it will be seen that in the upshot 
the volume of imports tends to exceed the original import substitution 
output. 
Consequently, if there has been no expansion of exports, the 
balance of payments will tend to become unfavourable or the previous deficit 
will increase» Efforts to restrict, imports of other items are then 
redoubled, but little is gained in terms of foreign exchange, since 
the restrictions that have long been in operation have gradually limited 
imports to essential goods» In all likelihood, these new import substitution 
investments vill affect investment plans in other public or private 
activities through the shortage of external resources» 
If in Latin America's experience these effects did not immediately 
make themselves felt, it was because the countries concerned resorted to 
external financing or because an important part was played in the substitution 
process by direct foreign investment, as was the case in Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexicoe But the foreign exchange commitments under the heads of 
service payments and remittances of profits to which this external 
financing gave rise soon began to aggravate the balance-of-payments deficits» 
In a third phase - upon which the most advanced countries of the 
region are now venturing - the import substitution process would have to 
cover basic intermediate products and various types of capital goods» The 
activities concerned are mainly of the type needing large-scale plant and 
heavy investment, and operating on the basis of complex technologies and 
high degrees of specialization, especially in the capital goods industries» 
The development of these activities under adequate productivity and cost 
conditions and in line with up-to-date techniques will be difficult unless 
the policy of producing solely for the domestic market is drastically 
changed» A certain level of specialization and plant size is essential, 
and it can be achieved only through the expansion of trade» Moreover, the 
bottleneck in the external sector creates serious obstacles to the 
channelling of real resources towards the investment need for this purpose 
There are no non-essential imports that can be restricted in order to divert 
foreign exchange into the new activities, the critical financial situation 
does nothing to encourage direct foreign investment, and new loans are 
increasingly spent on servicing the accumulated debts» 
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To sum up, the following conclusions may be drawn from the experience 
gained in Latin America's import substitution process: 
(a) Import substitution, at each separate stage, has generated a strong 
dynamic impetus which has raised the national income and has decisively 
influenced economic and social development; 
(b) The productivity and general efficiency of import substitution 
have fallen below the levels that might have been expected because import 
substitution has been carried out indiscriminately under conditions of 
widespread de facto monopoly aimed only at a relatively small and unduly 
protected domestic market; 
(c) In spite of the advances made in import substitution, the external 
imbalance has been aggravated and the economies have become more vulnerable 
to the vicissitudes of the balance of payments; and 
(d) The rigidity to which the process has led explains the present 
decline in the rate of development and the.frequent economic recessions 
suffered by the more industrialized countries of the region, particularly 
Argentina and Brazil. By contrast, industrialization has been able to 
forge ahead in those countries that have contrived to raise their current 
foreign exchange earnings, as in the case of Mexico, during the last 
few years. 
However, many of the Latin American countries are still in the early 
stages of industrialization and have fairly high import coefficients. There 
are practical possibilities open to them of reducing those coefficients 
and making some headway in import substitution, as they are already doing. 
But it must be borne in mind that, in general, their domestic markets are 
far smaller in absolute terms and the obstacles to import substitution will 
arise at an earlier stage of industrial development. That is, even at 
different levels of industrialization these countries are now finding, 
or will soon find, that the dynamic potential of import substitution has been 
exhausted. In other words, the econosnicity of import substitution activities, 
the obstacles to their subsequent development and the decline in their 
dynamic impetus are determined in these countries by conditions far more 
restrictive than those obtaining in the more advanced countries because their 
domestic markets are much smaller and other impediments to development are 
more serious. 
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(c) External, financing, rate of growth and balance-of-payments equilibrium 
Foreign capital, in its various forms, is the additional source of 
funds to which the developing countries have access in order to finance the 
increased investment needed to step up their rate of growth. 
These external resources fulfil their dynamic role in.the growth 
process in the conditions governing foreign investment, the movement of funds, 
end the aevelopiaent of the economy making use of them are clearly defined» 
Inflows should be sufficiently flexible and, in principle, should follow 
a given steadily rising trend. They should suffice to cover the mounting 
debt service payments and returns on foreign investment, and possibly to 
provi.de a balance over a given period to finance the excess of imports over 
exports, which the country needs in order to increase the real resources 
upon which it can draw. 
Moreover, there must be a rise in domestic income and savings as 
well as exports, so that, after a certain stage has been reached, the external 
accounts will produce a surplus with which to cover, in some measure, the 
transfer payments deriving from debt servicing and returns on investments. 
While it is true that, in practice, economic and financial factors 
cannot act as freely as might be required, there is no doubt that this 
must be the pattern if external financing is to operate satisfactorily» 
In this respect, Latin America's experience in the last few years is very 
enlightening, since the critical financial situation affecting many 
countries of the region has been due precisely to the fact that those 
essential conditions were not met. 
External sources of funds often lack the flexibility needed to feed 
a flow of capital that will meet the aforementioned aims» In practice, 
capital flows tend to dry up when a country's borrowing increases, and much 
more so should the outlook for the balance-of-payments position be bleak» 
The short amortization periods and high interest payable on the large 
volume of external financing to which the Latin American countries have 
recourse merely aggravate the position. In addition, the decisions adopted 
by financing centres may be affected by political factors, while at the same 
time national policy imposes limits on foreign participation in production 
activities. 
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Uh brief, if capital inflow fails to increase because of one of these 
factors, the time will inevitably come when transfer payments in respect 
of servicing and returns will tend to exceed new inflows. The higher the 
rates of amortization, interest and returns, the sooner will this cone 
about. If capital flows are reduced and export earnings fail to increase 
suffici ently the rate of economic growth will decline to the point of an 
actu/AI recession, unless refinancing is secured on suitable terms. 
This, broadly speaking, describes Latin America's experience in 
recent years. The increase in its foreign exchange liabilities under the 
head of service payments and returns gradually absorbed increasing proportions 
of the new capital inflows, and current foreign exchange earnings from exports 
either remained at a standstill or went up all too slowly. In other words, 
the necessary financial and economic conditions were lacking for a sustained 
dynamic evolution of the process of absorbing external loans and investment. 
This is obviously what happened, for example, in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. 
Two factors added to the rigidity of the process: the restriction of 
imports to essential items, leaving no room for further retrenchment, and 
the effect of the deterioration in the terms of trade for primary products. 
The impact of the latter was so heavy that Latin America's losses exceeded 
the whole of the net external financing used by the region since the 
mid-fifties. 
It may be inferred, therefore, that a policy which lays emphasis on 
external financing and import substitution but fails to expand exports 
tends to lose its efficacy, often within a relatively brief period. Nothing 
can be done to put matters right after they have reached a certain point, 
except at the expense of the growth rate. 
There are two reasons for thist in the first place, import 
substitution in the Latin American countries has failed to reduce the 
over-all demand for imports; secondly, debt servicing follows a rigid 
pattern, being only partly dependent on the evolution of e^ort earnings. 
Amortization and interest payments constitute fixedr-term outflows while 
returns on foreiga investment in local production of import substitution 
activities are comparatively high and depend upon domestic market trends. 




Thus, the balance of payments of those countries which have made most 
headway in import substitution and in the use of external financing 
acquired a highly rigid real and financial structure. It was only when 
export earnings increased to some extent that the process could develop along 
fairly satisfactory lines. 
5. Latin America's foreign trade deficit 
In the present analysis of general development problems and the 
shortcomings of the policies applied in .'Latin America», the expansion and 
diversification of exports emerges as one of the most important aims. 
Accordingly, it would be useful to examine the practical possibilities open 
to the Latin American countries, taken individually, of achieving the aims 
for expanding their foreign trade, under existing conditions and based 
3/ 
on the expected trends in the world economy.-" 
From the technical projections made in relation to exports of primary 
products over the long term it does not appear that the Latin American 
countries can achieve the external purchasing capacity needed to meet the 
cost of imports and the servicing of the external financing required by 
a faster economic growth than at present. It is useful to ran ember that 
only in the early post-war years has Latin America attained a growth of 
3 per cent per capita, thanks to highly favourable export conditions which 
in some degree recurred during the hostilities in Korea. On the other hand, 
notwithstanding the exceptional economic growth of the industrialized 
countries to which the region is linked, the last ten years have marked a 
gradual decline in Latin America's foreign trade, because of either the 
deterioration of the terms of trade or the slow growth of the volvme of sales. 
The improvement noted in the last two years has been due mainly to 
the higher prices caused by supply restrictions, which are now being 
largely adjusted, and not to an expansion in the volume of regional sales. 
1/ This point was studied by the ECLA secretariat in "Latin America and 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development" (E/CM.12/693) 
and "The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: analysis 
of the results end prospects for Latin America" (E/CN.12/712). 
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Only a few Latin American exports.- such as minerals - are expected to do 
better. Be that as it may, it is to be hoped that the concerted action 
adopted by the Latin American countries can bring about a change in the 
attitude of the industrialized countries which will prevent the existing 
conditions from worsening and might result in brighter prospects. 
It is obvious, however, that not even under the most favourable 
conditions can the Latin American countries proceed with industrialization 
and ensure their future growth if they continue to be dependent on exports 
of primary products. If they propose to speed up their growth rate, the 
size of the gap between their export earnings and their liabilities in 
respect of imports and service payments will be such that it will be 
hard to fill by means of additional external borrowing. 
The Latin American countries will therefore have to find a way of 
pressing on with the process of economic and social change by creating 
an up-to-date industry which will produce for both the home and the export 
market. The question might be asked whether the Latin American countries 
would be capable, individually, of making the necessary investments and of 
competing with the industrialized countries on their home ground and in the 
other parts of the world. While some encouraging examples exist in this 
respect, it is difficult to imagine that it can be done on the scale and 
within the span required by the acceleration of development. There are 
two implications illustrating the difficulty and, in certain respects, the 
physical impossibility of rapidly attaining such a target. First, the 
high production cost© prevailing in Latin America and, secondly, the 
industrialized countries' reluctance to import manufactures from the 
developing countries. 
It does not seem reasonable, therefore, to expect the Latin American 
countries to achieve those new forms of growth if they have to rely only 
on what the industrialized countries are prepared to grant them, in respect 
either of trade or of financing. 
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On the other hand, if the Latin American countries form an economic 
union they will have created the economic and political conditions required 
for them to achieve their objective of industrialization and trade 
expansion and will have a powerful instrument for securing better terms 
from the industrialized countries» 
6, Regional economic integration as an instrument 
of national development 
(a) The contribution of integration towards eliminating the foreign 
trade deficit 
Regional economic integration will contribute directly, and in two 
ways, towards eliminating the foreign trade deficit which is preventing 
the faster growth of the Latin American countries. On the one hand, it 
will expand intra-regional trade through new flows of manufactured products 
and increased trade in traditional products, and, on the other hand, it 
will facilitate the continuation of import substitution in respect of 
purchases from third countries. 
During the course of this evolution, the coefficient of imports from 
the rest of the world can be reduced as required by the balances of payments, 
while that of imports from the integrated countries will soar. In fact, as 
the national economies forge ahead in the integration process, trade is 
stimulated by the co-ordination of policies, the reduction of customs 
duties and the elimination of other stumbling-blocks or obstacles, and the 
preferences agreed upon or agreements entered into with a veiw to 
reserving the domestic market to investment frcrn the integrated area tend 
to displace trade with third countries. 
It should be borne in mind, however, that under existing conditions 
in Latin America the benefits deriving from integration will, particularly 
in the early stages, depend primarily on the extent to which it enables 
each country to expand its trade over and above the level it could attain 
without the help of integration. This must, of course, be an over-all 
evaluation, since many items now imported from third countries will 
gradually be imported from other Latin American countries. But integration 
should, at the same time, generate additional exports from those countries 
which changed the source of their supplies. Obviously, however, a 
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unilateral shift in imports would not be harmful if the Latin American 
countries could secure equal or better terms in the integrated area than 
those obtainable from third countries. In any case, the important fact 
is that Latin American integration must bring about the e;^ an si on and 
diversification of trade, in evexy country of the region« 
While in all probability a conspicuous change vail take place in the 
composition of e:ctra-regional imports, their volume will tend to increase 
and, Indeed, there are good grounds for desiring this, especially in the 
early stages of integration» The experience of the European Common 
Market is highly illustrative in this respect0 Extra-area imports by 
the countries of the Community went up by over 50 per cent between 1958 
and 1963.> that is, in the sa'iie proportion as the product. In spite of 
this, area imports increased at a still faster pace, i0e,, by 130 per cent 
over the same period, according to the values expressed in current dollars 
In other words, these highly industrialized countries, in spite of having 
increased their reciprocal trade to a level representing Lfi per cent of 
their total trade, nevertheless continued to import fron the rest of the 
world without reducing the product-growth coefficient, which reached an 
1/ 
annual average of 6,5 per center1' 
(b) Market size, productivity and efficient use of regional resources 
Most of the Latin American countries have extremely small markets« 
This is clear from a few comparisons using population and average per 
capita income as approximate indexes of market size, which is tantamount 
to considering the product or total income of each country. On this basis 
Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, in that order, possess the largest domestic 
markets in the region. Brazil's market, for instance, is five times the 
size of Colombia's, and eight times larger than that of all members 
of the Central American integration scheme put together. The ratios of 
Mexico's market to the same areas is apparently three to one and nearly 
five to one, respectively, Argentina stands mid-way between Brazil and 
Mexico. Some thought should be given to the huge disparities there must 
be with respect to other countries of the region with smaller populations 
and income, 
U The domestic product is expressed in constant prices, and imports 
in current dollars. 
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The Brazilian, Argentine and Mexican ..markets, large though they may 
be when compared with the rest of Latin America, also seera very small when 
measured against the markets of the industrialized countries« Thus, for 
example, the comparative .indexes reveal that France, with its 47 million 
inhabitants, has a market which is four to five times larger than those 
of each of the three leading Latin American countries, and that their 
combined product is scarcely 65 per cent of that of France0 The gap would 
be even greater if they were compared with the Federal Republic of 
Germany« In these rough comparisons, the volume of production in Sweden 
is only slightly smaller than in Eracil and a little larger *>.sn in Argentina. 
In actual fact, Latin Arr.erica1 s domestic markets are oven smaller, 
relatively speaking, then would, appear from the indexes particularly in 
regard to manufactures,, A more accurate analysis should take into account 
such additional factors as the integration of the national economies, 
income distribution, the structures of demand and the level of 
industrial development, •which adversely affect the- position of the Latin 
American countriesc 
The small size of the domestic markets prevents the Latin American 
countries from going ahead with industrialization on the basis of 
productivity levels and production costs similar to those in the 
industrialised countries, since they cannot establish industrial plants 
of the size and degree of specialization required to enable them to take 
advantage of economies of scale«, Investments in certain key industrial 
development activities can only be made if strong protection is received 
from the State, and only at the e;<pense of productivity and of efficiency 
in the utilisation of resources. 
In most Latin American countries the domestic market is so small 
that there are a great many industrial activities in which investment is 
not justified on technical grounds, and consequently, it is practically 
impossible for import substitution to proceed any further. Prospects 
are more favourable in the larger countries like Argentina, Brazil and 
Mexico, and their market potential, combined with ample resources, largely 
explains their faster and more advanced stage of development. 
/The economies 
E/CN »12/AC o 61/10 
Page 157 
The economies of scale which cannot be turned to account because of 
market limitations are of significant proportions in important industries 
producing durable consumer goods, capital goods and basic intermediate 
products» Such economies depend on a number of factors, such as the 
indivisible nature of investment, the disporportion between the increase 
in a plant's production capacity and the cost of equipment, and the 
possibility of introducing up-to-date techniques and a certain degree of 
specialization when operating on an extensive scale of production» 
Regional integration will play a direct part in solving all these 
development problems deriving from the size of the market. As the 
integration process advances, production activities in each country will 
be able to count on the potential demand of the whole integrated area» 
It will therefore be possible to establish up-to-date plants of optimum 
size, with an adequate level of specialization, and to carry on with 
industrialization in other sectors where nothing can be done today within 
the limitations or? the domestic markets. 
Concurrently with broadening the market, integration will provide 
the enormous advantages deriving from the optimum location of new 
investment, in terms of the cheapest sources of raw materials, energy, 
fuels and other inputs with an important influence on production costs. 
Some highly illustrative examples of economies in investment and 
reductions in costs to be achieved through optimum regional location 
and through the establishment of plants that are up-yto-date as regards 
specialization, techniques and size are to be found in the chapter 
dealing with regional investment policy. 
The potential expansion of the market will assume exceptional 
proportions in the Latin American countries that are 01 small or 
medium geographic or economic size. For example, on the basis of the 
aforementioned approximate indexes, it can be stated that the five 
countries of the Central American economic community would have a potential 
additional market twenty-five times larger than that of their integration 
area itself j as regards Colombia, the rest of Latin America would 
represent a market fourteen times larger, and Chile, twenty-two times larger. 
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The broader market will also play a very important part in the 
major countries of the region. Thus, it may be estimated that* compared 
with Brazil, the rest of Latin America represents a population of 
150 million, and a market two and a half times larger than the local 
market; compared with Argentina, the population is 205 million, and the 
market four times larger; and in the case of Mexico, 190 million 
inhabitants and a market five times the size of the Me: a can arrketo 
Here it should be stressed that these comparisons give only an approximate 
idea of the potential market expansion. In practice, it cannot be taken 
for granted that a given industry of a country, can count on the vnole 
economic space of the region as a market, since the advantages inherent 
in location, transport costs and other general factors will tend to limit 
the scope of the market within the integrated area, a limitation which 
is all the more important because of the geographical size of the region. 
That is why this document places such stress on the need for embarking 
forthwith on a study of transport facilities with a view to the adoption 
of a co-ordinated policy for promoting integration, Whatever the 
difficulties, however, the huge disparities noted between the size of the 
domestic maricets and the potential size of the regional market convey some ' 
idea of the force that would be gathered by the incentives to trade 
.expansion* As progress is made in the establishement of a regional 
transport network and in the reduction of transport costs, the geographical 
size of Latin America will become an"advantage, since, concurrently with 
enlarging the real market, advantage can be taken of the region's resources 
in the interests of the most suitable location and the diversification and 
specialization of economic activities» 
A matter of some concern, and rightly so, is that the reduction in 
customs duties and the removal of obstacles to trade might give rise to 
an investment race aimed at the expansion of existing activities and the 
replacement of equipment. Such action might well have adverse 
repercussions were it to deflect resources from other higher-priority 
investments and undermine the economic activity of the less industrialized 
countries or those which cannot at once promote a process of modernization. 
These and other problems which will have to be provided for in establishing 
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the instruments for an integration policy are dealt with later on in this 
document. In the meantime, it should be stated here that integration 
will have to come about gradually so that the countries concerned will 
have time to introduce the necessary adjustments and reforms, as and when 
domestic output and income increase. In the first few years, action 
would be focused primarily on the integration of dynamic in entries which 
have a strategic part to play in development, and in which, moreover, the 
economies of scale are usually considerable. 
(c ) Assimilation of new techniques 
Technical progress has been the basio factor in the eco:.:ouic growth of 
the industrialized countries. According to the extensive resoarch which 
has been done on the subject it has as great or a greater dynamic influence 
thai the human effort and the actual volume of capital invested in the 
production process«, 
Nevertheless, the Latin American countries are not talcing advantage 
of the potential offered by technical advances in order to step up their 
development® A whole set of factors prevents them from so doing. 
pre>-»eE:lnent among them., because of their bearing on integration, being the 
narrowness of the market, the lack of dynamism in foreign trade and the 
limited resources allocated to manpower training and to scientific and 
techuical research a 
As mentioned previously, the limitations of the market and the 
slowness of income growth preclude the establishment of industrial plants 
with up-to-date production techniques in a broad range of activities» Even 
if this were feasible, the Latin American countries feel obliged to adopt 
a cautious policy, because it "would not increase employment* Regional 
integration will break this vicious circle since, by facilitating- a 
faster increase in production and income it will be possible to pursue 
the two objectives - i.e., the raising of productivity and employment 
levels - which today are incompatible. 
In the analyses if production in specific activities and of the 
economy as a whole, an effort is made to explain the part played in the 
expansion of production by each of the above-mentioned factors, i.e., 
technical progress, human effort and capital. In actual fact however, 
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technical progress does not act entirely on its own, but through better 
training and organization of the human factor and a more efficient use 
of the new capital goods used in the new production techniques. Therefore, 
as long as the Latin American countries continue to rely on exports of 
primary products and fail to increase their external purchasing power, 
owing to the deterioration of the terms cf trade or the lack of external 
demand, they will be unable to take full advantage of this powerful 
factor for development. 
By removing the eternal bottleneck, integration will permit the 
countries of the region to use their export earnings more efficiently 
for the acquisition of capital goods and for the establishment of 
up-to-date plants which will promote the necessary conditions for autonomous 
forces of scientific and technical progress to come into being in Latin 
America. Clearly foreign scientific and technical co-operation and 
co-ordinated action in regional education, training and research programmes 
will be needed hc/eeo 
(d) Regional integration and international policy a ins 
As shown above, regional integration is essential if the Latin 
American countries are to speed up their economic and social development 
and emerge from the stagnation in which they find themselves at present. 
However, integration does not represent an alternative to the aims of 
expansion and diversification of trade with other regions, particularly 
with the industrialized countries. 
The Latin American countries must take decisive steps towards 
integration and at the same time press on with their international 
economic policy aims. No other course is open to them since 9.0 per cent 
of their present trade is with areas outside the region; they rely on the 
industrialized countries for supplies of essential goods and require 
foreign financial' and technical co-operation if they are to make any 
headway in integration itself. Furthermore, it should be made plain 
right from the start that in the early stages of integration, requirements 
in respect of imports from other areas will increase considerably, and 
at a later stage their structure will change, though they will not 
diminish in absolute terms. On the contrary, it would be more logical for 





Two experiences which occurred under very dissimilar conditions 
in the Central American countries and in the European Economic Community 
illustrate these relationships between the evolution of trade and economic 
growth in an integrated area. The five Central American countries which 
are making steadjr progress in integration increased their reciprocal trade 
by a total of 150 per cent between 1961 and 19i4. At the same time, their 
extra-area imports grew by 40 per cent. Undoubtedly the integration 
process has been helped in the last two or three years by the improvement 
in the export sector of the countries . concerned, which enabled external 
supplies to be increased on the scale indicated above. The countries of the 
European Common Market, with a combined population of 175 .nillion 
inhabitants a market probably three times the size of Latin America's, 
and a level of industrial development which is above comparison with the 
average for Latin America, increased their imports from third countries, 
as previously indicated, by over 50 per cent between 1958 and 1963, 
notwithstanding the tremendous growth of their reciprocal trade. 
/ 
All these considerations point to the need for an over-all co-ordination 
of integration aims with trade policy and international financing objectives. 
The Latin American countries will have to pool their efforts and work 
out a common policy vis-a-vis the industrialized countries; their economic 
union wou.ld give them the negotiating power they lack individually and 
. place them on a better competitive footing. Co-ordinated action with 
respect to the industrialized countries and international financing 
agencies is at once urgent and imperative, because radical changes must 
be wrought in the present situation so that the industrialized countries 
will facilitate the expansion of trade in primary products on the basis 
of adequate terms of trade, permit the entry of exports of manufactures 
from the developing countries, and increase their technical and financial 
co-operation in line with new systems that would be less onerous for the 
recipient countries. 
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Chapter VI 
INFLATION AND GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA 
A. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT QE MONETARY STABILITY: THE FALSE DILEMMA ^  ' 
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY, . 
1. Inflation and monetary orthodoxy 
The econo:lists of ECLA are often thought of as having a certain 
leaning towards inflation, as being prompted by the belief that this 
phenomenon is inevitable in the economic development of Latin America« 
Nothing could be further from our thoughts« This erroneous interpretation 
arises perhaps partly from the fact that the problem of inflation has not 
yet been systematically dealt with in our studies. 
Two facts largely explain why our thinking is wrongly judged, 
We reject the theory, which 5s so current, that inflation is caused solely t 
by the financial disorder and la ok of mcr.vtary restraint of the 
Latin American countries, not because we deny the existence of these patent 
aberrations but because there are extremely powerful structural factors in 
Latin America which lead to inflation and against which monetary policy is 
powerless. This is the first fact. 
The second is the critical position we have adopted towardo certain 
measures aimed at monetary stabilization. We all agree that a supreme 
effort must be made to arrest inflation and to achieve stability on sound 
bases. But we are seriously -worried about achieving thi3 at the expense 
of a decline in over-all income, of its stagnation or of a slovdng-down 
in its rate of development. 
Those who advocate this type of anti-inflationary policy - both those 
who suggest it from outside and those who live in the midst of this harsh 
and hazardous reality of Latin America - sometimes entertain the odd notion 
1/ See Raul Prebisch, "Economic development of monetary stability: the false 
dilemma", Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol, VI, N° 1 (March 1961), 
pp. 1-9. 
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that the region's monetary sins must be redeemed by sacrifice. The evil 
of inflation must be atoned for by retrenchment. But very often the 
classic form of punishment does not fall upon those who unleashed inflation 
or who thrived on it, but on the broad masses of the people who were 
suffering its consequences. 
The general mistake persists of considering inflation as a purely 
monetary phenomenon to be combated as such. Inflation car-wot be explained 
as something divorced from the economic and social maladjustments and 
stresses to which the economic development of our countries gives rise. 
Nor can serious thought be given to an autonomous anti-inflationary policy, 
as if only monetary considerations were involved; it must be an integral 
part of development policy. 
Economic development calls for constant changes in production methods 
in the economic and social structure and in patterns of income distribution. 
Not to make these changes in tine, or to undertake them partially and 
incompletely, leads to these maladjustments and stresses which release the 
ever-latent and extremely powerful inflationary forces in the Latin American 
economy. 
This should not be construed as meaning that inflation is inevitable 
in our countries. Par from it. To avoid inflation, however, there must be 
a rational and far-sighted policy of economic development and social 
betterment, in other words, an essentially new approach in which an answer 
other than inflation is sought to these maladjustments and stresses arising 
from development. 
This is not a merely technical prpblem; it is essentially a political 
one in which the paramount task for us economists is to clarify and to 
persuade. We have often seen politicians who, imbued with the genuine 
desire measurably to improve the well-being of the masses, are frequently 
blinded by the corrosive illusion of inflation. Have we offered them any 
other alternative? Have we come to them with a coherent and feasible set 
of principles which would have enabled them to escape from the dilemma of 
choosing between inflation and an over-simplified and perplexing monetary 
orthodoxy? We Latin American economists are indebted to the politicians of 
our countries, I should like, in the present paper, to requite them as 
far as it befits me to do so. 
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The object of these pages is to demonstrate that there is a solution 
to the problem of monetary stabilization that is different from the one so 
often recommended by the orthodox school» Before going into this any 
further, however, the structural factors usually leading to inflation 
should be examined. Perhaps a general picture should be presented here 
which will allow us? from the very outset, to grasp the nature and trend 
of our argument, even at the risk of indulging later in possible repetitions. 
2. The why and wherefore of the dilecria 
It is common knowledge that the economic development of a peripheral 
country is very closely linked to the trend followed by its exports. On the 
one hand, the rate of growth of Its export ? 3ets a limit to spontaneous 
economic development. On the other hand, continuous fluctuation in this 
rate contributes to serious internal instability. When there is a cyclic 
increase in exports, income La the aggregate expands with relative ease, and 
this calls for a volume of imports easily paid for by exports. But Mien 
exports fall off, these imports cannot be maintained and, as a result, 
neither can the level of income formerly attained. Under aa orthodox system 
of monetary stability, the external and internal disequilibrium thus 
produced necessarily leads to a contraction of economic activity, and the 
balance tends to be restored at a lower income level. 
This contraction usually arouses the ever-latent inflationary forces 
lurking within the Latin American economy, that is, if they are not already 
at work. Recourse is then had to the expansion of credit and this, while 
counteracting the downward trend income, also impedes the readjustment 
of imports and, consequently, restoration of the internal balance. 
Disequilibrium is one of the factors which renders it very difficult 
for our countries to apply an anti-cyclic policy that does not compromise 
monetary stability. Hence, the solution does not lie in counteracting the 
effects of contraction but in preventing them by means of effective 
structural changes. The purpose of these changes is twofoldj to allow the 
rate of development to exceed the limit imposed by exports; and, at the 
same time, to keep internal activity operating at the highest level of 




Structural rather than cyclic measures should be resorted to in 
order to overcome the external vulnerability of our economies, although 
some anti-cyclic measures are also helpful as a complement to the structural 
solutions. 
Another - and perhaps the most significant - factor hampering an j 
anti-cyclic policy is.the inadequacy of savings, which becomes more acute 
when exports decline. Any attempt then made to maintain the level of 
investment previously achieved is usually one of the chief causes of the 
inflationary expansion of credit. 
The savings coefficient is relatively low in our countries, not 
only because average per capita income is also low but, ir. addition, 
because of the form in which this income is distributed and the prevailing 
patterns of consumption, An increase in this coefficient calls for work 
on distribution and consumption - in other words, on the social structure -
and, at the same time, for a change in the structure of production and 
imports so that the increased savings can be converted into capital goods« 
In order to do this and to facilitate a rise in the savings coefficient 
to a level which would accelerate the rate of economic development, an 
additional contribution in the form of international funds is usually needed. 
Resistance to these structural changes, which are essential to a rise 
in the savings coefficient, often leads to inflation in our countries. 
Inflation not only makes it possible to raise the level of public and private 
expenditure and investment but, by swelling the profits of entrepreneurs 
and, through them, of other high-income groups, it also causes them to 
increase their consumption, generally on a much higher scale than that of 
investments. It is therefore a socially costly and regressive method of 
raising the savings coefficient. 
Since the inadequacy of savings becomes more acute during the period 
of contraction, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for monetary 
authorities to oppose an expansion of credit to cover expenditure and 
investments which tend to shrink. It should not be concluded, however, 
that this type of inflation of expenditure and investments - different from 
inflation of costs - is attributable solely to the structural vulnerability 
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of the economy. The effects of inflationary forces are usually also 
felt in periods of prosperity, when increased economic activity stimulates 
expenditure and creates new investment opportunities. 
These forces toad to burst forth whenever a marked change takes place. 
When the change is favourable, however, inflationary expansion cannot be 
attributed to vulnerability of the economy - as it can when the change is 
unfavourable - but to the powerlessness of the central banl:s to arrest these 
inflationary forces; indeed they may w e n be operating within the banks 
themselves. 
It is therefore an expression of the aforementioned lack of financial 
and monetary restraint which, while it may not explain our inflationary 
phenomena in all their great complexity, .i3 nevertheless a very important 
elepent thereof. 
The simple orthodox formula of credit containment - perfectly correct 
when rising exports stimulate domestic activity - completely ignores the 
phenomena of structural vulnerability and, once the decline sets in, exposes 
the economy ineluctably to the inflationary forces. 
All this relates to the inflation of expenditure and investments, 
i 
where the inflationary pressure of demand first causes prices to rise and 
then brings about an increase in wages and salaries in order - very rightly -
to restore the real income of the workers, This is the traditional type 
of inflation in our countries, although there are new aspects to structural 
vulnerability. 
However, inflationary phenomena of another type emerge as the process 
of development continues. Either because of the form in which the structural 
changes required by development are carried out, or because they are 
undertaken only partially or inadequately, regressive movements come into 
operation in income distribution. Efforts to compensate for their effects 
lead to higher wages and salaries and their inevitable impact on prices. 
There are three main elements in these regressive movements which 
derive from.economic development itself.- the cost of import substitution; 
the higher' cost of agricultural products; and the rise in taxes and duties 
•which affect mass consumption in one way or another. 
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Import substitution policy, while reflecting an inevitable structural 
change, has been carried out with very serious flaws. Very often 
considerations of economic feasibility have not been given their due, and 
it was not until recently that an attempt was made to break the confining 
bonds of national markets by means of the gradual economic integration of 
our countries. First and foremost, this policy has been applied in a 
discriminatory way, without promoting a corresponding expansion in exports, 
and thus it has been carried farther than it might have been tinder other 
circumstances. 
The cost of substitution has thus been exaggerated to the detriment 
of mass consumption, particularly when the increase in productivity has been 
small in the rest of the economy a 
This is particularly true of the productivity of the land and it 
constitutes one of the chief obstacles to economic development. Antiquated 
systems of land tenure have contributed to the relative rise in the cost of 
food in some Latin American countries as demand increased with population 
growth. 
If to this is added the greater cost of some elements or inputs of 
agricultural production as a result of substitution policy and agricultural 
wage increases arising from higher productivity in other branches of the 
economy, an answer may be found to the question why in some countries 
costs and prices relative to agricultural production have risen with a 
marked effect on mass consumption. 
To raise wages and salaries is a very understandable reaction. 
However, it fails to solve the problem either in the present or in the 
previous case; it is merely reflected in the aforementioned inflationary 
spiral, Nor does the solution lie in the policy of credit containment; if 
central banks do not increase the amount of currency in circulation when 
salaries and wages rise, they cause a contraction in economic activity. 
Hence, the contraction may be due not only to the external vulnerability 
of the economy but also to the endeavour to use monetary instruments to 
deal with the consequences of its structural flaws. 
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In the case of an inflation of expenditure and investments, and not 
of costs, the inflationary rise in prices likewise involves a corresponding 
readjustment of salaries and wages. Unlike the previous case, however, 
this increase is not inflationary but is the corrective of an inflationary 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, what happens very often is that the entrepreneurs, 
instead of absorbing it at the expense of thsir inflation-swollen profits, 
resort to credit e::?pansion and transfer it to prices, thus generating 
the inflationary spiral. 
Inflation is asymmetrical in so far as its distributive effects are 
concerned. It is used by entrepreneurs to modify distribution to their 
advantage and to the detriment chiefly of the workers. Yet it does not 
help the latter to achieve the opposite effect but, at best, to restore 
their earlier share, if the credit system is handled fairly and firaly» 
Hence, inflation is not an effective means of redistributing income 
from the point of view of the broad masses. In those cases where positive 
results are achieved at the expense of social groups other than the 
entrepreneurs, there is no doubt that taxation, if judiciously applied, 
is a more efficacious and less disruptive method. In fact, taxation is 
the income redistribution instrument par excellence, and the Latin American 
masses must learn to meld their growing political power so that it can be 
used for economic and social, purposes. likewise they must learn to wield 
their trade union power - already very substantial in sorie countries -
to effect sizable increases in productivity and thus raise their real 
income, instead of wasting their energy on securing salary and wage increases 
which are soon cancelled out by the inflationary spiral. What is needed, 
therefore, is a salary and wage policy which leads to this goal and at the 
same time ensures the growing participation of the broad masses in the 
process of national capital formation. 
All these considerations allow us to approach the problem of 
inflation in our countries in all its vast complexity. Ih actual fact, it 
merges with the problem of development. There is inflation because the 
economy is structurally vulnerable, because there are regressive income 
distribution factors, because there are not enough savings to expedite 
investment within a given economic and social structure. The resulting 
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maladjustments and tensions encourage latent inflationary forces to burst 
forth. By means of regular and intensive economic development the maximum 
resistance can be offered to these inflationary forces and the policy of 
monetary stability can thus be upheld on sound bases - which do no exist 
today - as an integral part of economic development policy® 
II. STRUCTURAL VULNERABILITY OF THE ECONOMY AND INFLATIONARY FORCES 
Growth and vulnerability 
(a) Structural character of the solution. 
This section attviiapts to explain how the growth of income at a more 
rapid rate than exports permit, and continual fluctuation of exports, 
release inflationary forces that upset monetary stability in Latin American 
countries. 
The solution of this problem is fundamental because it calls for 
structural changes that will allow the economy to grow beyond the limit 
imposed by exports, while at the same time giving it the strength it must 
have to prevent, rather than correct, the internal consequences of these 
export fluctuations. 
In the absence of such structural changes these countries will 
inevitably be faced with the dilemma of choosing between a policy of 
monetary stability that subordinates economic development to the tempo and 
fluctuation of exports, on the one hand, and an attempt to counterbalance 
the effects of these factors through inflation on the other. In our 
countries, a corrective policy of a compensatory nature is difficult to 
apply for reasons that will be explained in due course. 
We will begin by explaining the nature of the structural phenomenon, 
summarizing briefly what we have been expounding for some time in ECLA. 
(b) Exports as a factor limiting growth 
The growth of exports places an upper limit on the rate of development 
in a peripheral country. This lirit is set by the intensity with which the 
demand for imports expands with the growth of per capita income. A simple 
example will serve to illustrate this point. Let us suppose that primary 
exports grow at an annual rate of 2 per cent per capita. Per capita income 
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can rise at the same rate only if the demand for imports also increases 
at 2 per cent, that is, if the income elasticity is 1. But if imports 
expand at a higher rate, it will not be possible for per capita income to 
rise spontaneously at the same rate as exports. If imports tend to expand 
by 1.50 for each 1 per cent of increase in per capita income, the latter 
cannot rise by as much as 2 per cent, since in that case the demand for 
imports would go up by 3 per cent, thus exceeding the rate of 2 per cent 
at which exports increase. Obviously an external imbalance of this kind 
could not continue for long,^ If development is to be accompanied by 
external balance, the annual growth of per capita income must not exceed 
1.33 since this rate, given the income elasticity of demand for imports, 
will result in a growth of 2 per cent in imports, that is, the same rate 
as for exports. 
Consequently, if per capita income is to rise more rapidly, import 
substitution is essential. In the example given above, an annual per capita 
import substitution rate of 1 per cent is required if income is to grow 
by 2 per cent. A 3 per cent rise in income would require an expansion of 
4.5 per cent in inport demand, of which 2.5 per cent would have to be met 
from domestic production in order to maintain this rate of growth in 
conjunction with a dynamic equilibrium. 
The rate of growth of exports in Latin American countries has in fact 
generally been much lower than that in the above illustration, and in some 
cases exports have declined instead of grown. Hence the great proportions 
which the substitution process has had to assume. 
This disparity in the trends of external trade is a consequence of 
the well-known fact that, as per capita income grows, the demand for 
industrial goods tends to expand more rapidly than the demand for primary 
commodities. Peripheral countries import the former and export the latter, 
whereas the position of the major industrial countries is exactly the 
reverse. In the industrial countries, import substitution can. in no way 
be justified on the grounds of growth; if it takes place for other reasons, 
2/ In the interest of simplification a balance of payments consisting only 
of imports and exports is assumed; at this juncture it would be pointless 
to include other balance-of-payments components. 
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income-elasticity of demand for primary commodities tends to become weaker 
still, with the result that the peripheral countries which export those 
commodities have to intensify their substitution policy in order to maintain 
the same rate of income growth. 
It follows from the above arguments that, even with the same population 
increase, a peripheral country cannot attain the same rate of spontaneous 
growth as the industrial centres with which it trades, because of differences 
of elasticity, which are generally rendered even greater by the protectionist 
policies applied by these centres. Hence import substitution (and the 
development of industrial exports to the centres) is a sine qua n?n for 
rectifying these differences» Since the peripheral countr:'.es of Latin America 
have a much mere rapid population growth than the industrial centres, the 
process has to be proportionately more vigorous0 
The substitution process has to be steadily maintained so long as 
income continues to grow more than exports, even when the coefficient of 
elasticity of demand for imports is not constant, as was assumed for the 
sake of simplification in the illustrative exarjple. This depends on the 
rate of growth of per capita income, on the changes in import demand 
arising from technical developments and consumer preferences, on changes in 
the composition of imports caused by substitution policy, and on the cost 
of the substitutions« 
(c) Improvisation of substitution policy 
If there were in practice a regular and constant increase in exports, 
it would be comparatively easy to determine the extent of the substitution 
effort required annually. Unfortunately this is not so, since exports are 
subject to a continuous undulating movement which makes the systematic 
application of this policy difficult. 
When exports increase comparatively rapidly during the favourable 
phase of this cyclical movement, the domestic economy can obtain all the 
imports required for its development and there is no apparent need for 
substitution. All is well so long as exports continue to rise or are 
maintained at a high level and provided that a prudent monetary policy 
has been pursued. This latter aspect will be dealt with below. But as 
soon as exports fall off, the country finds that its income in the aggregate 
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has grown to such an extent that the volume of imports required is higher 
than what can be paid for by its declining exports. An import substitution 
policy therefore has to be improvised» It is generally applied not as a 
prudent measure that anticipates the demands of development, but as a step 
imposed by critical circumstances when there is already an external 
disequilibrium. 
The frequent result of this has been that considerations of economic 
feasibility and of anti-cyclic flexibility are left out of account. Moreover, 
the inescapable need to protect substitution activities, and the various 
extreme forms which such protection usually assumes, create conditions 
unfavourable to export development, and thus increase the tendency to 
disequilibrium,. All this points to the need for a review of substitution 
policy» 
Above all, it is essential to adopt substitution measures in advance 
without waiting until external disequilibrium imposes than as an unavoidable 
necessity. It is precisely in tha ascending phase, when savings are 
mounting and there are greater resources for importing capital goods, that 
special emphasis should be laid on substitution policy. 
How can substitutions be planned in advance? How can the pressure 
of future events be forestalled? This is a problem to which the secretariat 
of ECLA has long been devoting,attention, and it was with this in mind that 
the first analyses and projections of economic development ware attempted» 
I believe that sufficient progress has been made to enable us to determine 
the requirements of an import substitution policy; consequently, I shall 
not dwell on this point, which is beyond the scope of the present paper, 
despite its intrinsic interest. 
(d) The economic feasibxlity of import substitution 
Much less progress has been made in elucidating the problem of the 
economic feasibility of substitution activities. Generally speaking, it 
has been tackled in the light of considerations of circumstance rather 
than on the basis of a selective criterion. When external disequilibrium 
arises, the reaction often is to restrict iraoorts of finished consumer 
goods by measures which, albeit unintentionally, involve the promotion of 
substitution production, regardless of the type of goods concerned. 
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The laudable aim of thus facilitating imports essential to economic 
activity at the expense of finished consumer goods has led to increasing 
rigidity in the composition of imports, with serious consequences for some 
countries. These consequences may also be felt in other countries if a 
rational and far-sighted substitution policy is not followed. 
What has happened is that the structure of imports has become so 
distorted that they are limited to raw materials, intermediate goods vital 
to the maintenance of economic activity and a few capital goods, together 
with essential items for direct consumption. As a result, any subsequent 
appreciable contraction in the capacity to import has a depressive effect 
on the economy because it becomes difficult to obtain these essential and 
urgently needed goods from abroad. It remains a paradox that 
industrialization, instead of helping greatly to soften the internal impact 
of external fluctuations, is bringing us to a new and unknown type of 
external vulnerability. 
All this is of great importance not only for the proper functioning of 
monetary policy but also for economic development policy itself, and consequent]} 
it is essential to formulate a substitution policy whereby the requirements 
of economic feasibility and the aim of endowing the economy with the strongest 
possible structural resistance to external fluctuations are combined. 
Reasons of economic feasibility should induce us again to create a 
situation in which it would be possible to import a wide range of finished 
consumer goods for which substitution production would be less economic than 
•that of other goods. By this means the reducible margin of imports could be 
restored in whole or in part, an essential condition of anti-cydic flexibility, 
(e) Discrimination aga.'r.st exports 
Obviously the development of new exports, in addition to traditional 
lines, would help considerably to achieve this aim. This brings us to the 
other fundamental error; an asymmetrical development policy. The need for 
import substitution and for the consequent protection of substitution 
activities has been unavoidable. But there has been a failure to boost 
exports to the same extent. There has been discrimination in favour of 
industrial substitution and against exports, mainly industrial exports. 
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The ideal policy would have been to promote exports in order to place 
them once more on an equal footing with substitution activities, which 
does not necessarily mean equal incentives. 
This aspect is sufficiently important to merit examination; in a 
nutshell, it is the following. Limitation of external demand for primary 
exports makes it necessary to devote part of the increase in the factors 
of production to substitution activities. As their productivity is lower 
than in the industrial centres, they need to be given a certain subsidy in 
the form of tariff protection. Yet there would be possibilities of using 
a smaller subsidy to develop new Industrial export activities, whereby a 
greater quantity of industrial goods could b h obtained through trade than 
those that could be manufactured by substitution production. 
By subsidizing substitution production rather than production intended 
for new exports (industrial or primary)3 export opportunities have been lost 
which, had they been properly used, would have reduced the scope of 
substitution policy or made more rapid economic growth possible 
This is admittedly a problem for which there is no slsiple practical 
solution, but it is unquestionably true that the lack of subsidy policy, 
especially for new exports and, even more, the negative subsidy that 
monetary over-valuation sometimes constitutes, have caused the Latin American 
countries to miss export opportunities to the detriment of their economic 
development. 
However, it should be recalled that some countries, conscious of this 
need to encourage exports, have resorted to multiple rates of exchange. 
It is open to question whether this is the best formula. At all events, 
multiple rates of exchange have been rejected by the school of monetary 
orthodoxy, without the application in their stead of any rational subsidy 
policy, which, it might be added, might come up against other forms of 
doctrinaire opposition. All these questions should be thoroughly debated, 
and it is to be hoped that, when countries review their policies of economic 
co-operation with Latin America, this subject will receive the attention 
it deserves. 
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I should now explain why I referred to new exports and not to 
already established exports» In this connexion there is one thing that 
is self-evident: if external demand makes it possible to employ the whole 
of the increase in the active population and other factors of production 
on customary exports, it would be absurd to embark on substitution 
activities that would yield a lower net product» This is, in essence, 
the classic argument of an essentially static character« 
However, it can happen that, by increasing exports beyond a certain 
point, prices fall both for the increment and for those that already existed, 
and the resultant net product is often lower than that which could be 
obtained by substitution activiti.es, and ma:/- even be negative. This is 
the basic argument in favour of protection in developing countries whose 
exports have a much lower income-elasticity of demand in the rest of the 
world than industrial imports have in the Latin American countries» 
2. The internal, impact of external fluctuations 
(a) The internal cyclic upswing 
In the preceding section it was explained how, when exports underwent 
a cyclic decline, the economy's over-all income - as a result of its 
previous growth - required a volume of imports larger than exports permitted» 
Thus income would have to contract until the consequent reduction of imports 
restored the export-import balance» This is the requirement of an orthodox 
policy of monetary stability» 
Thus, through successive expansions and contractions, the spontaneous 
growth of the internal economy follows the tempo imposed by exports, if no 
substitution policy has been followed. The country is then faced with the 
dilemma, referred to above, of choosing between monetary stability, which 
requires domestic activity to contract until over-all income has been 
reduced to a level consistent with exports, and inflationary credit expansion 
to counteract the contraction in the economy, to the detriment of monetary 
stability. Before analysing this question, however, it is advisable to 
consider the course followed by the internal economy during this undulating 
movement of exports. 
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This movement is generally accompanied by a change in the terms 
of trade, which improve during the ascending phase and deteriorate when 
exports decline, with a consequent change in the profits and other returns 
from this branch of production. Thus there is heavier demand for goods 
and services in internal activities and production increases, both because 
of a greater use of productive capacity and because that capacity is 
expanded by new investment. 
Entrepreneurs in internal activities also get a higher return on these 
new investments, because of the fall in costs that accompanies the better 
utilization of capacity and because of the rise in domestic prices0 
The extent to which this occurs depends mairly on the forro. and methods 
adopted for limiting imports in order to protect domestic production. 
If this is done by customs duties that merely compensate for differences 
in productivity between domestic and foreign output, without providing any 
excessive margin of profit fov the entrepreneur, the rise in domestic prices 
tends to be moderate, since foreign competition makes itself felt instantly. 
If, on the other hand, the protective margin is large, or if imports are 
limited by bans or direct restrictive measures, domestic prices may rise 
considerably, even without the stimulus of an inflationary credit expansion« 
However this may be, the general rise in profits facilitates further 
investment, with a consequent increase in employment, although generally 
not at the expense of consumer activities. Employment shows an upward trend 
in both forms of activity, but more especially in investment activities, 
because of the growth of the active population. Public investment and 
expenditure also tend to increase, as a result of higher tax returns, 
especially when these are closely linked with foreign trade«. 
When the over-all income of the economy is thus expanded, there tends 
to be a stronger general upward movement in the growth rate of imports 
- that is, there is a cyclic increase in their coefficient - owing to changes 
in income distribution in favour of entrepreneurs and other social groups 
high on the income distribution.scale. 
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In this ascending phase, easy credit and new opportunities for 
expenditure and investment stimulate the expansion of credit beyond the 
point required by the increment in business activity. This expansion 
tends to speed up utilization of the economy's idle capacity, and to 
broaden it, so that imports proceed at a brisker pace. In general terms, 
it can be stated that inflationary credit expansion tends to increase 
imports to a corresponding extent, 
(b) The cyclic downswing 
A decline in exports and a deterioration in the terms of trade 
naturally lead to phenomena of an opposite kind. First, over-all demand 
falls off as a result of contracting demand in the export factor; this, 
coupled with the decrease in revenue, discourages investment, thereby 
reducing employment in export activities, with further depressive effects 
on over-all employment, income and imports. 
The State, of course, suffers from the same depressive effects as a 
result of falling tax revenue; and the endeavour to maintain the level of 
its expenditure and investment generally leads to a deficit with its 
inevitable inflationary effects,> These effects tend to relieve the 
contraction of the economy and to give private investment further 
encouragement, and for this purpose recourse is usually had to credit 
expansion also which leads to further compensatory effects on over-all 
economic activity. 
However, if the impact of a contraction in exports on over-all income 
is counteracted in this way, the decline in imports i3 prevented or 
attenuated, thereby intensifying external disequilibrium. The continuation 
of such a policy makes monetary depreciation inevitable. 
(c) The import lag 
For a better understanding of the nature and magnitude of this 
external disequilibrium, attention must be given to the way in which a 
growth in exports entails an increase in inports as part of the undulating 
movement. This phenomenon could be explained in the following way. 
When there is no inflationary pressure, imports always lag behind exports; 
but while, during the upswing, this lag indicates a surplus of exports over 
imports and accordingly an accumulation of foreign currency, during the 
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downswing the exact opposite occurs, because the previously accumulated 
foreign currency reserves are used up. These reserves will not be completely 
exhausted if exports stop declining at a level higher than their starting 
point, which is customary in their growth process. 
If inflationary pressure makes itself felt - i.e., if part of public 
or private investment is financed with bank credit instead of genuine 
savings - imports will tend to rise with greater rapidity and approach or 
even exceed exports during the upward phase. At all events, inflationary 
investment - or inflationary expenditure covered by bank credit - by 
accentuating the growth of imports will tend to bring about external 
di?.equilibrium proportionate to the magnitude of such investment. For these 
reasons, monetary reserves tend to shrink more than they otherwise would; 
and if inflationary pressure is very strong, monetary reserves may not 
only lose all the ground they have gained but may even fall below their 
previous level. This phenomenon usually Occurs in an acute form during 
the downswing when inflationary pressure originating in the previous phase, 
added to the pressure that continues to develop later, intensifies the 
external disequilibrium characteristic of this phase of the cycle» 
(d) Compensatory effects of inflation 
The decline in exports is evidenced both by the inadequacy of 
internal demand and by excess demand for imports until the contraction 
in income re-establishes external equilibrium. Thus, if exports decrease 
by 1,000 and the import coefficient is 0.20 - we shall suppose it to be 
constant for purposes of simplification - the first impact of the reduction 
will be a fall of 800 in internal demand and of only 200 in imports, compared 
with the drop of 1,000 in exports. 
The fall in internal demand will bring over-all income down with it 
until the latter is suff.i ciently low to bring about a decrease in imports 
to the same extent as exports. On the basis of the foregoing example, 
this will occur when over-all income falls to 5,000. 
The credit expansion which usually occurs then is not always a 
spontaneous consequence of economic contraction, for it is sometimes the 
expression of an anti-cyclic policy. At all events, expansion .tends to 




a decline in inports and thus runs counter to the re-establishment of 
external equilibrium. In our example, an expansion of 1,000 will offset 
the fall in exports and the gap of 800 in internal demand. But inports 
will fail to decline and external disequilibrium will be equivalent to 
the amount of the drop in exports. Naturally, disequilibrium leads to a 
monetary devaluation which, in its turn, tends to bring about external 
equilibrium by restricting imports and promoting exports. 
But this policy of an inflationary nature has very serious defects, 
since its positive effects depend essentially on the regressive redistribution 
of income. In fact, devaluation leads to price rises - if this has not 
already occurred - with the resultant redistribution of income in favour 
of entrepreneurs and high-income groups in general. 
Such income redistribution generates certain changes in the composition 
of demand: it reduces the demand of the broad :lasses and boosts that of the 
high-i;icome groups. Apart fr-:m its social effects, this would have no 
adverse effect on the total voluris of internal demand if the investment 
coefficients of demand cf the broad masses and of the high-income groups 
were the same. But this does not happen in practice; the coefficient of 
the latter is usually higher. 
Thus a new problem arises. A reduction of. the import coefficient is 
essential to correct external disequilibrium. But, as the demand for 
imports of the high-income groups tend3 to remain at the same level or 
to rise, depending on the intensity of inflationary pressure, the contraction 
necessarily makes itself felt on the rest of the imports. The very decrease 
in consumption suffered by the mass of the population has depressive effects 
on internal activity and thereby makes for a regressive readjustment of 
inports. 
As a result, the inflationary redistribution produces two opposite 
effects. By expanding investment, it tends to maintain internal economic 
activity at a level higher than is justified by exports. At the same time, 
however, the increased imports of the groups favoured by the redistribution 
tend to limit the scope of this process. 
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It is therefore not strange that intensive credit inflation my be 
accompanied by inadequate use of productive capacity or may result irt a 
slow rate of income growth, if no direct measures are taken to modify the 
composition of imports, 
(e) Possibilities of an anti-cyclic policy 
Inflationary expansion is far from being a satisfactory anti-cyclic 
instrument. Would it be possible to pursue a policy of expansion without 
inflationary consequences? Can a fiscal deficit possibly bo used in our 
countries to counteract external contraction without inflation ensuing? 
It should be remembered that, even if inflationary credit expansion 
counterbalances the inadequacy of internal demand, such expansion constitutes 
an obstacle to the re-'33tablishmsnt of external equilibria by preventing 
a readjustment of imports. An apparently simple problem thus arises: 
to divert excess demand for imports towards internal demand, to compensate 
in a non-inflationary way fox* the shortage resulting from the fall in 
exports. In practice, however, such an operation involves serious 
difficulties. Let us examine the chief of these» 
For it to be possible to divert the excess demand for imports, it is 
essential that there should be an easily reducible margin. The most 
favourable case is when this margin consists of articles, imports of which 
can be cut or abolished without lowering the level of employment or affecting 
mass consumption unfavourably;, 
Let us suppose that the articles concerned are for the high-income 
groups. Part of the excess demand can be absorbed by import taxes. 
These taxes must be high enough to divert the rest of the excess demand 
towards the internal market. This diversion will be converted into 
inflationary pressure of demand to the extent that there is no idle 
capacity in the economy. And the only way to avoid this is by absorbing 
this remaining demand by new taxes of an internal nature. 
In this way all the excess demand - except that part which has been 
covered by the aforesaid idle capacity and the resultant rise in employment -
will have been collected by the State in the form of taxes. The resources 
accumulated in this way enable the State to cover the investments which 
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formerly were made in an inflationary manner and thereby to ensure 
employment for that part of the labour force which was not absorbed by 
fuller utilization of the available capacity referred to above. 
In a nutshell, the operation consists essentially in shifting 
excess demand for imports to internal demand for the factors occupied 
in investment activities. This is, however, a simple case. Let us now 
examine the complications, first those arising from the composition of 
the reducible margin and then those resulting from the inadequacy of 
that margin. 
Let us suppose that, in order to restore external equilibrium, the 
imports for the high-income groups are insufficient and that it is essential 
to use the imports that form a direct part of mass consumption. To carry 
out an operation similar to the previous one would be tantamount to placing 
a direct burden on such consumption; and if this burden is eschewed, 
inflationary pressure will emerge which will, in any event, make prices 
rise in the same way as if the burden had been applied. In both cases there 
is the danger of setting off the spiral already referred to. There is no 
alternative but to obtain financial aid from international sources to cover 
investments to an extent equivalent to the inflationary pressure. And this 
is even more cogent if the reducible margin is insufficient or if resources 
are lacking to cover all the imports essential to the maintenance of the 
level of economic activity. The only solution is international aid. 
Careful examination of the problem reveals that the policy we are 
considering consists of maintaining the volume of investment which was 
previously made in an inflationary way, but covering it with savings provided 
by taxes and with international financial assistance. Such international 
aid is essential when imports vital to mass consumption or economic activity 
cannot be reduced. It is conceivable that a higher level of internal savings 
might be achieved which would cover all investment, but this would not solve 
the problem because the lack of resources for essential imports would make 
it necessary to restrict mass consumption or lower the level of economic 
activity which would also have unfavourable effects for the population at 
large. 
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This is not all, however. Covering essential imports in this way-
is a temporary device until structural transformations are introduced to 
restore dynamic external equilibrium on a more lasting basis. It is 
therefore essential to invest capital in import substitution and export 
industries. In so far as the absence of internal savings or the extent or 
composition of the reducible margin leaves no room for corresponding imports 
of capital goods, international financial assistance will also be required. 
All that I have just said follows a logical line of reasoning. 
In practice, however, it would run into two serious difficulties. First, 
a greater internal savings effort through taxes or the floating of loans is 
required when a drop in exports has already weakened saving capacity. 
Secondly, recourse is had to international aid as a normal part of an 
anti-cyclic policy. Let us dwell on this aspect for a moment, 
(f) International financial assistance 
The difficulty does not lie solely in the deep-rooted reluctance of 
international credit institutions to cover internal investments which, 
would seem to have no very serious basis, but also in a consideration which 
is far more deserving of attention. The amount of international assistance 
that a country requires must correspond to the rate of growth which it 
wishes to maintain or attain and to the savings effort which it can make. 
But if considerations connected with anti-cyclic policy enter into the 
picture, the amount of international resources required could easily be 
exaggerated. 
Again, a compensatory policy might require a type of internal 
investment - public works and construction, for example - which would 
exceed the level proper to a rational distribution of available resources 
among the various investment requirements. In other words, as a result 
of this type of anti-cyclic policy, excessive resources might be used for 
such investments to the detriment, to cite one example, of the production 
or importation of machinery and equipment. 
International financial assistance can be justified as a means of 
supplementing the scant savings in our countries but not as a normal part 
of anti-cyclic policy to cover the imports required for the maintenance of 
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economic activity. The solution does not lie there, but in a far-sighted 
policy of import substitution that anticipates the cyclic decline of 
exports so as to obviate - or at least mitigate - its consequences on the 
internal econony. 
These considerations are relevant to anti-cyclic policy but not to 
means for stemming inflation. Contributions from national resources to 
cover external disequilibrium while the above-mentioned measures are being 
taken to deal with it fundamentally are usually a sine qua non. 
3. Structural equilibrium 
(a) Currency devaluation as an agent of structural equilibrium 
Are direct measures likely to be necessary to deal effectively with 
structural disequilibrium or is devaluation sufficient? The school of 
monetary orthodoxy usually advocates devaluation in all cases, whether the 
phenomenon is basically structural or merely a temporary departure from 
structural equilibrium. Neither the nature nor the effects of devaluation 
are the same in the two cases» 
A departure from structural equilibrium usually occurs in our countries 
in the event of currency over-valuation. A rise in internal prices 
unaccompanied by a similar movement in import and export prices leads to 
disequilibrium by encouraging the former and discouraging the latter. 
This disparity may originate in inflationary pressure on prices or in an 
upward movement of wages and salaries to a figure unjustified by the level 
of productivity. 
So long as there are no obstacles to an increase in imports, the 
rise in internal prices will be confined to those goods and services which 
are not linked to external trade, so that external disequilibrium is merely 
a direct consequence of inflationary pressure. If direct restrictive 
measures are applied to lessen or correct disequilibrium, the rise in prices 
will spread to the whole economy and occasion a readjustment in salaries 
and wages. 
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Such a readjustment will cause the cost of exports to rise but not 
their prices, owing to monetary over-valuation; and likewise it will affect 
those branches of production that compete with imports of articles which, 
for one reason or another, are free of restrictions. The damage which 
exports and the other aforementioned branches of production suffer makes 
devaluation indispensable if competitive conditions are to be re-established 
and the flow of external trade is to be restored on a balanced basis. 
The same occurs when the increase in prices is caused by a rise in wages 
and salaries unjustified by productivity. 
The case is very different when disequilibrium results from growth 
of income beyond the level justified by exports. This is the structural 
disequilibrium vhich occurs when exports fall off, as we saw earlier. 
If, in order to maintain or raise the level of internal activity, recourse 
is had to credit expansion with resulting devaluation, this will tend to 
re-establish equilibrium even though accompanied by the regressive effects 
mentioned earlier. 
Now, in this case, devaluation acts in a different way. The prices 
of exports and imports rise and, as costs are not adjusted simultaneously, 
an extraordinarily large margin of profit is generated which, while 
encouraging traditional exports and promoting the development of new lines, 
brings into being hitherto non-existent import substitution activities and 
offers an incentive to those that are already in operation. 
But, as wages and salaries mount, these effects gradually diminish; 
and, in order to keep productive activity at the higher level achieved, 
it becomes necessary either to resort to further devaluation or to take 
steps to place direct restrictions on imports or subsidize specific exports. 
It might be argued that the rise in remuneration need not keep pace 
with devaluation, since competition will prevent prices from moving up 
except in the case of new activities which may have cost more to develop. 
It is possible to think along these lines, although practices restricting 
competition frequently combine to push up prices to the extent permitted 
by the greater margin of protection afforded by devaluation. 
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When this fact sooner or later entails an adjustment in wages and 
salaries correlative to devaluation, the latter loses its effectiveness. 
In other words, devaluation acts in this case solely as a stabilizing 
factor so long as it has regressive effects on income distribution. 
It is true that import prices may be prevented from rising - except 
for imports to be replaced by nationally-produced items - if devaluation 
is accompanied by a proportional cut in customs duties for all existing 
industries, so as to avoid double protection. The protection provided 
by tariffs would thus be wholly or partly replaced by the protection 
resulting from devaluation. Consequently, the rise in prices would be 
confined to itans produced by the new substitution activities, whose cost 
is higher than that of the articles previously imported. 
An adjustment in wages and salaries, which is justifiable when there 
are extraordinary profits, would not be an adequate solution in this case, 
since there would be no such profits, and it would lead to an inflationary 
spiral. Other measures should therefore be adopted to prevent the rise in 
prices from affecting the consumption of the population at large. 
From the point of view of exports, the incentive given by devaluation 
to traditional items might bring about a deterioration in the terms of 
trade, if one country's products constituted a substantial proportion of 
the international supply. Steps would then have to be taken to restrict 
exports, either by taxes and duties which would absorb all - or part - of the 
extraordinary profit, or by direct controls. The incentive to devaluation 
would thus be confined to new exports. 
Measures of this kind imply deliberate intervention in the economy 
and lessen the prestige which devaluation normally enjoys as an automatic 
method of restoring equilibrium "by allowing money to find its own level". 
Moreover? such action is very seldom taken, because the amount of devaluation 
is usually determined by the particular effect that it is desired to produce. 
The question is therefore one of economic policy and the advantages 
and disadvantages of such a method have to be compared in practice with 
those of other measures such as direct export subsidies, import substitution 




(b) The gold standard and structural equilibrium 
Those who uphold the theory of monetary orthodoxy usually fail to 
see the problem of Latin American structural equilibrium as clearly as they 
might, despite the constant prompting of a reality which they usually prefer 
to ignore. They have inherited the fundamental principles of the gold 
standard and apply them to the policy of monetary stability. The adherents 
of the classic theory did not notice the structural problem, nor had they 
any reason to notice it in the golden age of the gold standard under 
British hegemony. 
The operation of the gold standard did not jeopardize in any way the 
structural equilibrium of the world economy, since the British centre, with 
its individual structure, had found in the peripheral countries and the 
dynamic centres a structural adaptability which facilitated the movement of 
gold in either direction. It is not surprising, therefore, that equilibrium 
was believed to be inherent in the operation of the gold standard. But, at 
the end of the last century and early 1900's, the main dynamic centre began 
to feel the consequences of certain structural changes in the rest of the 
world which were accompanied by constant signs of instability. I refer in 
particular to the repercussions of the rapid process taking place in the 
other dynamic centres (e.g. Germany) and of protectionism, and to certain 
monetary procedures that tended to keep gold in the leading countries. 
One result of this was of great importance: the British centre began 
to lose its knack of drawing back the gold that it sent out. Clear proof of 
the perplexity and distress which this caused the monetary authorities is 
to be found in Sir John Clapham1 s book on the Bank of England, the first 
written by an author with access to that institution's confidential files. 
An interpretation of those structural phenomena was, of course, still very 
premature in those days. But ideas were beginning to emerge for mitigating 
the consequences of the centrifugal tendency of gold. Thus, long before 
Keynes and earlier than the First World War, it was already thought desirable 
for the holdings of the world's central banks to be concentrated in the 
British centre. 
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It. is not surprising therefore that fairly similar events now 
occurring in the main dynamic centre - the United States - which superseded 
the British centre after the First World War, should be reflected in 
measures whose objectives are basically analogous. It is undeniable that 
the. new dynamic centre has operated in structural conditions very different 
from those that prevailed in earlier times and which made it very difficult 
for the gold standard to operate. These conditions became much less 
favourable when, during the great world depression, the dynamic centre 
reduced its import coefficient while continuous increases in productivity 
and technical innovations stimulated the expansiveness of its exports. 
It was impossible for the gold standard - monetary stability - to be 
maintained, and in the rest of the world, the other dynamic centres and 
peripheral countries were obliged to adapt their structure to the 
structural changes in the focal dynamic centre• 
The process of adaptation had lasted nearly a quarter of a century, 
and, as soon as it was completed, contrary phenomena affecting the main 
dynamic centre and posing a grave problem emerged in the other dynamic 
centres. These other centres either have to liberalize their policy as 
regards imports from the rest of the world, including the principal 
dynamic centre, without, prejudice to other measures of readjustment, or, 
by force majeure, they will be instrumental in inducing the principal centre 
to seek equilibrium to the detriment of interimtional trade. 
Our countries could not fail to take an interest in the solving of 
this problem since the more active development of world trade, by enhancing 
their export and import opportunities, is a factor of prime importance for 
the acceleration of their economic growth. 
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B. A SUMMARY OF THE RELATION BETWEEN G R ( M AND INFLATION, 
1929 TO 1959 y 
1. The position in 1929 
During the nineteenth century, the economy of every country in the 
region had become organized very largely around its export industries. 
By the time of the First World War, the main features of economic structure 
could be summarized as follows, A substantial part of the proceeds of 
exports was earned by plantations, large cattle farms or mines. Much of 
this income flowed straight out again. Some of it was remitted as profits 
to foreign companies or absentee landowners; the rent and profits received 
by local property owners were mostly spent on imports. The remainder 
entered the local economy by two main channels, namely, taxes on foreign 
trade and profits of export and import merchants. These sustained civil 
service bureaucracies and commercial life in the large cities, where some 
manufacturing activities could be found, such as food processing and the 
clothing industry. A considerable fraction of the population, often those 
of Indian or Negro stock, worked on estates, plantations or smallholdings, 
or on communal land, for little or no remuneration, so they hardly counted 
as part of the consumer market. They were also cut off from the city labour 
markets, not merely by distance and bad transport, but also ty illiteracy, 
lack of technical skill, and quasi-feudal obligations to their employers 
and landlords. 
It must not be inferred from these generalizations that all economies 
were at the same level in the early decades of this century. The scale of 
manufacturing, the extent of commercial agriculture, and the degree of 
urbanization varied greatly. Broadly speaking, they were all much more in 
evidence in the southern part of Latin America, where the original pattern 
of colonization had been modified by the extensive immigration of artisans, 
entrepreneurs and farmers. In Argentina, particularly, the economy had 
become quite highly unified geographically and socially, at least by comparison 
with that of other countries in the region. 
1 • 1 1 
3/ See "Inflation and growth: a summary of experience in Latin America", 
Economic Bulletin for Latin America, vol. VII, N° 1 (1962), pp. 28-45. 
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Where the process of industrialization had already got under way, 
it received a vigorous impulse from the conditions produced by the war 
of 1914-18. Imports became hard to obtain. Shipping grew scarce; 
blockades were maintained by the belligerent Powers; and both European and, 
eventually, North American industries were diverted to the manufacture of 
armaments and munitions. By the nineteen-twenties, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, 
and Brazil (especially the south) were Well on the same road as had been 
taken earlier by Argentina. Substantial proportions of the population were 
living in urban areas, and local industries could by now satisfy a significant 
part of local demand. The same signs of progress were also appearing in 
Colombia, Cuba, Peru, and Venezuela, although the degree of self-sufficiency 
they showed was lower, and typical of an earlier stage of development. 
Meanwhile, Argentine industry was expanding into new fields, suoh aB 
engineering. 
Yet all the Latin American economies were still vulnerable to 
fluctuations in foreign trade. Their exports, which provided a high 
proportion of income, consisted of a few important products, perhaps only 
a single item, and were sold to a limited number of buyer countries. 
The sectors producing for export had, except in the cases of Argentina and 
Uruguay, very limited possibilities of selling their output inside the 
economy. Even those countries which were becoming industrialized, and 
were thus growing less dependent on the income generated by exports, were 
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of external trade, though in a different way. 
Certain types of goods, not only the more highly processed consumer goods 
but also nearly all capital goods and intermediate products, had to be 
imported. The more advanced economies were coming to rely heavily on 
receipts of foreign exchange to provide the materials and equipment for 
their Industrial sectors. 
Despite the progress that had been made, internal developments 
continued to be hampered by the lack of economic integration. Some 
improvement had been made in the cultivation of export crops, but little 
technical progress could be seen in agricultural production for the home 
market. While owners of large estates still used the major part of their 




smallholdings or communal land were employing techniques which.were decades 
or even centuries out of date. Industrial firms, lacking the domestic 
market they needed for large-scale production were often inefficient and/or -
monopolistic. 
Nevertheless, as long as world trade was buoyant, as it was in most 
of the nineteen-twenties, economies did continue to grow. Exports expanded, 
private investment by foreigners was heavy, and Governments could raise 
considerable finance overseas for public works. Incomes rose, and with 
than consumption and tax revalues. The cities were able to absorb a 
continuous flow of migrants from the country districts, attracted not 
merely by higher incomes, but also by amenities and services such as 
electricity, water supply and schools, and in some cases by greater security. 
These physical changes in the Latin American economies had been 
accompanied by others of a financial nature. In the nineteenth century, 
a number of countries had still used dollars for local currency, while 
those with their own money had kept it tied to gold; foreign banks had 
provided most of the financial services. The countries of the southern 
zone which had made most progress economically had begun to show greater 
financial independence. In an attempt to alleviate the consequences of 
slumps in world trade, they devalued their currencies, on occasion, and 
often suspended convertibility into gold. In addition, locally-owned 
commercial banks played a growing part in the financial life of the more 
industrialized countries, and during the nineteen-twenties several central 
banks vie re established. 
These moves towards monetary independence had, however, met with 
setbacks from time to time. There had already been bouts of inflation, 
especially in Chile, and on occasion local banks had been forced to close 
their doors. Sometimes devaluation could be ascribed to plain mismanagement 
of national finance. After:the severe financial crises of 1921, when 
commodity markets had collapsed, there was a general attempt to return to 
the gold standard, Latin America was in this matter following the example 
of European countries which were trying to re-establish the international 
monetary system that had broken down in the First World War, 
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One of the consequences was that economic policy, in its present 
form and scope, was not applied in 1929 in any part of the region. 
Observance of the rules of the gold standard meant that certain problems 
never arose. A shortage of foreign reserves could hardly occur, and any 
incipient price inflation would be braked by shortage of money before it 
could gather momentum. Among the virtues of the gold standard was that 
it achieved these ends almost automatically, and problems requiring political 
decision and administrative action were less acute. 
Few instruments for policy had as yet been created. Taxation was 
relatively low, being based mainly on import duties, and since a chronic 
budget deficit would have been hard to finance, expenditure was also limited. 
Despite the moves towards financial independence, monetary systems were 
still hardly developed enough to give much scope for deliberate policy. 
Exchange controls and multiple rates were as yet unknown. In any case, 
the material basis for a more active and independent policy hardly existed 
in most countries, at least in the short run, if the lack of local capacity 
for producing manufactures is taken into account. Monetary expansion would 
have led quickly to an increase in Imports and an unacceptable loss of 
foreign reserves. Furthermore, the political pressures for such policies 
were limited, since power was effectively in the hands of those not entirely 
dissatisfied vdth developments, and even the discontented could still find 
some scope for the improvement of their conditions so long as the national 
product continued to rise and it was possible for them to move out of 
backward sectors of the economy. 
But the almost complete absence of a deliberate economic strategy 
proved a serious handicap in the years that followed. Administrations were 
not gaining experience in formulating policy and carrying it outj statistics 
were not being demanded because they were not needed, so they remained 
almost non-existent} and political leaders had become accustomed to thinking 
that economic developments were, broadly speaking, outside their control 
and therefore not their responsibility. 
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2. The consequences of the depression; new alternatives 
for economic policy emerge 
Great though its merits were, in retrospect it is hard to believe 
that the major economies of the region would have been prepared, or indeed 
able, to maintain the rules of the gold standard indefinitely, even if 
fluctuations in foreign trade had been avoided. These rules implied an 
overriding priority for balancing payments and for stabilizing the domestic 
price level. Income and employment could grow and recessions could be 
avoided, but only if foreign trade continued to expand. Thus the rate of 
expansion depended in the last resort on the pace at which the national 
product was growing in the leading industrial countries of North America 
and Western Europe, a pace which might prove too slow for an area with low 
per capita incomes and a fast rate of population increase. 
However, the question was never put to the test. The depression 
which started in 1929 was so deep that the gold standard was discarded as 
unworkable by the whole world, including the industrial countries themselves. 
World trade plunged sharply and speculative movements of capital were heavy. 
The leading industrial countries abandoned convertibility into gold one 
after another and devalued their currencies. Those that retained the gold 
standard, as Prance did, found their exports more and more difficult to 
market; they had to bring imports down by inducing a fall in activity, and 
therefore in employment, of a magnitude that in the end proved to be 
intolerable. The abandonment of the gold standard was the necessary 
condition for the adoption of anti-cyclical programmes, such as public 
works schemes, which became increasingly necessary. 
The slump came as a particularly severe shock to Latin America, 
Public revenues depended heavily on the taxation of foreign trade; and 
investment was being largely financed by foreign companies in export 
industries or in sectors which were linked with them. So the decline in 
exports, which was in any case relatively much sharper than in the industrial 
countries, meant reductions in income throughout the economy. At the same 
time, the foreign exchange shortage was aggravated by the drying up of the 
inflow of short-term capital, even in some cases by its reversal. Countries 
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which were accustomed to relying on foreign sources for a large 
proportion of their supplies found it hard to make the necessary cut in 
their imports. 
Governments discarded convertibility, not only into gold, but also 
into foreign currencies. This led to the appearance of free markets in 
which exchange rates were at a discount compared with official quotations 
and fluctuated from day to day. These were not the only breaches that 
occurred in the old economic order« Like many other countries, industrial 
or primary producer, those in Latin America introduced import quotas in an 
attempt to correct the deficit in foreign payments and increased duties on 
imports, (The United States had raised its tariff walls in 1930, under the 
Smoot-Hawley Act,) Many of them also defaulted on foreign debts, as a number 
of European countries were doing. Furthermore, several attempts were made, 
not very successfully, to stabilize commodity prices by international 
measures to control output. 
Apart from these steps, vhich were common to almost the whole region, 
one group of countries took additional measures, whereas the remainder did 
not, and there has been a clear distinction between these two groups ever 
since. The additional measures can be summed up as autonomous monetary 
expansion, autonomous in the sense that it was much greater than would have 
been justified by movements in reserves. This was accompanied by legal and 
institutional changes such as the establishment of new central banks, or 
an increase in the power of those that already existed. 
The countries which did take such autonomous action were broadly 
speaking, the largest and those already partially industrialized 
- Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico, They had the greatest 
incentive to attempt some form of compensation. Unemployment was a severe 
problem for their large city populations, which were not by any means 
powerless politically, and domestic bankers were threatened by the inability 
to meet current obligations. These countries had, moreover, the greatest 
scope for action: they had industries which could supply some at least of 
the needs of the local consumer and absorb some of the unemployment. 
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It must not be thought that compensatory action was in all cases 
deliberately chosen as an economic strategy and that exchange control was 
imposed to stop the consequent loss of reserves. The crisis developed so 
quickly that administrations improvised as best they could. Budget deficits 
appeared because revenues were falling fast, and the expansion of credit 
was often decided on at a few hours' notice to save banks from having to 
close their doors. 
Although it was some time before the gold standard was consciously 
and finally rejected, each step represented a further break with conventional 
monetary standards. Backing for the currency fell; further devaluation 
occurred vis-a-vis not merely gold, but also the United States dollar; and 
more controls 'were imposed on purchases of foreign exchange. But the 
depression was gradually changing attitudes as to what constituted permissible 
policy. Overseas, both professional and political opinion was swinging 
round in favour of the conscious use of fiscal and monetary policy, backed 
where necessary by direct controls, to prevent or cure cyclical depressions. 
The practical example of the New Deal in the United States was a particularly 
powerful stimulus to those Latin Americans who were urging a different and 
more autonomous approach. 
Although a number of Latin American economies had already been in 
some degree diversified by the end of the previous decade, the depression 
demonstrated how far this process was from being complete by revealing how 
much they still depended on imports. Because of the shortage of foreign 
exchange, the imports of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico shrank in volume by 
more than one half between 1929 and 1932, and those of Chile fell by more 
than three-quarters. Indeed, according to the League of Nations 
World Economic Report, 1932-33« Chilean exports and imports fell more than 
those of any other of the thirty-eight countries covered. The problem of 
maintaining living standards and limiting unemployment was in part one of 
adapting financial policy to the new circumstances, but in real terms it 
was a question of replacing imports - particularly manufactures - with domestic 
products on a big scale and in a short period of time. 
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A strong impetus was given to industrialization by the measures 
taken to protect reserves of foreign exchange. Devaluation, import quotas, 
higher tariffs - all these had the Incidental effect of opening up new 
markets for the domestic producer, or strengthening his position against 
foreign competition. The sudden expansion of manufacturing was not, 
however, easy. One obstacle was the difficulty of financing it. Investment 
by foreigners was now small; private savings had been depressed by the 
decline in incomes; and equipment had become expensive to import, because 
of devaluation. There were also more deeply-rooted handicaps to be overcome. 
The labour force lacked the range-of skills needed; the land-owning class 
was often unwilling to invest time and energy in new tasks to which, whatever 
their economic rationale, the traditional social prestige of agricultural 
activity did not attach; and those in trade and commerce usually preferred 
to follow in their customary family business, rather than undertake the 
risky and exacting work of founding industrial enterprises. 
As regards physical inputs, the new industries' needs in respect of 
fuel, materials and semi-manufactures were heavy. Moreover, industrialization 
induced an increased demand for foodstuffs in the cities. What was required, 
and what was indeed imposed by the circumstances, was a wholesale 
transformation of the economy. This placed novel demands on a transport 
system which had been designed mainly as an ancillary to foreign trade. 
The official bureaucracy was also hardly capable of meeting the 
administrative requirements of the new situation. There was, as in many 
other parts of the world, a severe shortage of civil servants capable of 
framing economic strategy and administering import controls in such a way 
as to minimize the tensions of the process. Statistics were still, in any 
case, of such a low quality that policy was inevitably based on "hunches" 
or biased information. 
Although the industrial sector did, in general, grow in response to 
this stimulus, the products of the new industries were usually expensive. 
New factories, like the old, were often very small and inefficient and 
competition was still far from perfect. The response of agriculture to 




made for the imported fuel and equipment needed by the new industries and 
for heavy consumer demand, in part stimulated by excessively expansionist 
policies, it is not surprising that the demand for foreign exchange did 
not abate; exchange rates were under continuous pressure. 
In Brazil, Chile and Mexico., price levels tended to rise after 1932. 
This was not true of Argentina and Uruguay. One reason was that the 
failure of their export markets released foodstuffs which' could be consumed 
at home. Secondly, Argentina had made some progress in industrialization, 
previously: a sizable industrial sector was already in existence at the 
start of the slump, with some surplus capacity, so substitution for imports 
involved a less radical departure from previous economic patterns. Thirdly, 
both countries were reasonably supplied with basic social capital like 
transport and electricity which facilitated the establishment of new 
industries; and the social environment itself made it easier than elsewhere 
to find entrepreneurs and suitable workers. Fourthly, Argentina's fiscal 
and monetary policy was managed in such a way as to offset the effects of 
fluctuations in foreign trade; and, finally, industrialization there was 
relatively well balanced. 
This experience is an interesting illustration of the relative 
significance of monetary and real factors, which was discussed above. 
It is possible to attribute currency devaluation and price rises to the 
laxness of the authorities, who expanded the supply of money, thus permitting 
Government deficits to occur and also the extension of more credit to the 
private sector. If this monetary expansion had not occurred, prices and 
exchange rates would probably have changed very little over the whole decade. 
But we must take account of the context of monetary policy. Faced with a 
catastrophic fall in exports, which was the original cause of the trouble, 
those responsible for policy had to make a series of choices between 
unpleasant alternatives. When revenue fell off, for example, Governments 
were presented with a dilemma. On the one hand, they could make equally 
drastic reductions in expenditure and face the social implications of this, 
at a time when unemployment was already rising to dangerous levels. 
Alternatively, they could resort to deficit financing. Similarly, the 
monetary authorities had to decide whether to contract credit when their 
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foreign reserves declined, and they had to make this decision at a time 
when commercial banks and business houses were already under severe 
financial stress. In many cases, the strain on the balance of payments 
and price inflation would have been much less if policy had been carefully 
framed, but the authorities ran risks either way, whether their policy was 
expansionist or restrictive. In several large economies, they chose 
rising prices and devaluation rather than falling incomes and unemployment. 
In view of the political circumstances of the times in these countries, 
which included civil disturbance, it is doubtful whether any other choice 
was possible. Authorities who tried to adhere to strictly orthodox policies 
were usually removed from office. 
Most of the remaining countries of the region either refrained from 
carrying out autonomous monetary policies, or at any rate did less in this 
direction and gave up sooner. In the small economies of Central America and 
the Caribbean area both the need and the opportunity for such policies were 
limited. For one thing, urban proletariats were relatively smaller. 
While the depression meant severe hardship, a great part of the population 
worked in subsistence sectors only remotely affected by fluctuations in the 
commercial part of the economy. Political pressure from this quarter to 
maintain incomes was therefore not very strong. The banking systems were, 
moreover, largely in foreign hands and there was opposition to measures 
which might lead to devaluation of the currency. 
In any event, the scope for expansionist policies was quite limited 
in economies which were still essentially dependent on exports and with 
relatively small manufacturing sectors. A country at an incipient stage of 
industrialization is particularly deficient in the economic, social and 
political conditions for further progress in this direction. 
The countries of the region are usually divided into two groups. 
Exchange rates of countries in the Caribbean area and Central America which 
had suffered de facto devaluation nearly all regained the former parity with 
the United States dollar, or something close to it, as the depression came 
to an end, making their currencies once more convertible into dollars. 
They were in effect now on a dollar standard and they continued to maintain 




have experienced only moderate price rises over the past three decades. 
Nicaragua has reverted to more conservative practices in the past decade 
and price rises have slowed down there; Ecuador can also be included in 
the group, taking the period as a whole. 
Venezuela falls into this class too. It possessed in petroleum an 
export which, until quite recently/ has proved easy to market, and earnings 
of foreign exchange have climbed very rapidly. Even in the depression, the 
upward trend was halted rather than reversed. The need for compensatory 
policy did not therefore arise in the nineteen-thirties and the Venezuelan 
bolivar was so strong that it appreciated vis-a-vis the United States dollar. 
There are therefore eleven countries which have followed, in general, 
orthodox policies in,the matter of reserves for most of the past thirty years 
and which have, on the whole, experienced only moderate increases in prices. 
These countries will be known as Group 0. They are mostly small economies, 
unindustrialized and heavily dependent on foreign trade. Even Cuba and 
Venezuela, although much larger, had in 1950 only narrow manufacturing sectors 
by comparison with their export industries. This type of economic structure 
tended to be preserved, as in certain other countries, by reciprocal trade 
agreements with the United States, which offered special marketing advantages 
for sugar and petroleum respectively, in return for undertakings to restrict 
the protection of local industries. 
The other nine countries of Latin America (Group U) have mostly 
followed less orthodox financial policies and have experienced, particularly 
in the past decade, steady-to-fast price inflation and a series of 
devaluations. Seven of these are the more industrialized economies of the 
region, and most of them are also large and highly urbanized. As a general 
rule, exports account for a smaller proportion of output. Bolivia and 
Paraguay are the other two countries which have followed unorthodox 
financial policies. Paraguay began to do so after the war. Structurally 
and in size they belong to the former group; but precisely because they 
lacked the industrial capacity needed for an expansionist policy, they 





3» The common problems of the war years 
The fundamental contrast between these types of economy was for a 
time not very obvious. When the world pulled out of the depression, 
Latin American imports rose and local price inflations slowed down to a 
halt. Accordingly, by the end of the nineteen-thirties movements in 
prices appeared to be once more in step, Puring the war they accelerated 
again in almost every country. 
This even occurred in economies of Group 0. Their exports rose in 
nearly every case. The entire crops of the sugar-producing countries were 
purchased, usually by the United States; and firm contracts were offered 
by the same country for supplies of certain minerals, cereals and agricultural 
materials. Some countries, for example Haiti, were provided with financial 
and technical assistance for the development of new products. Even non-
essentials like cacao and coffee profited.from high prices. An exception 
was banana exports, which fell to very low levels; because of the need for 
special shipping facilities, bananas did not have much priority in the 
supply programmes of belligerent countries. 
But imports were prevented from rising in step with exports. Goods 
from Western Europe became increasingly difficult to obtain. These 
could largely be replaced by purchases from the United States up to the 
time of the attack on Pearl Harbor; thenceforward the conversion of 
industry to war purposes in the United States, the shortage of shipping 
space, and submarine warfare in the Caribbean area severely limited supplies 
to Latin America. In some cases, the landed cost of imports rose, but the 
rise was limited because of price controls in the United States. 
The expansion of incomes in export industries, was therefore much 
bigger than the rise in the value of imports, and the automatic brake on 
inflation in dollar-standard countries ceased to function. Increases in 
foreign reserves induced an expansion of credit and thus stimulated 
investment in other sectors, so that the total expansion in demand was big. 
But these economies were quite unable to satisfy certain types of demand 
themselves. The net. result was a moderate-to-fast rise in prices. 
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The situation was not, in broad outline, very different in the 
countries which had been following more expansive monetary policies in the 
nineteen-thirties. Heavy exports were expanding demand, and internal 
activity was stimulated not only by an export surplus but also by a great 
increase in the liquidity of the banking systems of several countries with 
the influx of foreign capital as a result of investors» seeking refuge 
from the war. In some cases, the authorities tried to dampen the effect on 
credit of the growth of reserves. In Colombia, increases in deposits had 
to be invested in non-negotiable bonds, which businesses were also compelled 
to buy, and in Mexico the authorities sold gold to absorb currency, besides 
taking measures to limit credit. Authorities in other countries, however, 
followed less stringent policies: now that the rules of the gold standard 
had been abandoned, there was no generally accepted set of principles for 
guiding policy, 
A further fillip was given to import substitution, although the 
reason was no longer the shortage of foreign exchange. The nine countries 
in Group U were beset not merely by the same supply problems as the other 
group, but also, excepting Mexico and Colombia, with the additional 
difficulty of long hauls from the United States to their ports. Yet the 
very circumstances that made it difficult to import finished products also 
discouraged purchases of the machinery, materials and fuel which were needed 
to manufacture them domestically. 
Demand for the products of local secondary industry was so high that 
it stretched capacity to the limit. The war revealed weaknesses in other 
sectors too. In Peru, for example, food imports were cut by five-sixths 
between 1940 and 1942; and while local production was stimulated, areas of « i 
chronic shortage emerged, because of the poor communications inside the 
country. In Brazil, fuel was a serious problem, Wood and coffee were 
widely used as sources of energy; coal and gasoline were rationed; petrol 
was increasingly adulterated with alcohol, and by 1942 cars and lorries 
were running on gas generated from alcohol and lignite. In Argentina, too, 
there was an acute shortage of energy supplies. In 1943 alone, 
1.7 million tons of wheat, 1.5 million tons of flax and linseed and 
0.1 million tons of maize were burned as fuel. An other general weakness 
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in the region was,An basic metals; big efforts were made to develop local 
resources of iron ore, and such furnaces that existed were used intensively. 
The shortage of equipment was possibly most severe in transport. The railway 
from Sao Paulo to Rio de Janeiro, for example, was at times only allowed to / 
carry foodstuffs and fuels. 
These structural weaknesses did not check the rate of growth. 
Despite difficulties, important investments were made. For example, 
Construction of the Volta Redonda steel plan was started in Brazil, and 
industries for making simple types of capital goods were established there. 
The consequence for many countr5.es was a tendency for prices to rise, rather 
than stagnation. the effort to avoid the dangers of inflation, 
Governments once more followed the example of the indufet:.dal countries. 
Although some excess demand was considered inevitable in the United Kingdom 
and the United States because of the heavy burden of financing the war, a 
serious attempt was made to control prices in.both these countries on the 
grounds that inflation would hamper the war effort. Price control plans 
were also drawn up in Latin America, in some cases with the assistance of 
United States experts. In a number of countries, these were highly detailed; 
local price committees were set up in every Paraguayan town, for example: 
the Peruvian Government controlled food distribution; and in Brazil and 
Colombia, price controls were backed by elaborate systems of checking 
inventories and licensing production and imports. In practice, Latin American 
schemes seem to have had very much less success, judging by price indexes, 
than those of the developed countries. 
The smallest price increases for this group occurred once again in 
Argentina;> Rents were frozen there, but the main explanation, as in the 
depression, was that the structure of supply was more attuned to that of 
demand than in the other countries. Supplies of foodstuffs that could not 
be sold to overseas customers were diverted into the home market, and 
government controls were used to prevent good prices from falling too sharply. 
Manufacturing industry was better placed to cope with the situation. It was 
able, for example, to keep much of the existing equipment in service by 
repairing or reconditioning it locally. 
/The degree 
E/CN.12/AC,61/10 
Page 202 v 
The degree of inflation in various countries could again be explained 
by referring to changes in the means of payment; but this is not particularly 
enlightening. The origin of the problem was that imports were being reduced 
while exports were rising0 It was this that led to a general expansion of 
credit and incomes in the countries where special steps were not taken to 
prevent it. Moreover, the shortage of imports was simultaneously creating 
supply bottlenecks which could not be relieved until more food, fuel> 
materials and equipment could be ordered from overseas. Consequently, 
price increases in particular commodities, notably food, led to wage demands. 
A purely monetary approach might lead to the conclusion that firar.cial 
policy could have dealt with the whole problem successful!;?} certainly a 
firmer fiscal and monetary policy in many countries would have checked the 
general excess demand and reduced the pace of inflation, Eut supply problems 
in certain sectors could hardly be eased by global policies« 
4» The immediate pegb-war period; the ro-emergence 
of ect-aom:'.^  policy alternatives 
The years following the cessation of hostilities were, like the middle 
of the nineteen-twenties, a period of prosperity in primary-producing countries. 
Reserves were high and exports rose rapidly as transport difficulties were 
eased. The industrial countries required big increases in supplies of 
primary commodities to enable them to reconvert their industries to peace-
time needs and to build up their inventories of all goods from intermediate 
to final products. 
Banking systems in Latin America were characterized by the liquidity 
of their assets, and segments of the public held big bank deposits, so 
demand was buoyant. All types of imports rose rapidly. The rise in imports 
of fuel and materials eased the restraints on domestic production. It took, 
however, a cei-tain time to make up for the years in which investment had 
lagged and no equipment had been bought for transport and electric power 
and to re-equip local industries, for one reason because there were long 
delays before orders for capital goods could be filled. Therefore, certain 




Price structures were quite distorted by the time the war came to 
an end. As international trade was resumed, it became clear that many 
Latin American currencies were over-valued, and shortages and controls had 
produced internal price relationships which were not likely to endure. 
It is theoretically possible for such distortions to be corrected ty rises 
in some prices and falls in others. But under the booming conditions of 
trade, with rising e;cport and import prices and some persistent shortages, 
the general movement was upwards. 
In different parts of the region experience once again started to 
diverge. In the countries of Group 0, currencies remained fully convertible, 
and these countries, together with Canada and the United Spates became known 
as the "dollar area", or the "hard currency area". Here the rise in prices 
was limited. As imports climbed and reserves declined - if not in absolute 
terms, at least in relation to the national product - the conventional 
monetary machinery for stabilizing the balance of payments and checking 
price inflation was gradually re-established. The price rises which did 
occur in these countries after the war were mainly the reflection of 
developments abroad. Many of them import not merely manufactures but also 
staple foods, materials and fuels, so increases in import prices spread 
throughout the whole economy. Moreover, since export prices were also 
climbing and volumes increasing, the money supply could be expanded 
sufficiently to accomodate a general rise in tho price level. This was a 
pure case of "imported inflation"Q 
The countries in this group, which had experienced the biggest price 
rise during the war, remained at the end of the war with rather less 
liquidity in their banking uystem and with exchange rates that were 
obviously over-valued. So the operation of the dollar standard mechanism 
was quicker and more drastic. Thus in Nicaragua, where prices trebled 
between 1940 and 1945* they subsequently became stabilized at a lower 
level, and in Cuba the more gradual riss continued until 1948 before tapering 
off. For most members of the group, the trend in prices was all-rays upwards 
but it slowed down after the middle of 1V48C This reflected the deceleration 





In the group of countries which were following more flexible 
monetary policies, developments were different» The ecchange position at 
the end of the war gave a rather illusory impression of strength, since 
part of the reserves represented an inflow of capital which had been removed 
from the risks of war and would now be repatriated* Moreover, the rise in 
world prices was steadily reducing the real value of these reserves. 
Nevertheless, for some years, the external balance did not appear a very 
urgent matter in most of these countries. Consequently, there was some 
room for choice in policy. The growing acceptance of Keynosian doctrines 
overseas was having an impression on Latin American authorities, although 
these ideas often i>ipropsr!y usod to justify inflation« The measures 
adopted in Western Europe to redistribute income, such as the "Welfare State" 
in the United Kingdom were also having some impact« In the generally 
expansionist atmosphere, budget deficits and rapidly rising imports wore 
common, while the possibilities of expanding export industries and seeking 
new ones were not widely explored. 
The most vivid example of this was the case of Argentina, We have 
seen that since this country exports staple foods, it can absorb what it 
cannot sell abroad. For the same reason, the level of exports depends to 
a considerable degree on how much is left over from domestic consumption. 
Price and wage policies after 1945 had the effect of raising the purchasing 
power of wages in terrs of traditional export products. Real wages in 
Argentina rose by 50 per cent between 1944 and 1947? while dome.3tic prices 
of traditional export items (though not other farm products) were prevented 
from following the upward trends in overseas prices. Argentina therefore 
never fully recovered its pre-war markets for agricultural commodities, 
especially grains. Imports, on the other hand, rose to a high level, and 
there was a swift decline in foreign reserves (from 1,700 million dollars 
at the end of 1946 to 700 million at the end of 1949)» This rise in 
imports relieved the wartime shortages mentioned above; nevertheless, as 
wage increases were greater than the increases in productivity, production 
costs rose. Moreover, other forces were at work premoting inflation. 
A good deal of equipment was worn out and much economic and social capital 




was heavy but, being badly planned, it widened the budget deficit -without 
curing these shortages. Despite the import surplus and the use of controls 
from 1947 onwards, price rises averaged over 20 per cent a year in the 
period 1945-50. 
Chile was a different case again, Poreign reserves had not been 
built up so much during the war; exports shrank slightly in volume after 
it ended; and-the tonus of trade improved only moderately* Consequently, 
the volume of imports could hardly be expanded at all and supply problems 
continued to restrict the Government's room to manoeuvre. Investment 
was only moderate and the increase in the natioiial product was slow. 
Although imported, foods were subsidized, prices continued to rise at 
much the same rate as in the war years. In the cases of Bolivia and 
Paraguay, too, near-stagnation was associated with inflation. Apart 
from supply problems, cumulative forces had now emerged in these three, 
countries because of the duration and pace of inflation and these forces 
in turn propelled it further forward. The saving propensity was low, 
budgets were difficult to balance and investment tended to be directed to 
projects yielding high and quick returns rather than to developing the 
basic industries and services which were needed» 
Some other countries in this group did much better. In the first 
place, their exports expanded more quickly; and, secondly, they made use 
of the opportunity thus provided. Investment was high and better balanced 
in Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay; and the national products grew at about 
5 or 6 per cent a year. In these cases, now that itrports could be 
obtained in sufficient quantities and internal supply problems were eased, 
price rises became more moderate (5 per cent to 11 per cert a year). 
Still, in retrospect, it seems that the region failed to profit 
fully by the opportunity presented by the export boom of 1945-50. 
A large proportion of reserves was spent on consumer durables, such as 
motor vehicles, instead of being used to strengthen economies against the 
/lean period 
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lean period that obviously lay ahead in the not-so-distant future after 
the reconstruction period, when the industrial countries would have 
built up their inventories to normal peacetime levels« 
5« The position at the start of the 
nineteen-fiftie s 
Despite the developments of the nineteen-thirties and nineteen-
forties the structure of the Latin American economies still showed 
mary of the shortcomings of the pre-depression period» Capital was 
lacking in basic sectors of the economy» The inadequacies. of the 
educational srsteSa are shown, by the low ratio of teachers to children of 
school age, and their consequences in a specific sector can be inferred 
from the very low figures particularly in certain countries, for 
professionally trained personnel in agriculture« The level of training 
of the labour force is indicated by the low level of literacy, especially 
in the rural areas» 
The distribution of income continued to be highly unequal because 
of the concentration of property in a few hands, monopolistic profit 
margins, and the lack of educational opportunities« A large proportion 
of personal income still accrued to those accustomed to heavy personal 
spending on foreign travel or imported luxuries* The internal market 
for domestic industries was correspondingly limited and it was broken 
up because different qualities were demanded by the various social 
groups. The mass-production techniques needed, especially in the 
metal-using industries, could therefore hardly be established« 
The same contrast can be looked at on another plane as the 
difference between urban and rural incomes« In the cities incomes 
were very much higher and consumption patterns were distinctly different« 
City dwellers ate different foods, were more accustomed to wearing 




Apart from the inflexibility of an economy fissured in this way, 
the pattern of demand was changing rapidly, with the accelerated 
migration to the citieso 
Despite the degree of industrialization already achieved, economic 
structures were still unable to cope with various forms of rising 
demand« Even in the more developed countries, conspicuous gaps could 
be found, for instance in industries for making heavy equipment and 
heavy chemicals« The market mechanisms were highly imperfect, as 
was shown by a wide range of different prices in various parts of the 
same country 0 Mining sectors, usually dxunated by foreign capital, 
formed what amounted to separate enclaves within the economies concerned. 
There was a considerable degree of fragmentation in the region's 
econordeso If perfect mobility existed in the labour and capital 
markets, it might be expected that ther3 would be a marginal productivity 
and, therefore, a more or less equal average productivity in the 
various sectors, as in the industrialized countries. For Latin America 
as a whole, however, output per head still varied widely, and data 
for individual countries would show even more striking contrasts» 
Socio-economic structure of this type were obviously not well 
suited to copo with the strains - sometimes severe - of the new stages 
upon which the process of import substitution was entering® 
/6. The 
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6. The stagnation of exports in the nineteen-fifties: 
the acuto economic policy dilemma 
These strains, however, were late in making themselves felt. The 
post-war commodity boom continued into the early nineteen-f if ties. The 
United States economy rebounded from the recession of 1949, and the recovery 
in the Federal Republic of Gernary was gathering speed. Then the Korean 
hostilities led to the adoption of armament programmes in the industrial 
countries and had a more immediate impact on commodity prices. But in 1951, 
as fears of a general war diminished, prices of primary commodities fell 
back. In some cases they recovered later. There was a boom in non-ferrous 
metals in 1955 and 195-'j and free-market petroleum and su:-;;ir prices rose 
during the Suez crisis,, Coffee prices ro&e to a peak in 1954 and remained 
relatively high until 1957. But broadly speaking, there was no sustained 
rise in commodity prices after the first few months of 1951. The volume of 
exports continued to expand but in most cases the rise was only moderate, 
On the other hand, although the upward trend in import prices slowed down, 
reflecting an increased emphasis on price stabilisation overseas and the 
slowing down in the rate of growth of the world econony, it was not actually 
halted. So Latin America's terms of trade started to deteriorate. 
In the countries of Group 0 (i.e„, the countries of the Caribbean area 
and Central America, which followed conservative financial practices), price 
rises levelled off almost completely, in the sense that any further rises 
were vdthin the margin of statistical error, owing to the unreliability of 
price indices. Price changes closely fallowed those in the United States, 
the main customer and supplier of these countries. 
Appreciation of the success enjoyed hy these economies in holding 
inflation in check and then eliminating it must be tempered by the 
consideration that the closer the adherence to the dollar standard, the 
more will not only price movements but also economic growth depend on external 
developments. An upward trend in the value of exports raises incomes and 
reserves, increases the demand for locally-produced goods and also leads 
to rising imports. The whole set of variables can keep moving upward. 




income-elasticity of demand for imports tends to be greater than unity, 
despite attempts to protect local industries. So the rate of expansion 
of the value of exports tends to limit the rate of growth of the gross 
product. Account must also be taken of import prices, since, if they 
ris 3, this will tend to depress the rate of growth even more by absorbing 
for;ign exchange. Thus, "the purchasing power of exports", i.e., the value 
of exports deflated by an index of import prices, is likely to be the main 
determinant of changes in the domestic product of a dollar-standard country. 
The inflow of capital, would also of course stimulate growth just as 
an outflow would depress it. But data on capital movements are particularly 
scanty, so this is difficult to allow for statistically. In any case, the 
4 
effect of capital inflow trends is not coivprxcable with tint of export '.rends, 
especially if allowance is made for the rising expenditure of foreign 
exchange in thé form of profits and interest, associated with growing 
foreign investment. Moreover, the progress of experts very much determines 
the extent of foreign investment even in industries producing for the home 
market. So the purchasing power of exports can still be considered the 
main determinant. 
For Venezuela, a big rise in domestic income was associated with 
a more or less equivalent rise in exports, although, with the heavy investment 
in the Venezuelan petroleum industry in 1956 and 1957, a ^ bigger rise in the 
former variable might have been expected. Equally large increasss in both 
income and exports occurred in EL Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Panama. 
In other cases, the extent of import ' substitution appears to have caused 
a faster (or slower) growth in income than in exports. In Costa Rica and 
the Dominican Republic,, the growth of income appears to have substantially 
exceeded that of exports, while the reverse wa;3 true in Ecuador. In Cuba, 
Haiti and Honduras, the purchasing "power of exports hardly changed and may 
have declined; total real incomes nevertheless rose somewhat in these cases, 
but the substantial reduction in the backing for their currencies indicates 
again that the temptation to relax monetary practices is strong when exports 
stagnate. Despite these signs of some monetary expansion, the increase in 
the total product was so small in the three countries concerned that there 
/was little -
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was little change, perhaps even a fall, in per capita terms. Since there 
was quite a close relation between changes in income and in the purchasing 
power of exports for the largest economy (Venezuela) and for most countries 
of the group, this was also true for the group as a whole. 
After the middle of 1957, the exports of several of these countries 
fared badly. Prices of free-market petroleum and sugar fell back from the 
peaks attained in the Suez crisis; coffee prices weakened as the world 
market became saturated, and exports were restricted in volume by international 
agreement; cotton prices declined; and among tropical commodities only the 
banana market remained, moderately strong. The penalty for failing to 
diversify the economy now became apparent in terms of economic stagnation 
and social unrest. It appears .from preliminary figures that, in most 
countries of this group, the rate of growth of income slowed down considerably. 
Its biggest members, Cuba and Venezuela, have in fact taken independent 
action to stimulate an expansion of internal activity. In these two cases, 
political and economic developments have been intermixed, and it cannot 
be said that it is purely for economic'reasons that the dollar standard 
has been relaxed. Moreover, in the case of Venezuela, the measures taken 
have not so far been incompatible with the principles of this standard. 
The Government has failed to balance the budget, but the deficit was partly 
attributable to repayment of the external debt, Import controls have been 
tightened, tariffs raised and exchange controls introduced., but the import 
surplus, like the budget deficit, has been covered by depleting reserves, 
and borrowing. Although prices started to rise in 1958, the rise has been 
moderate. However, banking legislation has been reformed to allow a lower 
ratio of reserves to central bank liabilities (33 per cent instead of 50 per 
cent) and-to permit lending fcy the Central Bank to the Government, 
The experience of Group U was very different. Prices continued to 
rise and, in several cases, the pace of inflation accelerated. There was 
quite a different relationship between the growth of income and exports. 
Industrialization was a more deliberate policy, even in the face of 
difficulties in marketing exports. Governments refrained from taking steps 




condensation was in fact practised. Budgets slipped into deficit, or 
deficit grew, particularly in Chile where taxes on profits of export 
companies form a big source of revenue. Moreover the base of the monetary 
structure was further reduced by allowing credit to increase when reserves 
were falling. 
The main problem was net, however, that exports slipped back from 
time to time, but rather that the trend was no longer definitely upward. 
Taking this group as a whole, the change in the purchasing power of exports 
over this period was virtually zero. Yet, population increases were . 
accelerating, except in Argentina and Uruguay, as death rates were driven 
further down by improvements in health services. The grovsh of cities, 
once under way, gains a certain momentum and a check to i-.>.du3trializat ion 
soon leads to serious social problems. Consequently, Governments had little 
option but to promote development and further diversification, and impcrt 
substitution became an increasingly deliberate aim. Brazil, in particular, 
established a programme of priority targets for the basic sectors of the 
economy (steel, petroleum, transport, etCc.). 
Indeed, the purchasing power of exports did not rise greatly for any 
member of this group, except Mexico, and in this case it is partly explained 
by the fact that the tourist industry has been included in exports. In 
Chile and Peru, moderate rises in exports were paralleled by similar increases 
in income. The exports of other countries showed only aaall rises or 
actually, fell, but experience with income was much better. Brazil and 
Colombia, especially the former, achieved the most significant increases 
in their domestic incomes, considering the. poor perfomance of their exports. 
Argentina achieved some increase in income, and Bolivia averted a decline, 
although exports fell somewhat in both cases. 
The total product of this group rose about 28 per cent (or over 4 per 




7a A summary of external and internal trends in 
the .'tain economic indicators, 1929-59 
It was not until after the Second World War that the purchasing power . 
of Latin American exports recovered the levels reached at the end of the 
nineteen-thirties, as a result solely of the Improvement in the terms of 
trade. Since these swung back against Latin America in the nineteen-fifties, 
there was no further significant increase in the purchasing power of the 
region's exports. In fact, if Venezuela is excluded, there was little 
change over the whole thirty years. Some countries were particularly 
severely affected. In Argentina, the purchasing power of exports- in 1958 
uzs only half what it had been thirty years earlier; and In Chile, too, 
exports - in this senae - never recovered their pre-deprec^ion levelt 
Much the same long-term trends are shown, by the volume of imports, 
since this depends very largely on exports and the terms of trade, i Total 
imports for the region in 1953 were not much greater in. quantity than in 
1928, if Venezuela is excluded. In Argentina and Chile, the volume of imports 
actually fell over the tüiree decades, and in Brasil the rise was limited. 
The evolution of imports must be contrasted with the expansion of the 
region's gross product, which more than trebled in the same period. This 
was accompanied by the rapid growth of cities, which resulted not merely 
in a rapid increase in total demand but in. an accelerated expansion of 
demand for manufactures (especially equipment), processed foodstuffs, and 
professional services. 
In the "open economies" of Group 0, rising demand was accommodated by 
imports increasing more quickly than the output of goods for internal 
consumption. So imports formed a growing proportion of total supply. 
No doubt a similar trend would have been obsex-vable in Group U, if foreign 
exchange supplies had permitted, but in all members of this group, except 
Peru which was really an "open economy" for much of the nineteen-fifties, 
the opposite happened. The import coefficient, defined in this way, fell 
almost throughout the period, being approximately halved from 1928-29 to 
1957-58. Only in Mexico did the coefficient cease falling after 1938-39. 
i 
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Producers in this group of countries were therefore confronted with 
a major task, both during and after the depression: they had to provide 
substitutes for imports which were unobtainable. In some cases the task 
was made harder by price controls and subsidies that stimulated consumption 
of energy for example. Within the stationary or contracting total of 
imports, petroleum imports grew rapidly, especially in Argentina and Brazil. 
Import substitution in steel also lagged in Argentina and Chile, although 
in the latter case it increased greatly in the nineteen-fifties. Output 
of capital equipment rose everywhere after 1939, but demand also expanded 
very quickly, so that imports continued to climb except in Argentina. 
Nevertheless, because of the shortage of equipment, there uas growing 
pressure on capacity In several key industries, especially electric power 
production, and the railways. 
One consequence of this series of developments was that the heavy 
industries had to be expanded rapidly.. Thus, in Mexico the number of 
workers employed in the metallurgical, machinery and vehicle industries 
rose from under 10,000 in 1930 to 173,000 in 1955. The impact was, however, 
wider than this: industrial expansion on this scale means changes in many 
other industries, in fact a transformation of the whole economy. Another 
consequence was that the composition of imports changed greatly. While 
consumer goods accounted for almost half of all imports in 1928, by 
1957-58 this proportion had fallen to 7 per cent in Brazil, 10 per cent 
in Argentina, and only slightly more in Colombia, Chile, and Mexico. 
On the other hand, the share of capital equipment rose from about 20 per cent 
of total imports in 1928 in the countries of Group U to mere than one-third 
in 1957-58 (over 40 per cent in Chile and Mexico). The only exception was 
Argentina, where the shortage of foreign exchange was especially acute. 
The share of petroleum in total imports also grew considerably in Argentina, 
Brazil and Chile, though not in the traditional producers such as Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru, Finally, there were rapid increases in imports of raw 
materials - of metals in Argentina because of the need for ore, pig iron 




This forced shift in the structure of imports indicates the strain 
produced in many countries by° their attempts to achieve rapid growth 
during a period of foreign exchange shortage, especially in those - notably 
Argentina - where the necessary rate of production growth had not been 
achieved in key sectors. Although the deterioration in export markets was 
not so spectacular in the second half of the nineteen-fifties as in the 
first half of the nineteen-thirties, the impact was nevertheless comparable 
in some countries, because it came at a time when it was difficult to 
reduce imports, whereas the import structure in 1929 had afforded room 
for substantial reductions. 
There has been a close relationship between the import coefficients 
in various periods and the rate of price increases. One obvious exception 
is Argentina. Before 1945, plentiful supplies of food and a fairly 
well-equipped economy meant that structural problems were only of limited 
importance in Argentina, and in the early nineteen-fifties prir-s and wage 
controls were being used to suppress inflation. But in general it appears 
that, in the countries of Group U, an import coefficient of leas than 
10 per cent has been associated with inflation. At levels below this, 
there is little possibility of using foreign exchange for imports that 




Chapter VII . 
SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
A. SOCIAL REALITIES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ^ 
1, The need to .include social questions In 
development problems 
The progress made by the Latin American countries in their movement 
to promote economic growth has now reached a stage when it is perhaps 
necessary to consider certain aspects cf this process which have so far 
received scant attention. Since any exploratory work must start from known 
ground, in this case the point of departure may be the established fact that 
public opinion in the Latin American countries has generally adopted certain 
econcnic concepts, which seme of the ECLA publications endorse. First, 
there is the tenet that income redistribution is insufficient in itself 
to raise the average level of living of the masses and that the only 
lasting solution to this problem is to increase the average per capita 
product, or, what amounts to the same thing, to accelerate the growth of 
the whole economic system. Secondly, it is believed that economic growth 
posits an energetic development policy, directed with the greatest possible 
foresight and maintained with flexibility and continuity, The third idea 
is that policy of this kind must be founded upon a firm basis of programming, 
the nature and techniques of which have been defined with increasing precision 
over the last few years. 
For the foregoing suppositions, which are undoubtedly fairly realistic, 
little effort of the imagination is required to pass to others. Let it be 
assumed, for instance, that a given country has for some time been following 
a consistent development policy, guided in all its aspects by a well planned 
programme, and that, even so, the growth rate is falling short of the 
1/ "Progress report on the study on social conditions of economic 
development" (E/CN.12/374), PP. 1-8 and 12-14. 
/proposed target. 
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proposed target. What has gone wrong? A searching examination may fail 
to reveal, errors in the projections or calculations, or inaccuracies in 
the working data, and there may be no unforeseen internal or external 
factors that explain the phenomenon. Would it not in this case be 
legitimate to look beyond the mere working data for factors which were 
disregarded or simply taken for granted? May not the answer lie in the 
economic behaviour of the various social groups which were expected to 
react rationally to the new conditions proposed? What, in fact, were their 
actual conduct and motivations? An investment target does not set in 
motion an automatic process requiring to help from individuals with the 
will to invest and entrepreneurs with initiative, ready to seize favourable 
opportunities; a savings programme cannot be carried out without people who 
are willing to modify their consumer habits and income levels to a reasonable 
extent; finally, the required increase in productivity cannot be achieved 
by mechanical procedures alone, bat entails a responsible attitude to work 
and people who are drawn by their own aspirations to submit themselves 
voluntarily to the requ.vi.te discipline«. 
All these factors - will, habits, aspirations and sense of 
responsibility - fall outside the economist's usual sphere of interest 
and working concepts. But to acknowledge that this boundary has been 
overstepped can serve neither as an excuse nor as a facile consolidation for 
having e.-xpected too much, for the field is not an impossible one to explore, 
survey and in one way or another take into account. The problem is not, 
of course, new to the economist, but it presents itself in an acute and 
possible different form in under-developed countries. It can by no means 
be dismissed with the usual reference to the gap between an economic model 
and reality: precise mathematical computation and statistical projections 
are at all times in opposition to the unforseeable contingencies of life, 
its forces of inertia, conflicts and anomalies. In the under-developed 
countries - whose backwardness is not altogether a historical accident -
not only is this acknowledged and the unavoidable gap between the 
theoretical model and reality far greater, but the assumptions and conditions 
required for any economic model to function may be wholly or partially 
/lacking. Faced 
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lacking. Faced with this situation students of under-developed economies 
have virtually despaired of overcoming the difficulties involved. 
Nevertheless, there appears to be no justification for such discouragement, 
Although certain values and particular attitudes, habits and traditions can 
be singled out as powerful obstacles to economic development, they are 
neither incomprehensible nor imputable«, The first essential is to understand 
than, to know how they operate and to determine their effects; they can then 
be modified as expedient, slow though the process may be. 
When the pursuit of this hypothetical line of thought revealed the 
need to.investigate the actual behaviour of the different social groups 
that are essential to the economic life of a given country, the existence of 
negative motivations was mentioned. What motives did the;;e people have for 
not doing what was expected of them? A study of their motives, and of the 
charges wrought in them through the elimination of the forces of inertia 
and the introduction of incer.tives, should not be regarded as a task for the 
psychologist, and hence traditionally alien to the economist. The motives,, 
activities and "beliefs l>3* which men are influenced do not exist in a vacuum, 
but represent the demands of specific customs and institutions. The analysis 
of such motives necessarily entails an analysis of the social structure, 
a question which is obviously close to the economist's habitual concerns 
and field of training. Hardly anyone will deny that the broad principles, 
of contemporary social science, are based on two fundamental tenets: first, 
that social, structure and character - as it is termed today - are closely 
related, each being a correlative of the other; secondly, that the social 
structure is formed by a nexos of institutions which canrot be changed unless 
more or less radical modifications are made simultaneously in each of its 
partsa Hence, when the economist encounters behaviour which is not in 
accordance with his assumptions and requirements, the implication is that 
he is faced with a character - a system of attitude and motives - which 
was shaped by a different social structure from the one he is looking for 
and needs. And when, for purposes of development, the economist attempts 
to introduce into a country the in st rune'its that it requires for its 
economic growth, he is actually introducing factors of institutional change 
which can only operate with complete success if the other components of the 
social structure are modified in the same direction. 
/Thus, it 
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Thus, it is not .surprising that research workers and institutions 
are becoming increasingly aware of the integral nature of the problem of 
the under-developed countries. The expression "integrated development" has 
already become current usage, and many efforts are being made - sometimes of 
a rather confused kind - to def.ine the concept it represents,. But before 
elucidating this point further, a short disgression may usefully be made. 
It not infrequently happens that the first reaction to the difficulties 
posed for current economic development by more or less obsolete social 
structures is to refer to the past to find a model for guidance in the social 
evolution of the advanced countries. According to this approach, if the 
social and cultural conditions which governed the appearar.ee and development 
of modern capitalism were such and such, and followed this or that course in 
their internal evolution, it will be necessary to wait for then to recur 
spontaneously, or, at best, to induce them to reappear by shortened stages. 
The evolutionary theories of the nineteenth century and the pha/jic 
interpretation of economic growth by a number of prominent economic historians 
consciously or unconsciously still exert a strong influence on present-day 
thought. For example, the order recommended for the.process of 
industrialization is usually no other than the order of historical 
development itself. Some may hold this belief in its most extreme form, 
namely, that for a country to obtain the entrepreneurial cadres it requires, 
it will have to await a new religious reform or the creation of certain 
heterodox and marginal groups. 
The foregoing remarks do not, of course, deny in any way the value of 
historical research and knowledge for Latin America and its problems, but 
are intended to draw attention forthwith to the fact that in most cases 
these problems are completely new, and cannot be solved by reference to the 
past or imitation of the supposedly real models offered by the more advanced 
countries. The trend of events is the same in the field of social 
institutions and human relations as in that of economics and technology. 
The countries of the periphery represent a new situation in relation to the 
dynamic centres of the world economy. Consequently, although they can 





result frora the obligation of continually exercising their own ingenuity. 
In the sphere of economic theory itself, they have had to seek and find 
new variants based on their own actual situation, while, as regards 
technology, the urgent need for them to find solutions better adapted to 
their own technical problems has repeatedly been emphasized. In the field 
of social customs and human relationships, entirely new situations have 
also emerged,. which preclude the recurrence of others arising from different 
circumstances, and for which there is no precedent that can be followed. 
In this respect, it sometimes happens that models are held up which merely 
represent imaginary conditions, or have been crystallized in academic theory, 
when they have already crumb3.ed away in actual fact. For Instance, the 
exact entrepreneurial model it is hoped to imitate may hare ceased to exist 
in the milieu where it is being sought, while the image of the industrial 
worker or the rural community, as presented, may be distorted by failure 
to take later changes duly into account. The warnings of a Reisraann on the 
dangers of using the United States as an example for the under-developed 
countri.es may, despite their perspicacity, be somewhat exaggerated or 
paradoxical, but they underline a vital fact. There is.no reason to 
suppose that the power of creating new social and cultural patterns in the 
drive to propagate the industrial society has been exhausted. The new 
social problems^ bred in the peripheral countries by their eagerness to 
share actively in the industrialization process can be dealt with not 
ty looking backwards, but by an effort of the imagination focused on the 
future. But as imagination and invention must be kept in contact with 
reality to be effective, it is necessary to make a searching and detailed 
examination of the factso This disgression thus ends as it began, with the 
realization on many sides that it is essential not to overlook the 
fundamental social and human factors of economic development in the task 
of promoting growth. 
The interest aroused by the social and cultural aspects of economic 
development has not yet begur. to follow a definite line, nor is it always 
dear and undivided. Moreover, it'may seem to have arisen belatedly. For 
this reason, a brief outline of the way in which concern for such factors 
has developed will be given below, 
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2* A synopsis of past history 
It is not surprising, first that .the study of the social aspects of 
economic development has been relegated well to the background in the 
special world of the economistj and, secondly, that its initial stages 
reproduce to some extent the evolution of economic theory itself. In the 
last analysis, it is invariably the most topical issues that form the 
point of departure, and contemporary interest has therefore been aroused 
by the urgent practical problems rather than by the advance of theory. 
This is acknowledged by numerous economist, who point out the extent to 
which the current analysis of economic development theory has been spurred 
on by the burning questions of the day. The interest and concern displayed in 
relation to the so-called under-developed countries is the outcome of 
a particular1 set of circumstances, which stemmed from the consecuences of 
the Second World War, and has therefore become a fait accompli. Economic 
development theory was thus conceived - or revised - in response to immediate 
requirements, and for that very reason was inevitably coloured by ideological 
dogma in certain cases. Accordingly, it -;ould be worth wtole to examine 
carefully a trend that will merely be summarized in a few words here: namely, 
the twofold effort made by current economic thingers to forge as comprehensive 
and precise a body of ideas as possible, and at the same time to free it from 
all traces of extraneous influence. 
In the sociological analysis of development - to use a single term for 
the sake of convenience -, exactly the same stages are reproduced, with a 
certain time-lag. A cursory review of the official and private publications 
that have touched upon the subject in cne way or another in the last few 
years shows clearly that current interest in the social aspects of economic 
development emanates from three sources. 
Cne point of departure - possibly the first in order of time and of 
empirical importance - is practical action itself. The interest thus 
aroused has taken different forms. It is useful, however, to emphasize those 
manifestations deriving from the reactions produced by the technical 
assistance which international organizations and the governments of advanced 




those involved agree on a point which only a few have put in writing: 
namely, that the success of technical assistance depend upon a broader and 
more comprehensive social vision of the countries that receive it. Some 
have expresely recognized that to this end closer co-operation should be 
established between the various specialists in the social sciences. It is 
certainly very significant that the unified and integrated concept of the social 
sciences which used to be a lodestar - now rechristened "inter-disciplinary 
research" - is repeatedly urged as a requisite today by those engaged in the 
more practical type of action. 
A. second point of departure is to be found in economic theory itself, 
that is, among certain economists who are working on the construction of 
a satisfactory and integrated theory of development. Detailed consideration 
of this question would be impracticable here; it would entail closer study, 
. because of the wide variations in the terminology used and in the breadth 
of the approach adopted. Recognition of the importance of social aspects 
is sometimes even carried so far as to be tantamount to a repudiation of 
economic methods, with the resultant loss of valué from the standpoint of 
development theory. One school of thought actually aims at dovetailing 
social aspects with the theory of development itself, in the hope of finding 
measurable values for its component factors. Another recognizes the importance 
of these factors, but cannot see how to use them as parameters in constructing 
its model. The majority, however, are content to indicate the need for 
complementary approaches, and, as before, hope for an integration of the 
piecemeal findings of the social sciences. The antecedents of these 
different positions are to be found in the history of economics itself, and 
this is. drawn upon more or less explicitly. For the purposes of the present 
summary, however, no more need to be said. The salient point to note is that 
history, sociology and psyichology are once again being used as fields of 
reference by some of the economists who are currently engaged in formulating 
development theory. 
The third point of departure is to be found, as might be ejected, 
among the specialists in the various social sciences - apart from economists -




universal issues of our time, or who are awake to what C. Brinkmann has 
recently termed "the sociological dimensions of human disciplines". 
However, the suggestions put forward by the social scientists are still 
inclined to be vague and confused, a fact which is readily understandable 
simply because, generally speaking, they have no unified position. 
Furthermore, as a result of special circumstances, the rationale and working 
methods of the anthropologist and, to a certain extent, of the social 
psychologist have taken pride of place over the traditional approach of the 
sociologist. The bibliographies and some of the attempted syntheses recently 
published have clearly show the disconnected and heterogeneous nature of 
this whole school of thought. Finally, there are the contributions made by 
certain writers who look at economic development from the angle of particular 
codes of values, and who therefore tackle the far from insignificant question 
of the type of economic growth that should be encouraged: for example, they 
may advocate only the kind that would simultaneously foster and make possible 
the materialization of those personal values which form the moral basis of 
any given culture. To state this in objective terms, what is the price in 
human values which must be paid for each type of development and for the 
rate of growth it demands? 
These brief considerations show that although the study of the social 
aspects of development has advanced comparatively quickly to a new stage, 
much still remains to be done, from the theoretical standpoint, in the way 
of elaborating and systematizing the fragmentary observations that have been 
made. For without a minimum of theoretical background, it is obviously 
impossible to guide specific research, to marshal the findings of studies 
carried out in an unco-ordinated and random fashion, and to distinguish 
between waht is really essential and what is of little or no importance. 
Moreover, this insistence on scientific precision is a sine qua non for 
practical action, since the social and political aspects of economic 
development are more apt than those of a strictly economic or technical 
character to acquire ideological overtones or to evoke interested or 
emotional responses that are over-hasty and ill-defined. The only way to 
ensure that the action taken is characterized by vision and continuity is 




3. The two major issues 
The method followed up to now has been retrospective and exploratory, 
and the impression it has left may have been predominantly one of vagueness 
and doubt. This was inevitable, however, and therefore the least compromising 
terminology was deliberately and voluntarily chosen. The time has now come, 
however, to make some points clear, and to escape from the imprecision of 
such platitudes as "the interest in the social aspects of economic development". 
The best way of shedding the necessary light at the outset is doubtless to 
give a definite answer to the following question: what are the basic issues 
involved? Plainly, there are two: the social conditions of economic 
development, and the social effects of that development. Both, while quite 
different, strictly demarcate the field of research, and the ground thus 
cleared, a firm starting-point can be established.' 
Both questions have already been raised on various occasions, but 
particular emphasis has been laid on the first. The variety of views that 
have been encpressed on the relationship of economic activity with human 
character, and motivations, and with the customs, traditions and usages of 
a society, amount in the end to an inverse recapitulation - at times purely 
descriptive - of the theme that made Weber's study of capitalism a classic: 
what are the social conditions that enable this system to function? To pose 
the same question from the standpoint of modern economic development implies 
the continuity of an extremely precise theoretical tradition. 
In this sense, the preference of some writers for the term "obstacles" 
to denote the development difficulties of the less advanced countries is 
debatable. These obstacles certainly exist, but theoretically they are only 
special features of those conditions which must be examined as a whole. 
They are, so to speak, negative conditions, whose effects differ considerably 
according to whether they constitute lacunae or opposing forces. Moreover, 
apart from the fact that the construction of a theory demands an extremely 
broad and general basis, the stress laid on »obstacles'» leads to the 
adoption of a dogmatic or militant position, sometimes tinged with 
a pessimism that is prejudicial to the maintenance of a scientific attitude. 
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The second question, that of the social effects of development, simply 
relates to a specific example of the results inherent in any process of 
change, whatever its nature. Economic development is a process of induced 
change, and entails an examination, not only of its primary and, willed effects^ 
but also of its secondary and unforseen consequences. In fact, as was 
pointed out before, economic change inevitably has repercussions - sought or 
unsought - on the institutions that make up the social structure. Can these 
be predicted? Apart from such abstract considerations, which will be 
reverted to later, the outstanding practical problem of the under-developed 
countries, which has been viewed from many different angles, can perhaps 
be stated most flexibly and directly in the following terms: countries in 
course of development must progress by using Western methods of 
industrialization, but should not have to pay the same price as did the 
West for its industrial revolution. In the words of E. Heimann, 
industrialization must not destroy the moral and social structure of the 
newcomers, as it did in the older industrial countries. This is the idea 
which in one form or another dominates the consideration of the social 
effects of economic development. 
4, The situation in Latin America 
If an attempt is made to establish a list of the studies undertaken 
from this viewpoint on the present social situation in Latin America it 
will be seen that they are few in number and, on the whole, inadequate. 
The region's situation, in this respect cannot be compared with those of 
Africa and Asia, which, as international abstracts and bibliographies 
testify, have formed the subject of most of the research work carried out 
in recent years. Although this is largely due to the pattern of world 
events and to a new policy on the part of certain countries that still 
retain territories overseas, a contributory cause lies in the peculiar 
features of Latin America's own situation, which can mislead those who have 
no intimate knowledge of it. Its compound of unity and diversity in social 
and cultural respects, the contrasts, between its huge rural population and 
its thriving industrial centres, and, above all, the fact that the culture 
to which this region belongs is, up to a point, a peripheral version of 
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Western culture, make up a picture that is not always easy to understand, 
and to which the standards formed elsewhere in the world do not apply. 
The social and cultural questions raised by Latin America's economic 
development can only be dealt with in this context, because they are neither 
the same as those of the more developed countries nor wholly identifiable 
with those proper to some of the industrial centres' more primitive accretions. 
The reasons for the lack of sociological studies on latin America 
cannot be explored any further here. Whatever they are, however, the fact 
remains that the gap exists and must be filled as soon as possible. 
With this in mind, it was thought timely to embark on a closer, if 
still preliminary, examination of the questions that have been raised. 
The following pages are devoted to the pursuit of this end. 
B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE STRUCTURE OF EMPLQTMMT & 
This study is merely tentative and introductory in scope. It attempts 
to consider from the sociological standpoint the data gathered in the course 
of a statistical study on manpower problems, in the hope that, from this 
fresh point of view, it may be possible to discern the shape and depth of 
several of the more important socio-cultural questions associated with 
economic development. Manpower surveys undertaken from an economic stand 
point are justified ty. their intrinsic value; this point need not therefore 
be stressed. What is of interest is to open a new line of approach, since 
if such studies are viewed from a more properly sociological angle, not 
only can they emphasize in their own terms some of the main social elements 
of any development policy, but they also call for a strict definition of the 
concepts indispensable to their classification and understanding, 
A study of the structure of employment and occupations from the 
sociological point of view shows that there are three broad social aspects 
of economic development (disregarding other minor questions for the moment) 
2/ "Three sociological aspects of economic development", Economic Review 




which require different types of economic and psycho-social analyses. 
Economic development may be considered as: (l) the adjustment of a society 
to new functions; (2) the creation of new patterns of living within the 
society; and (3) the formation of a hew social structure. These are the 
questions which this study attempts to outline. 
The first two aspects require a micro-analysis, since they refer to 
individual action or finite social relationships; while the third necessitates 
macro-analysis since it deals with the social structure as a whole. A more 
detailed analysis would make it necessary to resort to different psycho-social 
approaches. The problems of adjustment can be studied through the psychology 
of automatic selection, though this is not the only way of tackling them. 
On the other hand, all questions involving new patterns of living require the 
help of social psychology and fall within the field of the sociology of 
relationships and of sociometric research. Finally, the third aspect will 
inevitably lead to the classic subjects of structural or historical sociology. 
This line of thought will not be followed here, since only an initial, 
general exploration will be attempted, and stress will be laid on the fact 
that these phenomena are to a certain extent social obstacles to the 
economic process. 
1, Social adjustment to new functions 
Data on the structure of employment and occupations within a country, 
if extended over a certain period, give the best indication of the meaning 
of economic development as a phenomenon of social change. It is primarily 
a question of changing an institution, in this case the economic institution; 
and the change may be large or small according to whether there are complete 
structural transformations or merely minor amendments not affecting the 
over-all pattern. But in every case it is soon evident that these changes 
will inevitably transform the other institutions of the same society. 
Therefore the effort of adjustment to be made by the individuals making 
up this institution is not limited to the initial sphere of change but is 




It is not necessary to linger over this point or to rebut the objection 
that an unilateral criterion is being used, since the course of the process 
outlined above is set at the point of departure, and there is nothing to 
prevent other starting points from being chosen and a different course set. 
For present purposes, on the contrary, it is advisable to bear in 
mind the significance of any institutional change. In effect, an institution, 
is a complex or orderly pattern of functions required for its continued 
existence and growth, which from the individual point of view appear as 
different roles to be played. The change in an institution therefore 
consists in a modification of the functions which support it or of the 
reciprocal links between them. For the individual each social role involves 
certain material aspects and a complex of human relationships, varying in 
scope, which are not limited merely to the necessary distribution of rights 
and obligations; consequently, every institutional change will imply greater 
or lesser changes for the individual at the different levels already indicated. 
From the sociological standpoint and at the most abstract level, 
society is only a systematic pattern of roles and functions which must be 
fulfilled in order that it may subsist. It is also a commonplace that such 
roles take precedence over the individual, on whom they are inposed, very 
often with complete disregard for the individual nature of his personal fate. 
In order to make these statements completely intelligible and acceptable, 
numerous comments and reservations would have to be made, but they will have 
to suffice as they stand in view of what follows, since it is only a question 
of defining the scope of the phenomenon of «»induced" change implied in the 
acceleration of economic progress in the under-developed countries. This 
phenomenon in reality involves two factors. First, the process implies 
the continual emergence of social roles and functions far in advance of the 
individuals needed to take them on. Expressed in another way, the creation 
of new social roles very often precedes the training of individuals capable 
of performing them. This time lag between the creation of new roles and 
functions and the training of individuals to carry them out is the origin 
of the first social bottleneck, which varies in intensity according to the 
inherent complexity of each function. 
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But in the second place, given the conditions of modern life, it is 
no longer possible to await the slow, spontaneous disappearance of such 
maladjustment, as it was 'in other periods. This is mainly because of the 
almost total lack of any ascribed status of functional importance outside 
the family today, and the irreparable seriousness of the mistakes made in 
the technical activity of our society. In previous communities of another 
type, when a similar emergency arose which was a matter of life and death 
to society, the common expedient was to resort to the principle of heredity 
and to fill any gaps by ascription. In present society, which is ruled by 
the principle of functional adequacy, of the knowledge and skills peculiar 
to each task (i.e, perfomance or merit, from the standpoint of the role), 
the old procedure can no longer be used without risk, and the only possible 
solution is to find the best means of selection and training as the occasion 
arises. The induction of an economic change should be accompanied by a 
parallel induction of the necessary social change. In other words, economic 
development planning should contain the minimum sociological programming 
required to foresee and forestall as far as possible any social obstacles 
to development, 
3h order of complexity, the adjustments required of society for the 
creation of new functions, purely from the socio-economic point of view, 
are as described below. 
(a) Simple modernization of existing activities 
This is not a matter of creating new roles or completely new activities, 
but of modifying the methods of carrying them out. Which requires an 
adjustment from the individual in the shape of new habits and automatic 
responses. An examination of the data available on the structure of 
employment and occupations reveals some of the main features. The best known 
case is that of agricultural mechanization, in which the traditional tasks 
remain the same although different methods are used. It is advisable to 
consider this example in some detail, if only for purposes of illustration. 
The recent introduction of modern methods into agricultural operations may be 
perfectly evaluated by the mechanization process, which in turn is measured 
fay the expansion of the tractor park. In Latin America there were 




190,000 in 1953. These changes are still greater if consideration is given 
only to the block of countries where mechanization has made the most rapid 
strides (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Uruguay), For the region as a whole, 
20 per cent of the arable land is already being cultivated with tractors, 
but in Uruguay, which is relatively the roost advanced country in this 
respect, the proportion rises to 80 per cent. These few data are enough 
to indicate the effort of adjustment already made and that which will be 
required in future if this trend is to be maintained. Ihe mechanization 
process creates a large mass of drivers and mechanics in the farm environment, 
and requires from all some degree of familiarity with agricultural machines. 
Except in Mexico, until now this process has been mainly confined to large 
holdings, and has thus transformed the work habits of the employees. But 
the establishment of pools of agricultural machinery in some countries 
(Brazil, Chile, Cuba and Peru) not only brings the benefits of progress 
to smallholders, but also introduces a new professional category into the 
rural milieu, since the drivers and mechanics of those pools fiilfil a public 
function. 
The same is true when internal improvements - use of machines 
electricity, etc. - are introduced into non-factors industries, since 
this not only increases productivity but also, with the introduction of 
new automatic responses, gives rise to a different mental attitude towards 
the same task. The interest shown in some countries in these small forms 
of development is based to a large extent on the educational effect obtained. 
A similar adjustment, although on a smaller scale, is required when 
obsolete equipment is replaced in existing industries. The workers must 
then adapt their skills to more modern machinery, without thereby abandoning 
their previous activities. 
The other two most important cases in this connexion occur in the 
modernization of business methods and public and private administrative 
procedures. Not even by citing specific cases would it be possible to 
indicate the full significance of the changes entailed by economic development 
in both cases. It is enough to bear in mind that it is not so much a question 




abrupt, of traditional ones. No better illustration could be furnished than 
the development of office techniques in both sectors in industrialized 
countries, through the constant introduction of new and faster typewriters, 
filling and classification equipment, calculating machines, tabulators, etc., 
not to mention the new electronic calculating equipment. It has been 
observed that even the physical characteristics of offices are changing and 
becoming similar to those of factories: it is possible that the typical desk 
will be replaced by a kind of assembly line which will make the office 
worker's task similar to that of the factory hand. 
The serious problem of public administration in under-developed 
countries largely calls for reforms of this type - of functional adjustment 
rather than simple expansion - for its solution, but this is not the place 
to describe them in detail, 
(b) Change of activity within the same field 
This aspect is particularly interesting from the standpoint of 
development, although in practice it is sometimes imprecise or confused 
with the preceding one. A typical example is the convertion of a homeworker 
into an industrial worker within the same activity: textiles, ceramics, etc. 
In this case it is not only a question of an adjustment to new working 
techniques, but, what is sociologically still more important, of a change 
in social status which requires wider readjustments in other spheres of 
behaviour. All statistics on the disappearance of non-factory industries 
should be interpreted from the sociological angle as an expression of this 
effort of adjustment. 
A similar case is the change in the position of casual workers when 
they become permanently employed. This change plays a point in reducing 
the marginal population. In Latin America, a typical example is that of the 
building industry, where stability of employment varies greatly from country 
to country, resulting in different degree of productivity, A final example, 





(c) Change of occupations 
Social adjustment is much greater in this case than in the previous 
ones, since it implies not only a move to a new environment, tut a total 
transformation of material activities and human relationships. The classic 
example is the shift of rural labour to non-agricultural types of employment. 
This shift has reached tremendous proportions in Latin America. 
Another type of move to a new environment, also related to employment, 
is that associated with inter-regional migrations of the population. These 
generally consist of marginal populations which in their region of origin 
are unable to rise above a mere subsistence level, and therefore try to 
settle on virgin land or seek new and better-paid employment. Suffice it to 
recall that in Brazil this kind of movement has assumed such significance 
that it more than counterbalances the decline in international immigration 
in the receiving areas. 
(d) Creation of new roles and functions 
As the title indicates, these are entirely new activities, which 
therefore require a mnyiirnun effort of social adjustment. This is where 
the greatest temporary disequilibrium may arise, although it is also the 
easiest to determine, between the creation of new roles and functions and 
the necessary training of the individuals for their fulfilment. 
Given the wide range of functions necessary for the subsistence of 
a modern economy, only some few examples will be given, in order of 
their importance to developing countries. 
(i) There is first the question of training a modern entrepreneurial 
class in the main branches of economic activity. To speak of such training 
is in no way unreasonable since the problem is posed in the same terms, 
though for different reasons, in more advanced countries. As Sargant Florence 
has said, one hundred years ago it would have seemed grotesque to discuss 
the problem of entrepreneurial training, although today it is of vital 
importance. 
(ii) Secondly comes the training of a professional class, according to 
present needs, in the various fields of the economy - the executives whose 
work at present ranks second only to that of managers and directors. A similar 
significance attaches to the training of administrators able to deal with 




(iii) The third aspect relates to very complex category of intermediate 
technicians and specialists, who are indispensable in every land of 
enterprise and must be available in large numbers in order to attain the 
successive targets of economic development. Their include all personnel 
with co-ordination and supervision functions: overseers, mechanics 
assemblers, etc,; and also book-keepers and other administrative and 
laboratory staff with training at the intermediate level, 
(iv) Finally, at the level of manual labour, skilled workers, 
particularly for the operation of special machinery, and highly skilled 
artisans. 
One of the most arduous tasks which the Latin American societies must 
face if they do not wish to retard their economic development is that of 
foreseeing the obstacles which may beset the rapid creation of all these 
functions and of promply solving any temporary disequilibria which may appear, 
2, The creation of new patterns of living 
If at first sight economic development appears to be the continuous 
formation of roles and functions, it also consists, at a more complex 
level, in the creation of new patterns of living. In the rapid review of the 
principal functional changes only a rough idea was given of the technical 
and professional aspects of the effort from adjustment required of society 
through its individual members. In this respect, it should not be forgotten 
that an occupation is not only a method of work but also a distinctive, 
individual way of life, A brief reference to this point is the best 
possible introduction to the present theme. In the analysis of an occupation, 
such as that made by industrial sociologists, not only the working routines, 
but also the distinctive social milieu in which these take place and the 
influence which they exert on the non-professional activities of the 
individual, should be borne in mind. The result of all these factors is 
what is called the pattern of professional life. But it is also evident 
that the adjustment of the individual to this behavioural pattern is in 




As a first approximation it may be contended that these patterns of 
living are only the uniform repetition, collectively or as a whole, of 
similar professional modes of life. This, however, involves two consequences: 
firstly, when new roles and functions are developed within a society, 
patterns of living are necessarily created; secondly, their complete 
assimilation tends to be relatively slow. Pattern of living such as social 
customs or mores do not produce their full effects - personal, social or 
economic - until they are firmly established. 
The full significance and scope of the creation of new patterns of 
living can now be appreciated from the standpoint of economic development, 
since the greater delay in their stabilization and the greater effort of 
adjustment required may constitute a more serious social obstacle to economic 
development than those already described. The problem is one of the pace 
of adjustment - of delays, undue haste and synchronization - but it is much 
more difficult to control, although not totally impossible in some aspects. 
It might be considered that a way 9f facilitating this task, would be to i 
compare the two major patterns of living, the rural and the urban, whose 
various elements are thought to be generally known. But this is an illusion 
which must be dispelled before, the problems presenting themselves can be 
fully grasped. At first sight, for instance, the urbanization process in 
Latin America may seem to be relatively rapid and encouraging, in so far as 
it is analysed in relation to economic development. 1950, the urban 
population represented about /»I per cent of the total population, and 
about 45. per cent of the urban population lived in large cities of more 
than 100,000 inhabitants. These figures, however, tell only a small part 
of the story, since in themselves they express nothing about the intensity 
and stabilization of the corresponding patterns of living. It would first 
be necessary to make an analysis of the occupational structure of certain 
urban units, to see whether or not they resemble the traditional patterns 
of typical modern cities. Two urban centres with the same population may 
in fact represent two very different patterns of living. Other indexes, 
such as those on consumption, would shed further light on the question. 
But once this has been done, it would still be necessary to determine the 
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influence of the traits revealed in the analysis on the formation of 
social character within a specific urban form. It should be remembered 
that what is of interest is the moment of complete assimilation of a pattern 
of living by a sufficiently large mass of individuals, since only from then 
on are the full effects felt. This is not meant to discourage an optimistic 
interpretation of certain phenomena, but to indicate the fertile field for 
research which has been opened up, and which must be explored if the 
progress of economic development is to be correctly construed, 
(a) Patterns of living and consumption 
What has already been said about the contrast between rural and urban 
patterns of living would have to be repeated in any attempt to describe 
other modes or ways of life which are of equal importance to the socio-
economic interpretation of development, ranging from complete patterns 
of living peculiar to a specific type of civilization, to those relating 
to certain key occupations - the entrepreneur, the foreman, etc. - through 
others which are proper to certain social strata of decisive significance 
from the economic standpoint. However, this subject lies outside the 
scope of this study and could be tackled only by compiling a relatively 
complete list of the necessary studies. However interesting this might be, 
it would not serve the purposes of this article, which is mainly concerned 
with showing the link between the purely sociological considerations of 
patterns of living and the questions which economists must study for purposes 
of development. 
Fortunately this link is not difficult to find and is not entirely 
terra incognita. Consumption is an essential component of any pattern of 
living, and, together with the structure of demand which it determines, 
provides the link from the economic standpoint between some of the 
consequences indicated above concerning the nature of patterns of living. 
It is therefore advisable to consider this point in some detail. 
A H these patterns of living, however widespread, are composed of 
three different elements, which may be termed the cultural, social and 
material, in order to avoid using esoteric, though more exact, terminology. 





certain beliefs - ways of seeing or apprehending the world, or that part 
at it which comes within his ken -, enters into personal contacts - what 
are known as human relationships - and makes use of these and material 
objects,i.e., goods produced and material means of production. It should 
/ 
be recalled, in addition, that the essential characteristic of these 
patterns of living, as of every collective phenomenon, is their compulsive 
or obligatory nature. When they are fully established, they impose 
themselves even in. the tiniest details on the individual who desires 
conform to society, and therefore mould or shape him even if he is not 
fully conscious of the process. Thus, consumption i3 merely the economic 
counterpart of the prevailing patterns of living, and correspond exactly, with 
each constituent element. It depends on ideas and convictions, is stimulated 
and provoked by social relationships and manifests itself through the use of 
material goods. In turn, consumption patterns are also compulsive, and 
exert constant pressure on personal tastes and inclinations. This, however, 
is only fully true when the patterns of living have become stable. This 
is why, incidentally, the Duesenberry theory of the influence exorted on the 
propensity to consume by certain forms of emulation can be valid only 
to the extent allowed by the soclo-eoonomic structure and is therefore not 
true of the prevailing structure in under-developed countries, since in these, 
according to the terns of this article, the corresponding pattern of living 
has not yet been stabilized. 
If, instead of going this roundabout way, the procedure were adopted 
of starting from consunption and accepting the most common description of its 
determinants, identical results would be achieved, since, at least these at 
the usual determinants - level of income acquired habits, consciousness 
status and level of aspirations - would to be fully intelligible, make it 
necessary to revert, in varying degrees of detail, to the subject of the 
patterns of living as a whole. 
What is the general significance of the connexion between the social 
adjustment required and the rapidity of the economic process? Here it is 




Of the different ways of establishing this connexion, the following 
should be mentioned: the volume and structure of consumer demand; the 
volume and structure of savings; the nature and extent of stimuli or 
incentives encouraging human effort; and the values, both material and 
spiritual, determining the quality of the work. 
There is no need to insist on the aspects of consumption already 
mentioned; but it is worth emphasizing that the patently multiple character 
of the links between patterns of living and economic development makes the 
problem extremely complex and not always susceptible of statistical analysis. 
Thus, a single change in the patterns of living may be favorable or 
unfavourable to economic development, depending upon the other prevailing 
circumstances. First of all, naturally, consideration should be given to 
the general economic conditions of the country in question, but still more 
important are the conditions produced by a co-ordinated planning process which 
gives rigid priorities to specific sectors of production. In such a case, 
one of two situations may arise: first, the too rapid growth of certain 
consumer trends may take place at the expense of other goods and services 
which are considered of crucial importance for economic development. 
Secondly, and conversely, there may be insufficient demand for certain 
goods and services, of which greater consumption would have a generally 
simulating effect on the economy. It is always a question of imbalances 
between consumer demand and the needs and possibilities of the economy, 
with negative and disturbing effects on development. 
This problem is one particular aspect of the problem of social 
adjustment already defined. The adjustment of a community to a new 
consumption pattern may sometimes be extremely quick, but since at other 
times it may be both slow and hampered by social bottlenecks, question 
arises of the feasibility of applying the consumer education so much in 
vogue at present, which is undoubtedly most urgently needed in under-developed 
countries and which ultimately requires conscious intervention to speed 




(b) Stages in the development of demand 
The consideration of patterns of living through their concrete 
expression in the structure of demand makes it possible to outline the temporal 
phases of its development, which, although they may be indistinguishable 
in practice, are of interest for analytical pu-poses. Such an attempt 
will also make it possible to consider some of the questions already dealt 
with separately as a logical whole. Thus social adjustment to change of 
occupation reappears in a new guise, the typical case being the transfer 
of agricultural labour to industrial occupations, which is considered crucial 
for development problems. This approach also clasifies what has already been 
explained about the relative slowness of the stabilization of the patterns 
of living when viewed from the economic standpoint. If not only gives 
a clearer indication of the points at which social and economic bottlenecks 
are most likely to appear, but also stimulates the formulation of such 
strategies as consumer education of training. Finally, it may show the 
economist, who habitually tends to consider the direct relationship 
between per capita income and the demand for various products, that he 
should remember that, in fact the composition of demand' by groups of 
products generally evolves in accordance with socially-conditioned stages 
of development. 
These stages are the following: 
(i) Concentration 
Perhaps the most important factor in the creation of new patterns 
of living and their far-reaching repercussions on the structure of demand 
is the concentration of the population in large centres. This is the 
beginning of the "urbanization process", and the reason why large cities 
grow more rapidly than mediums-size and small towns. 
It is well known that this process is a result of the fact that 
demand for labour , in industry and services is much more intense than in 
agriculture. To this must be added the attraction of the large cities for 
the rural population, particularly its marginal sectors. It is the exodus 
of this population which causes the spontaneous growth of the cities which 




( U ) Stabilieatiçn 
At the outset, a large proportion of the rural population which arrives 
in the cities in search of non-agricultural occupations is semi-skilled 
and is usually employed as casual labour in a variety of tasks. In other 
words, they lack specialization and adequate stability in the various 
branches of economic activity. Since even the income of the marginal 
population in towns is relatively higher than in rural areas they are 
better able to satisfy their most urgent dietary needs, in contrast with 
their former very low nutritional standards. It cannot be expected, 
however, that when the surplus rural population moves to the cities the 
chronic under-nutrition of the marginal population will quickly disappear. 
This will be posible only after employment has become stabilized, when new 
forms of demand begin to be created. 
Stabilization depends to a large extent on the general level of 
economic activity and, consequently, on the current phase of the business 
cycle and on the economic policy in force. Thus, stabilization will be 
relatively fast in times of prosperity and will be delayed during periods 
o 
of depression. 
This stabilization of employment arises concurrently with specialization 
and with the development of branches of activity which can provide more 
permanent employment; i.e., the new situation coincides with the period when 
unskilled labour is capable of adjusting to new types of employment requiring 
semi-skilled labour or minimum training. 
In certain cases the process of stabilization may coincide with 
concentration, but more often the disparity between both processes gives 
rise to a large floating reserve of under-employed labour which over and 
above the actual unemployed, constitutes the main source of the labour 
needed for the development of industries and services. 
Stabilization results in better wages and prompts new and greater 
requirements. Once nutritional needs have been more or less adequately 
covered, city life channels consumption towards an improvement in clothing. 
In addition, demand for cultural goods and services first appears, although 




( i i l ) Resettlement 
The rapid growth of cities inevitably causes an acute housing 
shortage, reflected in an abnormal density of inhabitants per housing 
unit or in the proliferation of slum districts, which are called by 
different names in the various Latin American countries. This tragic 
phenomenon has been described repeatedly since the first analyses of the 
human consequences of the industrial revolution, and is still of primary 
importance in any social policy, owing to its complex repercussions. 
Further comment would be out of place here. 
In general, once the urban population achieves stabilization of 
employment and higher incomes, it is possible to apply private and public 
capital to the improvement of housing, either directly ty the construction 
of low-cost housing for the working classes, or indirectly by the creation 
of new residential districts for the middle classes so that their former 
dwellings may become available to the lower income brackets. 
This whole process o f resetting city dwellers has great social 
significance, since i t enables many of then to have an adequate dome 
perhaps for the first time and channels demand towards new types of goods 
and services, which, while improving their level of living, are at the 
same time an important stabilizing factor, 
(iv) Increase in comforts 
In most cases, the satisfaction of minimum housing requirements must 
precede higher levels of demand for durable goods. The. two phenomena are 
not always exactly parallel, but a detailed analysis will not affect the 
general thesis from the sociological point of view. Incidentally, in 
industrial countries there has been a significant link between the economic 
and social consequences of the production of some of these goods, resulting 
in the gradual emancipation of women. 
It is probably at this stage that consciousness of status or of levels 
of living begins to be formed. This converts the mass of consumers into 
one homogeneous body which can respond in a uniform and foreseeable manner 
to successive changes in the market. In other words, a truly integrated 
market is then established, which is equally accessible to all social classes. 
/(v) Private 
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( v ) Private transport 
The last phase in the development of demand and in the transformation 
of patterns of living begins with the appearance of interest in private 
means of transport, A detail description of this process would be out 
of place here. It is sufficient to indicate that the acquisition of 
private transport has vast implications for all aspect.3 of life - works, 
recreation, culture, etc, - and that it is necessarily reflected in the 
structure of demand. 
Reasons of time and space forbid detailed consideration of the 
expansion in the demand for public services which accompanies the final 
stages of this process. But mention must be made of the fact that it is 
during these stages that the concept of the future first becomes 
important. Just as individuals can plan their lives only when there is 
a minimum of security for the future so in the major forms of collective 
life it is the emergence of thought for the morrow which perhaps 
represents the moment of true stabilization. In the economic sphere, 
the arrival of this stage is of vital importance for the whole process of 
development, since the propensity to save, interest in social security 
schemes and, equally important increased demand for education, all 
depend on it. Individual and collective investment in the future 
undoubtedly represents one of the most powerful tools fot the adjustment 
of a Society to new patterns of living. 
The foregoing should not be interpreted as a denial of the possibility 
of similar progress in the rural environment. But conditions in Latin 
America and the rapid growth of the cities have made it advisable to 
stress the significance of this process. 
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3. The new social stratification 
The central idea of this section has already been touched upon 
in the two previous ones, since if economic development involves the 
continual formation of new roles and functions and the concomitant 
creation of new patters of living the result of these processes for 
society as a whole, is a different arrangement of social strata. All 
economic development, therefore, inevitably gives rise to a new social 
stratification. 
This approach is, however, much more abstract and complex, since 
it means that social structure must always be viewed as a whole,. The 
risks incurred in this type of macro-analysis are in direct relation to 
the simplifications required, but if they are kept in mind, it is worth 
while venturing an over-all approach because of the light it sheds on 
the general picture and on the broad relationships between the phenomena 
already studied. This is what happens when the arrangement of social 
strata is viewed from the standpoint of economic development. The •. . 
difficulties which might arise and which must be identified and the social 
obstacles reflecting unfavourable arrangements of social strata now 
loom so large that they would lead to complete discouragement, unless 
it is remembered that the concepts employed simplify the picture for 
specific purposes. 
Apart from its controversial aspects, which are to some extent 
inevitable, the subject of stratification is in itself extremely complex. 
Various factors need to be considered, such as status, income, occupation 
and power, which, depending upon the purpose of the research, lend . 
themselves to different combinations and to different methods of study. 
However, a brief outline is sufficient for the purposes of this study, 
and excessively complicated theoretical refinement and all unnecessary 
details will be avoid. 
The thesis should therefore be stated very closely. A comparative 
study of the structure of employment in countries at different stages 




fundamental phenomenon which has a dual aspect; firstly that social 
stratification tends not to be economically integrated at the national 
level; and, secondly, that a social class which at present wields a 
decisive influence in industrialized countries, namely, the so-called 
new middle class, is totally lacking or at least only incipient. This 
class is characterized by its functional diversity, by its dependence 
on income from employment and by the nature of its work, which deals with 
symbols or with the co-ordination of other people's activities. 
( a) Social stratification in under-developed countries 
An attempt will be made to sketch, in broad outline, the 
characteristics of social stratification in the under-developed countries, 
standing as they do at the point of transition between more advanced 
nations and traditional and primitive communities. 
In primitive and traditional societies stratification presents a 
homogeneous aspect, whatever the predominating formative factor. This 
factor may be blood or family ties, or the land with its fundamental 
relationships of ownership and neighbourhood, or the status ascribed to 
the main occupations. What is important — though it is impossible to 
go into the subtle distinctions drawn by specialists - is the uniform 
nature of the stratification criteria during fairly lengthy periods of 
social stability. In contrast with this homogeneity, which is also 
characteristic of more advanced countries, social stratification in 
developing countries is essentially heterogeneous and complex in character. 
That is to say, numerous isolated and completely unrelated vestiges of 
traditional and primitive stratifications tend to remain embedded in 
the new fabric created by the exigencies of modern life. It goes without 
saying that the complications resulting from this situation vary according 
to the stage of development reached by these countries. Generally speaking, 
it may be said that three parallel systems of social stratification exist 
side by side in under-developed countries: (i) the old residual forms, 
which in the Latin American countries may be either primitive or a product 
of the colonial period; (ii) intermediate patterns of recent origin, 
which are doomed to disappear under the conditions of modern life, and 
(iii) new emergent forms, which are adjusted to these conditions. 
/The existence 
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The existence of such a mixture creates a typical social bottleneck 
in under-developed countries which hampers economic development in 
various ways and can only be overcome gradually through technical and 
cultural progress. The trend is always towards greater simplicity, since 
stratification in more advanced countries always presents a simpler 
structure, so simple, in fact, that it can be assessed by one criterion 
only, namely, income distribution. It should be recalled that modern 
society is integrated as follows: first, by the formation of a nation-wide 
market for goods and services, which stimulates the formation of a common 
pattern of tastes and preferences; secondly, by the formation of a labour 
market, also nation-wide, owing to the intense mobility of the labour 
force; and thirdly, by the creation of a stratification in accordance 
with income and the level of living of the different occupations,, 
When the modern social structure achieves full functional integration 
it continues to maintain a close relationship with the structure of 
economic development. But until this stage has been reached and while 
anachronistic vestiges remain, the social structure will continue to 
present serious obstacles to rapid development. A false structure 
produces a vicious circle of negative conditions for economic progress, 
which often persist despite the existence of favourable natural conditions, 
(b) The situation in Latin America and the problem of the middle class 
An examination of the data provided by existing studies on the 
structure of employment and occupations in Latin America reveals, of 
course, that at the present time stratification generally displays the 
characteristics peculiar to under-developed countries which have been 
described above. Only a brief outline will be made of the results of 
such an examination. 
For the moment, it will be sufficient to bear in mind the percentage 
distribution of total manpower (59 per cent of the active male population 
was employed in agriculture or related activities in 1950) in order to 
obtain a preliminary view of the still considerable importance of relatively 




Data on the structure of agriculture show to what extent the 
agricultural population of many Latin American countries is forced to 
live in extremely primitive conditions. A large proportion of this population 
farms extremely small holdings, which, in addition, are in most cases 
distributed over vast areas with insufficient means of communication and 
where the nearest markets do not yet possess the modern characteristics 
of the terms and ths more densely populated areas; not to mention the 
still numerous remrunta of primitive and semi-primitive jungle communities. 
On the other hand, the agricultural sector is still much influenced 
by the inertia of its colonial past. Its structure is characterized by 
the coexistence of large holdings, worked by numerous hired labourers, 
and smallholdings, whose farmers - whether owners, tenants or sharecroppers; 
cannot because of the size of the holdings, attain more than a subsistence 
level of living. 
With certain well-known exceptions, medium-size family farms 
producing for the market, which are the basis of the agricultural economy 
in the Halted States and a large part of Western Europe, are only very, 
rarely found in Latin America. Thus, from the sociological standpoint, 
there is practically no middle class in the agricultural sector, and 
this is a typical feature of most Latin American rural communities. 
This class in already in existence or is just beginning to emerge only 
in some of the more advanced regions, where it is composed mostly of 
European immigrants or their descendants who brought with thorn not only 
their techniques and willingness to work, but also the traditions of 
their class. Similar- reasons explain the little contribution made by 
fishing and forestry activities to the development of a middle class in 
the rural environment. 
The rapid expansion of industry in Latin American countries, 
would seem to imply the existence of a strong middle class, made up of 
small entrepreneurs, professionals and well-paid specialists, as was the 
case in more advanced industrial nations. But this does not seem to be 
the case at present. It is true that industrialization has created an 
entrepreneurial class, and that some small- and medium-scale industrialists 
already constitute a middle-class with all the traditional characteristics, 
but their number is very limited. In addition, a large proportion of 
/these persons 
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these persons, who in the European tradition, for example, would permanently 
adopt the living patterns of the middle class, take advantage of the 
business opportunities provided by deficiencies in the market, shortage 
of technical skill, privileged political situations, etc«, to participate 
in the upper-class way of life, thanks to their rapid and abundant earnings. 
Although this aspect is very interesting fro® the socio-economic point 
of view, it will net be developed further, since all that matters is 
that this phenomenon restricts even further the possibility of creating 
a middle class with stable traditions. 
Moreover, the artisan group, which in Europe and the united Stat-53 
made a substantial contribution to the formation of the middle cdassss, 
is virtually non-existent in Latin America, since it still occupies 
a very low level with the characteristic features of the lower urban 
groups form which it springs. 
Professionals and intermediate specialists - i.e,, technicians 
of all kinds, who in industrial countries represent the core of the 
middle class - are only found in small numbers in the industries so far 
developed in Latin America. It is to be hoped that such technical cadres 
will be formed with greater speed with the present development of the 
metallurgical industry, basic chemical industries, production of mechanical 
and electrical equipment, etc. 
All this is equally applicable to the formation of the upper strata 
of the working class, who are indispensable in modern industry because of 
their qualities of leadership and their roles as teachers and technical 
instructors. Socially, they also constitute an intermediate link, 
ambitious to push the new generation up into the middle class. The 
present stage of Latin America's industry has not yet created a sufficiently 
large demand for this kind of occupation typified by foremen and various 
types of highly skilled workers. Apparently, in the more advanced areas, 
mining and building activities (e.g., in Venezuela) have stimulated the 
formation of a large number of well-paid technicians, who have reinforced 




This brief outline of the over-all situation in Latin America 
confirms the extreme weakness of the middle classes - both old and new -
in the sectors concerned with the production of goods. Most of the 
existing middle class is connected with the services sector, i.e., 
commerce, public administration and other personal and public services. 
Thus, the services sector is not only more developed than the industrial, 
but also ties up a large proportion of the social strata more urgently 
needed in industry. There is thus an imbalance within the Latin American 
middle class itself, which accentuated by the force of family tradition, 
prevents it from making the adjustments required for economic development. 
This means that in addition to quantitative deficiencies in 
stratification there are others of a qualitative order, which are more 
difficult to analyse, but which are reflected in the difficulties of 
effecting a rapid adjustment to new economic conditions. As is well 
know, the essential characteristic of the middle classes in modern industrial 
countries is their great flexibility, which makes them plastic and 
capable of adjusting easily to the continual changes brought about by 
technical progress. Considered as a whole, it is improbable that the 
Latin American middle class with its current structure will be able to 
respond fully to the demands of present-day economic development policy. 
In this respect, therefore, intelligent intervention is vital, for the 






PROBLEMS AND POLICIES RELATING TO WORLD TRADE & 
This second session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development marks a crucial stage in the international cammtiniby ?s 
attempts to speed up economic and social progress and improve living 
conditions in the developing regions of the world« The end of the 
present decade is upon us, and it is all too clear that the radical changes 
in international economic policy required to facilitate the development 
of the economically less advanced countries are still a long way off, 
and that new obstacles are looming ahead. From Latin America^ standpoint, 
this Conference is meeting at a time when circumstances are once again 
such as to perpetuate and strengthen the influence of certain external 
factors which have been distorting and retarding the regions*s development 
for centuries* 
1« The weakness of Latin Americans economic growth 
If Latin America is viewed as a whole, it will be seen that the 
regions economic growth has been slow and uncertain ever since the 
mid-nineteen-ilfties. During the past seven years, the annual growth rate 
of the dome?tic product has barely readied 4«5 per cent, which means that 
the development of Latin America has been less dynamic than in the post-
war period, up to 1955« This growth pattern is particularly unsatisfactory, 
i/ This chapter is a reproduction of the address delivered by 
Mr. Carlos Quintana, Executive Secretary of ECLA, at the second 
session of UNCTAD (New Delhi, India, 1 February to 25 March 1968). 
World trade problems, particularly those connected with trade 
relationships between the developing and the industrialized countries, 
have been the focal point of ECLA*s activities over the last few 
years. The studies entitled "Latin America and the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development" (I^CN.12/693, February 1964) and 
«Latin America and the second session of UNCTAD" (E/CN.12/803 
December 1967) are among the tahgible evidences of this concern. The 
statement made by the Executive Secretary at the second session of 
UNCTAD summarizes the most important of the questions raised and the 




inasmuch as the population is increasing at the high annual rate of 3 per 
cent, so that any improvement in living conditions is only very slight, 
and the increment in the active population resulting from the population 
explosion cannot be absorbed in productive occupations. 
It is true that the growth rates of some countries (including Mexico, 
and several others of less geographical and economic importance; have been 
above the average; bat it mast be bome in mind that the rate of population 
increase is relatively higher and income levels lower in the smaller 
countries, that the diversification of their economies is only beginning 
and that the undor-development of their economies in the past was 
more marked« 
2. Exportsj external financing, and growth rate 
during the nineteen-sixties 
As everyone knows, the main causes of Latin America's erratic and 
sluggish economic development are the inadequate expansion and 
diversification of its exports, the fluctuations in its export earnings, 
the deterioration of its terms of trade, and the lack of a genuine 
technical and financial co-operation policy. It should be noted, in this 
context, that during the first six years of the current decade Latin 
America's export earnings rose relatively fast. In terms of dollars, 
their annual rate of increase exceeded 5 per cent, as against barely 
1.5 per cent in the second half of the nineteen-fifties. In addition, 
these more favourable trends were recorded in almost all the countries 
of the region, whereas in 1955-59 the improvement was largely confined 
to petroleum exports. 
This was one of the factors that helped to increase the rate of 
economic development in several countries. Other determinants included 
certain external financing facilities promoted through regional co-operation 
programmes, a greater readiness to tackle development problems of 
institutional and structural origin, progress in integration, and the 
introduction of planning procedures. 
/Thus, the 
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Thus, the Latin American economies have given proof of their capacity 
to increase investment and production whoa the external-sector bottleneck 
is relieved. 
Some aspects of Latin America's experience seem to me to have a 
very important bearing on the topics to be discussed at the present 
Conference. I should like to draw attention to the apparently paradoxical 
fact that, despite the expansion of export earnings and the inflow of 
external financing, the economic growth rate of the region as a whole 
has been even lower than in previous years. The explanation lies in 
four basic circumstances t the deterioration of the terms of trade, the 
increase in service payments on external debts, the need to replenish 
monetary reserves, and the brief duration of the boom in export earnings. 
The depresive effects of anti-inflationary policies must also be taken 
into account. The influence of these various factors has made itself 
felt, in greater or lesser degree, in a number of countries (including 
seme of those that carry considerable weight in the aggregate figures 
for the region), and has caused contractions in their economic activity 
or, in many cases, has kept their growth rates below the over-all average. 
Let me describe how these factors have worked. 
Latin America's external terms of trade have steadily deteriorated 
since the mid-nineteen-fifties, falling lowest' in 1962, when the overall 
index showed a decline of 22 per cent in relation to the average level 
for the period 1950-54« The subsequent improvement did not extend to all 
products, and for petroleum and certain agricultural commodities the 
downward trend continued. Thus the adverse terms of trade affected some 
countries more severely than others, and the purchasing power of their 
exports was reduced - very considerably in the case of Venezuela. 
The aggregate inflow of external funds in the shape of loans 
and investment has increased considerably during the present decade. 
Between I960 and 1966, annual gross inflows averaged 2,950 million dollars 
(excluding Venezuela, where there was a substantial outflow of capital 
from the petroleum industry). This is a much higher figure than the 
average of about 2,000 million dollars recorded during the second half 




net inflow of funds works out at 1,560 million dollars, which i s about 
the same as in the previous decade« A comparison of these net inflows 
with the amounts represented by interest and profits on loans «aid 
investment will show that the net balance of all these movements 
represented an average annual contribution to the over-all balance of 
payments of only about 610 million dollars, while in the second h.^ lf 
of the last decade these additional resources averaged 730 million dollars« 
If Venezuela i s taken into account, i t will be seen that latin 
America has been transferring abroad, under the head of amortisation 
and interest payments and profits, sums exceeding the gross inflows of funds 
i t has received« 
This i s the result of the calculation for the region as a whole. 
But in certain countries, the movement of external fluids has been sti l l 
more unfavourable; net inflows of capital have dwindled in recent years 
until, in sane cases, they have been replaced by outflows, and the 
balance-of-payments position has been further aggravated by transfers 
of profits and the growing burden of interest payments on the accumulated 
debt. Moreover, this situation has often arisen at times when monetary 
reserves were at a critically low ebb, and it has been combined with 
the depressive impact of fiscal and anti-inflationary policies« All this 
explains why it has been so difficult for -these countries to increase 
their growth rate, notwithstanding any increase in their export earnings« 
On the other hand, in another group of countries - comprising 
Mexico and many smaller States - which have made more intensive use of 
external financing in recent years, the resulting supply of external 
funds may have helped to increase external purchasing power and push 
up the rate of growth« 
2h short, the point that must be stressed i s the shakiness of 
the balance-of-payments position of the Latin American countries* 
Notwithstanding a few discrepancies, the following aggregate figures 
give an enlightening picture of this state of affairs* Between I960 and 1966, 
while export earnings increased by 35 per cent, profits and interest on 




payments on noncompensatory loans by over 40 per cent. Thus, in 1966 
total payments under the heads of amortization, interest and profits 
amounted to one-third of the income accruing from exports. 
It is becoming clear, therefore, that unless, financial co-operation 
programmes are launched in which the amount, costs, repayment procedures, 
and other features of external financing are tailored to the needs of 
development policy and of development itself, and unless external action i 
is effectively co-ordinated with internal measures, it will be impossible 
to establish conditions in which foreign capital can help to augment 
investment and promote domestic saving. 
3» Limitations on,,economic growth and the potential 
balanc e-of-payment s deficit 
Consideration must therefore be given to the prospects which the 
external sector may hold out for a lasting and more satisfactory process of 
growth in Latin America. In this respect, the increase in export earnings 
over the past few years might be regarded as a premising sign of a more 
favourable trend than in the past. But after study of the factors underlying 
the export situation and the principles and procedures governing international 
trade and financial policy, it must be concluded that those prospects 
are not satisfactory. 
Although the greater demand stemming from the economic growth of 
the industrialized countries had a certain impact on Latin American exports, 
it is nevertheless true that transitory or fortuitous factors which are 
liable to disappear quickly exerted a significant influences on export 
earnings. Thus, for example, shortages in the Soviet Union and mainland 
China were responsible for a temporary increase in exports of cereals; 
a contraction in the supply of meat in Europe and Argentina raised meat 
prices; trade union and other disputes and demand for military purposes 
were reflected in the world prices of metals, particularly copper; and 
coffee prices rose temporarily as a result of a fall in production due 
to adverse weather conditions. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the disappearance of these 
factors should have caused the prices of many agricultural and mining 




in 1967« This trend in combination with the weakness, of demand in the 
industrialized countries because of the recent decline in their growth rate, 
explains, in large measure, why the growth of Latin America's export earnings 
came to a standstill in that year* They remained at the 1'966 levelj and 
the fall in prices will also have affected foreign exchange reserves in 1967» 
The terms of trade, which as I said before were recovering somewhat 
from their previous low levels, are now again unfavourable for Latin America* 
And, as in the past, this deterioration will affect investment and earnings, 
with a consequent reduction of the real contribution which may be expected 
from external financing* 
Other factors restricting the expansion and diversification o.f 
Latin America's exports will aggravate these unfavourable effects* I am 
referring to the protection and development policies of the industrialized 
countries, which are trying, regardless of higher costs, to become more self-
sufficient in important coranodities which are the traditional exports of 
the developing countries and to promote subsidized exports; to the restrictions, 
quotas, taxes, and other measures which limit consumption of products 
exported only by the developing countries; to the progressive replacement 
of natural products by synthetics; to the special preference which seme of 
the developed countries accord to other developing countries and which 
are being extended to more and more countries and products; to the shipping 
practices and policies which injure our countries' trade; and to the 
increasing difficulties and unfair treatment which are hampering our 
attempts to diversify our export trade by introducing new exports of 
manufactures® I am also thinking of the policies which lead the developed 
countries to restrict financial co-operation and aid, raise interest rates, 
and impose conditions on the use of external funds* 
These features of the world economy are preventing the developing 
countries from expanding their trade and securing the financial and technical 
co-operation which in conjunction with internal institutional reforms and 
the mobilization of their domestic resources, would enable the© to attract 
more investment, assimilate new techniques and increase production and 




It is clear from the technical studies that have been carried out 
\ 
since the first session of the Conference and the new studies presented 
at the present session that there is a considerable potential trade or 
balance-of-payaents deficit, which would preclude a satisfactory rate of 
growth over the next decade« 
This creates a very delicate situation for Latin America» -import 
substitution has forged ahead in the large and medium-sized countries 
and is continuing in the others along traditional lines. In the former group, 
no further impetus of any significance can be expected from that source, 
and in the remainder, for obvious reasons, the prospects are extremely 
dim. It is true that regional integration is opening up new possibilities; 
but here, too, difficulties are bound to arise unless trade with the rest 
of the world is expanded and adequate financial and technical co-operation 
is forthcoming. 
4« The need for a reorganization of world trade and for 
substantial changes in the economic policy 
of the developed countries 
A.t its first session four years ago, UNCTAD adopted principles and 
recommendations which, had they been put into effect, would have led to a 
reorganization of world trade and would have promoted the economic growth 
of the developing countries» Unfortunately, those undertakings were not 
translated into policy decisions, and other measures and restrictions 
increased the obstacles to the expansion of Latin America's exports. The 
appropriate instruments have yet to be drawn up to give effect to 
recommendations that were adopted without opposition, such as those on the 
redaction and elimination of obstacles to trade in products pf export 
interest to developing countries, and on the negotiation of international 
commodity agreements of arrangements. The experience is disheartening, for 
if this can happen in, a field in which there is general agreement regarding 
the action that should be taken by the international community, still 
graver doubts may be felt as to the implementation of other recommendations 





These clauses and other provisos have been used to seme extent as 
an excuse for taking no action with regard to the formidable problems that 
remain to be solved. It is necessary, therefore, to establish objective 
criteria and determine the circumstances under which such clauses may be 
invoked. They should not be applied on the unilateral decision of one 
country but only after prior consultations or negotiations between the 
parties concerned. 
The results of the Kennedy Round of tariff negotiations were a source 
of deep satisfaction to the developed countries inasmuch as great strides were 
made towards the liberalization of world trade. Unfortunately, the 
developing countries cannot fully share this feeling, because only marginal 
consideration was given to their interests. 
The most important tariff reductions were granted on highly processed 
products whose manufacture is capital-intensive and fairly complex in 
technique, and which are exported exclusively by the developed countries. 
In respect of primary commodities and manufactures and semi-manufactures 
of special interest to the developing countries, the concessions were 
minimal, and in some cases merely t represented the consolidation of tariff 
reductions which were already in force cm a temporary basis. Moreover, 
as a result of the application of the most-favoured-nation clause, many 
of the concessions are likely to encourage trade between developed 
countries more than the developing countries' trade. The hoped-for tariff 
reductions in favour of the developing countries have not been achieved, 
and no progress has been made in relaxing the protectionist policies of 
the developed countries, or in reducing or eliminating duties and other 
restrictions on agricultural commodities of vital interest to the 
developing countries. 
Although the developing countries did obtain fairly sizable tariff 
reductions for some of their products, no solution has yet been found for 
the serious problems connected with the access of their traditional exports 
to the markets of the industrialized countries and with the stabilization 
of prices at remunerative levels, or for those which impede the 




If this goes on, the relative position of our countries in world 
trade and development will continue to deteriorate» The world community 
cannot remain indifferent to this paradoxical state of affairs« while the 
industrialized countries have agreed upon decisions of enormous importance 
for the liberalization of their trade which will certainly promote a new 
surge of rapid technical progress and economic growth in the developed 
areas of the world, no such agreement has been reached as regards adopting 
the measures or establishing the institutions which would make for equal 
progress in the developing countries« 
If the developed nations have decided to liberalize their trade, 
despite the industrial competition and adjustments which such a process 
entails, why should not similar action be undertaken in favour of the 
less advanced countries, and why should they not be given equitable 
treatment, seeing that their development is only just beginning, so that 
they also may share the benefits of technical progress and infuse the 
necessary dynamism into the development of their economies? 
In asking this question, I have in mind two particularly significant 
facts which emerge from Latin America's past experience: first, that the 
growth rate of investment and income can be stepped up immediatly if a 
cure is found for the lack of dynamism in the external sectorj and, 
secondly, that the rate of growth must be increased so as to facilitate 
the institutional reforms and the mobilization of domestic resources 
which are an urgent necessity if there is to be any easing of the social 
tensions that dominate the Latin American scene* 
5« ECLA and the second session of UNCTAD 
The present session affords an opportunity of adopting decisions 
that will lay new bases for world trade and financial co-operation with 
the developing countries. Definite programmes of action and practical 
procedures should be agreed upon, so that the recommendations of the 
first session, and any that may be formulated here, can be put into effect 
through specific government measures. Energy and determination are 
called for, in view of the fact that the developing countries can no 
longer confine their aspirations to a modest improvement of their present 
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rate of growth; the promotion of conditions that will enable lasting 
progress to be achieved in the caning decade will entail a co-ordination 
and redoubling of effort in the next few years, in the light of more 
ambitious objectives. In Latin America's case, employment problems and 
the need to improve living conditions both at the material and at the 
cultural level make it urgently necessary that the annual per capita 
growth rate should average more than 3 per cent. 
Since the date of its establishment, ECLA has been exploring these 
practical problems and studying world trade in relation to development. 
In the last year or two, at the express request of the Commission, the 
secretariat has been concentrating even more attention on the preparatory 
work for the present session. The document entitled "Latin America and 
the second session of UNCTAD" (E/CN.12/803), submitted to you here, is the 
outcome of a process of research, exchange of views and consultation which 
began in mid-1966 at the third meeting of experts of the Ad Hoc Committee on 
Latin American Co-ordination (CECLA), and was continued at the twelfth 
session of ECLA, in May 1967 - where it was the keynote of the proceedings r 
and at the Fourth Meeting of CECLA at the Expert Level. It culminated 
in the meeting of government experts from the developing countries members 
of ECLA which was held last December. 
At all these gatherings, the ECLA secretariat put forward ideas and 
proposals relating to items on the agenda for the Conference, and a 
provisional text of the document was examined at the twelfth session of 
the Commission. In the first part of the study, recent trends in Latin 
America's foreign trade are reviewed, together with the economic and 
financial policy of the industrialized countries. Special attention is 
devoted to problems connected with the fulfilment of commitments assumed 
at the first session of UNCTAD and under GAIT, and to procedures for 
applying escape clauses. The results of the Kennedy Round are also analysed 
from the standpoint of the developing countries in general and the 
Latin American countries in particular. The second part of the document 
deals with the various items on the agenda for this Conference, and 
specific ideas and suggestions are put forward as to the decisions that 
in our opinion should be adopted, in line with the considerations I have 




I should like to point out in advance that owing to the course 
followed in preparing the EGLA document, the proposals it puts forward 
with respect to trade policy and financing differ little, in the main, from 
those formulated by the latin American countries in the Charter of 
Tequendica, or from the essential content of the Charter of Algiers. 
Howevers, I feel that some points should be emphasized as being of special 
importance for the success of the present session. 
We are all convinced that an indispensable step towards tackling 
the problems of the developing countries is the adoption of effective 
measures to ensure an iomediate and progressive increase in export 
earnings and to provide instruments for the implementation of a financial 
and technical co-operation programme on lines adapted to development 
needs. I think the international community should establish practical 
procedures and some kind of institutional machinery for the co-ordination 
of essential aspects of external action in the light of national 
development programmes or targets, so that countries may be able to rely 
on obtainig support which is co-ordinated - not conflicting, as is the case in 
actual fact - to enable them to carry out their national programmes. 
Naturally, at the present session of the Conference specific 
decisions cannot be taken in respect of all the agenda items, either on 
account of pressure of time or because headway must first be made in 
certain basic technical studies; but at all events, we should bear in 
mind that it would be extremely discouraging if this session were to end 
with the adoption of general declarations or recommendations more or less 
echoing the agreements reached nearly four years ago. Disappointment 
of this kind would generate a profound and dangerous sense of frustration 
in the developing world, because the fiasco that caused it would occur 
just after the developed countries had concluded negotiations of vital 
importance for their own interests. 
Consequently, certain lines of action should be mapped out beforehand. 
In this connexion, I fully endorse the Board's decision that discussion 
must be concentrated on those basic issues where the problems have been 
sufficiently elucidated and enough information has been collected for 




that as regards other important items, basic directives should be adopted 
•with a view to expediting research and discussion, and that they should 
include precise guideliness and time schedules for the convening of any 
meetings of experts that are considered, necessary and for the various 
phases of the work, right up to the actual application of decisions 
by Governments. 
.Just to explain what I think about the nature and scope of the 
decisions that should be adopted at the second session, I should like 
to allude briefly to some of. the items on the agenda» 
(a) Oonmodities 
There seans to be a consensus of opinion that in dealing with 
commodity problems the product-by-product approach should be adopted. 
The developing countries should be guaranteed a minimum share in the 
consumer markets of the industrialized countries for commodities which 
are produced by both. Moreover, a specific plan of action should be agreed 
upon, on a product-by-product or market-by-market basis, with a view to 
reaching government-supported decisions which will remove the mass of 
obstructions impeding trade in such commodities. With regard to those . 
other primary products which are exported mainly by the developing countries, 
the aim should be to secure the reduction or elimination of the customs 
duties, internal taxes and other restrictions which limit their access to 
the markets of the developed countries. An imperative necessity here is 
to devise appropriate procedures for the elimination of the existing 
special preferences. In addition, steps should be taken to prepare a 
specific programme of action to improve the competitive position of natural 
products vi3-a-vis substitutes and synthetics. Another point that must 
be mentioned is the pressing need for effective decisions to ensure closer 
co-operation in concluding commodity agreements or agreeing upon other 
market organization arrangements to secure the expansion of exports and 




(b) Manufactures and semi-manufactures 
I am fully confident that at the present session, agreement will 
be reached on the essential principles of a system of general preferences 
in favour of manufactures and semi-manufactures from the developing 
countries The suggestions formulated in the ECLA document largely 
coincide -with the proposals put forward in the Charters of Tequendama 
and Algiers, They relate to the following points: the preferences should 
be general and non-discriminatory, without reciprocity; free access to 
the markets of the industrialized countries should be granted, although 
quotas may be established for certain products; and preferential treatment 
should be unconditionally extended to all manufactures and semi-manufactures 
produced by the developing countries. Provision may be made for exceptions 
to this last rule, provided that they are subject to consultation and 
negotiation with the developing countries. 
At the present session, tedious discussions of detail which might 
hold up the entry into operation of the system should be avoided. The best 
plan would be to agree on the basic principles of the systaa and establish 
directives for the programme of negotiations that should be undertaken, so 
that the preferences may be applied as from the beginning of nex£ year. 
(c) Trade with the centrally-planned economies 
Latin America is aware of the importance that may be assumed by trade 
with the centrally-planned economies. Some procedures conducive to the 
expansion of such trade have recently been introduced. However, the 
familiar difficulties still keep it down to very low figures. Consideration 
should therefore be given to new modes of action, and more specific 
commitments and decisions should be arrived at, so that the centrally-
planned economies may, inter alia, include in their purchasing programmes 
increasing volumes of products frcm the developing countries, reduce the 
unduly wide margins between import and domestic maricet prices, and introduce 
more flexible procedures in payments agreements to facilitate multilateralism 




(d) Financing of development 
Lastly, the only other question I should like to touch upon is that 
of financing, a subject on which there is no lack of information and 
technical studies of the kind required to pave the way for decisions 
which will establish the necessary institutional framework and provide 
a permanent solution for the problems that are threatening to become more 
acute. Among the various proposals mooted, I would highlight those 
relating to the conversion of the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (IBRD) into a bank for the developing countries, and to 
the expansion of the net flow of external funds to these countries until the 
established targets have been attained. Above all, I think enough progress 
has been made for the Conference to take at this session a final decision 
to establish a system of supplementary financing. Moreover, we all feel 
that it is urgently necessary to adopt measures to modify the terms and 
procedures of external financing and, in particular, to establish a fund 
by means of which interest payments on loans to developing countries can 
be substantially reduced. 
6. Concluding remarks 
The mention of these specific points does not mean that I assign 
less importance to other items on the agenda for this session; I would 
merely stress that what I feel to be indispensable is the adoption of 
decisions on subjects of particular importance, and the establishment of 
bases for reaching agreement on others through programmes of action which 
also must be very precisely defined. 
Out of indifference, or for want of effective action, no international 
economic and financial machinery has yet been set up to ensure the observance 
of principles of economic rationality and a fair deal for peoples that 




Today the time is ripe for us to begin finding effective solutions 
for the vital problems of the developing countries, and I am confident that 
co-ordinated action on the part of these countries themselves, together 
with constructive co-operation on that of the developed countries, in 
accordance with the claims of equity and the responsibility they bear 
within the international community, will help to ensure that the achievements 
of this session of UNCTAD will mark it as an epoch-making evento We hope 
that thanks to these achievements, the developing regions of the world will 
at last emerge from their economic stagnation and share in the technical 





TOWARDS A DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY FOR LATIN AMERICA ^ 
la Structural reforms to clear the way for development 
The ills besetting the Latin American economy are not determined by 
circumstantial or transient factors. They are an expression of the critical 
state of affairs in our time and of the incapacity of the economic system 
- owing to structural defects that it has been beyond our ability or our 
power to remedy - to achieve and maintain a rate of development consonant 
with the growth of the population and with its demands for a speedy 
improvement in its levels of living. 
The increase in the population is certainly phenomenal. At the 
beginning of the century, there were 63 million inhabitants in Latin America, 
and the annual rate of demographic growth was 1*8 per cent. Now we number 
220 million, and we are multiplying at an annual rate of 2*9 per cent which 
2/ 
shows signs of rising even highertr* 
On the basis of conjectural data, it may be estimated that about 
half the existing population has a tiny average personal income of 
120 dollars a year.^ And this vast social aggregate accounts for only 
about one-fifth of total personal consumption in Latin America, showing 
the highest coefficients of under-nourishment, poor clothing and worse 
housing and of disease and illiteracy; and, at the same time, the highest 
rates of reproduction. 
1/ Rai5l Prebisch, Towards a dynamic development policy for Latin America 
(United Nations publication, Sales N°: 64,II,G,4)» PI'» 3-20, 
2/ In 1900 the population increased by 1,1 million inhabitants, and in 
i960 by 6.4 million - almost six times that figure, 
y See the chapter entitled "Income distribution in Latin America" in 
The Economic Development of Latin America in the Post-War PeTiodi 
(United Nations publication, Sales~~N°: 64cII.G.6), pp. 62-74« 
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It is here that development effort must primarily be concentrated, 
The notion, which.dies hard, that development takes place spontaneously, 
without a rational and deliberate effort to achieve it, has proved to be 
an illusion,.both in Latin, America and in.the other peripheral regions 
of the world. For a century; now our economies have been linked to the 
international economy, and 50 per cent of the population is still stagnating 
in pre-capitalist conditions which.are incompatible with its growing economic 
and social aspirations. -
Even so, average per capita income in; Latin Auerica. is appreciably 
higher than in other peripheral regions,., and thus affords an advantageous 
starting-point for the realization of what is no longer a Utopian dream: 
the eradication of poverty and its inherent evils, by virtue of the 
tremendous potential of contemporary technology and the possibility of 
assimilating it more quickly than was the case with the capitalist 
evolution of the more advanced countries. : 
However, this rapid penetration of technique demands and carries 
with it radical changes: changes both in the pattern of production and in 
the structure of the economy which could not be effectively brought about 
without a basic reform of the social structure. 
The prevailing social'structure in Latin America constitutes a 
serious obstacle to technical progress and, consequently, to economic 
and "social development. This shows itself in three main ways: 
(a) The structure of society considerably hampers social mobility, 
that is, the emergence and rise of the dynamic elements in society,, men of 
drive and initiative, capable of taking risks and responsibilities both 
in technical and economic matters and in the other aspects of community lifej 
(b) The social structure is largely characterized by a situation of 
privilege in the distribution of wealth and therefore of income. Privilege 
weakens or destroys the incentive to economic activity, to the detriment 
of the efficient utilization of human resources, land and machinery; 
(c) This state of privilege in regard to distribution is reflected 
not in a rapid rate of net capital formation, but in extravagant 
patterns of consumption in the upper strata of society, contrasting with 
the unsatisfactory living conditions of the broad masses of the population. 
/In these 
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In these days of zeal for planning there is a great deal of talk 
about the prime importance of the role of private enterprise in Latin America 
and the need to keep it intact» But what is meant by this, in the last 
analysis? Is it suggested that the present system, under which individual 
initiative is cramped by social stratification and privilege, should be kept 
intact? Or is the way to be cleared for this initiative by the above- . 
* 
mentioned structural reforms, so that the system may acquire the full 
dynamic force it lacks at present? 
2. Capital formation and income distribution 
The test of a system's dynamic strength lies in its ability to 
accelerate the rate of development and progressively improve the distribution 
of income» If the annual rate of growth of average per capita income 
could be raised from the very low figure of 1 per cent recently recorded 
to a minimum of 3 per cent in Latin America as a whole, by moons of a 
rational redistribution policy, the personal income of the under-privileged 
half of the population could be doubled in seventeen years, and a lot of the 
middle-income groups could be improved likewise, although at a less 
rapid rate» 
This is where the first step towards reform of the social structure 
becomes essential, since such a rate of growth is not feasible without 
substantial restriction of the consumption of the higher-income groups« 
The social contrast is striking indeed, While 50 per cent of the 
population accounts for approximately two-tenths of total personal 
consumption, at the other end of the scale 5 per cent of the inhabitants 
of the region enjoy nearly three-tenths of that total, according to the 
conjectural estimates referred to above. A policy of austerity mainly 
affecting thi3 latter social group, and supplemented by the contribution 
of international resources, would permit an increase in net capital 
formation and the attainment of the above-mentioned growth target for 
per capita income, while at the same time redistribution policy would 
ensure that the income increment thus obtained was passed on to the lower 




Herein lies the essence of redistribution policy. It is not a 
matter of taking income away from the upper minority and simply distributing 
it among the broad masses of the population, for with per capita personal 
income in Latin America as a whole barely amounting to 370 dollars a year, 
the benefits of such a redistribution would not stretch very far. But if, 
on the other hand, restrictions on the consumption of the privileged groups 
were reflected in a steady increase in net capital formation, the standard 
of living of the bulk of the population would rise progressively faster. 
Technology has made this dynamic concept of redistribution viable 
for the first time in history, for without the immense potential it places 
at the disposal of developing countries, the effects of the redistribution 
operation would be very limited in their scope. Thus, the problems of 
capital formation and income distribution assume very different forms from 
those they took during the capitalist evolution of the more advanced countries. 
At that time it was capital formation that came first, and the gradual 
redistribution of income followed. Now, on the other hand, both these ' 
requirements present themselves - as they are bound to do - simultaneously, 
under the increasing political and trade-union pressure exerted by the 
lower income groups. 
The only available means of meeting them is by directly combating 
one of the anomalies that most affect the development of Latin America, . 
namely, the marked failure of capital formation to reach the levels 
demanded by contemporary technology, as against the extravagant pattern 
of consumption of the high-income groups. 
Among these upper strata (5 per cent of the population) which account 
for about three-tenths of Latin America's total consumption, average 
consumption per household is fifteen times greater than that of the lower 
strata (50 per cent of the population). If this ratio were reduced to 
11:1, by the restriction of consumption in favour of increased investment, 
the annual rate of growth of per capita income could rise from 1 per cent 
to 3 per cent. And if restriction of consumption brought the ratio down 
to 9:1, the rate of growth might reach 4 per cent or even more, according 
to the political feasibility of this operation and the capacity of each 




3. International co-operation and the structure of trade 
This capacity might be seriously handicapped by the external bottleneck 
in development, which, in conjunction with the limitations of domestic 
production of capital goods, would make it impossible for all the additional 
savings obtained to be invested in such goods. Hence the vital need for 
international resources, until the structural reforms advocated here 
permit full advantage to be taken of the increase in savings. 
The contribution to be made by international resources is thus of 
a temporary nature. It would cease to be necessary once the reforms had 
borne the full crop of results to be expected of them. They are not a 
matter for Latin America alone, since it is also essential to work for the 
elimination of the external bottleneck by changing the existing structure 
of international trade. 
The countries in which industrialization advances most rapidly 
tend to be affected more and more by this bottleneck. Their difficulties 
do not originate solely in the social structure, but also in the type of 
trade structure which characterized the epoch of externally-geared development 
that preceded the world depression of the thirties. Here again, as in other 
aspects of Latin America's development problems, a whole constellation 
of out-of-date ideas survives. It is true that the industrialization of the 
peripheral regions has at last been accepted as an indispensable requisite 
for economic development. But what is still perpetuated is the anachronistic 
trade pattern inherent in the peculiar concept of the international division 
of labour which was prevalent up to a short time ago - the trading of primary 
commodities against manufactured goods. This is the framework within 
xtfhich the industrialization of the Latin American countries has been taking 
place. And the obstacle to economic development that it represents is 
now beginning to loom larger at every turn, for whereas the upward trend 
of demand for the manufactures we import is very sharp, primary exports 
are expanding relatively slowly, largely-for reasons over which the 
Latin Anerican countries have no control. Thus there is a latent 
tendency towards disequilibrium which is aggravated as economic 




This is a new phenomenon not experienced by the more advanced countries 
in the.past. Hence it is that only now is its significance beginning to 
be understood, and recognition accorded to the vital need to encourage 
the industrial exports of the peripheral countries, especially those which 
have completed the first stage of the industrialization process. 
This encouragement of industrial exports, in addition to exports 
of primary commodities, cannot be achieved within the narrow bounds of 
the existing markets. It is essential to alter the geographical structure 
of trade, as well as its composition by products. 
Latin America's exports are of course affected by the universal 
slowness of the growth of demand for primary commodities, in contrast 
with the buoyancy of demand for manufactures as per capita income raises. 
But this circumstance combines with other factors of considerable importance. 
In the first place, the moderate rate of economic development of the 
United States, with its import restrictions it has.imposed, have exerted 
an adverse influence on Latin America's export trade. And, secondly, the 
protectionism and discrimination practised by the European Common Market 
prevent us from taking full advantage of the steady expansion of demand 
for primary commodities in the vast economic area it represents. 
Without prejudice to measures aimed at eliminating or reducing these 
barriers to trade, it is a matter of urgent necessity to explore, with 
the utmost diligence, the possibilities for trade with other regions of 
the world, especially those - the socialist economies, for example -
which show a high rate of development. 
While it is true that basically the solution of such problems 
depends upon the great industrial countries and the degree to which their 
trade policy favours liberalization, it is no less certain that the 
Latin American countries too must put forth a tremendous effort in the 
same direction. In this sense, the formation of a common market is an 
undertaking that brooks no delay. Its importance has been realized by 
the Central American countries, whose determination to establish such a 
market has been bold and resolute. The problem of the Latin American 
Free-Trade Association is more difficult, for the very reason that the 




vested interests and prejudices which oppose reciprocal trade without 
taking account of the serious effects of such an attitude on economic 
development. This is not a merely technical matterj it is a question, of 
important policy decisions which must follow up the Montevideo Treaty. 
The technical ground work for these decisions is basically complete; all 
that remains to be done is to study and select the best ways of putting 
them into practice. 
4. The closed type of development in Latin America 
The external bottleneck in development is not due solely to the slow 
upward trend of exports of primary commodities as against the rapid 
expansion of industrial imports from the great centres, or to the low 
level of inter-Latin American trade; it has also largely been determined, 
in recent years, by the deterioration of the terras of trade and its serious 
effects on the purchasing power of exports. The action of all these factors 
in combination reduced the per capita value of Latin America's exports from 
58 dollars in 1930 to 39 dollars in i960 (at 1950 prices). 
The recent decline in the terms of trade is yet another indication 
of the peripheral countries' inherent incapacity to retain the whole of the 
benefits accruing from their technical progress. There is not much 
consolation to be had from the reflection that in the future, when the 
Latin American countries reach more advanced stages of development and 
their industrialization process is complete, this state of affairs will 
some day be brought to an end; it will all take a long time, and in the 
meanwhile the deterioration of the terms of trade is aggravating the 
external bottleneck and exerting a marked depressive influence on domestic 
capacity for capital formation, to the detriment of development itself. 
Prom a different angle, the other notion that still survives in 
some circles, to the effect that the external bottleneck and the 
disequilibria in international accounts in which it is reflected are 
mere matters of monetary operation, ha? had deplorable consequences, since 
its practical application - besides adversely affecting economic 
development - has diverted attention from the basic solutions which this 




This is a point of considerable importance for Latin America, for 
unless the solutions in question are resolutely sought, our countries 
will be swept by the force of circumstances towards an increasingly closed 
type of development, and a steady contraction of their share in trade with 
the rest of the world, which will add further difficulties to those inherent 
in such a process. In default of sufficient international co-operation 
in overcoming these difficulties, both in the field of trade and in that 
of financing, all kinds of authoritarian measures might supervene, with 
grave consequences for the progressive development of democracy in 
Latin America. 
5» Internal bottlenecks 
The intensification of development is not simply a question of 
increasing net capital formation. While this is necessary, it is by 
no means sufficient, since development may be cramped by a variety of 
factors. Those of an external kind have already been mentioned, but 
there are also internal bottlenecks that circumscribe or hamper the 
expansive force of net capital formation. 
Furthermore, there is usually a wide margin for the immediate 
growth of production in our countries because of idle capacity in a 
number of branches. But the factors that have been mentioned either rule 
out this possibility or bring inflationary pressures of a non-monetary 
kind in their train if a policy directed towards the full utilization 
of idle capacity is put into force. 
There is no doubt that the most persistent bottleneck in the whole 
of Latin America's development process is generally to be found in 
agricultural production.^ A combination of several factors is responsible 
for this: the system of land tenure, which makes it difficult for modern 
y This internal bottleneck - in common with others frequently encountered 
in the Latin American development process - has frustrated a number 
of attempts to redistribute incomej these have been limited to improving 
the monetary level of wages and salaries, irrespective of the investment 
required to raise production, especially in the agricultural sector, and 
to satisfying the increase produced in popular demand by the 




techniques to be assimilated; inadequate State aid in the work of adapting 
and diffusing these techniques; and the unsatisfactory investment situation. 
However thoroughly these three problems may be dealt with, unless farmers 
are given proper incentives, efforts to accelerate development are liable . 
to find their most formidable stumbling-block in the agricultural sector, 
as has been the case in a number of countries with differing economic systems.'. 
The incentives may be of various kinds, but the most important is 
that agriculture should reap the benefits of the technical progress it . 
makes, both externally and in the interplay of internal economic forces. 
This is the only way in which the wide gap between average income figures 
in rural and in urban areas can be gradually narrowed. The fact is that 
the impoverished half of the population is lárgely to be found in rural areas. 
With a little thought, it will be seen that the externally-geared 
growth of earlier periods, based on the characteristic types of foreign 
enclave which do not allow technical progress to spread to the internal 
economy, broke up the original pre-capitalist integration of the 
countryside with the town. And industrialization tends to widen rather • 
than reduce the breach by aggravating the social and economic dichotomy. 
Steps must now be taken to remedy this. 
The widening of the gap is due not only to the structural features 
of the rural sector, but also to the fact that internal development has not 
been dynamic enough to raise the farmer's income. What is more, it is 
the farmer who is usually called upon to bear a considerable part of the 
cost of import substitution, excessive protection and unfair marketing 
practices, and also of social security and other State services from which 
the rural worker reaps virtually no benefit because he can exert no trade-
union pressure and has no political contacts. In fact, he continues to 
be the Cinderella of urban politics. 
No exhaustive examination has yet been made of all the repercussions 
of these factors on the drift from the countryside to the bigger Latin 
American towns, which is a striking and disquieting sign of economic and 
social disequilibrium. There is no doubt that in-migration is bound to 
take place; nor is there any doubt that the increased technical progress 
of the rural areas will tend to give it greater momentum. But is it necessary 
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for the displaced population to congregate in the big towns? Why should 
they not stay in the rural milieu, living in small and medium-sized 
communities and employed in industries and services that would satisfy 
some of the requirements of that milieu itself? Why have the bigger towns, 
in Latin America grown, at the expense of the medium-sized and small toxms, 
to an extraordinary extent that is quite disproportionate to the trend of 
events in more advanced countries? 
These questions cannot be answered satisfactorily without careful 
research. Perhaps the weakness of rural demand, or, to put it another way, 
the concentration of demand in the big towns as a result of the structural ' 
and adventitious factors mentioned above, may have played an important part 
in this phenomenon. And, as in the case of other social phenomena, there 
have been no countervailing reactions, but a self-perpetuating spiral, 
since the .agglomeration of people in big towns concentrates demand.there 
even more, and this in turn leads to further population congestion. It 
may therefore be concluded that the geographical redistribution of income 
is also of great social importance. 
6. Why should, development forces be deliberately controlled? 
One dominant idea runs through the whole of this paper: Latin America 
must quicken its rate of economic development and redistribute income j.n 
favour of the broad masses of the population. The attainment of this 
objective cannot be indefinitely posponed, nor are there grounds for 
expecting that economic development will take place first and be followed 
in the natural course of events by social development. Both must be 
achieved gradually and side by side. This will entail rational and 
deliberate action to influence the forces of development; the spontaneous 
interplay of these forces will not suffice' here, as it did in the 
capitalist evolution of the advanced countries. 
With respect to these structural factors, it should- be borne in mind 
that, because of the existing system of land tenure, much of the 
income from the land - particularly that of the big landowners - is 




The notion that this type of evolution could be repeated in Latin 
America has been very misleading,, In the advanced countries economic 
development has been essentially a spontaneous phenomenon, but the same 
is not true of social development, which has largely been shaped by deliberate 
policy measures. And it is clear that in those countries the need for action 
of this sort, the need for planning, is also gaining recognition. 
There is one overriding argument: today, when man is acquiring a 
power over the forces of nature hitherto undreamed-of, he cannot resign 
himself to remaining at the mercy of the unfettered play of economic t * 
forces, with its manifest incapacity to maintain or achieve a satisfactory 
rate of growth while at the same time reducing cyclical fluctuations, and 
to bring about equitable income distribution« 
As history cannot repeat itself in this respect, there are very 
cogent reasons for finding new paths. The assimilation of an already highly-
developed technique in a fairly short space of time is a very different 
matter from the gradual development of such a technique, since serious 
incongruities or disparities appear which have to be dealt with by State action. 
First, during the evolution of the capitalist economies, technology 
was gradually incorporated into the production process as the necessary 
capital formation took place. The countries now developing, on the other 
hand, have to assimilate a technology that is ready-made. And if they 
are to climb progressively towards the higher stage already reached by the 
more advanced countries, the rate of increase of per capita income will 
have to be more rapid in their case than it was in the industrial countries 
in the pasta 
Then too, this technology and the continual innovations it entails 
call for substancial capital investment per head, which'the advanced 
countries can easily build up on the strength of their high per capita 
income. The developing countries, on the other hand, in face of the same 
extremely capital-intensive technology, have an average per capita income 
barely comparable to that of the advanced countries about a century ago. 
Hence there is no way out but for the State deliberately,to reduce the 
consumption of the higher income groups in the community, whereas ther? 
was no necessity for this when the capitalist economies were developing, 
since saving on the part of those same groups was spontaneous and 
almost automatic. /These two 
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These two incongruities bring in their train another, to which 
reference has already been made» VJhereas in the advanced countries,net 
capital formation came first and the redistribution of income later, in 
our countries the two problems have now to be solved simultaneously, 
particularly with the model of the Soviet method of economic development 
forever before our eyes. 
To add to this, there is the rapidity with which techniques for the 
prevention and cure of disease are spread, and the ensuing sharp drop in 
the mortality rate, a phenomenon that took place yery slowly during the 
evolutionary stage of the more advanced countries, and was accompanied by 
an equally gradual fall in the birth rate. There the increase in income 
fostered changes in the psychological attitude to family formation which 
are not yet in evidence among the broad masses of the Latin American 
population with their meagre resources. This explains the disparity 
between the exceptionally high rate of population growth in Latin America 
and the relatively moderate raté prevailing during the evolution of the 
capitalist economies«, 
The high rate of demographic growth entails a more intensive capital 
formation effort and enhances the incongruity between the inexhaustible 
supply of manpower in our countries and the technology we must assimilate, 
as evolved in the big industrial centres under the spur of an ever-
increasing labour shortage. 
Lastly, mention must be made of the incongruity or disparity between 
import and export demand, whiçh was likewise no problem in the past. Thus 
the big centres, as they grew, did not show that trend towards the formation 
of external bottlenecks which i.3 characteristic of the Latin American ca.intriea. 
The task of coping with these.incongruities and promoting development 
entails three forms of State action. First and foremost, action to reform 
the social structure and thereby remove the obstacles to development; this 
consists essentially in making full use of the savings potential, encouraging 
the intensive utilization of land and capital and freeing the huge potential 
of individual initiative which now goes to waste, so as to give the system 




These changes in the social structure pave the way for others, 
affecting the production pattern and structure of the economy, which are 
inherent in the spread and absorption of contemporary technology« 
Lastly, State action is indispensable if the, narked disparities in 
income distribution are to be progressively remedied by virtue of the 
increase in income accompanying the changes introduced. 
7» Opposition to reforms and responsibility for carrying them out 
The present document is designed as much for those who resist such 
changes within their own countries as for those who propose to carry them 
outa It is also directed at those outside the region who fail to grasp 
the nature and gravity of events in Latin America. 
To the first of these groups, we should like .to demonstrate the 
ineluctable necessity of introducing these changes into the social structure 
so that the pattern of production and the structure of the economy can respond 
to development requirements. If they are anxious to keep their position 
in the distribution scale inviolate, we would emphasize for their benefit 
that a point in history has been reached when it is no longer feasible to 
maintain consumption patterns that imply the dissipation of a substantial 
capital, formation potential, in a fashion totally incompatible with the 
region's vast capital formation requirements. And if they are concerned 
for the future of democracy, it will not be amiss to suggest that npthing 
will do more to strengthen it in Latin America than spcial mobility, the 
emergence and rise of the dynamic elements of society, by virtue of the 
reforms in question; and that stubborn opposition to, such measures ¡right 
compel other men, whose ultimate motive was the same, to ride roughshod over 
democratic procedure in order to achieve this aim, perhaps in the illusory 
belief that the opportunities for sound democratic development which would 
thus be lost in social strife could be recovered in the course of time. 
Those who are resolved to carry out the reforms are faced with a 
tremendous responsibility. Considerable emotional force is building up in 
Latin America, the emotional force of great mass movements« It must be 
channelled towards clear and constructive ends. Nothing can be accomplished 
without thought and rational planning« But neither can bold decisions 
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be taken - such decisions as our countries need - without the driving-
power of this force. The acid test of ultimate efficacy will lie.in the 
ability of the.leaders to fuse these elements into a development policy. 
There is, of course, always the risk that such reforms and the 
necessary follow-up action may be bungled if the primary objectives are 
lost sight of. There will be no genuine reforms in the structure of 
society if all that happens is that the existing privileges change hands 
or that new privileges and sinecures are added to the old. 
Furthermore, it must be understood both in our countries and outside 
them that in all this we are confronted with new requirements. In the 
evolution of the capitalist economies a development policy was not essential 
essential, because of the spontaneity of the process itself. This type 
of evolution cannot be repeated in the Latin American countries. 
Outside Latin America, naturally enough, it nay seem not only 
possible but desirable for the region to follow the path which led the 
developed countries to achieve such impressive results...But unfortunately 
this is often conducive to deplorable attitudes of mind, even in those 
who are actuated by a genuine desire to oo-operate, since there are also 
some who look to international co-operation.to produce,results which have 
some virtue viewed from the political angle, but which, however effective 
as stop-gaps, would be self-defeating over the long run. The only idmissible 
political meaning of such co-operation, from the Latin American standpoint 
is that it should contribute to the political viability of an intensive 
internal development effort. 
8» A system of ideas and a changed outlook 
All this presents Latin America with a new set of problems, very 
different from that with which previous generations were faced. In the 
midst of the world depression we did not know the true nature of Latin 
America's development difficulties: the dominant idea was simply to restore 
normal conditions, to return to the past. Fifteen years ago we were 
already able to attempt a definition or the set of problems in question 
and to point with deep conviction to certain basic solutions. And today 
sufficient progress has been made to work out a system of ideas, a dynamic 




the task is to promote public discussion and above all to gain the ear 
of political and trade-union leaders» What has to be done is to over-come 
the ideological poverty that prevails in our countries in this field, the 
traditional propensity to introduce from abroad nostrums that are largely 
alien to the real requirements of Latin America's situation« 
If the ideas that we Latin American economists have worked out ar$ 
to serve as a guide to the State in acting on the forces of development, 
they must be presented in a clear and easily understood form. There is , 
no idea in the development field that cannot be explained in simple terms, 
even though its working-out may have required complicated reasoning and 
mathematical procedures to improve the level of thinking - not to reduce 
the need for it. We economists must acquire this ability to make ourselves 
understood; if we do not succeed, the failure should be attributed to our own 
confused ideas'rather than to the limitations of others. In fact, if crar 
arguments are not concise and lucid, this is generally because they have 
not been properly sifted, or because we have not altogether freed ourselves 
from the frame of mind that looks to the esoteric for the material of 
intellectual prestige. Or perhaps confusion results from the play of 
economic or political interests, or from a certain tendency to wrap one?s 
thoughts in vague terms in order to shun the responsibility for definite views. 
This, too, involves a new problem. There was no need for public 
discussion of development when it took place of its oT«n accord as the 
capitalist economies evolved; there was no reason then to expound the 
problem of capital formation, since the solution came about spontaneously. -
This is undoubtedly the crucial problem of Latin American development. 
Given that very firm measures must be adopted to increase the flow of 
savings, steps must also be taken to ensure that the funds thus obtained 
are in fact used to augment capital, and that this capital is devoted to 
achieving the aims of the development plan. 
Here we must watch for an ever-present risk. The social tensions 
of today will not infrequently make for the use of an excessively high 
proportion of such funds to improve present consumption, or to effect 
social investment for immediate welfare purposes, at the expense of 
economic investment which would promote welfare at a later, although 
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not remote, date. To yield to this pressure would spell utter failure to 
attain the social objective of achieving a steady vigorous improvement in 
the living conditions of the broad masses of the population. 
What is more, military expenditure often absorbs an appreciable 
proportion of total income, to the detriment of economic.development. 
Certain very significant questions arise in this context. Does not the 
evolution of military technology also call for a searching review of the , 
prevailing ideas? ' And would this involve an increase in such expenditure, 
or might it not be possible, by virtue of this technology and the limitation 
of armaments, to reduce the armed forces, at the same time increasing their 
effectiveness and curtailing military expenditure in favour of economic 
development? 
All these questions open up, for the first time in our countries, 
a very broad field in which public awareness of development can be shaped. 
This does not apply solely to the lofty ideas and grand designs that 
capture the popular imagination. The practical process of development 
also provides very varied opportunities for channelling the energies of 
the community into the many specific tasks that are part of a development 
plan. There are visible signs in our countries of a vast latent wealth of 
enthusiasm and initiative that springs less from personal interest than 
from a community spirit which the women of Latin America too are showing 
by their increasing participation in political and social life. 
Furthermore, community action, like the co-operative movement, will 
permit simplification of State action by confining it to the efficient 
manipulation of the machinery of the system, and leaving to individuals 
the tasks that can,better be performed by them on their own initiative 
and responsibility, since the State is already taking on some very thorny 
problems as part of development planning. Generally speaking it is not 
equipped to do so in the Latin American countries, and in this respect 
too sweeping changes will have to be made if the State is to assume new 
and exacting responsibilities. 
In fact neither structural reforms nor planning can be approached 
on the basis of simple formulas that, once crystallized in the form of 




mere fact that a plan has been approved and international funds have been 
promised. In periods of externally-geared development this typical 
expectation that all problems will somehow solve themselves is strongly 
entrenched, and at times it is found in the least likely quarters. This 
danger is inherent in planning itself. 
We must clear our minds of such illusions. There is no easy way 
out for Latin America. Planning means a strictly methodical - although not 
a strait-jacket - approach to development problems, and an unremitting 
discipline in State action. It.consists in a series of acts of foresight, 
of anticipation of future needs, of rationally relating the method of 
meeting those needs to the scanty resources available. 
All this shows that the design of influencing the forces of 
development is a vast undertaking in terms both of time and of scope. It 
requires not only changed structures, but also changes in outlook, approach, 
and modes of action, But are such changes feasible in our countries? This 
question often evokes a feeling of scepticism that discourages action. But 
the attempt must be made, for there in no other way out. Reliance on the 
mere play of market forces, on foreign private investment and on a 
"hands-off" State policy is no solution. 
9 . Latin America must find its own paths to development 
Development policy must be based on a correct interpretation of the 
real state of affairs in Latin America. The theories that we have absorbed 
and are still absorbing from the big centres, often claim, quite wrongly, to be 
generally applicable. The fundamental task of those of us who. are on the 
periphery is to play our part in correcting these theories and in introducing 
the dynamic elements needed to bring them into line with our own situation. 
The same is true of the practical side of development. The 
uncompromising opposition to the industrialization of our countries has 
already been overcome, and we are now successfully combating the reluctance 
to recognize the significance of the deterioration in the terms of trade. 
But we have a long way to go - and perhaps even less time to lose - in .the 
field of monetary policy, where it is still the practice to impute 
inflationary leanings to those who refuse to admit that inflation is a 
phenomenon unconnected with the social structure, 
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In the actual planning of development it is obvious that we must 
find a way of our own. In the most advanced Western countries planning 
experience is being accumulated, but under conditions different from 
those existing in Latin America. This experience must be closely followed, 
and so must that of the socialist countries, where planning is of longer 
standing and is based on direct economic action by the State and the 
political system that would appear to be inherent in this. 
In Latin America the propensity to import ideologies is still very 
strong - as strong as the propensity of the centres to export them, .This 
is an obvious legacy from the times of externally-geared development. Let 
us be quite clear; there is no question of closing pur minds to what is 
being thought and done in other countries. Happily, in the great centres 
there is a growing interest in development theory and problems, and it 
would be a sorious mistake not to take advantage of the valuable assistance 
thxr. made available to us. But nothing can absolve us from the intellectual 
obligation to analyse our own phenomena and forge our own image of what 
we seek in our endeavour to change the existing order. .Let us make 
intelligent use of the thought and experience of others, but only as a 
means of crystallizing our own ideas. 
This does not apply to the economic field alone. Our vital problem 
is a much broader one, for we must not lose sight of the real object of 
development or fail to project, in addition , the image of what we want 
the Latin American citizen to become within the next few generations. 
The rapid assimilation of technology entails new patterns of living 
and new attitudes of mind. Nevertheless, there is nothing in this vast 
process of change that requires human values to take second place. On 
the contrary, present-day technology opens up infinite possibilities for 
a variety of ways of life and,a freedom of individual choice that until 
recently, in terms of history, were confined to a small fraction of mankind. 
But the production technique of today also makes possible an enormous 
concentration of economic power in a few hands, and this is perhaps even 
more true of information techniques and mass communication of ideas. 
Everything depends on the use we make of such techniques for the purpose 
of exercising conscious and deliberate control over the forces of economic 
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and social development- on whether we use them to place some men 
under the dominion of others, or to enhance the dignity of man as 
an individual. 
10. The concentration of economic power and its political effects 
However, circumstances might well lead Latin America to take decisions 
that are not based on an objective view of such arguments. Resistance to 
the structural reforms postulated in the Charter of Punta del Este is all 
too well known in oar countries; It may safely be assumed that some of 
the avowed opposition to State intervention is due at times to the simple 
fact that the prime purpose of such intervention is to effect these reforms. 
Ideological beliefs are invoked to dress up a basic opposition rather than 
because they are deeply held. Possibly the authoritarian State, and the 
disintegration of democracy, would not be regarded as nearly so distasteful 
by some critics if they thought that by such means it would be possible to 
achieve their goal - fantastic and illusory as this is - of keeping the 
present structure intact» 
This dissentient note often meets with a response in certain circles 
outside Latin America, where this is only to be expected, since the 
economic and social complex that hampers development also includes certain 
exogenous elements. Thus the old argument emerges once more, both at 
home and abroad: first, we must complete the stage of economic development, 
and social reforms.will follow; to speak of them now is to discourage 
private initiative. 
This is a profoundly mistaken belief. There can be no speed-up in 
economic development without a change in the social structure. And it is 
also a cause of deep concern for those who envisaged the Charter of 
Punta del Este as heralding a new policy of international co-operation 
with those countries that were resolute in undertaking such structural 
reforms. It is easy to understand that certain private investments may 
be held up while there is uncertainty as to the issue of these reforms. 
Without attempting to establish a strict parallel, it may be pointed out 
that equal uncertainty prevailed in the countries of Western Europe after 




private investment or appeals to repatriate fugitive European capital, 
but by the superb daring of the Marshall Plan, It was after this 
development that private investment began to flourish and the fugitive 
capital returned, 
We are living in an epoch that is, and will continue to be, decisive, 
and that calls for a long-term approach. The postponement or emasculation 
of reforms for fear of temporarily discouraging private investment would 
not mean that an atmosphere favourable to foreign private investment was 
created. On the contrary, it would jeopardize the very existence of private 
enterprise, not to mention the endeavour to give it full dynamic impetus. 
Let us not deceive ourselves. This is not a quest-ion that can be 
resolved on a doctrinaire level; it is essentially political. The political 
banner under which Latin American.development is carried out is not a mere 
matter of intellectual preference, but will depend largely on the actual 
course of events in the next, few years. There is a certain element of 
determinism in these events, and the only way to circumvent it is to 
act with forethought so as to influence their course0 
I have already stressed this point in these early pages, and there is 
no need to labour it further. Suffice it to recall the many serious 
difficulties that are attending the trend towards closed development. A 
supreme effort is called for to reverse this trend in national, Latin 
American and international plans, since if this is not done, and done in 
time, the outcome may be the authoritarian State, .and incentives to 
economic activity may be superseded by compulsion. 
We have spoken of determinism in relation to events; and perhaps there 
is an inexorable logic in their consequences. For if development were to 
become progressively more closed, we should also have to withdraw to sorpe 
extent from the'outside world, to avoid the contamination of new tastes, 
new needs or new aspirations, and this withdrawal would be woven into 
the fabric of an ideology that, on the basis of the same repressive 
machinery, would have to be similarly safeguarded from the harsh breath 
of criticism. 
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There are many paths leading to the authoritarian State; this is 
not the only one* Another is resistance to the structural changes that 
fling wide the gate for the forces of development. But in this case 
the starting-point is political, not economic, although both paths lead to 
the sains destination. If there were unyielding opposition , either to the 
reforms as such or to their execution, extremely critical situations 
might arise, 
And the men who acquire the political power to carry out these 
reforms as the result of a possibility irresistible tide of popular 
feeling may be forced to concentrate economic power in their,own hands 
in order to strengthen and consolidate their political power, and perhapp 
also in order to use the whole of the savings potential.of the community, 
in face of the magnitude of the problem confronting them and the contraction 
of private investment - an economic power far exceeding the State possessed 
during the evolution of the capitalist economies. 
The concentration of economic power in any form is always a threat 
to the true spirit of democracy0 The State is not an abstract and 
disembodied entity, and those who operate its machinery are inevitably 
swayed by interests and passions as well as by community aims. It is 
hardly conceivable that when they hold the economic power in their hands, 
when they have seized it under the spur of these interests and pressures, 
they will refrain from imposing their will on others, or that these 
others can be independent in their outlook and decisions if their every 
activity and their very means of existence depend on those in power, 
and any alternative is denied them, 
The basic question lies here, not in planning, since even those 
who hold deep and firm democratic convictions, who believe in political, 
freedom and human rights, might find themselves compelled to compromise, 
first of all by.the force of circumstance, and secondly by the actual 
logic of events. 
This is certainly not the state of affairs we would wish to 
substitute for the status quo. It would be a tragedy if, in order to 
free man from x-jant, we had to sacrifice other values and subject him to 
the demands of an arbitrary power. The very idea is fundamentally 
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incompatible with the genious of the Latin American peoples, with their 
latent urge to shake off the trammels of.poverty in order to liberate 
the human personality and give full rein, by means of economic development 
to democracy and huimn rights, especially as regards the underprivileged 
half of the population of Latin America; in order to ensure that both 
there and in all strata pf society, social mobility will allow the best 
elements to move upwards, for the good of economic development and of 
democracy. The goal must be a social order free from privilege, and 
not only economic privilege, but also that baneful sort whereby some 
men usurp dominion over the ideas of the rest, over the.creatives forces 
of the spirit and over the deepest feeling of the heart. 
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Annex 
ECLA PUBLICATIONS 1948-1967 * . 
Annual surveys' 
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA, 1948 
1949 279 pages' 
E/CN.12/82 Sales N°: 1949.II.G.1 
(Divided into two parts: 
Part one: Trends in production 
Part two: Other economic aspects) 
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA, 1949 . " 
• 11 January 1951 536 pages 
E/CN,12/l64/Rev.1: Sales N°: 1951.II.G.1 
(Divided into three parts: 
Part one: Growth, disequilibrium and disparities: interpretation of 
the process of economic development 
Part two: Economic development of selected Latin American countries 
Part three: Recent changes in the economic condition of Latin America) 
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA, 1951-1952 
December 1953 217 pages 
E/CN,12/291/Rev,2 Sales N°: 1953.H.G.3 
(Divided into three parts: 
Part I: The gross product, investments and Consumption in Latin America 
. Part II: The impact of recent world economic events on Latin America 
Part III: Trends in the principal sectors of production) 
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA, 1953 
April 1954 246 pages 
E/CN.12/358 Sales N°: 1954.H.G.1 
(Divided into two parts: 
Part I: The gross product, foreign trade and the monetary situation 
Part II: The main branches of production) 
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA,. 1954 
July 1955 203 pages 
E/CN.12/362/Rev.l Sales N°: 1955.H.G.1 
(Divided into tiro parts: 
Part I: Latin America as a whole 
Part II: Analysis ty countries) 
ECONOMIC SURVET OF LATIN AMERICA, 1955 
May 1956 176 pages 
E/CN,12/421/Rev.l Sales N°: 1956.II.G.1 
(Divided into two parts: 
Part I: Economic trends in Latin America during 1955 
Part II: Government income and expenditure 1947-1954) 
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ECONOMIC SURVEi OF LATIN AMERICA, 1956 
September 1957 183 pages 
E/CN.12/427/Rev.l Sales N°: 1957.II.G.1 
(Divided into three parts: 
Part one: Economic trends in Latin America during 1956 
Part two: Trends of the main production sectors 
Part three: Two special studies 
A. Preliminary study of the effects of post-war industrialization 
on import structures and external vulnerability in Latin America 
B. Productivity of labour and land in Latin America agriculture) 
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA, 1957 
1959 292 pages 
E/CN.12/489/Rev.1 Sales N°: 59.II.G.1 
(Divided into three parts: 
Part I: Latin America and the world economy 
Part II: Survey of the international economic situation in Latin America 
as a whole and in selected countries 
Part III: Pressures on the balance of payments 
Special study on trade in agricultural commodities in Latin America) 
ECONOMIC SURVEZ OF LATIN AMERICA, 1958 
September 1959 l60 pages 
E/CN.12/498/Rev.1 Sales N°: 59.II.G.1 
(Divided into two parts: 
Part I: The foreign exchange problem in Latin America 
Part II: The internal situation in Latin America) 
ECONOMIC SUWEZ OF LATIN AMERICA, 1961 ^ 
Prepared jointly by the secretariats of the Organization of American 
States (OAS) and of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) 
under the editorship of OAS, OAS Official Documents. OAS/Ser.H/X.3. 
ECONOMIC SURVEi OF LATIN AMERICA, 1963 
1965 289 pages 
E/CN.12/696/Rev.1 .-Sales N°: 65.II.G.I 
(Divided into four parts: 
Part one: The economic development of Latin America in recent years 
Part two: Sectoral evolution 
Part three: Commodity trade and the balance of payments 
Part four: The Cuban economy) 
a/ The 1959 and I960 Surveys were not printed. The mimeographed versions 
are out of stock. 
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ECONOMIC SURVET OF LATIN AMERICA,-1964 • 
1966 381 pages 
E/CN.12/711/Rev.l Sales N°: 66.II.G.l 
(Divided into three parts: 
Part one: The Latin American economy 1963-64 
Part two: Foreign trade, world markets and balance-of-payments trends 
in 1963-64 
Part three: Economic policy and planning in Latin America) 
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA, 1965 
1967 404 pages 
E/CN.12/752/Rev.l Sales N°: 67.II.G.l 
(Divided into" three parts: 
Part one: Latin America as a whole 
Part two: The recent economic situation in selected countries 
Part three: Evolution of the main economic sectors) 
THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY IN 1965" . • 
(Excerpt from ECLA Survey) 
May 1966 49 pages 
E/CN.12/754 Sales N°: 66.II.G.8 
ECONOMIC SURVEY OF LATIN AMERICA, 1966 
(In the press) 
E/CN.I2/767 
(Divided into four parts: 
Part one: The major trends of recent economic growth 
Part two: Recent changes in the economy of selected countries 
Part three: The major sectors of economic activity 
Part four: Agriculture in Latin America) 
THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMI IN 1966 
(Excerpt from ECLA Survey) 
March 1967 55 pages 
E/CN.I2/768 Sales N°: 67.11.G.5 
THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY IN 1967 
(Excerpt from ECLA Survey) 
March 1968 62 pages 
E/CN.12/806 - E/CN.12/AC.61/2 Sales N°: 68.II.G.12 
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Economic development 
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA. AND ITS PRINCIPAL PROBLEMS 
April 1950 59 pages 
E/CN.12/89/Rev.1 Sales N°: 50.II.G.2 
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
18 May 1951 113 pages (mimeographed) 
E/CN.12/221 
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN A LATIN AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT POLICI 
September 1954 " 147 pages 
E/CN.12/359 Sales N°: 1954. H . G . 2 
(Divided into two parts: 
I. Preliminary report of the secretariat of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Latin America; 
II, Explanatory statement and recommendations of the Preparatory Group 
appointed by the Commission's secretariat. 
Prepared for the Meeting of Ministers Of Finance or Economy, at 
the IVth Extraordinary Meeting of the Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council of the Organization of American States, held 
at Rio de Janeiro, Novanber 1954.) 
MANUAL ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS 
1958 242 pages 
E/CN,12/426/Add.l/Rev.l Sales N°: 58.II.G.5 
EL DESEQUILIBRIO EXTERNO EN EL DESARROLLO ECONOMICO LATINOAMERICANO, 
EL CASO DE MEXICO 
May 1957 386 pages 
E/CN.12/428 and Add.l Sales N°: 6l.II.G/Mim.l 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PLANNING AND INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
1961 65 pages--
E/cN.12/582/Rev.l Sales N°: 61.II.G.6 
THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD 
1964 147 pages 
E/CN.12/659/Rev.1 Sales N°: 64.II.G.6 
TOWARDS A DYNAMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY FOR LATIN AMERICA 
1963 103 pages 
E/CN.12/680/Rev.l Sales N°: 64.H.G .4 
EXTERNAL FINANCING IN LATIN AMERICA 
1965 247 pages 
E/CN,12/649/Rev,1 Sales N°: 65.II.G.4 
E/CN.12/AC.61/10 
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Social development . 
EL DESARROLLO SOCIAL DE AJpRICA- LATINA EN LA POSTGUERRA 
Docviment E/CN.12/660 published by Ediciones Solar and Libreria Hachette, 
Buenos Aires, 1963 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMMT IN. LATIN AMERICA: SOCIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
This document was presented at the Commission at its tenth session, 
May 1963 
E/CN.I2/646 
EDUCATION, HUMAN RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
(In the press) 
1968 
E/CN.12/800 
Analyses and projections of economic development 
I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TECHNIQUE OF PROGRAMMING 
June 1955 52 pages 
E/CN.I2/363 Sales N°: 1955.II.G.2 
. II. EL DESARROLLO ECONOMICO DEL BRASIL 
April 1956 176 pages 
E/CN.12/364/Rev.l Sales N°: 56.II.G.2 
III. THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF COLOMBIA 
Novanber 1956 454 pages 
E/CN.12/365/Rev.1 Sales N°: 57.II.G.3 
IV. EL DESARROLLO ECONOMICO DE BOLIVIA 
February 1958 301 pages 
E/CN.I2/43O and Add.l/Rev.l Sales N°: 58.II.G.2 
V. EL DESARROLLO ECONOMICO DE LA ARGENTINA 
Volume I. 129 pages Sales N°: 59.II.G.3Aol.I 
Volume II. • 259 pages Sales N°: 59.II.G,3/Vol.II 
Volume III. 181 pages Sales N°: 59.II.G.3/Vol.III 
VI. THE INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT OF PERU ' 
1959 323 pages 
E/CN.12/493 . Sales N°: 59.II.G.2 
VII. EL DESARROLLO ECONOMICO DE PANAMA 
December 1959 - 203 pages 
E/CN.12/494/Rev.1 Sales N°: 60.II.G.3 
VIII. EL DESARROLLO ECONOMICO DE EL SALVADOR 
December 1959 175 pages 
ï/CN.12/495/Rev.l Sales N°: 60.II.G.
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IX. EL DESARROLLO ECONOMICO DE NICARAGUA 
November 1966 220 pages 
E/CN.12/742/Rev.1 Sales N°: 67.II.G.2 
XI. EL DESARROLLO ECONOMICO DE HONDURAS 
December I960 222 pages 
E/CN.12/549 Sales N°: 61.II.G.8 
Agriculture 
AGRICULTURAL REQUISITES IN LATIN AMERICA 
Report of the Joint ECLA/FAO Working Party-
February I960 156 pages 
E/CN.12/83/Rev.l Sales N°: 5O.II.G.I 
THE SELECTIVE EXPANSION OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION IN LATIN AMERICA 
Joint report of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
February 1957 69 pages 
E/CN,12/378/Rev,2 Sales N°: 1957.II.G.4 
COFFEE IN LATIN AMERICA; PRODUCTIVITY PROBLEMS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
Reports prepared under the Joint Programme of the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations 
I. COLOMBIA AND EL SALVADOR 
1958 *M|4 pages 
E/CN„12/490 Sales N°: 58.II.G.4 
II. BRAZIL, STATE OF SAO PAULO 
Part I. The state and prospects of production 
December I960 111 pages 
E/CN. 12/545 Sales N°: 6O.II.G.6A0I.I 
Part II. A, Case study of thirty-three coffee farms 
B. Analysis of the functions of production 
December I960 109 pages 
E/CN.12/545/Add.l Sales N°: 6O.II.G.6 
LIVESTOCK IN LATIN AMERICA: STATUS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
Reports prepared in accordance with the Joint Programme of the 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations 
I, COLOMBIA, MEXICO, URUGUAY AND VENEZUELA 
1962 94 pages 
E/CN.I2/62O Sales N°: 61.II.G.7 
76 pages 
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AGRICULTURE W LATIN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 
This document was presented at the Commission at its tenth session, 
May 1963 
E/CN,12/686 (Mimeographed) 
EL USO DE FERTILIZANTES EN AMERICA LATINA 
Document prepared by the Joint ECLA/FAO Agriculture Division in 
collaboration with the Inter-American Development Bank 
December 1966 96 pages 
E/CN.I2/76O Sales N°: 67.II.G.3 
Reports of Seminars and Workshops 
WORKSHOP CN BUDGETARY CLASSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT IN SOUTH AMERICA 
Santiago, Chile, 27 May to 5 June 1959 
E/CN.12/53Ö 38 pages 
REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON HJDGETARY CLASSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT IN 
SOUTH AMERICA 
Santiago, Chile, 3-14 September 1962 
E/CNU.2/634/Rev.l 62 pages 
REPORT OF THE WORKSHOP ON BUDGETARY CLASSIFICATION AND MANAGEMENT IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA AND PANAMA . 
San José, Costa Rica, 18 to 30 September 1963 
E/CN.I2/692 83 pages 
. REPORT OF THE LATIN AMERICAN SEMINAR ON HOUSING STATISTICS AND PROGRAMMES 
Copenhagen, Denmark, 2-25 September 1962 
February 1963 87 pages 
E/CN,12/647/Rev.l Sales N°: 63.II.G.I4 
Transport 
EL TRANSPORTE EN AMERICA LATINA 
May 1965 348 pages 
E/CN.12/703/Rev.l Sales N°: 65.II.G.7 
Trade 
A STUDY OF TRADE BETWEEN LATIN AMERICA AND EUROPE 
January 1953 117 pages 
E/CN.I2/225 Sales N°: 1952.II.G.2 
STUDY OF THE PROSPECTS OF INTER-LATIN-AMERICAN TRADE : 
SOUTHERN ZONE OF THE REGION 
April 1954 134 pages 
E/CN.12/304/Rev.2 Sales N«: 1953.H.G.4 
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FOREIGN CAPITAL IN LATIN AMERICA 
November 1954 164 pages 
E/CN.12/360 Sales N°: 1954.II.G.4 
STUDY OF INTER-LAT IN-AMERICAN TRADE 
April 1956 313 pages 
E/CN.12/369/Rev.1 Sales N°: 1956.II.G.3 
INTER LATIN AMERICAN TRADE: CURRENT PROBLEMS 
January 1957 105 pages 
E/CN.12/423 Sales N°: 1957.II.G.5 
THE LATIN AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 
1959 146 pages 
E/CN . I2/53I Sales N° 59.II.G.4 
FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN THE LATIN AMERICAN FREE-TRADE AREA 
1961 30 pages 
E/CN.I2/55O Sales N°: 60.II.G.5 
MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION IN LATIN AMERICA 
Volume I. TEXTS AND DOCUMENTS 
1962 165 pages 
E/CN.12/621 Sales N°: 62.II.G.3 
HACIA LA INTEGRACION ACELERADA DE AMERICA LATINA 
(Published by Fondo de Cultura Econòmica, Mexico City, 1965 
Proposals submitted to the Presidents of the Latin American republics 
by José Antonio Mayobre, Felipe Herrera, Carlos Sana de Santamaria 
and Raül Prebisch, together with a technical study by ECLA) 
EL COMERCIO INTERNACIÖNAL I EL DESARROLLO DE AMERICA LATINA 
(Published by Fondo de Cultura Econòmica, Mexico City, 1964) 
Contains the Spanish text of the following documents prepared by ECLA 
"Latin America and the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development" b/ (E/CN.12/693) and "Report by the secretariat on the 
Meeting of Latin American Government Experts on Trade Policy" b/ 
(Brasilia, 20 to 25 January 1964) (E/CN.12/694) 
b/ English text in mimeograph only. 
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Industry 
LABOUR PRODUCTIVITY OF THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY DJ FIVE 
AMERICAN COUNTRIES . 
April 1951 294 
E/CN,12/219 Sales N°: 1951.II.G.2 
THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN LATIN AMERICA. 
I. CHILE (Spanish only) 
November 1962 97 pages 
. E/CN»12/622 Sales N°: 63.II.G.5 
II, BRAZIL 
October 1963 137 pages 
E/CN.12/623 Sales N°: 64.II.G.2 
III, COLOMBIA (Spanish only) 
August 1964 120 pages 
E/CN,12/698 Sales N°: 64.II.G/Mim.2 
IV, URUGUAY (Spanish only) 
December 1964 125 pages 
E/CN.12/691 Sales N°: 64,n,G/Mim,5 
V, PERU (Spanish only) 
October 1964 118 pages 
E/CN.12/700 Sales N°: 64,II,G/Mim.3 
VI, BOLIVIA (Spanish only) 
October 1964 51 pages 
E/CN.12/699 Sales N°: 64.II.G/Mim.4 
VII. PARAGUAY (Spanish only) 
July 1965 42 pages 
E/CN.12/736 Sales N°: 65.II.G/Mim.6 
VIII, ARGENTINA (Spanish only) 
August 1965 228 pages 
E/CN.12/735 Sales N°: 65.II,G/Mim.7 
IX. ECUADOR (Spanish only) 
August 1965 80 pages 
E/CN.12/738 Sales N°: 65.II.G/Mim.8 
•X, VENEZUELA 
December 1965 I36 pages 
E/CN.12/729 . Sales N°: 65.H.G/Mim.9 
XI. MEXICO 
February 1966 58 pages 
E/CN,12/745 .Sales N°: 66.II.G/Mm.l 
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POSSIBILITIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PULP AND PAPER INDUSTRY 
IN LATIN AMERICA 
November 1953 151 pages 
E/CN.12/294/Rev.2 Sales N°: 1953.H.G.2 
(A joint study by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) 
PULP AND PAPER PROSPECTS IN LATIN AMERICA 
October 1955 465 pages 
E/CN.12/361/Rev.1 Sales N°: 1955.II.G.4 
(Divided into two parts: 
First part. Report of the Latin American Meeting of Experts on the 
Pulp and Paper Industry sponsored by the secretariats of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America, the Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations and the Technical Assistance Administration 
Second Part. Working papers submitted to the Meeting) 
PULP AND PAPER PROSPECTS IN LATIN AMERICA 
December 1962 81 pages 
E/CN.12/570/Rev.l Sales N°: 63.II.G.7 
(A joint study by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) 
LATIN AMERICAN TIMBER TRENDS AND PROSPECTS 
1962 117 pages 
E/CN.I2/624 Sales N°: 63.II.G.I 
(A joint study by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations) 
A STUDY OF THE IRON AND STEEL INDUSTRY IN LATIN AMERICA 
Volume I. Report of the Expert Working Group held at Bogotá, 1952 
December 1954 123 pages 
E/CN.12/293/Rev.l Sales N°: 1954.II.G.3, Vol. I 
Volume II. Proceedings of the Expert Working Group held at Bogotá 
November 1954 449 pages 
E/CN.12/293/Rev.l/Add.l Sales N°: 1954.II.G.3, Vol. II 
(Sponsored by the secretariat of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and the Technical Assistance Administration) 
PROBLEMS OF THE STEEL-MAKING AND TRANSFORMING INDUSTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA 
Volume 1. Report of the Latin American Meeting of Experts on Steel 
Making and Transforming Industries, Sao Paulo, 1956 
March 1957 62 pages 
E/CN.12/425 Sales N°: 1957.II.G.6/Vol.l 
Volume 2 Siderurgia 258 pagos (Spanish only) 
Sales N°: 1957.H.G.6/Vol.2 
(Sponsored by the secretariats of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America and of the Technical Assistance Administration in 
collaboration with the Associa9ao Brasil eirá de Metáis) 
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EMERGI DEVELOPMENT IN LATÍN AMERICA 
1956 268 pages 
E/CN.12/384/Rev.I Sales N°: 1957.II.G.2 
ESTUDIOS SOBRE LA ELECTRICIDAD EN-AMERICA LATINA 
Volumen I. Informe y documentos del seminario latinoamericano de 
energía eléctrica 
October 1962 576 pages 
E/CN.12/630 Sales N°: 63.II.G.3 
Volumen II. Documentos del seminario latinoamericano de energía 
eléctrica 
October 1964 520 pages 
E/CN, 12/630/Add.1 Sales N°: 64.II.G.IO 
(This Seminar was held under-the joint auspices of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America, the Bureau of Technical Assistance 
Operations, the Resources aná Transport Branch of the United Nations 
and the Government of the United States of Mexico) 
LOS RECURSOS HIDRAULICOS EN AMERICA LATINA 
I. CHILE 
October I960 190 pages 
E/CN.12/501 . Sales N°: 60.II.G.4 
II. VENEZUELA 
November 1962 127 pages 
E/CN.12/593/Rev.l Sales N° 63.II.G.6 
III. BOLIVIA Y COLOMBIA 
September 1964 177 pages 
E/CN.12/695 Sales N°: 64.II.G.U 
THE MANUFACTURE OF INDUSTRIAL MACHINE® AND EQUIPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA ' 
I. BASIC EQUIPMENT IN BRAZIL ; 
November 1962 71 pages 
E/CN.12/6l9/Rev.l Sales N°: 63.II.G.2 
II. U S MAQUINAS-HERRAMIENTAS EN EL BRASIL 
Novanber 1962 49 pages 
E^CN.12/633 Sales N°: 63.II.G.4 
III. LOS EQUIPOS BASICOS EN LA ARGENTINA 
December 1963 85 pages 
E/CN.12/629/Rev.1 Sales N°: 64.II.G.5 
IV. LAS MAQUINAS-HERRAMIENTAS EN LA ARGENTINA 
October 1967 62 pages 
E/CN.12/747 Sales N°.s 68.II.G.4 
LA INDUSTRIA QUIMICA EN AMERICA LATINA -
August 1963 307 pages 
E/CN.12/628/Rev.l Sales N°: 64.II.G.7 
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THE PROCESS OF INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
1966 272 pages 
E/CN.12/716/Rev.l Sales N°: 66.II.G.4 
PROBLEMAS Y PERSPECTIVAS DEL DESARROLLO INDUSTRIAL LATINOAMERICANO 
(Published by Ediciones Solar y Librería Hachette S.A., 
Buenos Aires, 1964. Document E/CN.12/664 submitted to the 
Commission at its tenth session, May 1963) 
Studies on Central America 
MEMORIA DEL SEMINARIO CENTROAMERICANO DE CREDITO AGRICOLA 
Volume I. General conclusions 
January 1954 94 pages 
E/CN.I2/305 Sales N°: 1953.H.G.l/Vol.I 
Volume II. Survey of agricultural credit in countries in the area 
January 1954 159 pages 
E/CN.12/305 Sales N°: 1953.II.G.l/Vol.II 
Volume III. Legislation pertaining to agricultural credit in 
countries in the area 
January 1954 194 pages 
3/CN.12/305 Sales N°: 1953.II.G.l/Vol.Ill 
(The Central American Seminar on Agricultural Credit was held under 
the aegis of the Government of Guatemala, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations and the Economic Commission for 
Latin America) 
EL TRANSPORTE EN EL ISTMO CENTROAMERICANO 
September 1953 244 pages 
E/CN.12/356 Sales N°: 1953.VIII.2 
(Report of the Technical Mission nominated by the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Technical. Assistance Administration, in 
collaboration with the International Civil Aviation Organization, and 
report of the Seminar on Transport held in San José, Costa Rica, 
from 9 to 20 June 1953) 
NOMENCLATURA ARANCELARIA UNIFORME CENTROAMERICANA (NAUCA) Y SU MANUAL 
DE CODIFICACION 
November 1955 416 pages 
E/CN.12/420 Sales N°: 1955.II.G.3 
LA INTEGRACION ECONOMICA DE CENTROAMERICA: SU EVOLUCION Y PERSPECTIVAS 
November 1956 98 pages 
E/CN.12/422 Sales N°: 56.II.G.4 
LA POLITICA TRIBUTARIA Y EL DESARROLLO ECONOMICO EN CENTROAMERICA 
September 1956 141 pages 
E/CN.12/486 Sales N°: 1957.II.G.9 
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COMPENDIO ESTADISTICb CENTROAMÉRICANO • -
August 1957 125 pages ^ 
E/CN.12/487 ' Sales N°: 1957.IX.G.8 
SEGÜNDO COMPÈNDÏO ÊSTADIST1CO CENTROAMERICANO ' 
January 1963 62 pages 
E/CW.12/597 " Sales N°: 63.II.G.II ' 
HUMAN RESOURCES OP CENTRAL AMERICA, PANAMA AND MEXICO 1950-1980, IN 
RELATION TO SOME ASPECTS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
I960 155 pages 
E/CN.12/548 Sales N°: 60.XIII.I 
POSSIBILITIES OF INTEGRATED INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
November 1963 ' ' 54 pages 
E/CN.12/683/Add.l Sales N°: 63.II.G.10 
EVALUACIÛN DE LA INTEGRACION ECONQMICA EN CE33TROAMERICA 
January 1966 295 pages 
E/CN.I2/762 ' Sales N°: 66.II.G.9 
Reports of the Central American Economic Co-operation Committee 
REPORT OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION COMMITTEE 
30 January 1956 to 24 February 1957 ç/ 
E/CN.I2/43I, Annex Sales N°: 1957.II.G.7 
Contains draft texts of: 
I. Central American Multilateral Free Trade and Economic 
Integration Treaty 
II. Agreement on Central American Integration Industries 
III. Regional Central American Agreement on Road Signs and Signals 
REPORT OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION COMMITTEE 
25 February 1957 to 10 June 1958 
E/CN. 12/492 Sales N°: 1958.II.G.3 
Contains: 
I. Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central American 
Economic Integration 
II. Agreement on thé régime for Central American Integration Industries 
III. Central American agreement on road traffic 
IV. Central American. agreement on uniform road signs and signals 
c/ The English text, in mimeographed form only, does not contain the texts 
of the agreements mentioned here. 
E/CN.12/AC.Ô1/10 
Page 298 
REPORT OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION COMMITTEE 
11 June 1958 to 2 September 1959 
E/CN.12/533 Sales N°: 59.II.G.5 
Contains: 
I. Central American agreement on the Equalization of Import 
Duties and Charges Schedule A and Schedule B 
II. Protocol to the Central American Agreement on the Equalization 
of Import Duties and Charges 
III, Addresses delivered at the inaugural and the closing meetings 
of the sixt session of the Central American Co-operation 
Committee 
REPORT OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION COMMITTEE 
3 September 1959 to 13 December I960 
E/CN.12/552 Sales N°: 60.II.G.7 
Contains: 
I. General Treaty on Central American Economic Integration 
II, Protocol to the Central American Agreement on the Equalization 
of Import Duties and Charges 
III, Agreement establishing the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration 
REPORT OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION COMMITTEE 
13 December I960 to 29 January 1963 
E/CN.12/672 Sales N°: 63.H,G,12 
Contains: 
I, Protocol to the Agreement on the Régime for Central American 
Integration Industries 
II. Protocol to the Central American Agreement on the Equalization 
of Import Duties and Charges (San Salvador Protocol) 
III. General situation and future outlook of the Central American 
Integration Programme (note by the ECLA secretariat) 
IV, Instruments of Accession of Costa Rica to the General Treaty 
on Central American Economic Integration and to the Agreement 
establishing the Central American Bank for Economic Integration 
V, Protocol of Accession of Costa Rica to the Protocol on the 
Equalization of Import Duties and Charges, signed at Managua 
on 13 December I960 
VI, Protocol to the Central American Agreement on the Equalization 
of Import Duties and Charges, signed at San José, Costa Rica, 
on 31 July 1962 
VII, Central American Agreement on Fiscal Incentives to Industrial 
Development 
VIII, Protocol to the General Treaty on Central American Economic 
Integration: Schedules of goods subject to special interim 
régimes of exemption from free trade as between Costa Rica and 
each, of the other Signatory States 
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EVALUACICN EE LA INTEGRACI®! ECONOMICA EN CENTROAMERICA . 
E/CN# 12/762 Sales N°: 66.II.G.9 
Contains: • • 
Report of the Central American Economic Co-operation Committee 
29 January 1963 to 31 January 1966 
Economic Bulletins for Latin America 
ECONOMIC REVHJi OF LATIN AMERICA • I 
Special Issue 
1. Review of the economic situation in Latin America during the 
early months of 1955 
2. Recent trends in the exports and prices of some products 
3. Impact of coffee exports on the economies of Brazil and Colombia 
4. Some aspects of the recent evolution of Cuba's economy " f 
5. Three sociological aspects of economic development 
August 1955 
Vol. I. N° 1 
1. The economic situation in Latin America during 1955 
2. The situation in Argentina and the new economic policy 
3. Some aspects of the inflationary process in Chile ... 
4. Colombia in a year of balanc^-of-payments disequilibrium 
5. The meat problem in Latin America 
6. Recent trends in the exports and prices- of some products _ , 
January 1956 V 
Vol. I. N° 2 ' 
1» The economic situation in Latin America-during 1956 
2. The input-output model 
3. Concepts and methods used by ECLA 
4. Energy consumption .in Latin America 
5« United States imports of Latin American products 
6. Exports and prices of some products 
September 1956 
Vol. II. N° 1 
1. The economic situation in Latin .America during 1956 
2. Changes in employment structure in Latin America, 1945-1955 
3. Possibilities for the expansion of wheat'production in Brazil 
4» Recent developments and prospects in trade between Latin America 
and Japan 
February 1957 
Vol. II. N° 2. 
1. Latin America's foreign trade in the early months of 1957 
2. The economic development of Bolivia 
3. Index clause on deferred payments 
October 1957 
E/CN «12/AC ,61/10 
Page 300 
Vol. III. N° 1 
1. The Latin American regional market 
2. Latin America's trade with the Common Market countries of Europe 
3. Development policies and programmes, by Hollis B. Chenery 
March 1958 
Vol. III. N° 2 
1. Latin America's foreign trade in the first half of 1958 
2. The international banana market - its evolution and prospects 
3. Statistical supplement 
October 1958 
Vol. IV. N° 1 
1. Progress towards the Latin American common market 
2. The problem of the economic development of Argentina 
3. Some observations on the industrial development of Peru 
4. Coffee in Latin America: the producers' problem 
5. Statistical supplement 
March. 1959 
Vol. IV. N° 2 
1. Rolled iron and steel products in Latin America 
2. The Central American Economic Integration Programme 
3. The economic development of Panama 
4. Statistical supplement 
October 1959 
Vol. V. N° 1 
1. Heavy industry in the Latin American Common Market, by 
Jan Tinbergen 
2. The Free-Trade Area 
3. Economic developments in Venezuela in the 1950's 
4. Some applications of the input-output model to the Argentine 
• economy 
5. Statistical supplement 
March I960 
Vol. V. N° 2 
1. Economic trends in Latin America in 1959 
2. Central America's post-war exports to the United States 
3. The coffee industry in Sao Paulo 
October i960 
Vol. V — Statistical supplement 
November I960 
E/CN «12/AC ,61/10 
Page 301 
Vol. VI. N° 1 
1. Economic development or monetary stability; the false dilemma, 
by Ratil Frebisch 
2. Relationship between social and economic.institutions, 
A theoretical model applicable to Latin America, by 
José Medina Echavarria 
3. Economic policy and the price system, by Thomas Balogh 
4. Report of the Expert Working Group on Social Aspects of Economic 
Development in latin America 
March 1961 
Vol. VI. N° 2 
1, An agricultural policy to expedite the economic development 
of Latin America 
2. The demographic situation in Latin America 
3» Development of commodity trade between Latin America and the 
United States, by David H. Pollock 
4. Productivity of the agricultural sector in Ecuador 
October 1961 
Sales N° 61.II.G.5 
Vol. VI - Statistical supplement 
November 1961 
Sales N°: 6I.II.G.4 
Vol. VII. N° 1 
1. The economic development of Latin America and its principal 
problems, by Raul Prebisch 
2. Inflation and growth:.- -a summary of experience in Latin America 
3. Latin America's position in relation to world changes in trade 
policy, by Esteban Ivovich 
4. Hydroelectric resources in Latin America: their measurement and 
utilization 
February 1962 
Sales N°: 62.II.G.1 
Vol. VII. N° I - Statistical supplement 
October 1962 
Sales N°: 63.II.G.9 
Vol. VII. N° 2 
1. Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning 
2. The creation of a United Nations Economic Projections and 
Programming Centre and the technique of projections 
3. The achievement of co-ordination in Latin American trade policy: 
Relations with the European Economic Community 
4. Short-term economic fluctuations in Latin America during 
1948 to 1959 
5. Report of the Latin American Seminar on Planning 
6. Conference on Education and Economic and Social Development 
in Latin America 
7. Economic development and education in Latin America 
October 1962 
Sales N°: 62.II.G.4 
E/CN «12/AC ,61/10 
Page 302 
Vol. VII. N° 2 - Statistical supplement 
December 1962 
Sales N°: 63.II.G.9 
Vol. VIII. N° 1 
1. Stabilizing the terms of trade of under-developed countries, 
by Nicholas Kaldor 
2. General situation and future outlook of the Central American 
Economic integration programme 
3. Planning in Prance, by Francois Le Guay 
4. Geographic distribution of the population of Latin America and 
regional development priorities 
5. Technological research in Latin America 
6. ECLA's recent activities: 
I. Workshop on Budgetary Classification and Management 
II. Conference on Fiscal Policy 
III. Latin American Seminar on Housing Statistics and Programmes 
IV. Relation between community development and national development 
programmes 
V, Problems of the electricity industry 
7. Methodological notes, The concept of terms of trade and methods 
of computation 
March 1963 
Sales N°: 63.H.G.8 
Vol. VIII. N° 2 
1. The new Executive Secretary of ECLA 
2« Some aspects of the Latin American economic situation in 1962 
3« Progress in planning in Latin America 
4. Agriculture in Latin America: probi ans and prospects 
5. A measurement of price levels and the purchasing power of 
currencies in Latin America, 1960-62 
6. Informative note: The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 
7. Recent activities of ECLA: 
I, Tenth session of the Economic Commission for Latin America 
(Mar del Plata, Argentina, 6-17 May 1963) 
II, Seminar on Industrial Programming (Sao Paulo, Brazil, 
4-15 March 1963) 
8. Methodological notes: The adoption of machine tabulation for 
national foreign trade statistics, by Mario Movarec 
October 1963 
Sales N°: 64.II.G.1 
E/CN «12/AC ,61/10 
Page 303 
Vol. IX. N c 1 
• 1«. The growth and decline of import substitution in Brazil 
2. Protectionism and industrialisation in Latin America, 
by Santiago Macario 
3« Tax incentives in Latin America, by Pedro Mendive 
4» Central America: industrial policy problems 
5. Recent ECLA activities: 
I. Workshop on Budgetary Classification- and Management in 
Central America and Panama (San José, Costa Rica, 
lft-30 September 1963) 
II, Working Group on Classification of Manufactured Products 
(Santiago, Chile, 4-15 November 1963) 
Ilio Meeting of latin American Government Experts on Trade Policy 
(Brasilia, Brazil, 20-25 January 19^4) 




Vol, IX, N° 2 
16 Fifteen years of economic policy in Brazil 
2c Dua^ exchange rates and economic development, by Nicholas Kaldor 
3. Popular participation and principles of community development 
in relation to the acceleration of economic and social development 
4o Latin America's coffee exports to countries members ci' the 
European Economic Community 
5. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
6. Recent ECLA activities 
• November 1964 
Sales N°: 65.H.G .3 
Voli X. N° 1 
1. Rural settlement patterns and social change in Latin America: 
notes for a strategy or rural development 
2. The Central American Common Market for agricultural commodities 
3. Foreign trade of Argentina and Australia, 1930 to I960, 
by Ruth Kelly 
4. The programming of short-term financing, by Angel Monti 
5. Rural electrification in Latin America 
6. Recent activities of ECLA: 
I. Second Inter-American Seminar on Civil Registration 
(Lima, 30 November to 11 December 1964) 
II. Seminar on the Development of the Chemical Industries in 
Latin America (Caracas, 7 to 12 December 1964 ) 
III, Study Tour and Workshop on' Organization and Functions of 
National Housing Agencies for the Implementation of Housing 
Programmes (Copenhagen, Oslo and Stockholm, 30 August to 
10 September 1964) 
March 1965 
Sales N°: 65.II.G.6 
E/CN «12/AC ,61/10 
Page 304 
Vol. X. N° 2 
1« Aspects of development and trade in the Commonwealth Caribbean, 
by Alister Mclntyre 
2. Structural changes in employment within the context of 
Latin America's economic development 
3. Foreign trade of Argentina and Australia, 1930 to I960 (II), 
by Roth Kelly 
4. Recer.t ECLA activities 
5. Activities of the Latin American Institute for Economic and 
Social. Planning 
October 1965 
Sales N°: 66.II.G.3 
Vol. XI, N° 1 
1« The recent evolution of the Latin American economy 
2. Internat ion-'.! monetary reform, by Robert TriiTrin 
3« Social d;n-elopcient arid social planning* A survey of conceptual and 
practical problems in Latin America 
4. Social service in Latin America: Functions and relationships to 
development, by Virginia A. Paraiso 
5. Income distribution in Argentina 
April 1966 
Sales. N°: 66.II.G.7 
Vol. XI. N° 2 
1. The training cf human resources in the economic and social 
development of Latin America 
2. Economic planning in Brazil at the level of the states 
3. The housing problem in Latin America in relation to structural 
development factors, by Rubén D. TJtria 
4. Methodology of the national economic budget, by Federico J, Herschel 
and Juan J. Santieri 
October 1966 
Sales N°: 67.II.G.4 
Vole XII. F l 
1. The new Executive Secretary of ECLA 
2. Concepts and methods of area programming for community 
development 
3. Fiscal incentives for export 
4« Latin America's hydroelectric potential 
5. Small-scale industry in the development of Latin America 
6. Recent activities of ECLA: 
I. Latin American Seminar on Small-Scale Industry 
(Quito, Ecuador, 28 November to 3 December 1966) 
II. Latin American Seminar on Industrial Statistics 
(Quito, 7 to 16 December 1966) 
III. Seminar on the Latin American. Petroleum Industry 
(Santiago, Chile, 15 to 23 February 1967) 
IV. Meeting of the Group on the Application of Science and 
Technology to Development 
7. Activities of the Latin American Institute for Economic and 
Social Planning 
May 1967 
Sales N°: 67.II.G.7 
E/CN.12/AC.61/10 
Page 305:. 
Vol. XII. N° 2 - ' -1-' 
1. Planning in Latin America 
2. Planning and plan implementation in Xatin America .. 
3. Discussion and resolution on development planning at the 
twelfth session of the Commission. 
4. Income distribution in Latin America 
5. The economic policy of Bolivia in 1952-64 . 
6. The economic policy of Colombia in 1950-66 
7. The measurement of Latin American real, income in U.S. dollars 
8. Recent activities of ECLA: 
(In the. press) Twelfth session of the Economic Commission for 
Latin America 
Statistical Bulletin for Latin America 
Vol. I, N° 1 
March 1964 " v . > 
Sales N°: 64.11 .G.9 
Vol. I, 2 
August 1964 
Sales N°: 65.II.G.2 
Vol. II, N° 1 
March 1965 
Sales N°: 65.II.G.5 
Vol. II, N° 2 
August 1965 
Sales N°: 66.II.G.2 • 
Vol. Ill, N° 1 
May 1966 ' • 
Sales N°: 66.II.G.6 
Vol. Ill, N° 2 
September 1966 
Sales N°: 66.II.G.5 
Vol. IV, M° 1 • 
February-1967 
Sales N°: 67.II.G.9 
Vol.. IV, N° 2 .. .... . , 
September 1967 " 
Sales N°: 68.II.G.3 
E/CN «12/AC ,61/10 
Page 306 
SESSIONS OF THE COMMISSION AND OF THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE 
Sessions 
Commis- Committee of D a t e P 1 3 ^ R e p o r t 
sion the Whole 
First 7-25 June 1948, 
Santiago, Chile 
Second 29 May to 14 June 1949, 
Havana, Cuba 
Third 5-21 June 1950, 
Montevideo, Uruguay 
Fourth 28 May to 16 June 1951, 
Mexico City, Mexico 
First 11-14 February 1952, 
Santiago, Chile 
Fifth 9-25 April 1953, 
Quitandinha, Brazil 
Second 8-10 February 1954, 
Santiago, Chile 
Third 30 July 1954, 
Santiago, Chile 
Fourth 9-10 May 1955, 
Santiago, Chile 
Sixth 29 August to 16 
Septanber 1955, 
Bogotâ, Colombia 
A report on the first 
session. E/840/Rev,l 
Annual report (26 June 1948-
14 June 1949). 
E/1330-E/CN.12/158/Rev.l d/ 
Annual report (15 June 1949-
21 June 1950). 
E/1717-E/CN.12/190 
Annual report (22 June 1950-
16 June 1951). 
E/2021-E/CN, 12/266 
Annual report (17 June 1951-
14 February 1952). 
E/2185-E/CN.12/AC.16/15 
Annual report (15 February 
1952 - 25 April 1953. 
E/2405 and Corr.l-
E/CN.12/324 and Corr.l 
Annual report (26 April 1953-
10 February 1954). 
E/2536-E/CN.12/AC.24/9/Rev.l 
Special interim report. 
E/CN.12/AC.25/5 
Annual report (10 February 
1954 - 10 May 1955). 
E/2756-E/CN.12/AC,26/8/Rev.l 
Report of the sixth session 
(29 August - 16 September 
1955).' E/2796/Rev.l-
E/CN.12/387/Rev.l 
d/ On 10 January 1949 the Commission submitted a provisional annual report to 














14-15 May 1956, 
Santiago, Chile 
15-29 May 1957, 
La Paz, Bolivia 
7-8 April 1958, 
Santiago, Chile 





14-23 May 1959, 
Panama City, Panama 
28-29 March I960, 
Santiago, Chile 
28-30 June I960, 
New York 
(Earthquakes in Chile, 
21-23 May I960) 
4-15 May 1961, 
Santiago, Chile 
14-16 February 1962, 
Santiago, Chile 
Annual report (10 May 1955-
15 May 1956). 
E/2883/Re v. 1-E/CN. 12/AC « 3 4/ 
9/Rev.2 
Annual report (15 May 1956-
29 May 1957). 
E/2998-E/CN.12/451 
Annual report (30 May 1957 
to 8 April 1958). E/3C9/-
E/CN.12/AC.40/13/Rev.1 
Annual report of the 
Commission (9 April 1958-
23 May 1959). E/3246-
E/CN*12/530/Rev.2 
Annex VIII (E/CN.12/AC.4L/3) 
Annual report (9 April 1958-
23 May 1959) E/3091-
E/3246/Rev.2-E/CN.12/530/Rev^ 
Annual report (24 May 1959-
29 March I960) 
E/3333-E/CN.12/AC.45/13/Rev,l 
Report on the third 
extraordinary session 
E/3402-E/CN.12/AC.46/4 
Annual report (30 March 196O-
15 May 1961) 
E/3486-E/CN.12/573/Rev„l 
Annual report (16 May I 9 6 I -
16 February 1962) 
E/3581/Rev.1-E/CN.12/AC.50/ 
11/Rev.l 
E/CN «12/AC ,61/10 
Page 308 
Sessions 
Commission Committee of the Whole 








21-22 March 1962, 
Santiago, Chile 
(Election of the 
Governing Council of 
the Latin American 
Institute for Economic 
and Social Planning 
6-7 June 1962, 
New York 
(Latin American 
Institute for Economic 
and Social Planning) 
6-18 May 1963, 
Mar del Plata, 
Argentina 
12-14 February 1964, 
Santiago, Chile 
6-18 May 1965, 
Mexico City, Mexico 
10-12 May 1966, 
Santiago, Chile 
2-13 May 1967, 
Caracas, Venezuela 




Report on ninth session. 
E/3649-E/CN.12/AC.52/3 
Annual report (17 February 
1962 - 17 May 1963) 
E/3766/Rev.3-E/CNd2/690/Rev.3 
Annual report (18 May 1963-
14 February 1964) 
E/3857/Rev,2-E/CN,12/AC »57/ 
15/Rev.2 
Annual report (15 February 




Annual report (18 May 1965-
12 May 1966) 
E/4181-E/CN.12/AC.58/9/Rev.l 
Annual report (13 May 1966-
13 May 1967) 
E/CN012/784/Rev,l and 
E/4359/Add•1-E/CN,12/784/Add,1 
